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NOTE
The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a
Right to Member Derivative Suits
Nonprofit corporations are an increasingly important part of the American
economy. Although they control a "staggering"'1 amount of wealth, nonprofit
corporations have received far less attention from scholars, courts, and legislatures than "for-profit" corporations. 2 In most states, including North Carolina,
an important legal mechanism for discouraging mismanagement on the part of
corporate directors and officers-the right to bring a derivative suit-is not
3
given members of nonprofit corporations.
Under existing law in North Carolina and most other states, a member who
suspects that a nonprofit corporation director or officer has breached a duty to
the corporation either must prevail on the directors to sue on behalf of the corporation or bring his complaint to the Attorney General's attention.4 When the
directors are benefitting from the wrongdoing and the Attorney General's office
is unresponsive, there is no redress for a wrong to the corporation. This Note
examines the basis of derivative suits and analyzes the desirability of recognizing
a right for members of nonprofit corporations in North Carolina to bring such
suits. It concludes that recognition of such a right would provide a valuable
means of supervising the management of many of the state's nonprofit
corporations. 5
A nonprofit corporation by definition is organized for a purpose other than
the direct pecuniary gain of its incorporators or members. 6 Unlike for-profit
1. Henn & Boyd, Statutory Trends in the Law ofNonprofit Organizations: California,Here We
Camel, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1103, 1104 n.3 (1981). One commentator has estimated that there are
now at least as many nonprofit corporations as "for-profit" corporations in the United States. H.
OLECK, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 4 (4th ed. 1980). Nonprofit corporations are increasing in number. See J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND ESTATES 608-09 (1984); H. OLECK, supra, at 5-6; Tivnan, Foundations: A Time for Review,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 135.
2. Henn & Boyd, supra note 1, at 1106-07. This Note will refer to general business corporations as "for-profit" corporations to distinguish them from nonprofit corporations. A for-profit corporation is organized for the pecuniary profit of its shareholders, although it may never in fact earn
profits. See 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 68 (rev.
perm. ed. 1983); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 1, at 2-3 (3d ed. 1983).
Conversely, a nonprofit corporation may earn profits, but is forbidden to distribute them to its members. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
3. See H. OLECK, supra note 1,at 1149-50; see also Goshien, Relocation of Publicly Supported
CharitableOrganizations, 19 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 316 (1970) (discussing supervision of charitable

nonprofit corporations). This Note will refer to those participating in for-profit corporations as
"shareholders," while referring to participants in nonprofit corporations as "members."
4. See infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
5. Legislation amending North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 55A-1 to -89.1 (1982), to provide procedures for derivative suits by members and directors has
been proposed by the General Statutes Commission and introduced in the General Assembly. H.

939, 1st Sess. (1985).
6. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68. The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act of the Ameri-
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corporations, nonprofit corporations cannot distribute profits or net income to
their members, officers, or directors 7 and are prohibited from issuing shares of

stock or paying dividends to those who have contributed capital. 8 All income

must be retained and used to advance the purpose of the corporation. 9 Directors

or officers of such a corporation may receive only reasonable compensation for
services they render to the corporation.1 ° This broad definition allows a wide
variety of associations to incorporate as nonprofits, including organizations for
charitable or altruistic
purposes,1 1 religious groups, social clubs, and home12
associations.
owner
Today most states have statutes that deal explicitly with nonprofit corporacan Bar Association and American Law Institute defines a nonprofit corporation as "a corporation
no part of the income or profit of which is distributable to its members, directors or officers."
MODEL NON-PROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 2 (1980), reprintedin 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2,
§ 2.75 [hereinafter cited as MODEL AT].
7. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(c); see 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68; H. OLECK, supra
note 1, at 17; Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 501
(1981).
8. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68.
9. Id. Many states permit distribution of assets to members upon dissolution. North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation Act authorizes distribution to members upon dissolution of the corporation if the corporation's charter or by-laws so provide. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-45(4) (1982).
Assets received subject to limitations on their use, such as donations for a specific charitable purpose,
must upon dissolution be transferred or conveyed to an organization "engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the dissolving corporation." Id. § 55A-45(3). This provision is a variation
of the equitable doctrine of cy pres, which allows a court to order that charitable trust funds be
applied in a manner different from-but as close as possible to-the settlor's express directions when
accomplishment of the original purpose of the trust has become impossible or impracticable. G.G.
BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRuSTS § 147 (5th ed. 1973); M. FREMONTSMrrH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 31-34, 127-28 (1965); Haskell, The University as Trustee,
17 GA. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1982).
10. 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 68; Hansmann, supra note 7, at 501.
11. A founder can organize a charity either as a charitable trust or a nonprofit corporation. J.
DUKEMINIER & S. JoHANSON, supra note 1, at 608. Approximately two-thirds of all charities are
organized as corporations. Id. at 608-09. According to Professor Haskell, the corporate form is
preferred more by charities that operate an organization such as a hospital, school, or church than
charities that invest money to subsidize charitable undertakings. P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO THE
LAW OF TRUSTS 77 (1975). The corporate form protects trustees of charitable organizations from
the harsh rules of personal liability in contract and tort actions. See id. at 130-34; see generally
Henn & Pfeifer, Nonprofit Groups" FactorsInfluencing Choice of Form, I1 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
181 (1975) (discussing factors to be weighed by a nonprofit group choosing its form and recommending that most groups give serious consideration to incorporation).
12. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 7 (rev. ed. 1946). The Model NonProfit Corporation Act provides that a nonprofit corporation may be organized:
for any lawful purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or more of
the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic;
political; religious; social; fraternal; literary; cultural; athletic; scientific; agricultural; horticultural; animal husbandry; and professional, commercial, industrial or trade association;
but labor unions, cooperative organizations, and organizations subject to any of the provisions of the insurance laws of this State may not be organized under this Act.
MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 4.
Schemes for classifying nonprofit corporations can be complex. Hansmann, supra note 7, at
502-04, for example, places nonprofit corporations into four categories according to whether the
corporation receives most of its income from donations and contributions or from charging for the
services it provides and whether the corporation is controlled by its donors or by a centralized group
of managers. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5.000-10.841 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985) (California Nonprofit Corporation Law divides nonprofit corporations into three categories according to purpose:
mutual benefit, religious, or public benefit.).
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tions. 13 Many of these acts are based on the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act
of the American Bar Association and American Law Institute. 14 Despite the
proliferation of statutes governing nonprofits, the law of nonprofit corporations
is considerably less developed than the law of for-profit corporations. 15 This
relative lack of development is due in part to the close relationship between
charitable nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts.1 6 Because of the similarities between charitable trusts and charitable corporations, courts fashioning
rules for charitable corporations frequently borrow from the law of trusts when
the state has no nonprofit statute or when its statute is silent on the matter at
issue. 17
The law pertaining to charitable nonprofits-and with it the law of nonprofit corporations in general-thus evolved into a hybrid of corporate and trust
principles.18 For example, courts have disagreed over the duty of loyalty to
which directors of nonprofit corporations should be held. A trustee traditionally
is held to a higher loyalty standard than a director of a for-profit corporation. 19
When the conduct of a nonprofit's director is in question, some courts apply a
13. See 1 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 2.65 (listing states having such statutes).
14. North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-1 to -89.1 (1982) is
among the state acts based on the Model Act. R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW AND PRACTICE 5 n.1 (3d ed. 1983). As of 1983, 37 other states had enacted nonprofit corporation acts based on the Model Act. See I W. FLETCHER, supranote 2, § 2.65. The Model Non-Profit
Corporation Act was approved in 1952 and currently is being revised. H. HE.NN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 2, § 1, at 3 n.4.
15. See Lesher, The Non-profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22 Bus.
LAv. 951, 951 (1967).
16. Whereas a private trust may be established to benefit one or more individuals, a charitable
trust is created to accomplish a "substantial" benefit to a reasonably large portion of the public.
G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, § 54. A charitable trust also must advance one of
several judicially recognized charitable purposes, which include the relief of poverty, the advancement of religion, the advancement of health, the advancement of government purposes, and other
purposes of benefit to the community. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 192 Va. 135, 63
S.E.2d 786 (1951); Haskell, supra note 9, at 3. If the trust serves one of these purposes, it need not
benefit directly a large group, because it will benefit indirectly the entire community. Thus, a trust to
provide college scholarships to only a few people each year is a valid charitable trust because it
advances education and benefits the community as a whole. 1. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, supra
note 1, at 588.
A charitable nonprofit corporation may be established to serve one of the recognized purposes
of a charitable trust. P. HASKELL, supra note 11, at 78. A corporation also may be considered
"charitable" by the public although it serves a purpose other than those considered charitable under
trust law. Id.
17. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 41; Note, The Charitable Corporation,64 HARv.
L. REv. 1168, 1168 (1951).
18. According to one court, "the charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity which
does not fit neatly into the established common law categories of corporation and trust." Stem v.
Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013
(D.D.C. 1974); see Note, supra note 17, at 1168. Confusion has been furthered by the decisions of
some courts that a charitable corporation holds its assets in trust for the benefit of the community.
See cases cited in Haskell, supra note 9, at 4 n.l1. Another source of confusion is the practice of
designating directors of charitable corporations as "trustees." See Note, supra note 17, at 1168-69.
19. The duty of loyalty applied to trustees precludes self-dealing. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, § 543; P. HASKELL, supra note 11, at 98-102; Note, The Fiduciary Duties of
Loyalty and CareAssociated With the Directorsand Trustees of Charitable Organizations,64 VA. L.
REV. 449, 451-52 (1978). Self-dealing by a director of a for-profit corporation, however, generally is
valid if approved by a majority of the shareholders acting with full disclosure, if approved by a
disinterested majority of the board of directors upon full disclosure, or if the transaction is fair. H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 637-44; Note, supra, at 452-53.
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trust standard of loyalty2 ° or another standard stricter than that applicable to a
21
business corporation director.
The rights of members of nonprofit corporations also are somewhat uncertain. The Model Non-Profit Corporation Act defines a "member" as "one having membership rights in a corporation in accordance with the provisions of its
articles of incorporation or by-laws."'22 The Act also provides that members
may be given voting rights, including the right to elect directors. 23 Under the
Act a corporation may have no members or may have members with no voting
rights; in either case the directors have sole voting power. 24 The designation of
members with voting rights is particularly convenient when those contributing
to the organization are likely to expect a voice in corporate management, as with
nonprofit organizations such as social clubs and homeowner associations, which
20. See, eg., Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 723-24, 49 N.E.2d 220, 223
(1943).
21. See, eg., Mountain Top Youth Camp, Inc. v. Lyon, 20 N.C. App. 694, 202 S.E.2d 498
(1974). In Lyon the court held that self-dealing by a charitable corporation's directors or officers is
not automatically void. Id. at 697, 202 S.E.2d at 500. Although it can be ratified by the corporation,
the transaction is void per se when there has been no disclosure, and the directors or officers may not
raise a defense of fairness. But see Fowle Memorial Hosp. Co. v. Nicholson, 189 N.C. 44, 49, 126
S.E. 94, 97 (1925) (applying for-profit corporation standard to an allegation of self-dealing on part of
a director of a nonprofit hospital corporation).
Some of the same uncertainty exists about the standard of care to be applied to nonprofit directors and officers. Under the for-profit corporation standard of care, a director or officer must exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances and is given the benefit of
the business judgment rule when transactions result in loss to the corporation. H. HENN & J.ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 232, at 613, 661-63. A trustee, on the other hand, is held to the standard of
care usually expressed as "that of a prudent man dealing with his own property." G.G. BOGERT &
G.T. BOGERT, supra note 9, § 93. The trust standard is stricter in application, and there is no
counterpart to the business judgment rule. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for
Deaconesses and Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974); Note, supra note 19, at 45354.
Courts have applied the trust standard of care to nonprofit directors. See, e.g., Wellesley College v. Attorney Gen., 313 Mass. 722, 49 N.E.2d 220 (1943). There is authority, however, for applying the same standard of care to nonprofit directors and officers as to for-profit directors and officers.
Stern, 381 F. Supp. at 1013; Pasley, Non-Profit Corporations-Accountabilityof Directorsand Officers, 21 Bus. LAw. 621, 638 (1966). Some commentators have argued that because nonprofit
directors often serve without compensation, they should be held to a standard of care even more
lenient than that applied to for-profit directors (such as liability only for gross negligence). See id. at
622-27; Note, supra note 17, at 1174. The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act provides that the managers of organizations for educational, religious, or charitable purposes shall be
held to the same standard of care as directors of for-profit corporations. UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF
INSTrTUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6, 7A U.L.A. 421 (1978). The Act has been adopted in about half
the states, but not in North Carolina. See id. § 5, 7A U.L.A. at 405. Although the Lyon decision
delineates the standard of loyalty for directors and officers of nonprofit corporations in North Carolina, there is no case law in North Carolina addressing the standard of care for nonprofit corporation
directors.
22. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(f);
see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-2(7) (1982) (identical
definition of "members").
23. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(0; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-20(c), -32 (1982)
(similar provisions).
24. MODEL ACT, supra note 6, § 2(0; see Hansmann, supra note 7, at 502 (noting that most
statutes provide for a self-perpetuating board of directors in the event that a nonprofit corporation
gives its members no voting rights or has no members). North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation
Act also provides that the corporation may have no members, or may have members with no voting
rights. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-29(a) (1982). If there are no members or they cannot vote, the
directors are to be "elected or appointed in the manner and for the terms as provided in the bylaws."
Id. § 55A-20(c).

1985]

NONPROFIT DERIVATIVE SUITS

1003

are organized for the mutual benefit of their members. 25 The designation of
26
members, however, is not limited to mutual benefit nonprofits.

When members of a nonprofit corporation have a right to elect directors
and vote on major corporate matters, they are similar to shareholders. Courts
and legislatures, however, have not extended to members one of the principal
tools shareholders use to oversee corporate managers-the right to bring a derivative suit against a director or officer.

In a derivative suit, a shareholder sues not on his own rights, but on behalf
of the corporation. 27 The shareholder is the nominal plaintiff and the corporation is the real party in interest. 2 8 In a for-profit corporation, a shareholder may
be unable to prevail on the corporation to sue on its own behalf; the wrongdoers
may be in control of the corporation or a majority of the shareholders may be
benefitting from the wrongful acts. 29 Even if a shareholder could prevail on the

majority to elect directors who would sue on the corporation's behalf, such an
effort would be expensive and time-consuming for a large, publicly held corpora-

tion.30 Recognizing the potential for an unredressed wrong to the corporation,

courts of equity historically allowed shareholders to sue on behalf of the
31
corporation:
25. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 12, § 7.
26. For example, a charitable nonprofit corporation may designate contributors of a certain
amount as "members" or even "life members." A charitable nonprofit corporation is less likely to
designate members, however, than a mutual benefit nonprofit corporation simply because donors to a
charitable enterprise usually do not expect the right to elect directors and other privileges that generally are incidents of "membership." When a charitable nonprofit designates donors as members, the
common-law rules on donor standing govern whether members can sue managers. See infra note
114 and cases cited infra note 41. But see cases cited infra note 73.
27. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 5939. The derivative cause of action stems from a wrong
to the corporation as a whole and must be distinguished from a direct cause of action arising from a
wrong to the shareholder. In general, a breach of the membership contract between the shareholder
and the corporation gives rise to an individual or direct cause of action whereas a derivative claim
arises when there has been a breach of a duty owed to the corporation. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 2, § 360, at 1048. This distinction may be difficult to make because performance of the
shareholders' membership contract is one aspect of the duty that management owes the corporation.
Id. § 360, at 1049. Among the claims usually deemed to give rise to direct or individual shareholder
actions are suits to compel payment of declared or mandatory dividends, suits to enforce a right to
inspect corporate books, suits to enforce the right to vote, and suits to enjoin a threatened wrong
before its consummation. Id. In contrast, actions to recover damages from a consummated ultra
vires act and actions to recover damages from directors or officers for mismanagement of the business, appropriation of corporate funds or corporate opportunities, sale of control, and other breaches
of duties owed to the corporation all have been held to give rise to a derivative rather than a direct
shareholder action. Id. § 360, at 1049-50.
28. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 5939.
29. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 888 (5th ed.
1980); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 358, at 1036 n.l.
30. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 886.
31. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970). For an early case recognizing a derivative suit
and discussing the rationale behind such a cause of action, see Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1882). Professor Prunty argues that recognition of the derivative suit followed from the application
of two bodies of law to an action by a shareholder: the trust law theory that a director is a trustee for
the shareholders and the doctrine of the "corporate entity," which recognizes that the corporation is
a separate right-holding entity. Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation,
32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 980, 986-90 (1957). When only the rights of the corporation are at stake, the
shareholder has no individual cause of action and must sue in a derivative or representative capacity.
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As elaborated in the cases, one precondition for the suit was a valid

claim on which the corporation could have sued; another was that the
corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable demand ....

Thus the dual nature of the stockholder's action: first the plaintiff's
right to sue on behalf of the
corporation and, second, the merits of the
32
corporation's claim itself.

As derivative suits became more common, they proved subject to abuse by

plaintiffs who sued not to recover on behalf of the corporation but to extract a
lucrative settlement from the corporation. 33 In response courts and legislatures
attempted to curb such "strike suits" by limiting the derivative suit. 34 The following requirements were added: that the plaintiff be a shareholder at the time

of the challenged transaction; 35 that the shareholder demand that the directors
36
bring suit on behalf of the corporation unless such a demand would be futile;
that the shareholder post a security bond for the defendants' litigation expenses;37 and that any recovery, including a settlement, go to the corporation
38
rather than to the individual shareholder.

The shareholder derivative suit has become a successful technique for discouraging mismanagement and abuse of fiduciary duties. 39 It has remained,
however, primarily a device for calling managers of for-profit corporations to
account; a similar action generally has not been available against a director or
officer of a nonprofit corporation. Most nonprofit statutes are silent on whether
a member may bring a derivative suit; consequently, the limits on such suits

stem primarily from the common law.4° When members of charitable nonprofits have attempted to bring derivative suits, some courts have denied them standing by analogy to the rule that only the attorney general can sue to enforce
charitable trusts. 4 1 Courts also have denied standing to members of noncharita32. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970).
33. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supranote 29, at 888; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note
2, § 358, at 1039; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741-43 (1975) (even a
plaintiff with a patently groundless claim may extract a settlement from a corporation since the
plaintiff can threaten extensive discovery and disruption of corporate business).
34. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 358, at 1039-40. These limits are unique to the
shareholder derivative action. Id.
35. This provision prevents a plaintiff from buying a cause of action. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 914-17; H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 362, at 1048.
36. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 926-27; H. HENN' & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 2, § 365, at 1069-70.
37. This requirement may be limited to shareholders with holdings below a prescribed minimum. If the plaintiff is unsuccessful, he forfeits the bond. According to Henn and Alexander, the
bond requirement saddles an unsuccessful small shareholder with the expenses of both sides of the
litigation--"an awesome and rather unique situation." H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2,
§ 372, at 1092.
38. This requirement lessens a plaintiff's motivation to bring a strike suit, but does not lessen
the motivation of a plaintiff's attorney, who may be the actual instigator of the suit and may hope
that the court will allow him generous fees out of any recovery. See id. § 372, at 1093 n.22.
39. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 888.
40. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
41. See, eg., Lopez v. Medford Community Center, 384 Mass. 171, 175, 424 N.E.2d 229, 232
(1981) (only attorney general can initiate judicial proceedings to correct abuses in administration of
public charities); Dillaway v. Burton, 256 Mass. 568, 574, 153 N.E. 13, 16-17 (1926) (member of a
charitable corporation is without standing to sue to enjoin alleged unlawful acts of "trustees" of
corporation because plaintiff's complaint concerns public interest rather than his private interest as a
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ble nonprofit corporations, without distinguishing between the charitable and
noncharitable purposes of the two types of corporations. 4 2
During the past twenty years, the New York and California legislatures and
the courts of several other states have reversed the common-law ban on derivative suits by members of nonprofit corporations. New York's Not-For-Profit
Corporation Law (N-PCL), enacted in 1969, provides that:
An action may be brought in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by five percent or more of any
class of members or capital certificate holders of record or owners, not
of record, of a beneficial interest in the capital certificates of such
corporation. 4 3
The N-PCL is designed to parallel New York's Business Corporation Law
(BCL). 44 Accordingly, the nonprofit derivative suit provisions are modeled after
the BCL provisions for shareholder derivative suits against directors and officers. 4 5 A derivative action under the N-PCL must meet the following requirements: the plaintiffs must have been members at the time the action was
brought; 4" the complaint must allege with particularity the plaintiffs' efforts to
secure board action prior to suit;47 the action must not be compromised or settled without court approval; 48 and the court may award expenses to the plaintiffs if the action is successful. 49
The New York N-PCL, however, differs from the BCL derivative suit promember); Voelker v. St. Louis Mercantile Library Ass'n, 359 S.W.2d 689, 694-95 (Mo. 1962) (charitable corporation is subject to the principles applicable to charitable trusts, and because a charitable
corporation is organized for benefit of others, its members do not have pecuniary interest analogous
to that of shareholders); Carroll v. City of Beaumont, 18 S.W.2d 813, 820 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)
(attorney general is the proper party to sue on behalf of a charitable corporation).
The power to enforce a charitable trust, which includes the right to call the trustee to account
for any breach of his fiduciary obligations, historically rested with the attorney general as the representative of the public at large. M. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 9, at 198. Unlike the beneficiary of
a private trust, members of the public have been denied the right to sue to enforce a charitable trust
under the rationale that the unlimited grant of this right would expose the trustee to vexatious
lawsuits and overburden the courts. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, Tim LAW OF TRusTs AND
TRusTEEs § 414, at 436 (rev. 2d ed. 1977); M. FREMONT-SMrH, supra note 9, at 87. For a discussion of the the right of a charitable corporation's beneficiaries to bring a derivative suit, see infra note
114.
42. Hansmann, supra note 7, at 606. Hansmann notes that some courts group charitable corporations within the single category of "charities" and thus should be willing to apply a different
standing rule to noncharitable nonprofits. He notes, however, that "the courts apparently do not
pay much attention to the distinction." Id.
43. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 623(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
44. Henn & Boyd, supra note 1, at 1114; see Joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of
Corporation Laws xvi, in N.Y. NOT-FoR-PROFIT CORP. LAW (McKinney 1970). The corresponding for-profit corporation statute sections are N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1-2001 (McKinney 1963).
45. N.Y. NOT-FoR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 623, note on legislative studies and reports (McKinney 1970).
46. Id. § 623(b) (McKinney 1970). The corresponding BCL provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963).
47. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623(c) (McKinney 1970). The corresponding BCL
provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1963).
48. N.Y. NOT-FoR-PROFrr CORP. LAW § 623(d) (McKinney 1970). The corresponding BCL
provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963).
49. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 623(e) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). The corresponding BCL provision is N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(e) (McKinney 1963).
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visions in three respects. Although section 627 of the BCL requires a shareholder holding less than five percent of any class of outstanding shares to post

security for "reasonable expenses" incurred by the defendants, 50 the N-PCL
contains no analogous provision. Instead, the N-PCL states that a member derivative action cannot be brought by fewer than five percent of any class of members. 5 ' The comments to the N-PCL indicate that the drafters believed the five

percent limit was needed in the absence of a security-for-expenses requirement,
presumably to reduce the risk of vexatious litigation.5 2 In addition, the N-PCL

contains no equivalent to the contemporaneous ownership rule.5 3 The drafters
apparently believed that a membership version of the contemporaneous owner-

ship rule-generally a guard against strike suits 54-was
the five percent requirement.

55

unnecessary in light of

California's Nonprofit Corporation Law (NCL)5 6 divides nonprofit corporations into three types-"mutual benefit," "public benefit," and "religious" 57and provides for derivative suits by members of "public benefit" and "mutual
benefit" corporations. 58 The NCL parallels the state's provisions for shareholder derivative suits in many respects. Like the California General Corpora-

tion Law (GCL),5 9 the NCL includes a contemporaneous membership rule 6°
and a requirement that the plaintiff allege with particularity his efforts to secure
action by the board. 6 1 The NCL also authorizes the court to grant a defendant's
motion requiring the plaintiff to provide up to $50,000 as security for the defend50. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). The plaintiff need not provide
security for expenses if the value of his shares exceeds $50,000. Id.
51. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CoR'. LAW § 623(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
52. Id. § 623, note on legislative studies and reports; Note, New Yorks Not-For-ProfitCorporation Law, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 787-88 (1972). For a criticism of the five percent limit, see Henn
& Boyd, supranote 1, at 1124. Professors Henn and Boyd argue that the five percent requirement is
"overly burdensome" and "likely to stifle many meritorious actions." Id.
53. Section 626(b) of the BCL states that the plaintiff must have been a shareholder "at the
time of the transaction of which he complains, or that his shares or his interest therein devolved
upon him by operation of law." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963).
54. See supra note 35.
55. The "contemporaneous ownership" provision in paragraph (b) of section 626 of the
Bus. Corp. L. has been eliminated in the new law as inappropriate for not-for-profit corporations, since the likelihood is remote that an interest in such corporations would be
purchased solely for the purpose of initiating a derivative suit.
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFrT CORP. LAW § 623, note on legislative studies and reports (McKinney 1970);
see Henn & Boyd, supra note 1, at 1123 n.158.
56. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-10841 (West Supp. 1985). The statute went into effect in 1980.
Nonprofit Corporation Law, ch. 567, 1978 Cal. Stat. 1740.
57. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5059-5061 (West Supp. 1985). For a discussion of the public policy
and first amendment considerations that caused the drafters to distinguish religious corporations, see
Hone, California'sNew Nonprofit Corporation Law--An Introduction and Conceptual Background,
13 U.S.F.L. REv. 733 (1979).
58. CAL. CORP.CODE §§ 5710, 7710 (West Supp. 1985). The statute also provides for derivative suits by directors of corporations that have no members. Id. §§ 5310(b), 7310(b)(2); see also
infra note 114 (discussing statutory and judicial recognition of the right of directors to bring a derivative suit).
59. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1-2319 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985).
60. Id. §§ 5710(b)(1) (public benefit corporations), 7710(b)(1) (mutual benefit corporations),
The corresponding provision of the GCL is id. § 800 (b)(l).
61. Id. §§ 5710(b)(2), 7710(b)(2). The corresponding provision of the GCL is id. § 800(b)(2).
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ant's litigation expenses;62 a corresponding provision is contained in the GCL.
Unlike the GCL, the NCL states that no security shall be required if the action
64
is brought by 100 or more members or by some other "authorized number."
Courts in several jurisdictions also recently have recognized the right of
members to bring derivative suits on behalf of nonprofit corporations. In most
of the decisions, the courts have reasoned that common-law precedent giving
shareholders a derivative suit right conferred such a right on members of nonprofit corporations by implication and that this right continues until the state's
legislature, through the corporation laws, expressly denies it. In Bourne v. Wiliams 65 the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that members of a property owners
association organized as a nonprofit corporation had standing to sue the directors for wasting corporate assets for personal gain. The court examined the
"well developed" common law that established a shareholder's right to a derivative suit and held that "[ilt has. . been established as part of the general law of
corporations that members of nonprofit corporations have the same rights in this
regard as stockholders of corporations for profit."' 66 In response to defendants'
argument that the statute recognizing derivative suits referred only to actions on
behalf of a "corporation for profit,"' 67 the court noted that other sections of the
68
same chapter used the term "member" and "shareholder" simultaneously.
Thus, the statute "clearly indicate[d]. . . that the drafters had in mind a non69
profit corporation, as well as a corporation for profit."

Similarly, in Atwell v. Bide-A- Wee Home Association,70 decided by the New
York Supreme Court prior to the effective date of the N-PCL, a member of a
nonprofit homeowner association was held to have standing to sue the directors. 7 1 At the time of the decision the derivative suit provisions of the Business
Corporation Law referred only to shareholders. 72 Because some types of corporations were excluded expressly from the Business Corporation Law and nonprofit corporations were not among these, the court reasoned that nonprofits
62. Id. §§ 5710(d), 7710(d).
63. Id. § 800(d).
64. Id. §§ 5710(a), 7710(a). Section 5036 defines "authorized number" to be five percent of the

voting power or
[w]here (disregarding any provision for cumulative voting which would otherwise apply),
the total number of votes entitled to be cast for a director is 1,000 or more, but less than
5,000 the authorized number shall be 2-1/2 percent of the voting power, but not less than
50.
Where. . .the total number of votes entitled to be cast for a director is 5,000 or more,
the authorized number shall be one-twentieth of I percent of the voting power, but not less
than 125.
Id. § 5036(b)-(c).
65. 633 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
66. Id. at 471-72.
67. Id. at 472.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 59 Misc. 2d 321, 299 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
71. Id. at 324, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
72. Id. at 323, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
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73
impliedly were within the statute.
North Carolina's Nonprofit Corporation Act 74 makes no provision for de-

rivative suits by members of nonprofit corporations. It does, however, authorize
the Attorney General to oversee nonprofit corporations under some circumstances. Section 55A-50 of the Act grants the Attorney General authority to
bring an action for involuntary dissolution of the corporation 75 on several
grounds, 76 including the ground that the corporation has "continued to exceed

or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law, to the injury of the public, or of
its members, creditors, or debtors. . .. -77 Section 55A-51 imposes a duty on
the Attorney General to bring such an action whenever he has reason to believe
73. Id. at 322-23, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 41; see also Wickes v. Belgian Am.Educ. Found., 266 F.
Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (neither New York nor Delaware law prohibited plaintiffs, who were
members and directors of a charitable nonprofit corporation, from bringing a derivative suit); Valle
v. North Jersey Auto. Club, 125 N.J. Super. 302, 310 A.2d 518 (Ch. Div. 1973) (the word "shareholder" in the statute recognizing a derivative action included members of nonprofit corporations),
modified, 74 N.J. 109, 376 A.2d 1192 (1977); Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 570, 72 A.2d 371,
377 (Ch. Div. 1950) (members of a charitable nonprofit corporation had standing to bring a derivative suit because "[t]he same rights and liabilities exist between the trustees of a non-profit corporation and the members as exist between the directors and stockholders of a corporation for profit").
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-1 to -89.1 (1982). The Act was enacted in 1955 and took effect in
1957. Nonprofit Corporation Act, ch. 1230, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1239. It defines "member" as
"one having membership rights in a corporation in accordance with the provisions of its charter or
bylaws." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-2(7) (1982). The Act also provides that a nonprofit corporation
"may have one or more classes of members or may have no members." Id. § 55A-29(a). If a nonprofit corporation does not have members or does not allow members to vote for directors, the
directors are to be elected or appointed in the manner and for the terms as provided in the bylaws.
Id. § 55A-20(c). Prior to the enactment of this Act, nonprofit corporations in North Carolina were
governed by the provisions of the General Corporation Act. R. RoBINSON,supra note 14, at 5 n.4.
75. An involuntary dissolution is a court-ordered wind-up of the corporation's business affairs
that ends the corporation's legal existence. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 280, at
751-55, § 382, at 1148. In North Carolina the Attorney General may bring an action for involuntary
dissolution of a for-profit corporation on grounds that it: procured its charter by fraud; refuses to
produce books, records, or documents; has abused its authority; or has failed to maintain a registered
agent or office. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-122 (1982). A shareholder may bring such an action on the
following grounds: that the directors are deadlocked; that the shareholders are deadlocked; that the
shareholders have actual notice of written agreement allowing dissolution; or that dissolution is
"reasonably necessary" to protect the interests of the complaining shareholder. Id. § 55-125 (a)(l)(4) (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1983). A creditor also can bring an action for involuntary dissolution in
some situations. See id. § 55-125o(b). See generally R. RoaINsoN, supra note 14, at 425-40 (discussing in detail the grounds and procedures for an involuntary dissolution decree).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-50(1)-(5) (1982). The grounds for involuntary dissolution are:
(1) The corporation procured its charter through fraud; or
(2) The corporation has, after written notice by the Attorney General given at least 20
days prior thereto, continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law, to
the injury of the public, or of its members, creditors, or debtors; or
(3) The corporation has, after written notice by the Attorney General given at least 20
days prior thereto, failed for 30 days to appoint and maintain a registered agent in this
State, as required by G.S. 55A-1 1; or
(4) The corporation has, after written notice by the Attorney General given at least 20
days prior thereto, failed for 30 days after change of its registered office or registered agent
to file in the office of the Secretary of State a statement of such change, as required by G.S.
55A-12; or
(5) The corporation has without justification refused to comply with a final court
order for the production of its books, records, or other documents as required to be kept by
G.S. 55A-27.
77. Id. § 55A-50(2).
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that the case "involves the public interest."7 8 Additionally, the laws governing
trusts and trustees 79 give the Attorney General authority to bring an action in
the name of the State against the trustees when "there is reason to believe that
the property has been mismanaged through negligence or fraud" 80 and to administer a charitable trust should the settlor's intent become impossible to fulfill. 8 1 North Carolina has no express statutory provision for member derivative
suits, and North Carolina courts have not yet recognized such a cause of
82
action.
Under existing North Carolina law, members of a nonprofit corporation
who believe management has breached a duty to the corporation have only two
83
options. They cannot sue in their own right if the injury is to the corporation,
but can use their voting power to remove the wrongdoers from office and then
prevail on the corporation to sue the directors or officers to recover damages.
Alternatively, members can report their complaint to the Attorney General's
84
office which will investigate and, if warranted, bring an enforcement action.
These options may limit severely members' ability to redress a wrong to the
corporation. If a majority of the members are indifferent or are benefitting from
the breach of duty, the complaining member may not be able to prevail on the
corporation to sue. 85 Limits on the resources of the Attorney General's office
may make it equally unresponsive. Several commentators have argued that state
attorneys general lack both the finances and the incentive to oversee effectively
nonprofit corporation managers. 86 In a decision recognizing the right of minority directors to bring derivative suits on behalf of a charitable corporation, the
California Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Attorney General may not be in a
position to become aware of wrongful conduct or be sufficiently familiar with the
78. Id. § 55A-51.

79.
80.
81.
enforce
79, 161

Id. §§ 36A-1 to -115.
Id. § 36A-48.
Id. § 36A-53(a). North Carolina common law also gives the Attorney General authority to
charitable trusts. See Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 678S.E.2d 116, 131 (1968); see also Edmisten, The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General
of North Carolina,9 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 24-25 (1977) (discussing the statutory and common-law
powers of the Attorney General to oversee charitable trusts). See generally Hansmann, supra note 7,
at 600 ("Virtually all states authorize the attorney general, either by common law or by statute, to
ensure that the managers of charitable organizations fulfill their fiduciary obligations.").
Notably absent from North Carolina law are requirements that nonprofit corporations file periodic disclosures with the Attorney General's office. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 486.
82. Apparently, no North Carolina appellate court has addressed whether a member has standing to bring a derivative suit.
83. See supra note 27.

84. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
86. See Karst, The Efficiency of the CharitableDollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73
HARV. L. REv.433, 448-60 (1960); see also M. FREMONT-SMrrH, supra note 9, at 234 (surveys show
that the attention of attorneys general to the affairs of charitable organizations is "minimal" in many
states); Hansmann, supranote 7, at 601 ("Commonly, little or no staff in the attorney general's office
is assigned to look after the affairs of nonprofits, and no effective system of financial reporting by
nonprofits exists in any state."); Oleck, Non-Profit Types, Uses, and Abuses: 1970, 19 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 207, 235-36 ("State attorneys-general practically shun investigations of nonprofit

organizations.").
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situation to appreciate its impact."' 87 One commentator who examined attorney
general supervision of charitable associations found it to be "irregular and
infrequent." 88
Recognition by statute or judicial decision of a right for North Carolina
members of nonprofit corporations to bring derivative suits would provide members a valuable tool for enforcing the duties directors and officers owe the corporation. Such a decision would have the obvious advantage of providing
consistency in the state's corporate law; members and shareholders alike would
have the right to bring a derivative suit, and management of both types of corporations would be subject to similar oversight mechanisms.
Recognition of member derivative suits in North Carolina would not contradict the state's existing corporation laws. The provisions of the Business Corporation Act 89 recognizing shareholder derivative suits do not expressly exclude
members. 90 Similarly, although the provision on the applicability of the Business Corporation Act states that the Act applies to "every corporation for
profit" and "every corporation not for profit having a capital stock," 9 1 the Act
does not expressly exclude nonprofit membership corporations.
There also is a common-law basis for member derivative suits in North
Carolina. In 1929 the North Carolina Supreme Court applied the corporate
statute providing for distribution of assets to shareholders after dissolution of
the corporation to nonprofit corporation members, despite the absence of any
reference to members in the statute.92 The court held that "'In the case of
nonstock corporations, the members, while not usually denominated stockholders, are in point of principle stockholders, having an interest in the corporate
property similar to that of stockholders in an ordinary corporation.' -g9
Furthermore, the history of the shareholder derivative suit in North Carolina supports an interpretation that statutory silence on a remedy against management does not mean that the legislature intended to deny the remedy. North
Carolina General Statutes section 55-55, recognizing shareholder derivative actions, was not enacted until 1973.94 The common-law right to a shareholder
derivative suit, however, already was well established. 95 In the years between
87. Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 63 Cal. 2d 750, 755, 394 P.2d 932,
935, 40 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247 (1964).
88. Karst, supra note 86, at 437; see also City of Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 97 N.J.
Super. 514, 527-28, 235 A.2d 487, 495 (Ch. Div. 1967) ("The manifold duties of [the attorney general's] office make readily understandable the fact that.. . supervision [by that office] is necessarily
sporadic.").

89. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to -175 (1982).
90. Id. § 55-55.
91. Id. § 55-3(a).
92. Smith v. Dicks, 197 N.C. 355, 148 S.E. 464 (1929). The suit was brought by a member of a

social and literary club organized as a nonprofit corporation. The lower court held that when the
corporation failed to renew its charter, plaintiff and the other members were vested with an equal,
undivided interest in the club's property. Id. at 359, 148 S.E. at 466. The supreme court affirmed.
Id. at 364, 148 S.E.2d at 469.
93. Id. at 363, 148 S.E. at 468 (quoting RULING CASE LAW (Corporations) § 754 (1920)).
94. Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 469, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 547-48.
95. See, ag., Coble v. Beall, 130 N.C. 533, 41 S.E. 793 (1902) (recognizing a shareholder's right
to bring a derivative suit, subject to the "one prerequisite" that the plaintiff show in his complaint
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the enactment of the first state corporation law in 185296 and the enactment of
section 55-55 in 1973, the courts apparently did not consider the statutory si97
lence on derivative suits as evidence of legislative intent to bar such suits.
A potential drawback to recognition of member derivative suits is that such
a provision may encourage strike suits against nonprofit directors and officers.
Unlike directors of for-profit corporations, nonprofit directors usually work on a
part-time basis without financial compensation.9" If serving on a nonprofit corporation's board subjects the director to the expense and inconvenience of defending spurious lawsuits, there may be few volunteers. Likewise, a nonprofit
corporation's officers, who are allowed reasonable compensation,9 9 may not
wish to serve if one of the incidents of employment is a significant risk of being
named a defendant in a vexatious lawsuit.
To minimize a nonprofit director's or officer's exposure to vexatious litigation, the right of members to bring derivative suits should be limited in much the
same way that shareholder deriviative suits are limited. The California and New
York statutes include in their provisions for member derivative suits most of the
limits applied to shareholder derivative suits. 100 In North Carolina, the right to
a shareholder derivative suit under section 55-55 is limited by the following: a
contemporaneous ownership rule; 10 1 a requirement that the plaintiff allege a demand on the directors; 10 2 a requirement that any compromise or settlement
have court approval;10 3 and a provision that the court may require the plaintiff
to pay defendant's attorney's fees if the court finds that the action was brought
without "reasonable cause."' 1 4 The last provision reverses the common-law reluctance to grant such relief, even when the defendant was successful, unless the
defense in some way benefitted the corporation.' 05
The North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act also provides that a director or officer of a nonprofit corporation is entitled to indemnification for defending an action alleging dereliction of a duty if his defense is successful. 10 6 Even if
a director or officer has been found liable for breach of a duty to the corporation,
the court may award indemnification if it finds that "such person has acted honthat he made a demand on the directors to bring the action and that they refused to do so); see also
R. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 213 (comparing North Carolina case law on derivative suits with

that of other states).
96. R. ROBINSON, supra note 14, at 1. The North Carolina legislature first enacted a statute
permitting organization of private corporations without a legislative charter in 1795, but the first
statute authorizing the organization of corporations for a wide range of business purposes was not
enacted until 1852. Id.
97. See, ag., Fulton v. Talbert, 255 N.C. 183, 120 S.E.2d 410 (1961) ("[W]here. . . an officer
of a corporation so utilizes his authority as to benefit himself to the detriment of the corporation, a
right of action accrues to the corporation.").
98. H. OLECK, supra note 1, at 612.
99. See supra text accompanying note 10.
100. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text; notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
101. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-55(a) (1982).
102. Id. § 55-55(b).
103. Id. § 55-55(c).
104. Id. § 55-55(e).
105. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, § 378, at 1115-16.
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17.3(a)(1) (1982).
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estly and reasonably and that, in view of all the circumstances of the case, his
conduct fairly and equitably merits such relief."' 10 7 This provision, if interpreted
broadly for member derivative suits, could reduce greatly the financial risks that
strike suits pose for nonprofit directors. That a nonprofit director works without
compensation and on a part-time basis should be a relevant "circumstance" for
determining whether his conduct was "reasonable." If these existing limits on
shareholder derivative suits and provisions for indemnification of nonprofit directors and officers are extended to member derivative suits, the risk of strike
suits probably will not discourage individuals from serving as nonprofit officers
10 8
or directors.
Another objection to the recognition of member derivative suits is that
members lack sufficient interest in the corporation to sue on its behalf. A shareholder's pecuniary interest in the corporation is part of the basis of his right to
bring a derivative suit; when the corporation will not sue on a valid claim, the
shareholder's equity interest is imperiled and thus he is entitled to sue derivatively. 109 Although a member may have no equity interest in a nonprofit corporation, he usually has a significant pecuniary interest in the organization.
Membership often is conditioned on the payment of dues. 110 Furthermore, in
the case of a homeowner association the decisions of the directors and officers
may affect the value of each member's property.
A member does not expect the same return on his money as an investor in
shares of stock, but he expects that his money will be used in the manner represented to him when he became a member. Apart from a concern over vexatious
litigation, there is no compelling reason why this pecuniary interest should be
insufficient to justify a derivative suit by a member. Of course, because section
55A-29(a) of the Act allows nonprofit incorporators to define membership as
they choose, 1 the corporation might have members with no financial stake.
Should the prospect of derivative litigation by such members trouble the incorporators, they could frame the bylaws or charter to condition membership on
1 12
some form of financial contribution or to have no members at all.
107. Id. § 55A-17.3(a)(2). The Act also provides that a nonprofit corporation may expand the

statutory indemnification provisions in its bylaws or charter. See id. § 55A-17.1(a); R. ROnINSON,
supra note 14, at 238 n.27.
108. See supra note 33. The Nonprofit Corporation Act also expressly gives nonprofit corporations power "to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director,
officer, employee or agent of the corporation.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-17.1(c) (1982).
109. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
110. See Henn & Pfeifer, supra note 11, at 185 n.10; Pasley, Organizationand Operation ofNon.
Profit Corporations-SomeGeneral Considerations, 19 CLEV. ST. L. Rv. 239, 248 (1970); see also
Lopez v. Medford Community Center, Inc., 384 Mass. 171, 173 & n.5, 174, 424 N.E.2d 229, 231 &
n.5, 232 (1982) (trial court's findings of fact included charter provision that membership in defendant charitable corporation was conditioned on payment of annual dues).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-29(a) (1982).
112. To discourage nonprofit corporations from choosing not to have members solely because of
the possibility of a derivative suit, the proposed amendment to the North Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act would recognize derivative actions by directors as well as members. See supranote 5. See

Minutes of Nonprofit Corporation Act Drafting Committee of the North Carolina General Statutes
Commission (Sept. 20, 1984). See generally infra note 114 (discussing statutory recognition in other
jurisdictions of derivative suits by directors).

As noted earlier, a charitable corporation may designate as "members" donors with no voice in
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The existing provisions for supervision of nonprofit corporations in North
Carolina are inadequate. Commentators and those state courts and legislatures

that have considered the issue have concluded that supervision by the attorney
general's office is likely to be sporadic and ineffective.1 13 When a nonprofit corporation has been wronged but a member cannot prevail on the directors to sue
on behalf of the corporation, the member may be without recourse. To correct
this problem, the North Carolina legislature or the state courts should recognize
the right of members of nonprofit corporations to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. 1 4 Such a provision would be consistent with North
the affairs of the corporation. To avoid the prospect of derivative suits by such honorary members, a
statute recognizing member derivative suits also could provide that a "member" must be given some
voice in the corporation's affairs, such as the right to elect directors or vote on changes in the charter
and bylaws. The California Nonprofit Corporation Law limits members in this fashion. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 5056 (West Supp. 1985). Such a provision would require a charitable corporation to bestow
a title other than "member" on donors it wanted to recognize but not give a voice in the operation of
the corporation.
113. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
114. A court or legislature recognizing a right for members to bring a derivative suit should
consider other means of improving the supervision of nonprofit corporations as well. In the New
York and California statutes, the provision for member derivative suits was accompanied by expanded powers for the attorney general's office. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West Supp. 1985); N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983). Another option is to give
directors a right to bring a derivative suit. The California Nonprofit Corporation Law authorizes
directors to bring derivative suits if the corporation has no members. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 50595061 (West Supp. 1985). In New York, where the Business Corporation Law authorizes derivative
suits by directors of for-profit corporations, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 720(b) (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1984), it has been held that the director or officer must have held his corporate office at the
time the derivative suit was commenced, a requirement analogous to the contemporaneous ownership limitation on shareholder derivative suits. Alan v. Landau-Alan Gallery, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 350,
320 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1971); see 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at § 5972. For a pre-1980 California
decision recognizing the right of directors of a nonprofit corporation to bring derivative suits, see
Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 63 Cal. 2d 750, 394 P.2d 932, 40 Cal. Rptr.

244 (1964).
The donors or beneficiaries of a charitable nonprofit corporation also could be given standing.
Hansmann, supra note 7, at 607-09, argues that a charitable corporation's donors and beneficiaries
are more likely than any other parties to take an interest in the corporation's affairs and thus may be
proper parties to bring suit. There is some historical basis for giving donors standing; founding
donors of a charitable trust were given a right of "visitation" over the trust, including the right to
inspect the trustees' actions and correct abuses. See M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 206;
Hansmann, supra note 7, at 607-09. This right, however, has fallen into disfavor and donors today
commonly are denied standing to sue. Hansmann, supra note 7, at 607; see also Shields v. Harris,
190 N.C. 520, 130 S.E. 189 (1925) (heirs of the settlor of a charitable trust do not have standing to
sue for enforcement of the trust). The rationale for this denial usually is either that the donor's legal
interest ends once he makes the gift to the corporation or that potential suits by charitable donors
would expose charitable corporation managers to a risk of excessive liability. Hansmann, supranote
7, at 607-09; Karst, supra note 86, at 447.
Under trust law, beneficiaries of a charitable trust generally were denied standing to sue unless
they could show a "special interest" in the benefits of the trust, beyond the benefit conferred on the
public at large. M. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 9, at 86-87; see also supra note 41 (discussing
denial of a public right to enforce a charitable trust). The same principle has been applied to deny
standing to beneficiaries of a charitable corporation who could not show a "special interest." City of
Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 97 N.J. Super. 514, 527, 235 A.2d 487, 495 (Ch. Div. 1967).
Recent decisions in some states have expanded the right of beneficiaries of a charitable trust or
corporation to bring a derivative suit or to sue to enforce the trust. See, eg., Ster v. Lucy Webb
Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973) (patients of a hospital organized as a charitable corporation have standing to sue the management);
Jones v. Grant, 344 So. 2d 1210 (Ala. 1977) (students, staff, and faculty of a college operated as a
charitable trust have standing to sue the trustees). A recent decision by the North Carolina Supreme
Court on beneficiary standing is Kania v. Chatham, 297 N.C. 290, 254 S.E.2d 528 (1979). In Kania
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Carolina case law recognizing the similarities between members and sharehold-

ers. The threat of strike suits could be reduced by limiting members' suits as
shareholder derivative suits are limited in the existing Business Corporation Act
and by enforcing indemnification provisions of the nonprofit act. Finally, because the right of shareholders to bring a derivative suit against business corporation managers is well established in North Carolina, a statute giving members
a right to bring such an action would provide consistency in the state's corpora-

tion law and would fulfill members' expectations.
BRENDA BOYKIN

a nominee for a college scholarship sued the trustees of the charitable trust that provided the scholarship program. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the suit because mere nomination for a scholarship did not give him a "special interest." Id. at 292, 254 S.E.2d at 530. In the
absence of such an interest, the court held, the proper party to sue for enforcement of a charitable
trust is the attorney general. Id. at 292-93, 254 S.E.2d at 530.
As with donors, one reason frequently given for denying standing to beneficiaries is a fear of
exposing trustees or directors to excessive liability. This fear may be unfounded. Hansmann notes
that a Wisconsin statute adopted in 1945 permitted any 10 or more donors or beneficiaries of a
charitable trust to bring a suit to enforce the trust. The statute later was replaced, but there are no
reported cases in which donors or beneficiaries brought such a suit. Hansmann, supra note 7, at 60910.

Allen v. Wright: Standing Beyond the Bounds of Article III
Sections 501(a) and 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) mandate
that racially discriminatory schools be denied both tax-exempt status and eligibility for tax-deductible contributions under section 170 of the Code.1 To implement these Code sections the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued
guidelines for determining whether a private school seeking tax-exempt status is
racially discriminatory. 2 These guidelines, however, have proved ineffective1. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2032 (1983); Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2
C.B. 230.
I.R.C. § 501(a) (1982) provides: "An organization described in subsection (c) or (d) or section
401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle ...."
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982) provides: "The following organizations are referred to in subsection
(a): . . .Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable,. . . or educational purposes,. . . no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, .. and
which does not participate in, or intervene in ...any political campaign .. "
I.R.C. § 170(a)(1) (1982) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made within the taxable year."
I.R.C § 170(c)(2) (1982) defines a "charitable contribution" as "a contribution or gift to or for
the use of.

.

.a corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation.

. .

organized and

operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, . . . no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual; and
which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) ...."
The IRS ruled in 1971 that §§ 501(a) and 501(c)(3) required it to deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Until 1965 the IRS had granted
tax exemptions to all educational institutions that satisfied the requirements enumerated in
§ 501(c)(3) without regard to whether the institution was racially discriminatory. From 1965 to
1967 it imposed a freeze on applications for tax-exempt status from racially discriminatory schools.
From 1967 to 1970 the IRS approved applications for tax-exempt status from racially discriminatory schools unless it appeared that such schools were so connected with the state that their actions
would be considered discriminatory state action and, therefore, unconstitutional. Green v. Kennedy,
309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970).
In 1970 the IRS announced that it no longer legally could justify granting tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprinted in [1970] 7 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6790. The reasoning behind this policy change was revealed in a 1971
revenue ruling. The IRS had determined that section 501(c)(3)'s requirement that an exempt organization be "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or educational purposes" was intended to reflect the common-law notion of charity. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B.
230. This determination led the IRS to conclude that this section was designed to benefit only those
organizations that operated as common-law charities. Common-law charities were subject to the
restriction that their activities be consistent with public policy. Because the operation of a racially
discriminatory private school violated the federal public policy against discrimination in education,
the IRS ruled that such schools failed to qualify for tax exemptions and that donations to such
schools were not tax deductible. Id. The IRS borrowed the reasoning of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mern.
sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), in making this ruling. See infra notes 13-19 and
accompanying text.
2. Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. The 1972 guidelines were modeled after a permanent
injunction issued by a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub noa. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971).
The injunction issued in Green enjoined and restrained the IRS from approving applications for
tax-exempt status for private schools in Mississippi unless the school had publicized its policy of
racial nondiscrimination in a manner reasonably effective in bringing the policy to the attention of
minority groups; referred to its policy of nondiscrimination in its brochures, catalogues, and other
advertisements; and certified that it had made no statements or taken any actions qualifying its
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even schools that have been adjudged discriminatory have been able to satisfy
the guidelines and maintain their tax-exempt status. 3 In 1977 parents of black4
schoolchildren filed suit to compel the IRS to adopt more stringent guidelines.
Their case reached the Supreme Court as Allen v. Wright,5 but the Court declined to reach the merits of the case; the Court held that neither of the two
injuries alleged by plaintiffs was sufficient to give them standing to challenge the
policy of nondiscrimination. The school also must have provided the IRS with data on the racial
composition of its student body, applicants for admission, and faculty and administrative staff, on
the amount of scholarship and loan funds awarded and the racial composition of students who
received such awards; and on whether any of its incorporators, founders, board members, or donors
of land or buildings were organizations or members of organizations that had as a goal the maintenance of segregation in school education. Id. at 1179-80. The injunction defined a policy of racial
nondiscrimination as meaning that the school "admitt[ed] the students of any race to all the rights,
privileges, programs and activities generally accorded or made available to students at that school"
and did not discriminate on the basis of race "in the administration of educational policies, applications for admission, . . .scholarship and loan programs, and athletic and extra-curricular programs." Id. at 1179. Surprisingly, the injunction did not expressly require the IRS to determine
that a school actually had implemented a policy of racial nondiscrimination before granting the
school tax-exempt status. For a discussion of the facts of Green, see infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
The first set of guidelines appeared in 1972. See Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. These
guidelines were replaced by slightly stricter guidelines in 1975. See Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B.
587. The 1975 guidelines generally require that schools adopt and publicize their adoption of a
policy of nondiscrimination. This policy must be included in the school's charter and made known
to the community served by the school. Schools are required to provide the IRS with a statistical
breakdown by race of their faculty, student body, administrative staff, and scholarship and loan
recipients. They also must state whether any of their incorporators, founders, board members, or
donors of land or buildings had or have as an objective the maintenance of segregated education.
Schools also must keep documents verifying their compliance with the guidelines and annually certify their compliance under penalty of perjury.
3. In statements before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and
Means, Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, stated:
mhe Service's procedures [are] ineffective in identifying schools which in actual operation
discriminate against minority students ....
A clear indication that our rules require strengthening is the fact that a number of
private schools continue to hold tax exemption even though they have been held by Federal
courts to be racially discriminatory. This position is indefensible.
ProposedIRS Revenue ProcedureAffecting Tax-Exemption of PrivateSchools: HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House CommL on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., IstSess. 5 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The IRS attempted to revise its guidelines in 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg.
37,296 (1978) (proposed Aug. 21, 1978). After evaluating public response to the proposed revisions,
the IRS released a new set of guidelines that were to take effect on January 1, 1980. These guidelines
established that a school which was formed or substantially expanded during public school desegregation and had an insignificant minority enrollment would be classified "reviewable" and rebuttably
presumed discriminatory if the IRS determined that its creation or expansion was related in-fact to
the desegregation of public schools in the area. Such schools were to be provided an opportunity to
explain their low minority enrollment and to document their efforts to recruit minority students
before being characterized as racially discriminatory. See 44 Fed. Reg. 9451 (1979) (proposed Feb.
12, 1979); see generally Hearings, supra, at 5 (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service) (explaining what proposed guidelines would require and how they would
be implemented). Congress blocked the implementation of these guidelines, however, by amending
the Treasury Appropriations Bill to withhold funds for their enforcement until October 1980. See
Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74,
§§ 103, 615, 93 Stat. 559, 562, 577 (1979); Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3323 n.16 (1984).
Similar spending restrictions, including a restriction on use of funds to enforce court orders entered
after August 1978, continued in effect until January 1, 1984. Id.
4. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
5. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
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IRS guidelines. 6
7
This Note reviews the Supreme Court's discussion of standing in Wright
and analyzes the Court's application of its standing test to the facts of Wright.8

The Note criticizes the Court's overly stringent application of the causation element of its standing test.9 It concludes that the Court's decision unduly impairs

access to the courts by victims of unlawful government conduct and leaves the
government free to lend substantial support to racially discriminatory
institutions.10
The IRS guidelines challenged by the Wright plaintiffs were adopted in
1975 to effectuate an IRS ruling that a school applying for tax-exempt status
must demonstrate that it admits the students of any race to all the rights, privileges, programs, and activities generally accorded or made available to students
at that school and that the school does not discriminate on the basis of race in
administration of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and

loan programs, and athletic and other school-administered programs."

This

ruling was made in 1971 following the IRS's announcement in 1970 that it could

"no longer legally justify" its former policy permitting racially discriminatory
schools to be granted tax-exempt status. 12 The 1970 policy change was made

after the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in Green v.
Kennedy13 preliminarily enjoined the IRS from continuing to grant tax-exempt
14
status to racially discriminatory schools in Mississippi.
The district court decided the merits of Green in 1971.15 Plaintiffs in Green
6. Id. at 3326. For a description of the challenged guidelines, see supra note 3. The Court
concluded that the first injury alleged was not judicially cognizable and that the second failed because it was not "fairly traceable" to the IRS's grant of tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools. See infra text accompanying note 33.
7. See infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 80-98 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
11. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3319.
12. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprintedin [1970] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
6790; see supra note I (explaining basis of IRS policy change).
13. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956
(1970).
14. The Green court issued its preliminary injunction on January 12, 1970. Id. The IRS announced its new policy on July 10, 1970. IRS News Release (July 10, 1970), reprintedin [1970] 7
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) %6790.

15. The district court rejected the argument that the IRS's reversal of its pre-1970 policy in the
course of the litigation rendered the case moot for lack of a "case or controversy." A defendant, the
court stated, does not render a case moot merely by "promising to conform to plaintiff's wishes."
Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1170 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S.
997 (1971). The court foresaw the danger that in the absence of a court order the IRS might change
its policy again. Critics of the decision, however, have charged that the district court ignored article
III's "case or controversy" requirement. See McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemptions ForDiscriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 441, 458-59
(1984).
The validity of the district court's concern was confirmed in 1982 when the IRS again reversed
its position and announced that it would "no longer revoke or deny tax-exempt status for...
organizations on grounds that they [do not] conform with.. . fundamental public policies." Legislation to Deny Tax Exemption to Racially Discriminatory Private School Hearings on S. 2024
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). Not surprisingly, this reversal
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were parents of black schoolchildren who sought to enjoin the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools in Mississippi.

They alleged that the IRS's pre-1970 policy was unconstitutional and contrary
to statute. 16 In light of the federal policy against racial segregation in schools,

the court held that the Code's provisions could not be construed in a manner
that would give racially discriminatory schools the same tax benefits given to
charitable organizations.

17

The court made it clear that any contrary interpretation of the Code would

"raise serious constitutional questions": "If the [IRS] had not adopted its July,
1970, interpretation, and if this court had acquiesced in the pre-1970 interpretation, we would in all likelihood have been required by the Constitution to
enter a decree ordering the Service to cease violating plaintiffs' constitutional
rights." 18 The court issued a permanent injunction allowing the IRS to grant

tax-exempt status to private schools in Mississippi only if the school had publicized its adoption of a policy of nondiscrmination and had provided the IRS
with sufficient information to determine whether the school actually had established such a policy. 19 The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the district

court's opinion. 20 Plaintiffs in Green reopened the case in 1976 alleging that the
IRS was failing to comply with the court's injunction. 2 1 Wright was filed shortly

thereafter; the United States District Court for the District of Columbia consolicame about during the pendency of Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983), in
which plaintiff university asserted a right to tax-exempt status despite its religiously mandated racially discriminatory policies. Again, the IRS argued that its reversal made the case moot and urged
dismissal. The Supreme Court, however, declined to vacate the case as moot. Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 456 U.S. 922 (1982). William Coleman, Jr., was invited to present arguments in favor
of the IRS's former position to preserve the adversarial nature of the case. Id. McCoy and Devins
also have criticized the Court's refusal to hold Bob Jones moot. McCoy & Devins, supra, at 464.
The flip-flops in IRS policy during the pendency of Green and Bob Jones illustrate the danger of
allowing cases to be rendered moot based on administrative changes of position on issues not governed by express statutory language or judicial decisions. The viewpoint advocated by McCoy and
Devins would allow the IRS to escape litigation of an issue ad infinitum simply by announcing a
policy change each time it is faced with hostile litigation.
Ten days after the announcement that the IRS no longer would deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory private schools, the Reagan Administration proposed legislation that expressly would have denied tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools. S.2024, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982), reprintedin [1982] 10 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCII) 1 6155. Congress responded
to the proposed bill by asserting that current Code provisions already prohibited the granting of such
exemptions. S. Con. Res. 59, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The Supreme Court settled the disagreement by holding in Bob Jones that current statutes did require the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to
racially discriminatory schools. Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2030-31.
16. Plaintiffs alleged that granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools violated
§§ 501 and 170 of the Code, Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), and the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Green
v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D.D.C.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398
U.S. 956 (1970).
17. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
18. Id. at 1171.
19. Id. at 1179-80; see supra note 2.
20. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
21. See Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright,
104 S.CL 3315 (1984).
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1977.22

Plaintiffs in Wright were black parents whose children attended public
school in desegregating school systems. The parents sought an injunction
prohibiting the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory
private schools and requiring the IRS to adopt more rigid guidelines for determining whether a school was racially discriminatory. They alleged that IRS
guidelines permitted schools to acquire tax-exempt status "'merely on the basis
of adopting and certifying-but not implementing-a policy of nondiscrimination,'" and thus did not comply with section 501(c)(3)'s requirement that racially discriminatory schools be denied tax-exempt status. 23 The essence of
plaintiffs' complaint was that the grant of federal tax exemptions to such schools
unconstitutionally supported racially segregated educational institutions by fostering and encouraging the "organization, operation and expansion" of racially
segregated schools for "white children avoiding attendance in desegregating
24
public school districts."
The district court dismissed the case in November 1979 on the grounds that
25
the Wright plaintiffs lacked standing and had presented a nonjusticiable issue.
The Green plaintiffs' action survived, however, because the court ruled that they
26
had standing to litigate their rights under the injunction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed the dismissal of Wright.27 The court of appeals relied on the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Green and the Supreme Court's decisions in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery28 and Norwood v. Harrison2 9 in holding that the
Wright plaintiffs had standing. The court categorized Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,3 0 a Supreme Court decision that weighed
against granting standing, as part of a "divergent" line of precedent that was the
"wrong frame" for the Wright case. 31
The Supreme Court rejected the analysis of the court of appeals. Applying
a three-pronged constitutional test of standing,3 2 the Court concluded that
22. See id.
23. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3321 (quoting appellants' brief).
24. Id. at 3322.
25. Wright v. Miller, 480 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Wright v. Regan, 656
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104 S.Ct. 3315 (1984).
26. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright, 104
S. Ct. 3315 (1984). The Green plaintiffs ultimately were successful in getting most of the relief they

requested. See id.
27. Id. at 838.
28. 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
29. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
30. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). For a discussion of the facts of Simon, see infra text accompanying
notes 59-61.
31. Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 828-29 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Wright,
104 S.Ct. 3315 (1984). The court of appeals also held that the issues raised in Wright were justiciable. Id. at 838.
32. See infra text accompanying note 33. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction
of federal courts to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court's
standing test is intended to determine whether the issue before the Court is being presented in the
context of a case or controversy. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW § 3-18, at 80
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plaintiffs had failed to allege an injury that gave them standing to challenge the
IRS guidelines. The Court's standing test required that (1) the injury suffered by
plaintiffs be "distinct and palpable," (2) that the injury be "fairly traceable" to
the challenged conduct, and (3) that relief from the injury be "likely" to result
from a favorable decision. 33 The first prong requires that the injury suffered by
the plaintiff be judically cognizable. The second and third prongs form the causation element of the standing inquiry-they are not satisfied unless the plaintiff's injury was caused by the defendant's conduct. Thus
these three prongs
34
ensure the existence of a genuine case or controversy.
As read by the Court, the complaint in Wright described two injuries resulting from the IRS's allegedly unlawful conduct: "First, . . . [plaintiffs] are
harmed by the mere fact of Government financial aid to discriminatory private
schools. Second,. . . the federal tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools in their communities impair their ability to have their public
schools desegregated." ' 35 The Court held that the first injury was not judicially
cognizable. Interpreted as "a claim. . . to have the Government avoid the violation of law,"' 36 the first injury asserted a right that the Court refused to recognize as a basis for standing. The Court stated that the" 'assertion of a right to a
particular kind of Government conduct, which the Government has violated by
acting differently, can not alone satisfy the requirements of Article III without
draining those requirements of meaning.' "37
The Court also interpreted the first injury as presenting a claim of stigmatization resulting from racial discrimination. Although the Court recognized this
type of injury as sufficient to confer standing, it concluded that stigmatic injury
conferred standing only on persons who alleged that they personally had been
denied equal treatment. The Court believed that to allow this type of injury to
confer standing on persons who did not allege a personal denial of equal treatment would "transform the federal court into '. . . a vehicle for the vindication
of. . .concerned bystanders'" and would extend standing to all members of
the racial group against which the government allegedly was discriminating. 3 8
(1978). Thus, the doctrine of standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient stake in the outcome of a controversy to pursue judicial resolution. Id. § 3-17, at 79. It has been suggested that the
Constitution's requirement of a case or controversy is not a requirement that a party have a personal
stake in the controversy. See Berger, Standing to Sue in PublicActions: Is it a ContitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969).
33. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3325.
34. See L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 96-97.
35. Wright, 104 S.Ct. at 3326.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 3327 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982)).
38. Id. (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
Generally, private litigants do not have standing to assert the rights of others. For example, in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Sierra Club was denied standing to assert the rights
of third parties who used Mineral King Valley. The Club would have had to allege that its members
visited and recreated in the valley to have standing. This third-party rule, however, is a "'rule of
practice'" rather than a "'principle ordained by the Constitution' "; the Court has recognized exceptions to the rule in a few situations. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-26, at 103 (quoting United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)). For example, the Court has allowed persons who them.
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Blacks in one state would have standing to challenge the tax-exempt status of
schools in other states: a result that article III does not permit.
The Court characterized plaintiffs' second injury as "not only judicially
cognizable," but also "one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal
system." 39 The diminished ability of plaintiffs' children to receive an education
in a racially integrated school was a distinct and palpable injury that satisfied the
first prong of the Court's standing test. This injury, however, did not satisfy the
Court's causation requirement. The Court stated that the line of causation between this injury and the IRS's grant of tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools was too attenuated to form a basis for standing; it characterized
plaintiffs' injury as "highly indirect" and "result[ing] from the independent action of some third party not before the court. ' 4° The required line of causation
would be present only if plaintiffs had alleged that "there were enough racially
discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions in [their] communities
for withdrawal of [tax-exempt status] to make an appreciable difference in public-school integration. 4 1 Concerned about this injury's redressability-the likelihood that a favorable decision would provide relief-the Court noted that it
was "entirely speculative" whether withdrawal of tax exemptions from racially
discriminatory schools would affect public school integration. 4 2
The Court underscored its conclusion that the line of causation drawn was
insufficient by applying the doctrine of separation of powers to its analysis of
article III requirements. In the Court's view the proper role of the federal courts
does not include deciding claims such as the one brought in Wright: "The Constitution. . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch,
the duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.' We could not recognize [plaintiffs'] standing . . . without running afoul of that structural
43
principle."
Justices Brennan and Stevens filed dissenting opinions. 44 Justice Brennan
criticized the Court's use of generalizations about separation of powers to cloud
the standing issue and to avoid recognizing of the true nature of the injuries
alleged. He did not discuss the Court's refusal to find standing as to the first
injury, but attacked the Court's conclusion that granting tax benefits to racially
discriminatory private schools did not detrimentally affect the integration of
public schools. Justice Brennan noted that "[c]ommonsense alone would recogselves have suffered an injury to litigate the rights of third-parties when it would be difficult or
impossible for those persons to assert their own rights. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). It also has recognized an exception when a special relationship existed between the plaintiff
and the third-party whose rights the plaintiff sought to assert. See, eg., Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 32, §§ 3-26 to -27, at 103-12 (discussing the
Court's willingness to grant certain parties surrogate standing).
39. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3328.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 3328.
42. Id. at 3328-29.
43. Id. at 3330 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
44. Wright was a five-to-three decision. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the majority.
Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens' dissent, and Justice Brennan filed a separate dissent.
Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of the case.
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nize that the elimination of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory private
those institutions have in defeating
schools would serve to lessen the impact that
'45
efforts to desegregate the public schools."
Justice Stevens criticized both the Court's causation analysis and its invocation of separation of powers doctrine to bolster its holding. He viewed the issue
as whether plaintiffs had alleged that the government was "subsidiz[ing] the exodus of white children from schools that would otherwise be racially integrated." 46 He concluded that as a matter of "elementary economics," the cash
grants given to racially discriminatory schools by way of tax exemptions and
tax-deductible contributions made those schools more affordable and therefore
more popular.47 Justice Stevens further contended that the Court's separation
of powers argument had no relevance to the issue of standing. He acknowledged
that Wright raised legitimate concerns of justiciability and usurpation of executive discretion, but believed that the Court had only confused the issue of standing by failing to address those concerns directly.
The standing test applied by the Court in Wright is the product of a series
of decisions in the 1970s. These decisions first liberalized standing requirements
by replacing the legal-interest test with an injury-in-fact test, but later retreated
from this liberalization by tightening the causation requirement. 48 In Association of DataProcessingService Organizations,Inc. v. Camp.49 the Court rejected
its former legal-interest test 50 in favor of a two-pronged standing test. To have
standing under the new test a plaintiff was required to demonstrate injury-in-fact
and an interest to be protected that fell within the zone of interests safeguarded
by the statutory or constitutional provision under which he sought relief. Under
this liberal test persons living in an apartment complex had standing to challenge the landlord's exclusion of nonwhites as an infringement of their right to
interracial association; 5 1 students who camped and hiked in the Washington,
D.C., metropolitan area had standing to challenge the approval of an increase in
railroad freight charges for recyclable goods as an injury to their right to enjoy
the environment;5 2 and persons who camped in national parks might have had
of those parks as an infringestanding to challenge the commercial development
53
ment of their right to enjoy the environment.
As early as 1973, however, the Court signaled a retreat from these liberal
holdings by placing new emphasis on causation and strengthening the line of
45. Id. at 3337 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 3342 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 3344 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. See Nichol, Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of JudicialRestraint, 69 Ky. L.J. 185, 186-92 (1980-81).
49. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
50. The legal-interest test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate injury to a legally protected interest to gain standing. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137
(1938).
51. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
52. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
53. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Although plaintiffs in Sierra Club were denied
standing because the Club failed to allege that its members used the valley threatened by development, the Court stated in dicta that such an allegation would have been sufficient basis for standing.
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causation required by article III.54 In Linda R.S. v. RichardD. 55 the Court held
that the mother of an illegitimate child did not have standing to challenge Texas
court decisions that construed a child support statute as applying only to married parents. The Court reasoned that although a favorable ruling might allow
the State to prosecute the child's father for failure to pay support, it would not
ensure that the mother would receive support payments.5 6 Therefore, Linda
R.S.'s injury was not redressable.
57
The causation test was developed further by the Court in Warth v. Seldin.
Plaintiffs in Warth were denied standing to challenge exclusionary zoning ordinances that prevented the construction of low-cost housing and thus prevented
plaintiffs from finding suitable housing. The Court denied standing because of
its uncertainty that the relief desired would result from a favorable decision.
Altering the zoning rules, the Court stated, would not guarantee plaintiffs access
58
to housing.
The requirement that the plaintiff's injury be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct became part of the Court's standing analysis in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization.5 9 Plaintiffs in Simon were indigents
who had been denied nonemergency medical care at hospitals that enjoyed taxexempt status. The hospitals enjoyed this privilege because they were designated
"charitable" under revised IRS guidelines. 6° The challenged guidelines granted
hospitals charitable status even if they restricted admissions to paying patients
so long as the hospital offered full-time emergency treatment to anyone in need
of emergency care. Plaintiffs argued that the new guidelines injured them by
encouraging hospitals to deny treatment to indigents. The Court held that
plaintiffs' inability to receive medical care could not fairly be traced to the IRS's
revision of its guidelines because there was no evidence that the decision to deny
admission to indigents would have been different if the IRS had denied the hospitals' charitable status. The Court believed it "purely speculative" that a
change in IRS guidelines would result in the admission of indigents. 6' As in
Linda R.S. and Warth, relief of the Simon plaintiffs' injury would depend in part
on the response of third parties to a favorable Court ruling; therefore, the causation requirement was not satisfied. "
The causation requirement, though harsh, has not presented an absolute
54. For an excellent article on the development of the causation requirement, see Nichol, supra
note 48.
55. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
56. Linda R.S. has been cited by Professor Tribe to illustrate a potential double standard in the
causation requirement. Professor Tribe notes that if the father of Linda R.S.'s child had brought an
action for a declaratory judgment, he would have had standing to challenge the statute. The basis
for his standing would have been the assumption that criminal sanctions change behavior-the very
assumption rejected by the Court in denying standing to Linda R.S. Professor Tribe concludes that
this result is "palpably unfair." L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 93.

57. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
58. Id. at 505-07.
59. 426 U.S. 26"(1976).
60. Prior guidelines did not consider hospitals charitable unless they provided as much care to
indigents as their financial resources allowed. Id. at 42.

61. Id.
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bar to plaintiffs who suffer an indirect injury. For example, in Duke Power Co. v.
CarolinaEnvironmentalStudy Group62 citizens alleging an injury to their environment resulting from the operation of nuclear power plants were held to have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act. 63 The
holding was based on evidence demonstrating that but for the Act, construction
64
of the nuclear facilities in plaintiffs' neighborhoods would not be completed. 5
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.6
plaintiff company was allowed standing to attack an exclusionary zoning scheme
because it could identify a specific project it intended to construct once the
scheme was removed. This allegation gave the complaint the" 'essential dimen66
sion of specificity'" the Court had found missing in Warth.
There are also a number of cases in which the causation requirement has
been abbreviated or ignored. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village ofBellwood 67 the
village and some of its residents claimed that their right to the benefits of living
in an integrated society was being infringed by the racial steering practices of
certain real estate brokers. The Court upheld plaintiffs' claim without requiring
plaintiffs to show with specificity that the changing composition of their neighborhood was the result of defendants' steering practices or that the composition
of the neighborhood would remain integrated if defendants ceased their steering
practices.
Standing requirements were not discussed in Norwood v. Harrison,68 in
which the Court held that the parents of school children were entitled to an
injunction prohibiting the State of Mississippi from providing free textbooks to
students attending racially discriminatory private schools. The issue whether
the parents had suffered a distinct injury, fairly traceable to the state's conduct
and redressable by the Court, was not addressed. Similarly, the Court made no
mention of article III standing requirements when it summarily affirmed the
69
grant of an injunction against the IRS in Green v. Coit.
The Court's inconsistent application of its article III standing test, specifically the causation element of the test, has led to criticism that the Court employs standing analysis in an "unprincipled" effort to "screen from [its] docket
claims which [it] substantively disfavors."' 70 The Court's analysis in Wright
71
lends support to this criticism.
The Court's conclusion in Wright that government support of racially dis62. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982). The Price-Anderson Act limits the liability of a nuclear power
company in the event of a nuclear accident. Id.
64. Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 74-77.
65. 429 U.S. 252 (1978).
66. Id. at 263 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974)).
67. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
68. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
69. 404 U.S. 997 (1971), affig mem. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971).
70. L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 93.
71. See Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3341 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also McCoy & Devins, supra
note 15, at 467 ("[I]f the Supreme Court. . . holds that the plaintiffs in Wright are without standing, it will be guilty of the ultimate irony.").
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criminatory private schools does not infringe on the rights of the blacks in the
neighborhoods where those schools exist ignores the constitutional right of
blacks to freedom from government supported segregation and its consequences.
In the Court's estimation plaintiffs' first injury72 alleged a general harm shared
by all blacks when the government discriminates on the basis of race. The Court
refused to recognize this stigmatic injury as a basis for standing because all
members of the racial group allegedly being discriminated against could claim
this type of injury. The Court also feared that such an injury could be made the
basis for third-party standing. 73 This analysis reveals the Court's unwillingness
to read plaintiffs' complaint carefully. As Justice Brennan noted, "the complaint. . . limits the claim of stigmatic injury from illegal government action to
black children attending public schools in districts that are currently desegregating yet contain discriminatory private schools benefitting from illegal tax
exemptions." 74
There can be little doubt that when a government-supported racially discriminatory private school exists beside an integrated public school in a neighborhood undergoing desegregation, black school children continue to carry the
badge of inferiority that burdened them under a dual school system. The existence of this badge and its impact on black youngsters were recognized by the
Court in Brown v. Board of Education.75 In Brown the Court stated: "A sense
of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn" and "may affect [the
' 76
"Segregation
child's] heart and mind in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational
and mental development of negro children. . .. ,"77 The Court thus recognized
in Brown not only the right of black children to equal protection, but also their
right to be free of the consequences of government-supported discrimination in
education. The infringement of this right is at least as distinct, palpable, and
personal an injury as the aesthetic injury suffered by campers when the beauty of
72. The first injury alleged by plaintiffs was harm resulting from unconstitutional government

financial aid to racially discriminatory private schools. See supra text accompanying note 35.
73. For criticism of racial denigration as a basis for standing, see McCoy & Devins, supra note
15, at 447-53.
74. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3335 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated: "Thus, the
Court's 'parade of horribles' concerning black plaintiffs from Hawaii challenging tax exemptions
granted to schools in Maine, is completely irrelevant for purposes of Article III standing in this
action. Indeed, even if relevant, that criticism would go to the scope of the class certified. . . ." Id.
at 3335 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court also expressed concern that recognizing a stigmatic injury as a basis for standing
would confer standing nationwide on all members of the minority group against which the government allegedly was discriminating. The Court, however, has not always been troubled by the
number of plaintiffs who may qualify to bring a particular cause of action. In United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973), the Court
specifically noted that the plaintiffs could not be deprived of standing simply because everyone who
used the "scenic resources of the country" could assert the same injury. Id. at 687-88. The Court
stated: "To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also
injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion." Id. at 688.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

76. Id. at 494.
77. Id.

1026

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

the places where they camp is diminished. 78

The Court did not reject completely the validity of this injury, but it held
that such an injury could confer standing only on persons who allege a personal

denial of equal treatment. Each of the cases cited by the Court as support for
this conclusion, however, involved plaintiffs whose complaints sought to compel
defendants to afford equal protection to parties not before the Court. 79 This
situation did not exist in Wright because plaintiffs alleged a direct injury to

themselves, not a denial of the rights of others.
The complaint in Wright posed a unique question: Can government be held
accountable for perpetuating the injuries suffered by blacks when the government endorses their treatment as second class citizens? The Court held in
Wright that the government is accountable only for those injuries caused by its
own denial of equal treatment and not for the injuries caused when it facilitates

discrimination by private organizations. This holding unfairly and unreasonably
limits the class of "distinct and palpable" injuries the Court is willing to redress.
The Court's refusal to grant standing on the basis of the second injury8"

alleged in Wright is unjustifiable. The Court in Wright applied the causation
element of its standing test far more strenuously than article III demands and
consequently left meritorious plaintiffs without relief. It ruled that the second
injury failed to satisfy the causation element of its standing test because plaintiffs' complete relief would be dependent on the response of third parties to the
Court's ruling. This decision insulates the government from liability for having
indirectly supported third parties in the commission of acts that the government
cannot lawfully support directly.81 Although the Court recognized that interference with the racial balance of public schools infringes on the right of children in
78. These were the facts in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). The Court recognized in SCRAP that this injury was a sufficient basis for standing. Id. at 686-87. For further discussion of the facts in SCRAP, see infra text
accompanying notes 91-92.
79. The Court cited Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974); and Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). In Moose Lodge the Court held that
a black plaintiff who had not sought and did not intend to seek membership in the lodge did not have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the lodge's discriminatory membership policies, even
though he had alleged that the lodge's actions constituted "state action" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Plaintiffhad not alleged any injury to himself resulting from the lodge's membership policies
and thus was attempting to assert the right of other blacks to be equally considered for membership.
Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 165-71.
In O'Shea plaintiffs sought to challenge the discriminatory administration of criminal justice in
Cairo, Illinois. Although plaintiffs purported to represent a class that included persons who had
suffered discriminatory treatment, none of the named plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered or were
threatened with such treatment. Therefore, they failed to allege any injury to themselves resulting
from the county's discriminatory practices. O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 494-95.
Plaintiffs in Rizzo sought injunctive relief for violations of the civil rights of Philadelphia citizens by city policemen. The Court determined that plaintiffs had failed to present a case or controversy because the threat of any future injury to plaintiffs was too remote. Therefore, the Court held
that plaintiffs lacked a stake in the outcome sufficient to confer standing. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 372-73.
80. The second injury alleged by plaintiffs was that the federal tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools in their communities impaired their children's ability to attend desegregated public schools. See supra text accompanying note 35.
81. Other authors have noted that the Court's application of the causation requirement has had
the effect of insulating the government from liability for contributing to the injury of plaintiffs. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 32, § 3-21, at 96-97; Nichol, supra note 48, at 223.
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public schools to receive an education in an integrated environment, it concluded that the causal relationship between infringement of this right and gov'82
ernment support of racially discriminatory schools was "attenuated at best."
Plaintiffs alleged that the tax exemptions given to racially discriminatory private
schools "foster[ed] and encourage[d] the organization, operation, and expansion" of racially discriminatory schools and interfered with the desegregation of
public schools, 83 but the Court found their pleading defective because it failed to
allege that "there were enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving

tax exemptions in [plaintiffs'] communities for withdrawal of those exemptions
to make an appreciable difference in public-school integration."'8 4 Under this

reasoning plaintiffs were required to allege not only that the government's conduct interfered with public school desegregation, but also that eliminating the
conduct would have a major impact on public school integration.

To require this type of specificity in pleading revives past notions of fact
pleading and forces plaintiffs to prove their cases on the merits to survive mo-

tions to dismiss. 85 Requiring plaintiffs to show more than a line of causation
such that a favorable decision would "contribute in a significant manner to remedying or preventing the injury alleged" goes beyond the article III causation
requirement. 86 Article III requires only that the courts avoid rendering gratui-

tous judgments by ensuring that plaintiffs allege an injury that is "fairly" or
reasonably traceable to the defendant's conduct and that the court's ruling is

"likely" to result in relief.87 Plaintiffs' allegation in Wright that tax exemptions
facilitated the activities of racially discriminatory private schools and thereby

diminished the ability of their children to receive an education in an integrated
school satisfied this requirement.
The government grants tax exemptions for the very purpose of promoting
the activities of the institutions that are exempted.88 The exemptions make it
82. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3328.
83. Id. at 3322.
84. Id. at 3328 (emphasis added). Surprisingly, the Court failed to recognize the importance of
tax-exempt status to the financial viability of many private schools. Although tax-exempt income
status is of little benefit to a school that earns little or no profit, eligibility for tax deductible contributions is a valuable asset. Because charitable contributions are deductible from taxable income, they
cost less than contributions to other organizations. For example, a person in a 35% tax bracket can
make a $100 contribution with only a $65 loss in disposable income. See Feldstein, The Income Tax
and CharitableContributions" Part I-Aggregate and DistributionalEffects, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 81, 81
(1975).
85. Justice Brennan has noted that the Court may be creating a doctrine which includes constitutionally mandated fact pleading. See Simon, 426 U.S. at 55 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result) ( "[B]y requiring that 'this line of causation'. . . be precisely and intricately elaborated in
the complaint, the Court continues its recent policy of 'reverting to the form of fact pleading long
abjured in the federal courts.'" (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 528)). One commentator also has
expressed alarm at this possible development. See Nichol, supra note 48, at 195; cf.L. TRiBE, supra
note 32, § 3-21, at 96-97 (criticizing the specificity of pleading the Court said would be required to
satisfy standing in Warth).
86. Nichol, supra note 48, at 226.
87. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
88. Tax exemptions and charitable deductions are means of federal assistance and are constitutionally equivalent to direct financial aid. "They serve ends. . . similar in nature to those served
. . . by direct government expenditures ....
" Surrey, FederalIncome Tax Reform: The Varied
Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct GovernmentalAssistance, 84 HARv.

1028

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

less expensive for the institution to operate and allow donors to contribute larger
sums by making their contributions tax deductible. 89 By making the activity of
these schools less expensive, the government makes them more affordable. Basic
economic theory demonstrates that if an activity is more affordable more people
will engage in it. 90 To the extent that tax exemptions allow racially discriminatory private schools to charge less tuition or provide better services, the government's unlawful activity aids in increasing the enrollments of such schools and
diminishes the opportunity for children to attend integrated public schools.
This line of causation, though rejected by the Court, hardly seems less direct or more attenuated than that accepted by the Court in United States v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP).9 1 In SCRAP
plaintiffs alleged that an increase in freight charges for recyclable waste would
result in an increased use of raw materials, the natural resources for which
might come from the Washington, D.C., area. They alleged that this increased
use would diminish their ability to enjoy the environment in which they camped
and hiked. The Court accepted these allegations as a sufficient basis for standing. Although the government argued that the Court should limit standing to
those who were "significantly" affected by the challenged conduct, the Court
refused stating: "[E]ven if we could begin to define what such a test would
mean, we think it fundamentally misconceived. .

.

. 'The basic idea.

. .

is that

an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle. . . ,,,92 This "fundamentally misconceived" standard, however, is pre-

cisely the test adopted by the Court in Wright.
The Court suggested that plaintiffs' injury was not redressable because it
was "purely speculative" whether withdrawal of tax exemptions would affect
public school integration and because redressing plaintiffs' injury would require
violation of separation of powers doctrine. Although plaintiffs probably could
not have offered evidence as to the exact number of white students who would
return to the public schools once the tax exemptions were removed, it does not
follow that the relief they sought was unlikely to flow from a favorable decision. 93 Plaintiffs sought relief for their children's diminished opportunity to reL. REv. 352, 354 (1970); see Allen v. Wright, 104 U.S. at 3343 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The purpose of [tax exemptions], like the purpose of any subsidy, is to promote the activity subsidized; the
statutes 'seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations
through the grant of tax benefits.' " (quoting Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2026 n. 10)); McCoy & Devins,
supra note 15, at 454-55 & n.71.
89. See supra note 84.
90. See Wright, 104 S.Ct. at 3344-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
92. Id. at 689 n.14 (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.601,
613 (1968)).
93. In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976), Justice
Brennan posed in his concurrence what he thought was a purely rhetorical question:
We may properly wonder where the Court, armed with its "fatally speculative pleadings" tool will strike next.... Will minority schoolchildren now have to plead and show
that in the absence of illegal governmental "encouragement" of private segregated schools,
such schools would not "elect to forgo" their favorable tax treatment, and that this will
"result in the availability" to complainants of an integrated educational system?
Simon, 426 U.S. at 63 ( Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan mistakenly believed that the
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ceive an education in an integrated school. If tax exemptions for racially

discriminatory private schools had been withdrawn, three factors could have
been expected to lead to an increase in the enrollment of white students in public

schools. First, fewer racially discriminatory schools would have been established because the absence of the tax exemptions would have made it more diffi-

cult for such schools to solicit necessary contributions from corporations and
individuals. 9 4 Second, schools then in existence, particularly those with little or

no endowment, would have been more likely to cease operations.95 As one
study has demonstrated, educational institutions are quite vulnerable to loss of

income resulting from the increased cost of donations when tax incentives to
contributors are withdrawn. 96 Last, fewer white students would have been able
to afford the cost of discriminatory schools as the loss of contributions and the
tax on revenues made attendance more expensive. These factors, which are

based on elementary economic theory, make it unlikely that the withdrawal of
tax exemptions could have failed to have an impact on public school integration.
The separation-of-powers analysis applied by the Court also fails to support

the Court's conclusion that the article III standing requirements were not satisfied. The idea of separation of powers traditionally is relevant to the jus-

ticiability of issues raised by the plaintiff, not to the plaintiff's standing to bring
an action. 97 The Court feared that allowing standing in Wright to challenge
administrative guidelines "would pave the way generally for suits challenging
. . . the particular programs agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations."'98 This fear, however, focuses on whether the Court should grant the
relief requested, not on whether the plaintiff has presented a case or controversy
under article III.

The Court's concern with avoiding undue interference with the executive's
discretion in enforcing the laws was appropriate because the administrative procedures of a government agency were challenged. This concern, however, has
no relevance to a discussion of standing. Further, as Justice Stevens observed,

the discretion given the executive "does not apply when suit is brought 'to enCourt's summary affirmance of Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971), had answered this question.
Simon, 426 U.S. at 63 n.ll. Although mistaken as to how the Court would answer his question,
Justice Brennan demonstrated some skill in predicting what issues the Court would confront in the
future.
94. Martin Feldstein has conducted a study which concludes that gifts to educational institutions are quite sensitive to the cost of giving. He predicts that an elimination of the charitable
deduction would reduce donations to educational institutions by at least 50%. Feldstein, The Income Tax and CharitableContributions: Part II-The Impact on Religious, Educationaland Other
Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 209, 224 (1975).
95. See Note, Bob Jones University v. United States: Paying the Priceof Prejudice-Lossof Tax
Exempt Status, 35 MERCER L. REv. 937, 958 (1984); see also Coffey v. State Edue. Fin. Comm'n,
296 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (1969) (per curiamn) (private schools formed in response to public school
desegregation operate on the "thinnest financial basis").
96. See supra note 94.
97. See Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3345-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The question whether a particular person is a proper party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise separation of
powers problems related to improper judicial interference in areas committed to other branches of
the Federal Government." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
98. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3329.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

force specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm.' "99
The Court's analysis in support of its conclusion that Norwood v. Harri1
son 00 and Colt v. Green 10 1 are distinguishable from Wright adds to the confusion and harshness of its opinion and gives rise to further criticism. In Norwood
parents of schoolchildren successfully challenged Mississippi's provision of free
textbooks to students attending racially discriminatory schools. Because standing was not specifically discussed in Norwood, the Court in Wright relied on a
footnote in Gilmore v. City ofMontgomery'0 2 to explain the basis for standing in
Norwood: "The plaintiffs in Norwood were parties to a school desegregation order and the relief they sought was directly related to the concrete injury they
suffered." 10 3 The Court inferred from this footnote that plaintiffs in Norwood
had acquired a right to have the State steer clear of supporting a dual educational system through a school desegregation decree and concluded that Wright
was distinguishable as its plaintiffs had not acquired any such injunctive
10 4
rights.
Mississippi's support of racially discriminatory schools by supplying them
free textbooks is analogous to the federal government's support of such schools
through tax exemptions. It hardly seems possible that the "concrete injury"
suffered by plaintiffs in Norwood differed significantly from the injury suffered by
plaintiffs in Wright. Despite the assertion by the Court that the rights of the
plaintiffs in Norwood were derived from a judicial decree, the Norwood opinion
makes it clear that plaintiffs' right to relief was derived from the Constitution:
"A State's constitutional obligation requires it to steer clear, not only of operating the old dual system of racially segregated schools, but also of giving signifi10 5
cant aid to institutions that practice racial or other invidious discrimination."
The Court struggled even more in differentiating standing in Green from
standing in Wright. First, the Court stated that since Green was "merely a summary affirmance" of a lower court holding that did not include a ruling on the
issue of standing, its affirmance "lack[ed] the precedential weight of a case involving a truly adversary controversy."' I 6 Second, the Court stated that Green
was distinguishable from Wright on its facts because Green concerned only Mississippi's public schools and evidence from an earlier Mississippi case had made
it clear that tax support to racially discriminatory schools was having a significant impact on public school desegregation.10 7 Last, the Court asserted that the
"history of school desegregation in Mississippi at the time of the [Green] litigation, the nature of the IRS conduct challenged at the outset of the litigation, and
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 3347 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting from the majority opinion, id. at 3330).
413 U.S. 455 (1973).
404 U.S. 997 (1971).
417 U.S. 556 (1974).
Id. at 570-71 n.10; Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3331.
Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3331.
Norwood, 413 U.S. at 467.
Wright, 104 S.Ct. at 3332.
The case referred to was Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss.

1969) (per curiam), in which plaintiffs successfully challenged Mississippi's grant of tuition tax credits to parents who sent their children to racially discriminatory private schools.
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the District Court's particular findings,
Wright.'0 8

..

amply distinguish[ed]" Green from

Justice Brennan's dissent raised the obvious question to this line of reasoning: How do these factors, specified by the Court as distinguishing Green from
Wright, bear on the issue of standing? Although Wright was a nationwide class
action and Green was limited to Mississippi, this distinction fails to show how
the injury suffered by plaintiffs in Wright was less distinct and palpable, less
traceable to the defendants' unlawful conduct, or less likely to be redressed by a
favorable decision than the injury suffered by plaintiffs in Green. The scope of a
class action is not relevant to the issue of standing.' 0 9 If a history of reluctance
to desegregate public schools is relevant at all to the issue of standing, it "weighs
in favor of allowing [plaintiffs in Wright] to maintain their . . . lawsuit"; 1 10

plaintiffs alleged that the IRS guidelines they challenged contributed to the
"substantial continuation of the onerous history of school segregation in the affected school districts."'
That IRS policy at the time of the Wright litigation differed from IRS policy at the time of the Green litigation also fails to provide a basis for distinguishing the two cases on the issue of standing." 2 Plaintiffs in Wright alleged that
IRS policy was "so ineffective as to be the functional equivalent" of the government's policy at the time of Green.' '3 The Court's use of the finding of the
district court in Green that tax exemptions were important to racially discriminatory schools as a factor in denying standing to similarly situated plaintiffs who
had never had the opportunity to present such evidence to the court made a
"mockery of the standing inquiry."" 4 The Green court's factual findings
strengthen the allegations made by plaintiffs in Wright and support a finding
that plaintiffs had standing. As Justice Brennan noted, the Court's discussion of
the distinctions between Wright and Green "stretches the imagination beyond its
'
breaking point." "

5

The most serious consequence of the Court's decision in Wright, however,
is that it sterilizes the Court's decision in Bob Jones University v. United
States." 6 In Bob Jones the Supreme Court determined that sections 501(c)(3)
and 170 of the Code prohibit the IRS from granting tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools and from allowing donations to such schools to be
considered tax deductible. Wright illustrates that the IRS may escape challenge
108. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3332-33.
109. See id. at 3340 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 3341 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. IRS policy at the time of the Green litigation granted tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools. IRS policy at the time of the Wright litigation purported to deny tax-exempt status
to such schools. See supra note 1.
113. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3340 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). For an analysis and criticism of the Court's failure to reach the
constitutional issues raised in Bob Jones, see Note, ReligiousSchools, PublicPolicy, and the Constitution: Bob Jones University v. United States, 62 N.C.L. REv. 1051 (1984).
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on grounds that it is violating these provisions by merely giving lip service to
the Bob Jones ruling; if the IRS did grant tax-exempt status to Bob Jones University or some other racially discriminatory school, no plaintiff would have
standing under the Court's holding in Wright to challenge the IRS's conduct.
government free to accomplish indirectly what
The Court in essence has left 1the
17
it is forbidden to do directly.
The Court in Wright used causation doctrine as a hammer to knock the
teeth out of Bob Jones and shatter the value of Norwood and Green as precedent
on the issue of standing. Standing doctrine remains shrouded in confusion and
controversy; any court desiring to do so will be able to use the doctrine as its
vehicle for avoiding decisions on the merits of cases in which government conduct is challenged. Although the Court purported to distinguish Wright from
similar cases in which the Court has recognized the standing of the parties, the
Court in fact imposed a harsher test of standing in Wright than it previously had
imposed. The causation standard applied by the Court in Wright exceeds the
scope of the article III requirements and unduly impairs access to the courts by
victims of unlawful goverment conduct. The Court's opinion "'"slam[s] the

courthouse door against plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration of their
claims on the merits"

' "118

and leaves the government free to lend substantial

support to racially discriminatory institutions.
TERESA WYNN ROSEBOROUGH

117. If the government desired to avoid the constitutional requirement that schools be integrated, providing support to racially discriminatory private schools certainly would be among its
chosen methods. The Court's holding in Wright condones this conduct.
118. Wright, 104 S. Ct. at 3333 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
result and dissenting))).

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.: The Requirement of Prior
Criminal Convictions in Private RICO Actions*
In 1970 Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) I for the purpose of providing new and more effective methods
of combatting organized crime in the United States. 2 In addition to criminal
penalties, 3 RICO provided new civil remedies, 4 including a private cause of action under which persons injured in their business or property by a violation of
5
the Act could recover treble damages.
* Shortly before publication of this Note, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit by a 5-4 vote. Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 53 U.S.L.W. 5034 (July 1, 1985), rev'g 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
2. According to the Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose, the purpose of RICO
was "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools
in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
4. See id. § 1964. In addition to the private cause of action for treble damages discussed infra
note 5, § 1964 authorizes the federal district courts to issue injunctions, orders for divestiture of any
interest in any enterprise under the Act, and orders for the dissolution or reorganization of any
enterprise under the Act.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."
The prohibited activities for which treble damages may be awarded under § 1964 are set forth in
§ 1962, which provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful
debt. . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any
enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce ...

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
The conduct prohibited by § 1962 encompasses a wide range of activities because of the broad
manner in which the key term "racketeering activity" is defined. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982),
racketeering activity includes (1) "any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson,
robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year"; (2) activities indictable
under a number of federal statutes, including the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes; (3) activities
indictable under two federal statutes dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations; and (4) offenses involving bankruptcy or securities fraud or dealings in narcotics or other
dangerous drugs. The requirement of a "pattern of racketeering activity" is satisfied by a showing of
two acts of racketeering activity occurring within a 10-year period. Id. § 1961(5).
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The availability of treble damages to plaintiffs injured by violations of
RICO has led to an explosion of private RICO litigation in recent years. 6 In
response to this dramatic increase, some courts have imposed restrictions on the
scope of civil RICO in an attempt to limit claims for which treble damages may
be awarded. The courts that have attempted to limit private RICO claims have
done so by requiring that civil RICO defendants have some connection with
organized crime, 7 that civil RICO plaintiffs suffer a commercial or competitive
injury, 8 or that civil RICO plaintiffs suffer a "racketeering injury." 9
6. Few civil actions for treble damages were brought under § 1964(c) during the first decade of
RICO's existence. As of 1979, only two private RICO cases had been reported. Sylvester, Civil
RICO'sNew Punch, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 1. As recognition has grown of the advantages
RICO offers plaintiffs, however, the number of private RICO suits has increased dramatically, As of
early 1983, over 100 cases had been reported concerning private RICO actions. Id.
The private RICO cause of action offers plaintiffs a number of advantages in addition to the
recovery of treble damages. RICO's liberal discovery, broad venue, and nationwide service of process provisions favor private plaintiffs. Bridges, PrivateRICO Litigation Based Upon "Fraudin the
Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L. REV.43, 46 (1983). Moreover, the threat of treble damages and the
possible stigma of the "racketeer" label are potent weapons in obtaining large settlements of private
RICO claims. Id.
7. See, eg., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 642-44 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Waterman
S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l
Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc,, 66 F.R.D. 109,
113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
In confining the scope of civil RICO to those defendants having some connection to organized
crime, the cases noted above relied on congressional statements indicating that RICO was intended
to be a weapon against organized crime. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The Act itself,
however, contains no requirement that a defendant be affiliated with organized crime. Indeed, Congress specifically rejected attempts to limit RICO's applicability to organized crime because of concerns that such a limitation might impair the effectiveness of the Act and create unconstitutional
status-based offenses. See Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of JudicialRestriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1107-09 (1982). An overwhelming majority of courts has rejected the
view that a civil RICO defendant must be connected with organized crime. See, e.g., Owl Constr.
Co. v. Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc., 727 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118
(1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280
(1984); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 n.6 (7th Cir.
1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063-64 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part on reh'g en banc, 710
F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Morosani v. First Nat'l Bank, 581 F. Supp,
945, 953-54 (N.D. Ga. 1984); Gerace v. Utica Veal Co., 580 F. Supp. 1465, 1468 (N.D.N.Y. 1984);
Willamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1425-26 (D. Or. 1984);
Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1318 (N.D. Ill.
1983); B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Ref.
Co., 577 F. Supp. 339, 347-48 (D.N.J. 1983); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 761 (N.D. Cal.
1983); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255, 269 (W.D. Okla. 1983); In re Action Indus.
Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 850-51 (E.D. Va. 1983); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp.
667, 681-82 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp, 714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983); Austin v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (W.D.Mich. 1983); Ralston
v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1579 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 490-93
(E.D. Pa. 1983); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Windsor Assocs,,
Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273, 276-78 (D. Md. 1983); Hunt Int'l Resources Corp. v. Binstein,
559 F. Supp. 601, 602 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Ill.
1982);
Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal. 1982); D'Iorio v.
Adonizio, 554 F. Supp. 222, 230-31 (M.D. Pa. 1982); Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc, v. Noto,
548 F. Supp. 352, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Gunther v. Dinger, 547 F. Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Engl v. Berg, 511 F.
Supp. 1146, 1154-55 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 64647 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313 (N.D. II. 1979).
8. See North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill.
1980). The requirement of a commercial or competitive injury in civil RICO cases, however, has been rejected by
the vast majority of courts that have considered this issue. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
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In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 10 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit imposed an entirely new restriction on the scope of civil
RICO in treble damage actions. The court held that a private RICO action may
not be brought against a defendant who has not previously been convicted of a
RICO violation or of the predicate offenses that form the basis of the alleged
racketeering activity."I This Note examines the implications of the requirement
741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 901 (1985); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United
Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508, 509 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part
on reh'g en banc, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Kimmel v. Peterson,
565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 564 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Crocker
Nat'l Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Cal. 1982); USACO Coal Co. v.
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir.
1982); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982); Landmark Sav. &
Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Hellenic Lines Ltd.
v. O'Hearn, 523 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
9. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(l), 1962, 1964(c) (1982); see, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), petitionfor cert.filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984) (No. 84-657);
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 901 (1985);
Kaufman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 581 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Willamette Say. &
Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415 (D. Or. 1984); Hudson v. LaRouche, 579 F. Supp.
1983); Dakis v.
623 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 574 F. Supp. 902 (N.D. Ill.
Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1983); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255 (W.D.
Okla. 1983); Richardson v. Shearson/American Express Co., 573 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp.
846 (E.D. Va. 1983); Friedlander v. Nims, 571 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appealdismissed, 747
F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1984); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553
F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd on othergrounds , 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1280 (1984); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l,
Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Cal. 1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower &
Co., 527 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
Based primarily on the rationale discussed infra note 11, the decisions noted above have held
that a civil RICO plaintiff must prove a racketeering injury distinct from the injury caused by the
defendant's predicate acts. A number of courts, however, have rejected the racketeering injury requirement, holding that injury from the defendant's predicate acts alone is sufficient to sustain a
private RICO claim. See, eg., Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 902 (1985); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 508, 509 (1983); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit, 586 F. Supp. 561 (N.D. Cal. 1984);
Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., 581 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 581 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F.
Supp. 1575 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 567 F. Supp. 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J.
1983), aff'd in partand rev'd in part on othergrounds, 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105
S. Ct. 1179 (1985); Crocker Natl Bank v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
10. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 901 (1985).
11. Id. at 503. In addition to the requirement of a prior criminal conviction, the court also
adopted the requirement of a racketeering injury in private RICO actions. Id. at 495; see also supra
note 9 (cases requiring that civil RICO plaintiffs suffer a "racketeering injury"). The court based its
analysis on the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982), which states that to recover treble damages, a
civil RICO plaintiff must prove injury to his business or property "by reason of a violation of section
1962." (emphasis added). Noting that "RICO was intended not simply to provide additional remedies for already compensable injuries" but rather as a method of fighting organized crime, the court
held that "[t]he 'by reason of' language [in the statute] requires that plaintiffs allege injury caused by
an activity which RICO was designed to deter, which, whatever it may be, is different from that
...Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494.
caused simply by [the] predicate acts.
The court further supported its position by analogizing the "by reason of" language in RICO to
identical language in the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982), from which the RICO language was
drawn. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494. Observing that antitrust plaintiffs must allege and prove an " 'anti-
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of a prior criminal conviction in private RICO suits and concludes that such a
requirement is both unsupported by statutory or judicial authority and contrary
to the policy considerations upon which RICO is based.

In 1979 Sedima, S.P.R.L. and Imrex Co. entered into a joint venture to

12
supply electronic component parts to a NATO subcontractor in Belgium.
Under the joint venture agreement, Sedima secured orders for the parts, and
Imrex obtained the parts and shipped them to Europe. Sedima sued alleging

that Imrex had wrongfully received and retained money belonging to the joint
venture by falsely overstating the purchase prices, shipping costs, and finance

charges of the parts purchased for the joint venture. Sedima asserted several
claims, including a private RICO claim based on the predicate acts of mail
fraud 13 and wire fraud 14 and on an alleged RICO conspiracy under section
15
1962(d).

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the RICO counts. 16 The lower court relied on previous RICO decisions
requiring a showing of8 competitive or commercial injury 17 or a showing of a
"racketeering injury"' and held that a civil RICO plaintiff must allege some19
thing more or different than injury resulting from the predicate acts alone.
Because it determined that Sedima had alleged no injury other than that caused
by the predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud, the district court dismissed
trust injury'" or an " 'injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent,' " id. at 494-95
(quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)), the court concluded by analogy that "the 'by reason of' language in section 1964(c) is intended to limit standing
to those injured by a 'racketeering injury,' by an injury of the type RICO was designed to prevent."
Id. at 495. Based on this analysis, the court held that civil RICO plaintiffs must "show injury
different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts themselves, or not simply
caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter." Id.
at 496.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reiterated its position with respect to
the racketeering injury requirement in Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984),
petitionfor cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1984) (No. 84-657), decided the day after
Sedima. The Rhoades panel elaborated on Sedima's analysis and attempted to provide some examples of situations that might constitute racketeering injuries. Id. at 517. Judge Cardamone, who
wrote strong dissents in Sedima and Rhoades,joined with the majority in Furman v. Cirrito, 741
F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), decided the day after Rhoades. The Furman panel acknowledged the stare
decisis effect of Sedima and Rhoades but expressed disagreement with those decisions and reaffirmed
the views expressed in Judge Cardamone's dissents. Id. at 525. By agreement of the court, the
Sedima, Rhoades, and Furman opinions were published in the order in which they were completed,
after the court's denial of en banc consideration of all three cases. Id.
12. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
14. Id. § 1343.
15. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 485. Sedima sought treble damages and attorney's fees under 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see supra note 5 (text of§ 1964(c)). Sedima also alleged breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of the joint venture agreement, conversion,
breach of a constructive trust, and a claim based on quasi-contract. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484.
16. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 482 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985).
17. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
19. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 482
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 901 (1985).
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Sedima's RICO claims. 20
The court of appeals agreed in part with the district court's analysis, holding that a civil RICO plaintiff must allege a "racketeering injury" to maintain a

suit for treble damages. 2 1 In addition, the court held that "a prior criminal

conviction is a prerequisite to a civil RICO action."' 22 Because Imrex had been

convicted neither of a RICO violation nor of the predicate offenses on which
the court held that the RICO claims
Sedima's RICO allegations were based,
dismissed. 2 3

against Imrex must be

The court began its discussion of the prerequisites for civil RICO suits by
disposing of possible impediments to its analysis of the private RICO claim.
First, the court discounted the relevance of the statute's legislative history to

private RICO actions, noting that section 1964(c) was introduced so late in the
legislative process that nearly all congressional discussion concerning the statute
was inapplicable to treble damage actions. 24 Second, the court refused to apply

the "plain meaning rule" 25 of statutory construction to section 1964(c) on the
20. Id.
21. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494-95; see supra note 11 (summary of court's analysis).
22. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
23. Id. at 503-04. The district court did not address whether a prior criminal conviction
against the defendant is required in private RICO actions.
24. Id. at 489. RICO originated in the Senate in 1969 as title IX of Senate Bill 30. S. 30, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. Rac. 769 (1969). Although Senate Bill 30 contained most of the provisions of § 1964, it did not include the treble damage remedy set forth in § 1964(c). Thus, according
to the Sedima court, "any comments in the Senate Report. . . pertaining to RICO's civil remedies
... Sedima,
do not pertain to the scope, impact, or purpose of the private treble damage remedy.
741 F.2d at 489.
The House of Representatives proposed the addition of § 1964(c) to Senate Bill 30. As the
court noted, § 1964(c) received little discussion, either in committee or on the House floor. Id. at
489-92. In addition, the House Report, which did little more than paraphrase the provisions of
§ 1964(c), shed little light on Congress' intent with respect to the private RICO cause of action. See
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4007,
4010 & 4034. The Senate accepted the House's addition of § 1964(c) without requesting a conference.
After its review of RICO's legislative history, the court observed:
The most important and evident conclusion to be drawn from the legislative history is that
the Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section 1964(c). If Congress
had intended to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs for so many common law wrongs, it
would at least have discussed it. If Congress had intended to provide an alternate and
more attractive scheme for private parties to remedy violations of the securites lawsinvolving decades of statutes, regulations, commentaries, and jurisprudence-it would at
least have mentioned it.
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492.
For more extensive discussions of RICO's legislative history, see Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminaland Civil Remedies, 53
TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980); 1 CORNELL INST. ON ORGANIZED CRIME, MATERIALS ON RICO
58-105 (1980-1981).
25. The plain meaning rule "preclude[s] the use of extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning
of a statute, the language of which seem[sJ clear on its face." Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native
Corp., 569 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978). The Supreme Court, however,
has refused to apply the plain meaning rule mechanically, holding that "[w]hen aid to construction
of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law'
which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'" Train v.
Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (quoting United States v. American
Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)). More recently, the Supreme Court stated:
"The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself."
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ground that such an analysis would provide "little or no guidance as to the
handling of the very real ambiguities ...

surrounding the complex statutory

scheme providing for the private civil remedy."' 26 Last, the court distinguished
previous decisions rejecting the requirement of a prior criminal conviction in

private RICO suits, holding
that they did not control disposition of the issues
27
raised in the Sedima case.

Having cleared the way for its analysis of the private RICO claim, the court
examined the language of the statute, scrutinizing in particular certain terms

which suggested that Congress intended to require prior criminal convictions in
civil RICO suits. For example, the court considered the meaning of the word
"violation" in the context of section 1964(c)'s requirement that civil RICO
plaintiffs show injury "by reason of a violation of section 1962." Although acknowledging that other interpretations were possible, the court concluded that

Congress' use of the word "violation" indicated an intent to require prior crimi28
nal convictions in private RICO suits.
Because civil RICO plaintiffs must prove that they have been injured by a
pattern of racketeering activity under section 1962, the court also examined the

meanings of several terms set forth in the definition of "racketeering activity."
Under section 1961(1) racketeering activity is defined to include acts "chargeable" under state law, acts "indictable" under federal law, and "offenses" under
But ascertainment of the meaning apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the
inquiry. This is because the plain-meaning rule is "rather an axiom of experience than a
rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists."
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1981) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Boston Sand Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48
(1928)).
26. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981), a criminal
RICO case, the Supreme Court disapproved of the lower court's departure from the language of the
statute, relying on the plain meaning of RICO to construe the term "enterprise" as used in the
statute. The Sedima court distinguished this use of the plain meaning rule in the criminal RICO
context from the possible use of the rule in construing the "very real ambiguities" of § 1964(c).
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494; see also infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (discussing Turkette's
construction of the term "enterprise").
27. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-98. The principal cases that the court discussed were United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975), and USACO
Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982). See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (discussion of these and other cases rejecting the requirement of a prior criminal conviction in private RICO suits).
28. The court based its analysis of the word "violation" on a comparison of § 1964(c) with the
parallel language of the Clayton Act, on which § 1964(c) was modelled. The Clayton Act provides
that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in
the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . .and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). By contrast, § 1964(c) states that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962" may bring suit for treble damages, attorney's fees, and costs. According to the
court,
The difference [in the language of the statutes] is instructive. It is possible to argue that
"violation" is simply a shorthand way of saying "by reason of anything forbidden," and
one could suppose that [the change in the language of the statute was made] in a desire
merely to eschew surplusage. But this interpretation does not seem as compelling as one
which suggests that the change was made with a specific intent in mind-to require that
conviction at least of the predicate acts be had before a civil suit may be brought by a
private person.
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
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the securities, bankruptcy, and dangerous drug laws.2 9 In the court's view, the
terms "chargeable," "indictable," and "offense" "speak along criminal rather
than civil lines" 30 and add force to the argument that Congress intended to re31
quire prior criminal convictions in civil RICO actions.

The court, however, did not rest its decision solely on interpretation of the
statutory language. Rather, it held that "[t]he structure of RICO as a whole
leads one to the narrower interpretation requiring criminal convictions by a

more direct route."'32 The court premised this argument on the proposition that
"RICO liability simply does not exist without criminal conduct," 33 since the
purpose of the Act was "to provide new penalties and remedies to combat conduct which explicitly has already been found criminal."' 34 In the court's view,
RICO's purpose of combatting activity already found to be criminal would be

frustrated in civil actions in which no prior criminal conviction was required,
because a civil action would be inadequate to determine whether specific conduct already was criminal.3 5 In addition, the court noted that in the absence of
29. See supra note 5.
30. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 499.
31. The court used the example of a civil action for securities fraud to illustrate this point. In
such a civil case, the court reasoned, a defendant could not be said to have committed an "offense,"
conviction of which would require criminal scienter and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because
such a result would be anomalous in a civil action for securities fraud, the court found it "hard to
believe that in adopting civil RICO Congress intended to permit proof of 'willful' violations by only
a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
With respect to the use of the terms "chargeable" and "indictable," the court found it conceivable that Congress intended no requirement of prior informations or indictments in civil RICO actions, since the predicate acts constituting the racketeering activity need only be "chargeable" or
"indictable." According to the court, however,
a plausible alternative view of the words "indictable" and "chargeable," found in RICO's
definitional section, is that Congress did not intend to give civil courts the power to determine whether an act is "indictable" in the absence of a properly returned indictment or
"chargeable" absent an information. Courts do not traditionally look at a given set of
facts-proved by a preponderance of the evidence only-and say that these facts make out
acts which are "indictable" or "chargeable." . . . In the case of indictments that is the
purpose of grand juries. The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a grand jury .... " Surely, being declared a "racketeer" or being held responsible for
being one is being held to "answer for" an "infamous crime." Whatever else one may
think of grand juries or the process by which they pursue their deliberations, they may
stand as a bulwark between the individual and the government. Under the interpretation
given RICO by those courts which do not require criminal convictions of the predicate acts
before the bringing of a civil action, every private plaintiff becomes his own one-person
grand jury, or in the case of state felonies chargeable by information, his own prosecutor.
Id. at 500.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 501.
34. Id. at 500. In support of this proposition, the court relied on a statement in an article
coauthored by Professor G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel of the Senate subcommittee that proposed
RICO and an advocate of broad construction of the statute. In discussing the congressional mandate that RICO be liberally construed, the authors observed that "RICO did not draw a line between
criminal and innocent conduct. Instead, RICO authorized the imposition of different civil or criminal remedies on conduct already criminal, when performed in a specified fashion." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 24, at 1032. Elsewhere in the article, the authors noted that "RICO is not a
criminal statute; it does not make criminal conduct that before its enactment was not already prohibited, since its application depends on the existence of 'racketeering activity' that violates an independent criminal statute." Id. at 1021 n.71.
35. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501. This view is analogous to the court's argument based on the
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prior criminal convictions, civil RICO actions would raise problems with respect

to the standard of proof to be applied 36 and the congressional mandate that
RICO be liberally construed. 37 The court concluded that a private RICO action
may not be maintained against a defendant who has not previously been con-

victed of a RICO violation or of the predicate offenses forming the basis of the
38
alleged racketeering activity.

Judge Cardamone filed a strong dissent in Sedima. He disagreed with the
majority's assumption that civil RICO defendants are entitled to the expertise
and procedural safeguards of the criminal system because RICO is an inherently
criminal statute.39 He also objected to the majority's attempt to distinguish con-

trary case law 4° and the majority's interpretation of the terms "indictable,"
"chargeable," and "violation." '4 1 In Judge Cardamone's view, the majority's requirement of prior criminal convictions in private RICO suits effectively deprived racketeering victims of the remedy that Congress intended them to have.
Regardless of whether a defendant is a member of an organized crime
family and no matter how lawless his pattern of racketeering activity
may be, if he escapes conviction-through acquittal, a beneficial plea,
meanings of the terms "chargeable" and "indictable." See supra note 31. Both arguments rely on
the premise that some binding and explicit determination of the criminality of a RICO defendant's
conduct must be made before such a defendant may be held civilly liable for his racketeering actvity.
This requirement creates problems in private RICO actions, since courts in civil cases cannot make
binding and explicit determinations of the criminality of particular conduct. The court's consideration of this conflict between the requirements of the civil and criminal systems led it to "conclude
that had Congress considered this problem, it would have explicitly required previously established
convictions in the context of section 1964(c)." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501.
36. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501-02. The court's burden of proof argument is based on the premise
that the operation of RICO is limited to punishment of criminal conduct; under this view, the conduct of a RICO defendant first must be found criminal to fall within the ambit of the statute. Given
this premise, the court reasoned that in the absence of a prior criminal conviction, a civil RICO
plaintiff must prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. Because there was no evidence that Congress intended such a scheme of proof in civil RICO actions, the court concluded that "Congress
expected the criminality of the predicate acts to be proved before the private action went forwardthat a criminal conviction must precede a private civil suit." Id. at 502.
37. Id. at 502-03. Congress directed that "[tihe provisions of [RICO] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947. According to the court, if civil RICO claims were allowed in the
absence of a prior criminal conviction, this clause mandating liberal construction would conflict with
the due process requirement that criminal statutes be strictly construed. In the court's view, liberal
construction of the statute in civil actions not based on prior criminal convictions would deprive
RICO defendants of their due process right to have the criminality of their conduct determined
under strict construction of the applicable statutes. The court opined that "had Congress considered
the [liberal construction] problem, it would have intended criminal convictions of at least the predicate crimes as a prerequisite for a civil RICO action." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 502.
38. In the words of the court, "To bring a private civil action [under RICO], there must be a
'violation,' that is, criminal convictions on the underlying predicate offenses. Of course, a conviction
under RICO itself will do, a fortiori." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 503.
39. Id. at 506-08 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). Judge Cardamone rejected the view that private
RICO actions are criminal or quasi-criminal under applicable Supreme Court precedents. See infra
notes 75-83 and accompanying text. Thus, in his view, civil RICO defendants are not entitled to the
same protections afforded defendants in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings. Judge Cardamone
argued that even if private RICO actions are viewed as criminal or quasi-criminal, such a finding
should not mandate the requirement of a prior criminal conviction, since any necessary procedural
safeguards could be afforded a defendant in the civil proceeding.
40. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 504-05 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 505-06, 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).

1985]

CIVIL RICO ACTIONS

1041

or a decision not to prosecute-then
the remedy granted the victim of
42

these activities is lost.

The Sedima requirement of prior criminal convictions in private RICO ac-

tions marks an entirely new direction in civil RICO jurisprudence. The prior
conviction requirement does not appear in the statute,43 and the legislative history contains no indication that Congress intended to impose such a requirement. 44 Moreover, every case prior to Sedima that had considered the issue had
45
held that no prior criminal conviction is required in private RICO suits.
As the majority observed,4 6 few of the cases rejecting the prior conviction
requirement have supported their position with extensive analysis. United States
v. Cappetto,4 7 which the Sedima court distinguished, frequently has been cited to
support the proposition that prior criminal convictions are not required in pri-

vate RICO actions.4 8 Although Cappetto did not deal specifically with this issue, 4 9 its recognition of the independence of RICO's civil remedies from its

criminal penalties50 led many courts to reject the prior conviction requirement.
42. Id. at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
43. See supra note 5.
44. This is hardly surprising given the dearth of legislative history relating to § 1964(c). See
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
45. See, eg., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir.
1983); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982); In re Longhorn See.
Litig., 573 F. Supp. 255 (W.D. Okla. 1983); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1983);
Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Kaushal v. State
Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Lode v. Leonardo, 557 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. Ill.
1982); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1982);
Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487
F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Inl. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill.
1979); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Del. 1978).
Although the majority stated that courts had split on whether prior criminal convictions are
necessary in private RICO actions, Sedima, 741 F.2d at 493, no case before Sedima had held that
prior convictions are required. Two of the cases the majority cited in support of its proposition
merely noted in dicta that prior criminal convictions might be required. See Van Schaick v. Church
of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137-38 n.12 (D. Mass. 1982) ("While it is difficult for us to
conclude that Congress, in using the words 'indictable' and 'punishable' contemplated that civil
liability could result without involvement of the criminal process, other courts have done so.");
Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank, 526 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("It may well be that
entitlement to the civil remedy of section 1964 should be conditioned upon a criminal conviction or
at least an indictment. However, the Court need not reach this issue here.").
46. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 497.
47. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
48. Many of the cases cited supra note 45 relied on Cappetto in rejecting the prior conviction
requirement.
49. Cappetto involved a civil action brought by the government under § 1964 for injunctive
relief and divestiture. Although it did not discuss the necessity of prior criminal convictions in civil
RICO actions, the Cappetto court rejected the contention that § 1964 actions are essentially criminal
proceedings that entitle defendants to the constitutional rights afforded in criminal cases. The
Sedima majority distinguished Cappetto on the ground that it dealt solely with governmental actions
and thus had no bearing on private RICO suits for treble damages. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-97.
50. The Cappetto court stated that
acts which may be prohibited by Congress may be made the subject of both criminal and
civil proceedings, and the prosecuting arm of the government may be authorized to elect
whether to bring a civil or criminal action, or both. A civil proceeding to enjoin those acts
is not rendered criminal in character by the fact that the acts also are punishable as crimes.
Cappetto, 502 F.2d at 1357.
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For example, in USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc."1 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied on Cappetto in determining that

Congress did not intend to limit liability under section 1964(c) to defendants
previously convicted of criminal charges. 52 In Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United

Business Forms, Inc. 53 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit cited both Cappetto and USACO Coal Co. in rejecting arguments for the

prior conviction
requirement strikingly similar to those successfully advanced in
54

Sedima.
Judge Cardamone in his dissent in Sedima suggested that there was an "ob-

viously simple explanation for [these courts'] resounding rejection of any prior
conviction requirement-it does not appear in the statute."15 5

Judge

Cardamone's point is well taken given that RICO contains no explicit requirement of prior criminal convictions in treble damage actions. It is a familiar
axiom that "[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute
is the language itself."'5 6 It is likely that the courts that rejected the prior con51. 689 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1982).
52. The court stated:
We find nothing in the plain language of RICO to suggest that civil liability under
§ 1964(c) is limited only to those already convicted or charged with criminal racketeering
activity. Section 1964(c) states that an action for damages may be maintained by any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of § 1962. . . . Section
1962 merely describes acts that are "unlawful" under RICO. Section 1963 provides that
violations of § 1962 are criminal, just as § 1964(c) provides that violations of § 1962 create
a private right of action for damages. If Congress had intended to limit liability under
§1964(c) only to those convicted of or charged with RICO crimes, it would have done so
within § 1964(c) by referring to § 1963 or by otherwise specifically indicating that a conviction under § 1963 is a basis for civil damages. By referring in § 1964(c) only to the unlawful acts of § 1962, Congress has created a civil remedy that is independent of criminal
proceedings under § 1963. We believe this literal reading of RICO is consistent with the
approach of United States v. Turkette. . . and the Supreme Court's recognition in that
case that Congress intended that RICO be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes.
Id. at 95 n.l. The Sedima court labelled this argument "misguided," observing that "[i]f Congress
had referred to section 1963 in section 1964(c), the result would have been not only to require
criminal convictions for the predicate acts before bringing a civil suit, but to require a conviction
under RICO." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 497-98. In the court's view, "people injured by 'racketeering
activity' [/e., predicate acts] may sue. . . whether or not the government has brought an action
under RICO to punish that activity. As to whether that racketeering activity itself must already
have been proven criminal. . . the reference to section 1962 in section 1964(c) provides no indication." Id. at 498.
53. 713 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 1983).
54. The Bunker Ramo court noted:
Defendants argue that "violation" as used in section 1962 must mean "conviction." Defendants point out that the treble damages provision of RICO differs from section 4 of the
Clayton Act which provides treble damages for injury to business or property "by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." According to defendants, this difference in language indicates that a criminal conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1963 for violating section
1962 is an essential element for civil liability under section 1964(c). Defendants also argue
that section 1962 is a criminal statute and Congress did not intend a charge of criminal
conduct to be adjudicated in a civil proceeding.
Id. at 1287. The court rejected these arguments, holding that "section 1964(c) creates a private right
of action for parties injured by conduct that violates section 1962 without any requirement of a prior
criminal conviction for that conduct." Id.
55. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
56. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, 1., concurring).
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viction requirement with little discussion simply concluded that the plain language of RICO fully disposed of the issue and obviated the need for further

inquiry.
The Supreme Court adopted substantially this approach to construing
RICO in United States v. Turkette.57 Turkette, a criminal RICO case, involved
the question whether the term "enterprise" as used in RICO 58 included both

legitimate and illegitimate enterprises.

In construing the provisions of RICO,

the Supreme Court began its inquiry with the language of the statute, stating:

"In determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative

intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' "59 The Court held that the language of RICO alone controlled interpretation of the term "enterprise," which must be construed to include both
legitimate and illegitimate enterprises in the absence of any explicit definitional
6°
limitation on the face of the statute.

If the Sedima court had followed the Turkette analysis, it would have concluded that no prior criminal conviction is required in private RICO actions,
since such a requirement does not appear on the face of the statute.6 1 The court,
however, expressly declined to follow Turkette on the ground that section

1964(c) presented ambiguities that could not be resolved by resort to the plain

meaning of the statutory language. 62 Because there was no legislative history to

indicate Congress' intent with respect to the prior conviction requirement, 63 the
court supplied its own interpretation of the statute based on its opinion as to

what Congress would have intended had it considered the need for prior convictions in private RICO actions.
The court relied in part upon interpretation of the statutory terms "viola57. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
58. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982), an "'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in
fact although not a legal entity."
59. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580 (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
60. The Court observed:
On its face, the definition [of "enterprise" under § 1961(4)] appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises
than it does legitimate ones. Had Congress not intended to reach criminal associations, it
could easily have narrowed the sweep of the definition by inserting a single word, "legitimate." But it did nothing to indicate that an enterprise consisting of a group of individuals
was not covered by RICO if the purpose of the enterprise was exclusively criminal.
Id. at 580-81.
61. Some of the courts rejecting the prior-conviction requirement in § 1964(c) actions have
relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Turkette. See, eg., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982) (construction of RICO rejecting the prior-conviction
requirement is consistent with Turkette's approach); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of
Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
62. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494, 503.
63. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Under the Turkette analysis, see supra text accompanying note 59, the Sedima court had to rely on asserted ambiguities in the statute to reject the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction, since there was no clearly expressed legislative intent
contrary to the language of the statute.
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tion," "chargeable," "indictable," and "offense" to support its finding that prior

convictions are required in private RICO suits. In the court's view, Congress'
use of these words in the statute evinced an intent to require prior convictions in

actions brought under section 1964(c). 64
The court's analysis on this point is not persuasive. For example, contrary
to the court's suggestion, 6 5 the term "violation" does not necessarily connote
criminal activity. In its ordinary usage, "violation" means an infringement or

breach of law. 66 All infringements or breaches of the law do not, of course,
result in criminal liability or conviction. Because the definition of "violation" is
not synonymous with "conviction," most courts have rejected the argument that
section 1964(c)'s reference to a "violation" of section 1962 requires prior convictions in private RICO suits. 67

The court's interpretation of the terms "chargeable" and "indictable" as
used in section 1961 is similarly misguided. The court argued that, in the RICO
context, these words must be interpreted to require the actual issuance of an
indictment or information by a criminal court prior to any civil RICO proceed-

ings, since courts in civil actions ordinarily do not determine whether particular
conduct is "chargeable" or "indictable" in the absence of a previous information
or indictment. 68 As Judge Cardamone observed, however, an indictable or
chargeable act generally is defined not as an act "for which an indictment or
information has been returned orfiled,"69 but rather as an act for which a defendant may be indicted or charged. 70 Because "indictable" and "chargeable"

connote only the possibility of an indictment or information, the use of these
terms in RICO provides no support for the argument that Congress intended to

make criminal proceedings a prerequisite to the maintenance of a section 1964(c)
1
action.

7

64. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-500.
65. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
66. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1408 (5th ed. 1979).
67. See, eg., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 (7th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument "that 'violation' as used in section 1962 must mean 'conviction' "); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576, 579 n.9 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (noting that the
term "violation" must be understood in a civil context and that private RICO plaintiffs need allege
only a prima facie violation of § 1962); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that "violation is not tantamount to conviction" under § 1964(c)).
68. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
69. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505. (Cardamone, L, dissenting).
70. "Indictable" means "[slubject to being indicted." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (5th ed.
1979). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "chargeable" only in its civil sense, "as applicable to the
imposition of a duty or burden." Id. at 211.
71. Even if the majority's arguments with respect to the terms "chargeable" and "indictable"
were accepted, they would not support the requirement of prior criminal convictions in private
RICO suits. Assuming arguendo that "chargeable" and "indictable" may be redefined to require the
issuance of an information or indictment, an information or indictment cannot be equated with
conviction of the alleged offense; "information" and "indictment" are not synonymous with "conviction," which the court found to be a prerequisite to a § 1964(c) action.
The court may be on firmer ground with respect to its analysis of the word "offense" as used in
§ 1961(1). See supra note 31. An offense is defined as:
A felony or misdemeanor; a breach of the criminal laws. The word "offense," while sometimes used in various senses, generally implies a felony or a misdemeanor infringing public
as distinguished from mere private rights, and punishable under the criminal laws, though
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As previously discussed, the majority's decision to require prior convictions
in private RICO actions also was based on the view that RICO is an entirely
criminal statute designed to punish conduct that already has been found criminal. 72 Because civil proceedings could neither determine the criminality of particular conduct 73 nor provide the procedural safeguards required in criminal
actions, 74 the court concluded that prior convictions are required to ensure that
private RICO defendants receive the benefits and protections of the criminal
system.
Judge Cardamone rejected the fundamental premise of the majority's analysis, stating that RICO "does not require civil courts to determine that the RICO
predicate acts are in fact criminal acts. All that need be determined is that they
are acts which, if proved by the government in a criminal proceeding, would
subject the violator to criminal sanctions."7 5s The statute itself contains no prior
conviction requirement, no requirement that a civil RICO defendant's conduct
be "already criminal," and no requirement that the civil courts determine the
criminality of a defendant's conduct. In short, the majority's reasoning in support of the prior conviction requirement is based not upon the provisions of the
statute, but rather upon its own implicit assumption that RICO, including its
civil provisions, is an inherently criminal statute enacted for the sole purpose of
combatting explicitly criminal activity.
The court's erroneous view of civil RICO as an inherently criminal statute
results from its focusing upon the nature of the predicate activity rather than the
effect and sanctions of section 1964(c) itself. The acts of racketeering set forth in
section 1961(1) are crimes when proved by the government in a criminal proceeding. In such a criminal proceeding, a defendant accused of committing any
of the section 1961(1) racketeering acts would be entitled to the procedural safeguards traditionally guaranteed in criminal actions. This fact is immaterial in
section 1964(c) suits, however, because civil RICO actions do not subject defendants to criminal prosecution. Even though a civil RICO defendant's conduct might be found criminal in a criminal proceeding, such conduct can give
rise to no criminal liability in a civil RICO action. Because there is no risk of
criminal liability in civil RICO actions, there is no need for criminal procedural
it may also include the violation of a criminal statute for which the remedy is merely a civil
suit to recover the penalty.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 975 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, it is arguable that the reference in § 1961(1)
to "offenses" under the securities, bankruptcy, and dangerous drug laws indicates a need for prior
criminal adjudication to determine whether a defendant's alleged conduct is actually an "offense,"
le., a felony or a misdemeanor. Even if this result is correct, however, it would not affect the disposition of Sedima, since defendants in Sedima were not alleged to have committed any "offenses"
under the securities, bankruptcy, or dangerous drug laws.
72. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500.
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
74. The procedural safeguards that the court discussed were the criminal standard of proof and
the requirement of strict construction of criminal statutes. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying
text. In the court's view, the absence of such procedural safeguards in civil litigation could result in
a denial of due process to civil RICO defendants against whom no prior criminal conviction had
been obtained. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 502.
75. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 505 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
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safeguards and no reason to require that a defendant's conduct be pronounced
criminal by a court qualified to make such a determination.

It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the nature of a defendant's predicate activity is not dispositive of the question whether a suit under section
1964(c) is an inherently criminal action that triggers the need for traditional
criminal safeguards. If private RICO actions are to be viewed as inherently

criminal, this conclusion must be based upon the provisions of section 1964(c)
itself and not upon the nature of the underlying predicate offenses.

It is true, of course, that "Congress may not, by labeling a proceeding civil,
foreclose inquiry into the true nature of the proceeding."' 76 To ensure that defendants receive the procedural safeguards and protections to which they are
entitled, courts may look beyond Congress' denomination of a statute as civil to
determine whether it is in fact criminal in nature. 77 If such a statute is found to
be essentially criminal, a defendant in a suit under the statute will be entitled to
the procedural safeguards required in criminal proceedings, including sixth
amendment rights, a criminal standard of proof, and protections against selfincrimination and double jeopardy.

78

The classification of particular penalties as either civil or criminal depends
upon construction of the applicable statute. 79 In United States v. Ward80 the

Supreme Court developed a two-part test for determining whether statutory
penalties are essentially civil or criminal. 8'
First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing
76. Note, Enforcing CriminalLaws Through Civil Proceedings: Section 1964 of the Organized
Crime ControlActof.1970, 18 U.S. C.§ 1964 (1970), 53 TEX. L. REv. 1055, 1059 (1975) (citing Boyd
v.United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
77. Ostensibly civil statutes also may be found quasi-criminal in some circumstances. See
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). As commentators have observed, the criteria for a finding of quasi-criminality are "(1) the triggering of the
statute by 'the commission of offenses against the law;' (2) the nature of the penalty; and (3) the
purpose of the penalty." Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 Am.CRIM. L. REV. 655, 708 (1982) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 634 (1886)). A determination of quasi-criminality entitles a defendant to the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination but does not "trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment,
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the other procedural guarantees normally
associated with criminal prosecutions." Ward, 448 U.S. at 253.
With respect to the Sedima decision, it is unnecessary to analyze § 1964(c) under the criteria set
forth above. As previously noted, the prior conviction requirement was based on the court's view
that civil RICO suits are inherently criminal actions which require that a defendant be afforded
criminal precedural safeguards. The court did not suggest that prior criminal convictions would be
required upon a finding of mere quasi-criminality in civil RICO actions. Moreover, the procedural
safeguards to which the court found civil RICO defendants to be entitled-the criminal standard of
proof and the requirement of strict statutory construction-would not be available upon a finding of
quasi-criminality, since defendants in quasi-criminal actions are entitled only to protection against
self-incrimination. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 253-54.
78. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
79. Id.
80. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
81. In addition to actions deemed criminal under the two-part Ward test discussed infra notes
82-83 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court has held that criminal procedural safeguards may
be required in some civil actions involving injury to a defendant's reputation. In In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), for example, the Court held that the possible loss of liberty and injury to reputation
resulting from an adjudication of delinquency entitled the juvenile against whom the proceeding was
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the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for [either the civil or criminal] label. . . . Second, where
Congress has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we
have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was
so punitive
82
either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention.
In determining whether a statute's purpose or effect is sufficiently punitive to
negate its intended civil nature, the Court has stated that it is helpful to consider
the "tests traditionally applied to determine whether an Act of Congress is penal
'8 3
or regulatory in character."

Application of the Ward test to section 1964(c) demonstrates that RICO's
provision for treble damages is not a criminal penalty entitling private RICO

defendants to the procedural safeguards of the criminal system. Under the first
part of the test, it is clear that Congress expressed a preference for the "civil"

label in private RICO actions by placing section 1964(c) within the section of the
statute entitled "civil remedies."' 84 In addition, private RICO actions must be
brought to certain procedural safeguards, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right
to confront witnesses, and the right to counsel.
Although the Court in Gault relied in part upon the possible stigma that might result from an
adjudication of delinquency, its primary reason for requiring criminal procedural safeguards in the
ostensibly civil proceeding was the juvenile's potential loss of liberty. As one commentator has
noted, the requirement of criminal procedural safeguards generally does not extend to actions that
threaten injury to reputation but do not involve a potential loss of liberty. Comment, Organized
Crime and the Infiltrationof Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "CriminalActivity, " 124 U. PA.
L. REv. 192, 213-15 (1975). Thus, defendants in § 1964(c) actions, who may suffer injury to reputation and the stigma of being labelled a racketeer, probably would not be entitled to criminal procedural safeguards under the Gault analysis, since § 1964(c) actions involve no potential loss of liberty.
The potential "loss of liberty, together with the more compelling policy reasons for protecting a
juvenile's reputation than for protecting that of a racketeer, sufficiently distinguishes Gault from a
section 1964 case to rule out a claim of damaged reputation as a sufficient basis for a claim of...
constitutional protection under section 1964." Id. at 214-15; cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712
(1976) (injury to reputation, even when inflicted by officer of state, does not, by itself, constitute
deprivation of liberty or property so as to invoke due process safeguards guaranteed by fourteenth
amendment).
82. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S.
Ct. 1099, 1106 (1984) (applying Ward test).
83. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). Under Mendoza-Martinez, the
tests for determining whether a statute is punitive or regulatory are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding ofscienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned ....
Id. at 168-69. The Court noted in Mendoza-Martinez that all of the above factors are relevant in
determining whether a statute is punitive or regulatory, and they "may often point in differing directions." Id. at 169. The Court has used the Mendoza-Martinez factors in applying the two-part Ward
test but has noted that these factors are neither exhaustive nor dispositive. See United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1106 (1984); Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
84. The Court held in Ward that Congress' denomination of a sanction imposed under the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act as a civil penalty left "no doubt that Congress intended to
allow imposition of [the penalty] without regard to the procedural protections and restrictions available in criminal prosecutions." Ward, 448 U.S. at 249. The Court found that the "civil" label took
on added significance in view of its juxtaposition with the criminal penalties set forth in the immediately preceding section. Id. A similar juxtaposition is present in RICO, in which § 1964 is immediately preceded by § 1963, which sets forth criminal penalties for RICO violations.
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regarded as civil under the second part of the Ward test because neither the

purpose nor the effect of section 1964(c) is so punitive as to negate Congress'
intention that its remedies be civil. As stated by Congress, the purpose of RICO
is remedial, 85 its aim being to eliminate organized crime in the United States.86
Section 1964(c) serves the additional remedial purpose of compensating victims
of racketeering activity. Moreover, the sanctions imposed on defendants in pri-

vate RICO actions are not sufficiently punitive to require that section 1964(c) be
regarded as criminal. Civil RICO defendants are not subject to restraint or incarceration, but rather to payment of treble damages upon a finding of liability.
Although such treble damages arguably may be regarded as partially punitive

and may serve a traditional aim of punishment by deterring racketeering activ87
ity,

they also serve the important purpose of compensating persons who have

been injured as a result of racketeering activity. Finally, as the Supreme Court
has indicated, the fact that conduct subject to civil liability also may be punished
as a crime does not, of itself, convert a civil remedy into a criminal sanction. 88
Whether RICO's civil provisions are essentially criminal has not been
widely discussed. Most authorities that have addressed this question have con85. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947.
86. See supra note 2. The fact that a statute's purpose is to eliminate crime does not prevent it
from being remedial. In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099 (1984), for
example, the Court considered whether a firearms forfeiture provision first promulgated under the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and later made part of the Gun Control Act of
1968 was essentially civil or criminal. Applying the Ward test, the Court determined that the forfeiture provision was essentially civil, observing that "[k]eeping potentially dangerous weapons out of
the hands of unlicensed dealers is a goal plainly more remedial than punitive." Id. at 1106.
87. Courts have split on whether multiple damages are punitive or remedial. See, e.g., John
Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding treble damages under
antitrust laws basically remedial, notwithstanding their punitive and deterrent effect); Adler v.
Northern Hotel Co., 175 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1949) (holding treble damages under Housing and Rent
Act remedial); Bowles v. Farmers Nat'l Bank, 147 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1945) (if sum exacted is greatly
disproportionate to actual loss, it constitutes penalty rather than damages); Sullivan v. Associated
Billposters & Distribs. of United States & Canada, 6 F.2d 1000, 1009 (2d Cir. 1925) ("If a statute
which is penal in part gives a remedy for an injury to the person injured to the extent that it gives
such a remedy it is a remedial statute, irrespective of whether it limits the recovery to the amount of
actual loss sustained or as cumulative damages as compensation for the injury."); Wahba v. H & N
Prescription Center, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (observing that treble damages and
punitive damages share common functions in that both are penalties imposed to punish offenders
and deter future offenses); Aretz v. United States, 456 F. Supp. 397, 408 (S.D. Ga. 1978) ("The fact
that damages are accumulated or enhanced does not in itself render them penal."), aff'd, 604 F.2d
417 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehg en banc, 660 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Countryside Farms, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Utah 1977) (treble damages are punishment but not criminal
punishment); Porter v. Household Fin. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 336, 341 (S.D. Ohio 1974) ("[A] liability
is not penal merely because greater than 'actual' damages are imposed."); Erie Basin Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 561 (Ct. Cl. 1957) ("[TIhe fact that a statute grants the right of
assessment of treble damages does not make an action on the statute a penal one. . ."); Wolf Sales
Co. v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 105 F. Supp. 506 (D. Colo. 1952) (treble damages under antitrust
laws not penal, but compensatory and remedial); see also Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the
Anti-trust Act Penal or Compensatory?, 28 Ky. L.J. 117 (1940) (most courts hold treble damages
under antitrust laws remedial rather than penal).
In this regard, it should be noted that Congress has provided for multiple damages in other
kinds of civil actions, such as suits brought under the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), the false
claims statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982), and the odometer requirements statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1989
(1982).
88. See, eg., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1107 (1984);
Ward, 448 U.S. at 250.
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sidered the criminality issue in the context of civil RICO proceedings brought by
the government for injunctive relief, divestiture, or dissolution under section
1964(a) or (b). 89 These authorities have concluded that civil RICO actions instituted by the government are not criminal proceedings that entitle a defendant to
the procedural safeguards afforded by the criminal system. 9o
The court in Sedima declined to follow the reasoning of these authorities,
observing that a determination that civil RICO actions brought by the government are not criminal does not resolve the question whether purely private
RICO actions are criminal. 9 1 This observation is misguided, however, since the
rationale the court rejected applies with even greater force to RICO suits instituted by private plaintiffs. For purposes of determining whether RICO's civil
provisions are inherently criminal, there is no analytic difference between private

and governmental actions under section 1964; both private and governmental

92
actions involve penalties for conduct that also might be punished as a crime.

There is even less reason to afford defendants criminal procedural safeguards in
private RICO actions than in governmental actions because private actions do

not involve the government as a party. As Judge Cardamone observed, defendants in purely private actions ordinarily are not entitled to greater protection
93
than defendants in actions to which the government is a party.

Because private RICO actions are neither inherently criminal nor subject to
the procedural requirements of the criminal system, there is no basis for the
court's position that prior criminal convictions must be required to ensure that
defendants have the benefit of the criminal standard of proof 94 and strict statutory construction. 9 5 In actions such as private RICO suits, which are not inher89. But see Windsor Assocs., Inc. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273 (D. Md. 1983) (rejecting
argument that private RICO action was essentially criminal proceeding). In Greenfeld, defendants
in a private RICO action attacked the constitutionality of § 1964(c), arguing that the statute was
inherently criminal and did not provide the constitutional protections required in criminal proceedings, including the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to indictment by a grand jury.
Relying on United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975), discussed supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text, the court rejected this argument on the
ground that a civil proceeding is not rendered criminal by the fact that the prohibited activity also is
punishable as a crime. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. at 281. The court further observed that the defendants' argument could be asserted against any statute that provides for both civil and criminal enforcement, including the undoubtedly constitutional antitrust laws. Id.
90. See United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); Note, supra note 76; Comment, supra note 81. But cf Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, supra
note 77, at 708-09 (suggesting that § 1964 might be found quasi-criminal in some circumstances).
91. The court in Sedima found the Cappetto reasoning inapplicable to § 1964(c) actions, since
Cappetto involved a civil RICO action brought by the government. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496-97.
92. Thus, the requirement in Sedima of prior criminal convictions in civil RICO suits would
appear to apply to governmental as well as private actions, even though the Sedima holding was
restricted to private RICO suits. See id. at 503.
93. Id. at 504-05 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). In this regard, it is interesting to note that the
Supreme Court decisions considering the criminality or punitive nature of ostensibly civil statutes
generally have involved actions to which the government was a party. See, eg., United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 104 S. Ct. 1099 (1984); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); One
Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 148 (1956); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
94. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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ently criminal, neither proof beyond a reasonable doubt 96 nor strict construction
98
97
of the applicable statutes is required.

The requirement in Sedima of prior criminal convictions in private RICO
actions marks a significant and erroneous departure from established precedent.
Initially, the court erred by failing to follow the Supreme Court's criteria for

construction of RICO set forth in United States v. Turkette. If the court had
followed the Turkette analysis, it would have been unable to insert into RICO a

restriction on treble damage actions that has no support either in the statute or
its legislative history. Instead, however, the court created "ambiguities" in the
statute, which it then resolved by redefining key statutory terms and holding

that civil RICO actions are inherently criminal proceedings that entitle defendants to criminal procedural safeguards.
The questionable reasoning in Sedima, however, is not as disturbing as its
result. By requiring prior criminal convictions in private RICO actions, the decision strikes a serious blow against private persons who are injured by racketeering activity. Under the rule of Sedima, the right of private plaintiffs to bring
actions under section 1964(c) depends upon the success of the criminal justice
system insecuring convictions against potential civil RICO defendants. In view

of the possibility of plea bargains and decisions not to prosecute, as well as the
high standard of proof required in criminal proceedings, the prior conviction

requirement may present an insurmountable obstacle to many private plaintiffs
with legitimate claims for racketeering injuries.
In enacting RICO, Congress explicitly indicated that the statute was
designed to serve broad remedial purposes. By severely restricting the scope of

section 1964(c), the court's prior conviction requirement violates Congress' intent and frustrates the purposes for which the statute was enacted. Indeed, in
the words of the court itself, the requirement of prior criminal convictions in
private RICO actions "make[s] a hash" 99 of the congressional mandate that
RICO be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.
JANE WYLIE SAUNDERS

96. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (government need not prove its case beyond
a reasonable doubt in civil proceedings); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914) (proof beyond a
reasonable doubt required only in criminal cases).
97. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (in cases that do not involve criminal prosecutions,
strict statutory construction not required); Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S.
356, 375 (1973) (not "every section of an act establishing a broad regulatory scheme must be construed as a 'penal' provision. . . merely because two sections of the Act provide for civil and criminal penalties"); see also Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968) ("[R]emedial statutes should be
liberally construed."); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) ("[R]emedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.").
98. As Judge Cardamone observed, even if criminal procedural safeguards were found to be
required in private RICO actions, such a finding would not necessitate the requirement of a prior
conviction, since any necessary protection could be afforded a defendant in the civil action itself.
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 506 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 502.

Tice v. Department of Transportation: A Declining Role
for the Attorney General?
In North Carolina, as in most states, the rights and powers inherent in the
Office of the Attorney General have been established and defined by the common law and by constitutional and statutory provisions.' One of the powers
widely held to vest in the Office is the prerogative to manage and control litigation involving state and public interests. 2 In Tice v. Department of Transportation3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals announced an exception to this
general principle, holding void a consent judgment entered into by an assistant
attorney general. In Tice an assistant attorney general had represented defendant Department of Transportation (DOT) and had failed to obtain the agency's
agreement to the consent judgment. Although the court left undisturbed the
Attorney General's power to manage litigation when bringing an action or prosecuting an appeal in the State's name, the court concluded that an attorney general acting in a representative capacity on behalf of a state agency or department
is bound by the traditional rules governing the attorney-client relationship and
4
may not concede the client's substantive rights without the client's approval.
This Note analyzes the Tice decision to determine whether the court's ruling is consistent with constitutional, statutory, and common-law delineations of
the powers vested in the attorney general. The court in Tice focused attention
on the appropriateness of separating the roles of chief law officer and representative counsel5 and, in the latter role, reduced the attorney general's customary
responsibility to serve as protector of the interests of the state and public. This
Note concludes that Tice is consistent with constitutional, statutory, and common-law concepts of the power of the attorney general. Because the court failed
to restrict its holding, however, the possibility remains that further limitations
on the Attorney General's powers may be imposed.
In Tice plaintiff sought to establish title to a parcel of land connecting a
1. See generally COMMITEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, COMMON LAW PoWERS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
(1980) (concise overview of the historical development of the office of attorney general and the specific common-law powers vested in the offices of attorneys general) [hereinafter cited as COMMON
LAW PowERs]; COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIA-

TION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1977) (focusing primarily on present-day powers, but also including a history of the
development of the office of attorney general) [hereinafter cited as POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS]; Edmisten, The Common Law Powers of the Attorney General of North Carolina, 9 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 1 (1977) (examining the development of the Office of Attorney General in North
Carolina).
2. See COMMON LAW POWERS, supra note 1, at 68; POWER,

DUTIES AND OPERATIONS,

supra note 1, at 194.
3. 67 N.C. App. 48, 312 S.E.2d 241 (1984).
4. Id. at 57, 312 S.E.2d at 246.
5. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 10, 18 (distinguishing the roles of chief law officer and counsel to
state agencies and departments).
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6
state road to the waters of Tulls Creek Bay in northeastern North Carolina.

Defendant DOT also claimed an interest in the land. After protracted negotiations, 7 the Assistant Attorney General representing the DOT8 entered into a
consent agreement with plaintiff, setting the boundaries of the state road and

enjoining plaintiff from interfering with use of the road. Defendant DOT filed a
motion to set aside the agreement, asserting that the stipulations on which it was
based were untrue and that the Assistant Attorney General lacked authority to
enter into the consent agreement without the DOT's approval. 9
The court of appeals invalidated the agreement, basing its holding on the
legislative delegation to the DOT of exclusive authority for decisions affecting
the state highway system.10 Judge Whichard, writing for a unanimous panel,

reasoned that the attorney general's common-law power to control litigation
reaches its limit when exercise of that authority would usurp the exclusive authority expressly granted to a state department by the legislature.1 1 Tice, therefore, stands for the proposition that the powers inherent in the attorney general

are less extensive when the attorney general is engaged as counsel to a state
agency or department than when he brings an action or prosecutes an appeal on
behalf of the state itself.

The Office of the North Carolina Attorney General was created in the state
constitution. Article III, section 7(1) of the North Carolina Constitution provides for the quadrennial election of the attorney general, 12 and section 7(2)

states that the attorney general's duties "shall be prescribed by law." 13 Article 6
of the Executive Organization Act of 1971 further provides that "[t]he Attorney
General shall have such powers and duties as are conferred on him by this Chapter, delegated to him by the Governor, and conferred by the Constitution and
14
laws of this State."

The body of law that defines the duties and related powers vested in the

constitutionally created Office of Attorney General is derived from statutory
6. Plaintiff also sought injunctive relief to prohibit defendant DOT from trespassing on her
property. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 49, 312 S.E.2d at 242.
7. Negotiations between the Assistant Attorney General and plaintiff lasted for almost two
years, during which time the Assistant Attorney General maintained regular contact with officials of
defendant. Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 12-13.
8. The Assistant Attorney General represented defendant DOT pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 114-4.2 (1983), which states:
The Attorney General is authorized to appoint from among his staff such assistant attorneys general and such other staff attorneys as he shall deem advisable to provide all legal
assistance for the State highway functions of the Department of Transportation, and such
assistant attorneys general and other attorneys shall also perform such additional duties as
may be assigned to them by the Attorney General, and shall otherwise be subject to all
provisions of the statutes relating to assistant attorneys general and other staff attorneys.
9. Defendant also alleged that the stipulations upon which the consent judgment was based
were executed by the Assistant Attorney General "by mistake and inadvertence under a misapprehension of the true facts." Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 50, 312 S.E.2d at 242.
10. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
11. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 54, 312 S.E.2d at 245; see also infra note 42 and accompanying text
(attorney general may not concede state agency's substantive rights without agency's consent).
12. N.C. CONsT. art. III, § 7(l).
13. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 7(2).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143A-49.1 (1983).
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provisions' s and the common law. The statutory provisions, although extensive,
do not expressly enumerate the powers inherent in the attorney general. The
attorney general's common-law powers, specifically the authority to initiate,
conduct, and maintain legal actions, have developed throughout the evolution of
the Office. 1 6 There is some authority for the proposition that the North Carolina Attorney General retains the common-law powers of the Office, 17 but the
state's courts never have ruled expressly on the extent of these powers."' The
North Carolina General Assembly has provided that when the common law is
not antithetical to the state's elemental system of government, it shall be applicable. 19 Because of the lack of North Carolina cases dealing with the common-law
powers of the attorney general, it is necessary to look to other jurisdictions for
an understanding of the development of these powers.
The office of attorney general had its nascence in the attornatus regis of
thirteenth and fourteenth century England. 20 The attornatusregis served as the
sovereign's primary legal representative, with considerable power subject to limitation only by the King. The office was carried over to colonial America, where
it eventually became the office of attorney general. All fifty states have an office
of attorney general created either by constitution or statute.2 1 The specific powers and duties vested in the office vary greatly among the states. Although some
states restrict the attorney general's common-law powers by express statutory or
constitutional language, 22 the large majority of states have chosen to recognize
23
the existence of these powers.
The most far reaching of the attorney general's common-law powers is the
authority to control litigation involving state and public interests. It is generally
accepted that the attorney general is authorized to bring actions on the state's
behalf.2 4 As the state's chief legal officer, "the attorney-general has power, both
under common law and by statute, to make any disposition of the state's litigation that he deems for its best interest. . . . [H]e may abandon, discontinue,
15. Id. § 114-2.
16. See COMMON LAW PowE.s, supra note 1, at 68; PowERs, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS,
supra note 1, at 194.
17. See, eg., Sigmund Sternberger Found., Inc. v. Tannenbaum, 273 N.C. 658, 161 S.E.2d 116
(1968) (common-law power to protect beneficiaries of charitable trusts); State v. Thompson, 10 N.C.
(3 Hawks) 613 (1825) (common-law power to enter a nolle prosequi); In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.,
30 N.C. App. 585, 227 S.E.2d 645 (1976) (common-law investigatory powers).
18. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 2.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1981).
20. For a more detailed description of the development of the Office of Attorney General from
its origins in England through the colonial period, see COMMON LAW PowERs, supra note 1, at 914; PowERs, DunaEs AND OPERATIONS supra note 1, at 17-22.
21. See PowERs, DtrIEs AND OPERATIONS supra note 1, at 30-31.
22. See, eg., Island-Gentry Joint Venture v. State, 57 Hawaii 259, 554 P.2d 761 (1976) (attorney general has exclusive authority to control all phases of civil litigation in which state has an
interest, unless authority has been expressly or impiledly granted to another department); State ex
rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973) (common-law duties and powers
inhere in attorney general absent express statutory or constitutional restrictions).
23. See COMMON LAW POwERs supra note 1, at 25-27 (identifying 35 states in which the
attorney general is recognized as having common-law powers).
24. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 10.
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dismiss or compromise it."'25 In addition to having authority to initiate and
manage an action, the attorney general may elect not to pursue a claim or to

compromise or settle a suit when he determines that continued litigation would
26
be adverse to the public interest.
Most courts have given the attorney general "a broad discretion

. . .

in

determining what matters may, or may not be, of interest to the people generally." 27 The investment of such discretion is based on the premise that the attorney general should act on behalf of the public interest, or as the "people's
attorney." 2 8 In an early North Carolina Supreme Court decision, the court re-

fused to interfere with the attorney general's use of his discretionary power to
enter a nolle prosequi on grounds that the authority had not been used "oppres-

sively." 29 Other courts have left undisturbed the use of the power to control
litigation as long as the attorney general's actions are not arbitrary, capricious,
30

or in bad faith.
Like the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the courts of several other juris-

dictions have recognized limitations on the attorney general's powers when "authority. . . has been expressly or impliedly granted to another department or
agency."' 31 An attorney general's authority may be restricted explicitly by the
statutes governing the office, or it may be impliedly limited by legislative assignment of certain powers to another state governmental body. Thus, the constitutional and statutory framework underlying a legislature's delegation of powers
must be read in its entirety to determine the extent of the attorney general's
authority.
The court inTice expressly acknowledged the attorney general's common25. State v. Finch, 128 Kan. 665, 671, 280 P. 910, 912 (1929).
26. Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334 (1975); Lyle
v. Luna, 65 N.M. 429, 338 P.2d 1060 (1959); Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 51, 312 S.E.2d at 243; State ex
reL Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973); Cooley v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 204 S.C. 10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943) (per curiam). But cf. Arizona State Land Dep't v.
McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1960) (attorney general has no power to initiate and pursue
claims in the public interest except in a few instances in which power is conferred specifically by
statute).
27. Mundy v. McDonald, 216 Mich. 444, 450, 185 N.W. 877, 880 (1921).
The breadth of the modern attorney general's discretion resembles that of his common-law
counterpart. In reviewing the historical development of the Office of Attorney General, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
As chief legal representative to the king, the common law attorney general was clearly
subject to the wishes of the crown, but, even in those times, the office was also a repository
of power and discretion. . . . Transportation of the institution to this country, where governmental initiative was diffused among the officers of the executive branch and the many
individuals comprising the legislative branch could only broaden this area of the attorney
general's discretion.
Florida ex rel Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 930
(1976).
28. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 36.
29. State v. Thompson, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 613, 614 (1825).
30. See, eg., Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E.2d 1262 (1977) (discretionary
power not to be used in arbitrary or capricious manner); Cooley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,
204 S.C. 10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943) (Attorney General found to have acted in good faith).
31. Island-Gentry Joint Venture v. State, 57 Hawaii 259, 265, 554 P.2d 761, 765-66 (1976); see
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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law power to control litigation when acting on behalf of the state. 32 The court,
however, refused to extend this authority to situations in which the attorney
general acts in a representative capacity on behalf of a state agency or department. The court reached its holding after reviewing the statutory powers of
both the attorney general and the affected agency.
North Carolina General Statutes section 147-17 provides the statutory basis
33
for the attorney general's representation of state agencies and departments.
The attorney general is afforded the exclusive power of representation: "No department, agency, institution, commission, bureau or other organized activity of
the State which receives support in whole or in part from the State shall employ
any counsel, except with the approval of the Governor."'34 The governor is authorized to hire other counsel on behalf of an agency or department "[w]henever
the Attorney General shall advise [him] that it is impracticable for [the Attorney
General] to render legal services to [the] State agency."' 35 One commentator has
suggested that "the courts would probably construe this statute as exclusive and
would not permit appointment or employment of counsel other than the Attorney General by state agencies in situations not specified by North Carolina General Statutes [section] 147-17."36 These statutory provisions indicate that the
general assembly intended to limit state agencies' use of outside counsel and
that, absent unusual circumstances, the attorney general is to be their sole legal
representative. Although neither the general assembly nor the courts have identified explicitly those circumstances under which it would be "impracticable" for
37
the attorney general to provide legal services to an agency or department, it is
arguable that Tice presents such a fact setting. When the attorney general believes that a compromise or consent agreement is in the best interest of the state
and the public and when such an agreement would concede the agency's best
interest, gubernatorial appointment of outside counsel on behalf of the affected
would be consistent with North Carolina General Statutes section 147agency
8
17.3
The North Carolina General Assembly has created a complex framework
32. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 51, 312 S.E.2d at 243.

33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-17 (1983).
34. Id. § 147-17(a).
35. Id. § 147-17(b).
36. Edmisten, supra note 1, at 21.
37. For a general discussion of the role of the Attorney General as counsel for state agencies
and departments, see Edmisten, supra note 1, at 18-21. Edmisten states that "North Carolina has
not produced significant judicial statements on the common law authority of the Attorney General
to represent state agencies to the exclusion of other counsel." Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
38. See, eg., Clerk of Superior Court v. Treasurer and Receiver Gen., 386 Mass. 517, 437
N.E.2d 158 (1982) (special counsel appointed when Attorney General determined that further litigation of case was not in the public's interest); Teleco, Inc. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 649
P.2d 772 (Okla. 1982) (special counsel appointed when Attorney General was personally disqualified
because of prior membership on defendant commission).
The court inTice expressed concern that vesting power in the Attorney General to enter into a
consent agreement without the consent of the agency "could cause State agencies and departments,
with the approval of the Governor as required by G.S. 147-17(a), to engage in more extensive employment of their own counsel. . . .This practice would. . . cause additional expense to the State."
Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 55, 312 S.E.2d at 245. Because of this potential for added expense, § 147-17
should be construed narrowly to preclude wholesale use of outside counsel by agencies and depart-
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of institutional bodies it believes are needed to provide the services essential to
the people of the State. The Executive Organization Act enumerates these various state agencies, departments, bureaus, and commissions and their respective
areas of responsibility. 39 The court in Tice focused on the purposes and powers
of the DOT as delineated in the pertinent statutes.4° From its research the court
determined, "It is thus clear that the legislature has provided a comprehensive

scheme in which all decisions relating to the State highway system have been
'4 1
delegated to defendant DOT."

After reviewing the statutes governing the powers and duties of the Attorney General and the DOT, the court concluded that a consent agreement en-

tered into by the Assistant Attorney General derogated the responsibilities and
authority of the DOT and contravened the legislative intent evidenced by care-

fully delineated areas of responsibility. In recognizing the primacy of these statutory provisions, the court rejected application of the common-law notions
governing the Office of Attorney General.
We do not believe the legislature, by providing that the Attorney General would serve as counsel for State departments, intended to authorize him to make decisions in areas which have been specifically
delegated to a designated department. That would be the effect of al-

lowing the Attorney General to enter, without the consent of defendant DOT, a consent judgment which establishes the boundaries of a
road and gives defendant DOT a right-of-way. We believe, instead,

that the legislature intended that when the Attorney General represents a State department pursuant to G.S. 114-2(2), the traditional at-

torney-client relationship should exist. 42

ments dissatisfied with the attorney general's decisions regarding proper handling of litigation. See
also infra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing appropriate use of outside counsel).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143A-I to -245, 143B-1 to -492 (1983).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-346 (1983) provides that the DOT
is to provide for the necessary planning, construction, maintenance, and operation of an
integrated statewide transportation system for the economical and safe transportation of
people and goods as provided for by law. . . .The Department of Transportation shall be
responsible for all of the transportation functions of the executive branch of the State as
provided by law ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-18(2) (Supp. 1983) states that the DOT has power
to locate and acquire rights-of-way for any new roads that may be necessary for a State
highway system, with full power to widen, relocate, change or alter the grade or location
thereof and to change or relocate any existing roads that the Department of Transportation
may now own or may acquire; to acquire by gift, purchase, or otherwise, any road or
highway, or tract of land or other property whatsoever that may be necessary for a State
highway system.
41. Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 54, 312 S.E.2d at 245.
42. Id. It is well established in North Carolina that in the traditional attorney-client relationship an attorney cannot enter into a consent agreement on behalf of his client without the client's
consent. Howard v. Boyce, 254 N.C. 255, 118 S.E.2d 897 (1961); Bath v. Norman, 226 NC. 502,
39 S.E.2d 363 (1946). An attorney, by virtue of inherent and implied authority, has considerable
discretionary power in the management and control of litigation in which he is involved. Absent
fraud or collusion, an attorney's actions, particularly those dealing with procedural matters, generally will be held to bind his client. Bath, 226 N.C. at 506, 39 S.E.2d at 365; Bizzell v. Auto Tire and
Equip. Co., 182 N.C. 98, 108 S.E. 439 (1921). The courts, however, have been unwilling to deprive
the individual litigant of the power to make decisions that constitute a compromise or concession of
substantive rights in litigation. Bath, 226 N.C. at 506, 39 S.E.2d at 365. The attorney has neither
inherent nor implied authority to compromise his client's cause or to consent to a judgment that
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Thus, the DOT's statutorily conferred authority to determine the location of
state roads and rights-of-way 43 constituted a substantive right not to be compromised or conceded without the Department's consent. 44 The Assistant Attorney
General's disputed consent agreement constituted a usurpation of these powers
in that it conceded the "whole corpus" of the Department's position. 45
Although the logic of Tice is compelling, 4 6 the historical role of the attorney general as chief law officer and defender of the public interest may be undermined if certain principles underlying the holding are applied broadly. If the
traditional attorney-client relationship is extended to all aspects of the attorney
general's representation of state agencies and departments, thus eliminating the
attorney general's common-law power to control litigation whenever he acts in a
representative capacity, the decision could lead to a number of anomalous
results.
Some authorities contend that, when acting as counsel to a state department or agency, the attorney general is not in a traditional attorney-client relationship with department or agency officials.47 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, for example, has held:
concedes "the whole corpus of the controversy." Bath, 226 N.C. at 505, 39 S.E.2d at 365; see also
Howard, 254 N.C. at 263, 118 S.E.2d at 903.
A consent agreement frequently has been compared to a contract. See e.g., King v. King, 225
N.C. 639, 35 S.E.2d 893 (1945); Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 224 N.C. 275, 29 S.E.2d 901 (1944). Like
a contract, a consent judgment results from an unqualified agreement between the parties. By refusing to permit an attorney to enter a consent judgment without the knowledge and acquiescence of his
client, the courts have sought to ensure the primacy of clients' interests as clients perceive them.
It is important to distinguish the facts of Tice from those in cases involving suits brought by the
attorney general on behalf of a state agency or department but not in a representative capacity. In
Nash County Bd. of Educ. v. Biltmore Co., 464 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 484
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981), the County Board of Education filed a federal antitrust
action against certain dairy companies. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground
that plaintiff's action was barred by res judicata. In an earlier action brought in state court, the
Attorney General had claimed violations of state antitrust laws by the same defendants. That litigation ended when the parties reached a consent agreement. The court held for defendants, ruling
that, for purposes of res judicata, the Attorney General and plaintiff Board of Education were the
same party and that the Attorney General had the authority to act on behalf of the County and bind
the County even though the County had not consented to the prior consent judgment.
43. See supra note 40.
44. "Neither expressly nor by necessary implication does North Carolina General Statute[s]
§ 114-2 authorize the Attorney General or his staff to concede a substantial right of a State agency as
to a matter which the General Assembly has placed within the agency's authority and discretion."
Defendant Appellee's Brief at 4.
45. Many of the compromise agreements entered into by a state attorney general involve unresolved tax liabilities. See infra note 49 and accompanying text. The distinction between these
cases and Tice rests on the concept of substantive rights. When an attorney general negotiates a
compromise agreement with a taxpayer, no substantive rights are conceded-the taxpayer's basic
obligation to pay taxes is not disturbed. In Tice, however, there is no "middle ground." Either
North Carolina will enjoy right-of-way access to the bay and complete use of the public road or it
will not. An agreement that concedes either of these two points gives up a substantive right of the
State.
46. The implied limitation on discretionary power to control litigation inhering at common law
in the Office of Attorney General is clear from the express grants of authority to the DOT. See supra
note 40 and accompanying text.
47. See, eg., Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen. 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334
(1975) (traditional attorney-client relationship does not exist when an attorney general "appears for"
an officer, department head, or secretary); Edmisten, supra note 1, at 17.

1058

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

The Attorney General represents the Commonwealth as well as the

Secretary, agency or department head who requests his appearance ....
He also has a common law duty to represent the public
interest ....
Thus, when an agency head recommends a course of

action, the Attorney General must consider the ramifications of that
action on the interests of the Commonwealth and the public generally,
as well as on the official himself and his agency.
To fail to do so would
48
be an abdication of official responsibility.

Belief in the primacy of the common-law duty to represent the public interest
has led some courts to uphold compromise settlements entered into by attorneys
general when the agreements were challenged by those agencies on whose behalf
the attorneys general ostensibly acted. Typically, these compromise settlements

have occurred in tax cases in which the attorney general negotiated with the
taxpayer for payment of some portion of an outstanding tax liability. 4 9 A com-

parable result was reached in an Oklahoma case in which the Attorney General
compromised and settled a price-fixing claim contrary to the wishes of the Governor.5 0 Courts generally have held that the attorney general has the sole authority to decide whether to appeal an adverse action relating to litigation
involving state agencies and departments.5 1

In each of these situations, the attorney general's decision to proceed without the approval of the agency or office represented was based on a good faith

determination that continued litigation was not in the public's best interest. The
decisions to enter into compromise agreements did not concede the agencies'
substantive rights.5 2 These cases thus are distinguishable from Tice and are
good examples of the practical application of the attorney general's common-law
duty to defend the public interest.
Not all courts have been so willing to allow the attorney general this mea-

sure of discretion when he is engaged in a representative capacity on behalf of a
state agency or department. 53 For instance, the Wyoming Supreme Court
48. Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 163, 326 N.E.2d 334, 338
(1975).
49. See eg., State ex rel.Carmichael v. Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 41 So.2d 280 (1949) (compromise
agreement entered into by Attorney General representing Department of Revenue upheld); Lyle v.
Luna, 65 N.M. 429, 338 P.2d 1060 (1959) (stipulation of settlement entered into by Attorney General representing Bureau of Revenue upheld despite challenge by Bureau officials); Cooley v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 204 S.C. 10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943) (per curiam) (compromise agreement
between executors of estate and Attorney General representing Tax Commission upheld despite attack on agreement by two of three commissioners); see alsosupra note 45 (distinguishing tax liability
cases from Tice on basis of substantive rights).
50. State ex reL Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973) (absent legislative
or constitutional expression to contrary, Attorney General had complete control over all litigation in
which he appeared on behalf of the state).
51. Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334 (1975); State
ex rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1973).
52. See supra note 45.
53. In a 1919 North Dakota decision, the state supreme court stated:
[A]Ithough it is perfectly obvious under the statute that the attorney general is the general
and the legal advisor of the various departments and officers of the state government, and
entitled to appear and represent them in court, this does not mean that the attorney general, standing in the position of an attorney to a client, who happens to be an officer of the
government, steps into the shoes of such client in wholly directing the defense and the legal
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stated:
The rule... would seem to be that the Attorney General has power
to settle and compromise a suit, when the rights of the state are in
doubt and are in honest dispute, at least when he acts with the approval
case, have
of the executive head of the department which may, in any
54
the matter involved in the suit in his particular charge.
When confronted with a similar question, another court adopted a uniquely
practical approach: it refused to allow an assistant attorney general to compromise a subrogation claim of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau. The ready
availability of individuals with authority to approve the compromise and the
absence of an emergency that precluded obtaining consent were significant considerations in the court's decision. 55
Although the Tice court carefully limited its holding to an attorney general's entry into a consent judgment without the consent of the agency or department, some of the court's dicta reflect a concern over possible overreaching by
the Attorney General and the potential for conflict between the Office of the
Attorney General and the executive branch of state government. 56 It is unclear
whether the court intended its language to be construed as a precursor to additional restrictions on the exercise of independent judgment by the attorney general when acting in a representative capacity, or whether the term "consent" as
used by the court was intended to refer solely to consent agreements. If the
court was forecasting additional restrictions, its decision in Tice may indicate a
significant potential for change in the attorney general's common-law powers,
with separation between the roles of chief law officer and representative
57
counsel.
steps to be taken in opposition or contrary to the wishes and demands of his client or the
officer or department concerned.
State ex rel. Amerland v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 311, 175 N.W. 372, 374 (1919); see also Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd. v. Kusic, 7 Pa. Commw. 274, 299 A.2d 53 (1973) (court distinguished between
state agency acting in an executive capacity and state agency acting in a judicial capacity; held
agency bound by Attorney General only when acting in former role).
54. State ex reL Wilson v. Young, 44 Wyo. 6, 20, 7 P.2d 216, 221 (1932) (emphasis added).
55. Robinson v. State, 63 N.W.2d 521 (N.D. 1954).
56. After reviewing the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the offices of Governor and Attorney General, the court stated:
The constitutional independence of these offices, and their differing functions and duties,
create clear potential for conflict between their respective holders. In the event of such
conflict, power in the Attorney General to resolve, without their consent, controversies
involving agencies or departments under the supervision of the Governor, could be abused
by exercise in a manner effectively derogative of the Governor's constitutional duties to
exercise executive power and to supervise the official conduct of all executive officers.
Tice, 67 N.C. App. at 55, 312 S.E.2d at 245.
57. Carried to its logical extreme Tice would lead to a "split personality" attorney general.
When dealing with a matter not involving a state agency or department, the attorney general's primary goal would be to seek a resolution in the best interest of the public generally. When acting in a
representative capacity on behalf of a state agency or department, however, the attorney general
would be concerned only with implementing the will of agency heads-his role would be analogous to
that of an outside counsel. Further, he would have little choice but to implement decisions he believed to be contrary to the public's best interest or to request appointment of special or outside
counsel. See also supra note 38 (use of outside counsel should be restricted to avoid additional
expense to state).
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The North Carolina General Statutes provide that an agency may employ
outside counsel if its request is approved by the Governor.5 8 Obtaining outside
counsel would appear to be appropriate for the limited number of cases in which
the Attorney General concludes in good faith that a decision affecting the substantive rights of an executive agency would not be in the public's best interest. 59
For those disputes in which the agency's substantive rights are unaffected-that
is, when expressly delegated authority is not usurped by the attorney general's
proposed action-the common-law power to control litigation should be retained
by the attorney general. The statutorily delineated powers of individual state
agencies would be preserved, and the Attorney General would not be in a position of abdicating his official responsibility to protect the interests of the general
public.
Some observers may be disturbed by the application of Tice to only consent
judgment and substantive rights cases. One commentator has written that "the
Attorney General should be extremely cautious in attempting to substitute his
policy judgment as to what is in the public interest for that of a state agency for
which he is the lawyer." 6° This cautionary note is appropriate. Decisions of the
attorney general must not be arbitrary, capricious, or undertaken in bad faith;
indeed, the courts likely wil continue to overturn such decisions. Nevertheless,
expansion of Tice would undermine the attorney general's role as the defender of
the public interest, leaving the ultimate decisions as to the proper conduct of
litigation in the hands of agency officials not vested either by statute or common
law with this authority.
In Tice the North Carolina Court of Appeals crafted a narrow holding consistent with constitutional, statutory, and common-law notions of the powers
inherent in the Office of Attorney General. The court's failure to preclude an
expansion of its holding to a broader range of representational questions, however, leaves open the possibility that the attorney general's powers could be further diminished. Such a limitation of authority would affect adversely both the
Office of Attorney General and the protection of the public interest that it provides. The court should close the door on this potentiality in order to preserve
the common-law powers of the attorney general.
WILLIAM

C.

HAFLETr, JR.

58. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
59. Concerning the issue of an Attorney General's reluctance to do the bidding of an executive
agency, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has stated:
[twhere there is a policy disagreement between the Attorney General and the Governor or
his designee, the appropriate procedure would be for the Attorney General to appoint a
special assistant to represent the Governor's interests. It is only where the Attorney General believes that there is no merit to the appeal, or where the interests of a consistent legal
policy for the Commonwealth are at stake, that the Attorney General should refuse representation at all.
Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney Gen., 367 Mass. 154, 165 n.8, 326 N.E.2d 334, 339-40 n.8
(1975).
60. PowEas, DUTrEs AND OPERATIONS supra note 1, at 34.

State v. Jones: Double Jeopardy and Substantial Rights
in North Carolina Appeals
Both the law of the land clause of the North Carolina Constitution' and the
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 2 guarantee that no person
may be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. 3 North Carolina courts have
regarded the right to be free from double jeopardy as "a fundamental and sacred
'4
principle of the common law," an "integral part of the 'law of the land.' ,,5
Nevertheless, the North Carolina Court of Appeals' recent decision in State v.
Jones 6 makes it clear that however "sacred," "fundamental," "integral," and

constitutional the right may be, it is not a "substantial" right for the purposes of

an appeal under section 1-277 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 7 Consequently, the court held that the defendant in Jones had no right to the immediate
appeal of an interlocutory order s that denied his motion to dismiss the indictment against him on double jeopardy grounds. 9

On April 13, 1981, Andrew Lynn Jones was indicted for the murder of
1. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19, provides: "No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of
his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." This clause has been interpreted as protecting
persons from being tried or punished twice for the same offense, although it does not explicitly
prohibit double jeopardy. See State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 231 S.E.2d 833 (1977); State v. Crocker,
239 N.C. 446, 80 S.E.2d 243 (1954) (prohibition against double jeopardy regarded as integral part of
the law of the land).
2. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall... be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
double jeopardy clause of the federal Constitution was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
In Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497 (1978), the Supreme Court reviewed the purposes behind
the double jeopardy clause:
The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second
trial following an acquittal. The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so
strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though "the acquittal was
based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation"....
Because jeopardy attaches before the judgment becomes final, the constitutional protection also embraces the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal."... Even if the first trial is not completed, a second prosecution may be
grossly unfair. It increases the financial and emotional burden on the accused, prolongs
the period in which he is stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and may
even enhance the risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted.
Id. at 503-04.
3. Jeopardy attaches in North Carolina when a defendant in a criminal prosecution is placed
on trial: (1) on a valid indictment or information; (2) before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
after arraignment; (4) after plea; and (5) when a competent jury has been impaneled and sworn to
make a true deliverance of the case. State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 449, 80 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1954).
4. Id. at 449, 80 S.E.2d at 245.
5. Id.
6. 67 N.C. App. 413, 313 S.E.2d 264 (1984).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1983) provides that "[ain appeal may be taken from every judicial order or determination . . . which affects a substantial right claimed in any action or
proceeding."
8. An interlocutory order is an order that does not determine the issues but directs some
further proceeding preliminary to a final decree. Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200,
207, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978).
9. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266-67.
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David Lee Height. 10 The first of Jones' three trials based on this indictment was
declared a mistrial." Before the start of his second trial for the same offense,
Jones moved to dismiss the indictment against him on double jeopardy grounds,
arguing that the judge in his first trial had improperly declared a mistrial.1 2 The

judge presiding over Jones' second trial denied the motion and refused to stay
the second trial pending the outcome of Jones' appeal. 1 3 Jones' second trial also

ended in a mistrial. 14 At Jones' third trial for the same offense, he finally was
15

convicted of second degree murder.
Following his conviction, Jones appealed the second trial court's denial of

his pretrial motion to dismiss. He argued that he had a constitutional right to
immediate appeal of the order based on the United States Supreme Court's deci-

sion in Abney v. United States16 and that under North Carolina General Statutes
section 1-277 the trial court's order denying his motion for dismissal was immediately appealable because it affected a substantial right. 17
The North Carolina Court of Appeals found that Jones did not have a constitutional right to immediate appeal. 18 In distinguishing Abney, the court
found that the Supreme Court was merely interpreting the federal jurisdictional

statute and not the federal Constitution when it held that the Abney defendant
had a right to immediate appeal of an interlocutory order denying his motion to
dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. 19 Interpreting the corresponding North
Carolina jurisdictional statutes, sections 7A-2720 and 1-277,21 the court of appeals in Jones found that there was no right to immediate appeal of an interlocu10. Id. at 413, 313 S.E.2d at 265.
11. Id. Judge Britt, presiding over the case, found that the jury was deadlocked. The defendant immediately fied objections to the order of mistrial. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 380, 313
S.E.2d 808, 811 (1984) (separate appeal from conviction at third trial).
12. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 380, 313 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1984). The defendant asserted
that the judge's declaration of a mistrial had been provoked by actions of the prosecutor and that the
judge had failed to make either a judicial inquiry or finding of fact as to whether the jury actually
was deadlocked. Id. at 386, 313 S.E.2d at 814. When a trial court makes no findings in the process
of improperly ordering a mistrial over the defendant's objection, the defendant cannot be retried for
the same offense. Id. at 388, 313 S.E.2d at 815-16.
13. Following the original trial court's order of a mistrial, defendant petitioned that court for
habeas corpus relief. The trial court denied defendant's petition. Jones then petitioned the North
Carolina Supreme Court for writs of supersedeas, habeas corpus, and mandamus. See infra note 24
for a discussion of these and other prerogative writs. The supreme court vacated Judge Britt's order
of mistrial and remanded the case to the superior court for a de novo hearing on defendant's motion
for habeas corpus relief before a different judge. Judge Bailey, presiding over the de novo hearing,
denied defendant's petition for habeas corpus. Defendant then petitioned the North Carolina
Supreme Court for writs of supersedeas and certiorari, but both writs were denied. Defendant filed
similar motions in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, but
did not succeed in preventing his retrial. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 381, 313 S.E.2d 808, 811
(1984).
14. State v. Jones, 67 N.C. App. 377, 380, 313 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1984). A mistrial was granted
on defendant's motion.
15. Id.
16. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Court inAbney held that an order denying a motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds was a final decision within the federal jurisdictional statute and was immediately appealable under the statute. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
17. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415-16, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
18. Id. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
19. Id. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
20. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 (1981). Although the court did not cite any specific subsection of
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tory order unless the order would deprive the appellant of a substantial right if
not reviewed before a final judgment on the merits. 22 Referring to two decisions
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, the court in Jones determined that the
right to avoid a rehearing or trial was not substantial within the meaning of the
statute.2 3 The court then reasoned that Jones' asserted right to avoid a second
trial also was not substantial. The court added that the defendant's right to
interlocutory review was adequately protected by his opportunity to obtain discretionary review in the appellate courts by means of prerogative writs. 24
Judge Johnson dissented from the panel decision on two grounds. First, he
contended that the "final decision" requirement of the federal jurisdictional stat-

ute was substantially similar to the "final judgment" requirement in the North

Carolina appellate statute;2 5 thus, the holding in Abney was equally applicable to
North Carolina law.2 6 Second, Judge Johnson criticized the majority for basing
its decision solely on the authority of civil cases;27 he-argued that the cases relied

on were inapplicable and that an important case involving
rights substantially
28
similar to those asserted by Jones had been overlooked.

§ 7A-27, it appeared to be referring to the final judgment rule in § 7A-27(b) which allows appeals of
right to the court of appeals "flrom any final judgment of a superior court." Id. § 7A-27(b).
21. See supra note 7.
22. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266 (citing Blackwelder v. Department of
Human Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983)).
Jones appealed separately from the conviction entered at his third trial. See State v. Jones, 67
N.C. App. 377, 313 S.E.2d 808 (1984). The court of appeals in that case determined that the trial
judge in the original trial had improperly declared a mistrial, because the judge had failed to make a
judicial inquiry or finding of fact as to whether the jury actually was deadlocked. The court of
appeals then held that "where the trial court makes no findings at all in the course of improperly
ordering a mistrial over defendant's timely objection... the defendant cannot be tried again for the
same offense." Id. at 388, 313 S.E.2d at 815-16.
23. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
24. Id. Prerogative writs are extraordinary writs issued in the discretion of the court on a
showing of proper cause. Among the prerogative writs authorized for issuance by the court of appeals or the supreme court under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-32 (1981) are:
1) Certiorari,which allows the appellant to seek review of a case that would not otherwise be
entitled to review. Certiorari may be issued by the court of appeals or supreme court in situations in
which the right to appeal or petition for discretionary review has been lost by appellant's failure to
take timely action, or in which no right to appeal exists from an interlocutory order.
2) Supersedeas, which is used to stay the enforcement of an order while review of that order is
being sought.
3) Mandamus, which is used to correct erroneous judicial action, to compel judicial action that
erroneously has been refused, or to compel the exercise of judicial discretion when discretionary
action has been refused. See J. POTrER, NORTH CAROLINA APPELLATE HANDBOOK 49-53 (1978).
Section 7A-32 also authorizes the court of appeals or supreme court to issue the writ of habeas
corpus which is a writ "designed as an effective means of obtaining'. . . a speedy release of persons
who are illegally deprived of their liberty or illegally detained."' In re Stevens, 28 N.C. App. 471,
473, 221 S.E.2d 839, 840 (1976) (quoting 39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 1 (1968)).
25. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
26. Id. It is unclear whether Judge Johnson was suggesting that Jones had a constitutional
right to appeal on these facts or whether he was objecting merely to the majority's cursory treatment
of Abney.
27. Id. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Given the scarcity of criminal cases
involving interlocutory appeals, see infra note 91 and accompanying text, the dissent's criticism may
be unwarranted.
28. Jones,67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting); see infra notes 92-93
and accompanying text.
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This Note considers the propriety of the court of appeals' decision in Jones
in light of the history of the substantial rights doctrine and evaluates the attempts of federal and state courts to balance the competing interests of judicial

efficiency and individual rights. It concludes that although the court may have
been correct in not relying on federal law, North Carolina precedent and policy
dictate reversal of the decision.
Before considering the substantial rights doctrine, it is necessary to examine

the rule that created the need for the substantial rights doctrine exception. The
final judgment rule was developed over three hundred years ago in Metcalfe's

Case29 in which the King's Bench held that no appeal could be taken until an
action had been disposed of completely.30 The rule grew out of the common-law
conviction that a case was a single judicial unit and that it was impossible to
have two records in different courts upon the same original writ. 31 Today the
rule is based on the desire for judicial economy; it allows appellate courts to

consider the entire case at once, thus avoiding the inequities inherent in piece32

meal review.
All too often individual rights were lost in the common-law quest for judicial economy.33 The substantial rights doctrine thus evolved to relieve some of
the hardships of the final judgment rule; the doctrine allows immediate appeal to
be taken from any interlocutory judgment that has affected a substantial right of
a litigant.34 The doctrine first appeared in New York's Field Code, which
merged the final judgment rule of the common law with the liberal appeals policies of the courts of equity.35 North Carolina adopted the substantial rights
doctrine when it enacted its own Code of Civil Procedure based upon the Field
36
Code.
The doctrine remained part of North Carolina law even after the state
adopted new rules of civil procedure based on the federal rules. Even though the
federal rules did not explicitly provide for a substantial rights exception to the
final judgment rule37 and the substantial rights doctrine itself did not otherwise
29. 77 Eng. Rep. 1193, 11 Coke 28 (1615).
30. See Comment, InterlocutoryAppeals in North Carolina: The SubstantialRight Doctrine, 18
WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 857, 858 (1982).
31. See Crick, The FinalJudgment as a Basisfor Appeal, 41 YALE L. J. 539, 541-42 (1932);
Frank, Requiem for the FinalJudgment Rule, 45 TEx. L. REv. 292, 292 (1966).
32. Frank, supra note 31, at 292.
33. Id. at 292 & n.10.
34. See Comment, supra note 30, at 857.
35. N.Y. CIV. PROC. LAW § 5701(a)(2)(v) (McKinney 1978) (first modem code of civil procedure). Although the common law strictly had adhered to the final judgment rule, courts of equity
generally allowed appeals from nonfinal orders and decrees. See Comment, supra note 30, at 858.
36. See N.C. CODE CIV. PROC. LAW § 299 (1868) ("An appeal may be taken from every judicial order or determination of a judge of a superior court . . . which affects a substantial right
claimed in any action or proceeding .
), repealed by Act of April 30, 1971, ch. 268, § 34, 1971
N.C. Sess. Laws 199.
37. Although the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for a
substantial rights exception, the doctrine is part of the North Carolina General Statutes. See supra
note 7; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(d)(1) (1981) (providing for appeal as of right "from any
interiocutory order or judgment of a superior court or district court in a civil action or proceeding
which... affects a substantial right").
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become part of the federal law, 38 the federal system developed other exceptions,
four judicial and four legislative, to the final judgment rule. 3 9 It was one of the
judicially created exceptions, the collateral order doctrine, 43 that formed the ba41
sis for the Supreme Court's decision in Abney v. United States.
The Supreme Court developed the collateral order doctrine in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.42 Cohen involved a shareholder's derivative
suit in which the district court had denied defendant corporation's motion to
require plaintiff shareholders to post security to cover the cost of the litigation. 43
Defendant in Cohen had sought immediate review in the Third Circuit Court of

Appeals, which reversed the decision of the district court. 44 On review of the
appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court held that the pretrial order of the

district court was a "final decision" for the purposes of the federal appellate

jurisdiction statute.45 In determining that the pretrial order was a final decision

within the statute, the Court looked to three factors:
46
(1) whether the order fully disposed of the security issue;

(2) whether the order constituted a resolution of an issue completely collateral to the rights asserted in the actions or was merely a "step toward final
disposition of the merits"; 47 and
38. See Comment, supra note 30, at 859.
39. See id. The four legislative exceptions to the final judgment rule are: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1) (1982), which provides for immediate appeal to the court of appeals of interlocutory
injunctive orders; 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982), which authorizes federal courts to issue writs of mandamus (North Carolina has a corollary to § 1651(a) in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-32(b) (1981), which
authorizes the court of appeals and supreme court to issue writs of mandamus); FED. R. Civ. P.
54(b) which allows appellate review of final judgments entered against fewer than all the parties or
claims in a multiparty or multiclaim action (N.C. R. Civ. P. 54(b) parallels the federal rule except to
the extent that it is limited by the North Carolina General Statutes); and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982),
which allows discretionary review of cases involving a controlling question of law about which there
is substantial ground for difference of opinion and where the resolution of such an issue will materially advance the ultimate disposition of the litigation.
The four judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule are: the irreparable harm doctrine formulated in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848), which permits immediate appeal of an
order directing delivery of physical property when such an appeal is necessary to prevent irreparable
injury to appellant's interests; the collateral order doctrine, see infra notes 42-49 and accompanying
text; the death knell doctrine, which authorized appeal from an interlocutory order that has the
effect of terminating the litigation (in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) the Court
put an end to the use of this doctrine in the federal courts); and the pragmatic balancing test formulated in Gillespie v. United States, 379 U.S. 148 (1964), which allows appeal of nonfinal orders that
are fundamental to the furtherance of the litigation. See generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION, §§ 3910-13 (1976) (comprehensive
discussion of federal exceptions to final judgment rule).
40. See generally Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657-59 (1977) (discussing development
and application of collateral order doctrine); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 39,
§ 3911, at 467 (same); Frank, supra note 31, at 300-02 (same); Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 351, 364-67 (1961) (same).
41. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
42. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
43. Id. at 543.
44. Id. at 545.
45. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) provides: "The court of appeals. . . shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions.., except where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
46. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
47. Id.
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(3) whether the decision involved an important right that would be "lost,
48
probably irreparably," if review had to await a final judgment.
After considering these factors, the Court concluded that the pretrial order in
Cohen fell within the "small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of
right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that
49
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."
In determining whether the pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds belonged in the "small class" of Cohen orders, the
Supreme Court in Abney considered each of the three factors outlined in Cohen.50 The Court first found that the pretrial order constituted a final disposition of the double jeopardy claim, as no further steps could be taken in the trial
court to block the trial.5 1 Next, the Court determined that the double jeopardy
claim was collateral to and independent of the principal issue in a criminal trial,
as the claim was not relevant to defendant's guilt or innocence.5 2 Last, the
Court noted that the rights guaranteed by the double jeopardy clause would be
"significantly undermined" if the claim were postponed until after the defendant's conviction.53 The Court noted that the denial of an interlocutory appeal in
this case would subject the defendant to the very "personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial" from which the double jeopardy
clause was designed to protect him.54 Most significantly, the Court stated that
for the defendant to enjoy the "full protection" of the double jeopardy clause,
his double jeopardy challenge must be reviewable before he is exposed to a second criminal trial. 55
Rather than requiring a "final decision" on a collateral issue as the basis for
interlocutory appeal, as does section 1291, North Carolina's statute allows an
appeal of right from "every judicial order or determination of a judge of a superior or district court. . . which affects a substantial right claimed in any action
or proceeding."'5 6 The North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
have given the term "substantial right" differing, albeit consistent, definitions.
Relying on Webster's definition, the North Carolina Supreme Court has defined
48. Id.
49. Id. Other orders belonging to the small class defined by Cohen are: an order vacating ar
attachment in an admiralty appeal, the denial of a petition to proceed in forma pauperis, an ordet
challenging the amount of bail, and an order imposing on defendants 90% of costs of notifying clas
members of class action. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974) (class action)

Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (bail); Roberts v. United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844, 84!
(1950) (in forma pauperis); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684
688-89 (1950) (attachment).

50. Abney, 431 U.S. at 659-62.
51. Id. at 659.
52. Id. at 659-60.
53. Id. at 660. The Court noted that the double jeopardy clause was designed to protect indi.
viduals not only from being convicted twice, but from being tried twice as well. Such protection
would be lost, the Court said, if the defendant were forced to "'run the gauntlet'" a second time
before an appeal could be taken. Id. at 660-62.
54. Id. at 661.
55. Id. at 662.
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1983).
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a substantial right as "'a legal right affecting or invoking a matter of substance
as distinguished from matters of form: a right materially affecting those interests which a man is entitled to have preserved and protected by law: a material
right.' -57 The court of appeals has relied on Black's definition of substantial:
"'of real worth and importance: of considerable value, valuable.' "58 As one
commentator has noted, the term "substantial right" is best defined by
59
example.
Among those orders that North Carolina courts have found to affect a substantial right are orders granting or denying injunctions, orders maintaining the
unity of adjudication, and orders concerning separation and divorce. 6° In the
case of injunctive orders, North Carolina's substantial rights doctrine is comparable to the federal statute that allows immediate appeal of interlocutory injunctive orders in the federal courts. 6 1 In contrast to the federal statute, the
substantial rights doctrine authorizes appellate review only of those injunctive
orders that affect a substantial right instead of allowing appellate review of all
injunctions. 62 The right of a litigant to have all of his claims litigated in one suit
also has been considered substantial. 63 Thus, North Carolina courts have found
that an interlocutory order that prevents the complete adjudication of all of a
litigant's claims in one action is immediately appealable under the substantial
rights doctrine. 64 Finally, North Carolina courts generally have found that orders granting claims for alimony and child support arrearages, or granting full
faith and credit to another state's decree imposing one spouse's continuing sup65
port obligation, affect a substantial right.
Prior to the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Stephenson v.
Stephenson,66 North Carolina courts also had allowed immediate appeal of
awards pendente lite in alimony and divorce actions. 67 Influenced by the backlog of cases and the increased use of interlocutory appeals as delay tactics, the
court in Stephenson found that awards pendente lite do not "necessarily affect a
substantial right."' 68 Arguably, the Stephenson court's emphasis on the delay
57. Oestreicher v. American Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 (1976)
(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1971)).
58. Setzer v. Annas, 21 N.C. App. 632, 634, 205 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1974) (quoting BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 1597 (4th ed. 1968)), rev'd on other grounds, 286 N.C. 534, 212 S.E.2d 154 (1975).
59. See Comment, supra note 30, at 867.
60. See id. at 867-73.
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1982).
62. See Comment, supra note 30, at 868 ("[T]he advantage of the case-by-case substantial right
test [is] that it does not restrict the appellate courts to a black-letter rule requiring review of all
injunctions, but rather allows them to examine the particular facts and the individual rights involved
in deciding whether an immediate appeal should lie.").
63. Id. at 869.
64. See, eg., Hudspeth v. Bunzey, 35 N.C. App. 231, 241 S.E.2d 119 (denial of motion to
amend answer for purpose of asserting compulsory counterclaim affects a substantial right), disc. rev.
denied, 294 N.C. 736, 244 S.E.2d 154 (1978).
65. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 44 N.C. App. 381, 387, 261 S.E.2d 491, 495 (1980).
66. 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981).
67. See id. at 252, 285 S.E.2d at 282. Alimony pendente lite is alimony paid pending final
judgment of an action for alimony without divorce.
68. Id.
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caused by interlocutory appeals altered that court's previous dictionary69definition of substantial right to allow for consideration of judicial economy.

It is clear that the state and federal applications of the substantial rights and
collateral order doctrines differ. If the federal doctrine, as applied in Abney, is
not constitutionally based, then it would appear not to be controlling in state
court. However, the constitutional overtones of the Supreme Court's statement
in Abney that a defendant's challenge must be reviewable before a final judgment

if he is to enjoy the "full protection" of the double jeopardy clause suggest that
the dissenting judge in Jones may have been correct in his assertion that Jones

does have a constitutional right to immediate appeal. 70 A number of state
courts have found that Abney rests in part on constitutional grounds that are
applicable to both state and federal courts.7 1 Nevertheless, the Court's preface
to its discussion of the double jeopardy issue in Abney refutes such a conclusion.

The Court observed that "it is well settled that there is no constitutional right to
an appeal" 72 and noted that there was no right to appeal in criminal cases in the
73
federal courts until 1889.
Conceding that the right to appeal is purely a creature of statute, the dis-

senting judge in Jones nevertheless contended that no difference exists between
the "final decision" requirement of section 1291 and the "final judgment" requirement of section 7A-27(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes. 74 There-

fore, the dissenting judge argued that the constitutional principles of Abney are
equally applicable to North Carolina law.75 This argument has some merit because both the final judgment and the final decision requirement derive from the
same common-law root.76 Both requirements have the same practical effect of

preventing piecemeal review. 77 Moreover, in the specific context of a criminal
case, a final decision and a final judgment would appear to mean the same thing:
the ultimate determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. North Carolina's final judgment requirement and the federal final decision requirement are
69. See Comment, supranote 30, at 873 (Stephenson "may foreshadow a trend to constrict the
path of interlocutory appeals by a re-evaluation of 'substantiality.' ").
70. The Court's assertion that the denial of Abney's interlocutory appeal would deny him full
protection of the double jeopardy clause can be read as a suggestion that the denial works to deprive
the defendant of rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
71. See State v. Janvrin, 121 N.H. 370, 430 A.2d 152 (1981) (citing Abney for the proposition
that interlocutory appeal is necessary prior to retrial in order to protect defendant's constitutional
right to be free from double jeopardy); State v. Berberian, 122 R.I. 693, 696, 411 A.2d 308, 309
(1980) ("[a]lthough the Court in [Abney] was construing statutory provisions. . . Mr. Chief Justice
Burger appeared to base the majority opinion of the Court at least in part on constitutional
grounds"; court found that Abney established constitutional right to appeal).
72. Abney, 431 U.S. at 656.
73. Id. at 656 & n.3.
74. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
77. Compare Tridyn Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 296 N.C. 486, 487, 251 S.E.2d
443, 446 (1979) (" 'Appellate procedure is designed to eliminate the unnecessary delay and expense
of repeated fragmentary appeals, and to present the whole case for a single appeal from the final
judgment.' ") (quoting Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529, 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951)) with
Abney, 431 U.S. at 656 ("[Tlhere has been firm congressional policy against interlocutory or 'piecemeal' appeals.").

1985]

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

1069

at odds on this point. Under North Carolina law, a final judgment is one that
"'disposes of the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially
determined between them in the trial court.' "78 Under the federal collateral
order doctrine, an order that does not dispose of the cause as to all the parties
and that does leave issues to be determined in the trial court still may be considered a final decision provided it meets the Cohen criteria. 79 As Justice Jackson
has noted, it was specifically a "final decision that Congress ha[d] made reviewable," and that "[w]hile a final judgment is always a final decision, there are
instances in which a final decision is not a final judgment."( 0 Arguably Jones
embodies just such an instance. Indeed, one state court has found Abney's interpretation of a final decision to be inapplicable to its own final judgment rule
8
based on Justice Jackson's reasoning. '
Before disposing of the case completely, it should be noted that Abney,
although not dispositive, is persuasive on the substantial rights issue. In the
course of determining whether an interlocutory denial of a motion to dismiss on
double jeopardy grounds was a final decision, the Court in Abney had to determine whether that denial "involved an important right which would be 'lost,
probably irreparably"' if review had to await a final judgment. 82 The standard
the Court used is strikingly similar to the standard applied in Jones; that is,
whether the order "deprives the appellant of a substantial right which he would
lose if the order is not reviewed before final judgment." 83 To say an important
right that would be lost if not reviewed before a final judgment is not the same as
a substantialright that would be lost if not reviewed before a final judgment is

illogical.
Although the Jones decision may be sound constitutionally, it reflects an
incomplete analysis of the North Carolina case law on the substantial rights
issue. The court initially compared the defendant's right to be free from double
jeopardy with the right to avoid a rehearing or trial.8 4 The court then cited two
civil cases, Tridyn Industries,Inc. v. American MutualInsurance,Co.8 5 and Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc.,86 for the proposition that the right to avoid a
78. Atkins v. Beasley, 53 N.C. App. 33, 36, 279 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1981) (quoting Veazy v.
Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361-62, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)).
79. A collateral order by its very nature is an order that is collateral to the principal issue in the
case.

80. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951) (separate opinion of Justice Jackson) (contending that
order denying reduction in bail should be regarded as final decision even though order does not
constitute final judgment, which, in a criminal trial, could be appealed only upon sentencing).
81. See State v. Fisher, 2 Kan. Ct. App. 353, 579 P.2d 167 (1978).
82. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
83. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 415, 313 S.E.2d at 266 (citing Blackwelder v. Department of Human
Resources, 60 N.C. App. 331, 299 S.E.2d 777 (1983)).
84. Id.
85. 296 N.C. 486, 251 S.E.2d 443 (1979). In Tridyn, the superior court judge had granted
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of defendant's liability to plaintiff under a
general insurance contract issued by defendant. The court reserved for trial the issue of damages.
The court of appeals found that the order granting partial summary judgment did not deprive the
defendant of any substantial right. The supreme court affirmed that the "case should be reviewed, if
at all, in its entirety and not piecemeal." Id. at 494, 251 S.E.2d at 449.
86. 294 N.C. 200, 240 S.E.2d 338 (1978). In Waters, the superior court judge had set aside an
order of summary judgment entered in favor of defendant on the ground that defendant had failed to
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rehearing or trial is not substantial.8 7 The court offered no explanation for its
conclusion that the rights asserted in those cases were comparable to those asserted by Jones. In fact, examination of the practical effects of both Tridyn and
Waters indicates that the rights asserted in those cases are not comparable to the
constitutional right asserted by Jones. The practical effect of the decision in
Tridyn was to subject defendant to a single trial on the issue of damages.88 The
practical effect of Waters, at worst, was to subject defendant to a single trial on
the merits and, at best, to a rehearing on a motion for summary judgment.8 9 In
neither case was there a danger that the defendant would have to endure the
"personal strain," "expense," or even the "embarrassment" of a second trial. 90
Given that only a single trial was involved in both Tridyn and Waters, it is
difficult to see the relevance of either case to the issue in Jones. The issue in
Jones was not whether the defendant had a right to avoid an initial trial, but
whether the defendant had a right to avoid a second criminal trial. Reliance on
civil cases might be justified by the scarcity of North Carolina criminal cases
involving interlocutory appeals. 91 The court, however, chose the wrong civil
cases on which to rely; it failed to consider two cases that are relevant to the
second trial issue. In Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc. 92 the
Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the plaintiff had an immediate right
to appeal the decision to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment as to
some of plaintiff's claims when the effect would be to subject plaintiff to a possible second trial on these claims if the granting of the motion were ultimately
94
found to be erroneous. 93 Similarly, the court of appeals in Roberts v. Heffner
file notice of hearing in conjunction with its motion for summary judgment. The supreme court held
that such an order "setting aside without prejudice a summary judgment on the grounds of procedural irregularity. . . is not immediately appealable." Id. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343.
87. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
88. See Comment, supra note 30, at 870-71 (citing Tridyn for the proposition that "orders for
partial summary judgment that merely determine the liabilities of parties while reserving the issue of
damages for trial do not affect substantial rights").
89. See Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law-Civil Procedure, 1978, 57 N.C.L.
REv. 891, 909 (1979) ("In Waters. . .denial of the right to appeal the setting aside of defendant's
summary judgment necessitates only a rehearing of the summary judgment and at most one trial.").
90. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 661.
91. Judge Johnson cited State v. Bryant, 280 N.C. 407, 185 S.E.2d 854 (1972), apparently the
only criminal case in North Carolina allowing an interlocutory appeal, in his dissent. See Jones, 67
N.C. App. at 419, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J.,dissenting). In Bryant the North Carolina
Supreme Court found that an interlocutory order of a superior court judge authorizing police to
retain obscene material illegally seized from defendant's store was immediately appealable. The
court in Bryant found that a defendant may appeal immediately an order that "'may destroy or
impair or seriously imperil some substantial right of the appellant."' Bryant, 280 N.C. at 411, 185
S.E.2d at 856 (quoting State v. Childs, 265 N.C. 575, 578, 144 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1965) (quoting
Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 53, 51 S.E.2d 925, 926 (1949))).
Childs, though denying the criminal defendant's interlocutory appeal of an order denying his
motion for change of venue to another county, implicitly authorizes interlocutory appeals in criminal
cases. See Childs, 265 N.C. at 578, 144 S.E.2d at 655. Bryant appears to be the only case in which
such an appeal has ever been granted.
92. 290 N.C. 118, 225 S.E.2d 797 (1976).
93. Id. at 130, 225 S.E.2d at 805. In Oestreicher,the trial court granted summary judgment for
defendant on two of plaintiff's three related claims. The supreme court held that plaintiff had a
substantial right to have all three claims litigated in one action; thus, the grant of summary judgment
was immediately appealable. Ifplaintiffhad been forced to try his remaining claim, and if, on appeal

19851

APPELLATE PROCEDURE

1071

found that "the possibility of being forced to undergo two full trials on the merits... makes it clear that the judgment in question works an injury to defendants if not corrected before an appeal from a final judgment." 95 As the dissent
in Jones noted, it seems illogical to hold that the mere possibility of facing a
second trial on the merits in a civil case involves a substantial right, while the
96
virtual certainty of facing a second criminal trial does not.
The court in Jones also stated that there was no right to immediate appeal
from a motion to dismiss because "such refusal generally will not seriously impair any right of the defendant that cannot be corrected upon appeal. .. .
There are two problems with this assertion. First, the case cited for this proposition, North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power Co.,98 recognized
that there is a right to immediate appeal from a refusal to dismiss a cause of
action for want of jurisdiction.99 Thus, the court's conclusion is based on faulty
authority. Second, regardless of the general effect of a refusal to dismiss an action, such a refusal on the facts in Jones impairs a right of the defendant that
cannot be corrected on appeal. Even if a post-conviction appeal reverses an unfair conviction, the defendant still will have been unconstitutionally subjected to
a second trial. 100 When the right not to be subject to a second trial is the right
at issue, an appeal after that trial cannot erase the fact that a trial has already
occurred.
In response to this last contention, the court in Jones stated that defendant's
rights were adequately protected by his right to petition the court for prerogative
writs. 10 1 The fallacy of this statement is illustrated by the consequences of
Jones' appeal from his conviction in the third trial. Following the second trial
court's denial of Jones' motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, Jones
petitioned the North Carolina Supreme Court for writs of supersedeas and prohibition, arguing that his retrial should be barred by double jeopardy princi10 3
ples.10 2 The court refused to exercise its discretion and denied the petitions.
When Jones finally was allowed an appeal from the final judgment entered in his
third trial, his conviction was reversed. 1 4 In the words of the dissenting judge,
"Nothing in [the appellate files] indicates that the appellate courts considered
from a final judgment, the summary judgment against plaintiff's two other claims had been overturned, the plaintiff would have been forced to face a second trial on those two claims. Id.
94. 51 N.C. App. 646, 277 S.E.2d 446 (1981).
95. Id. at 650, 277 S.E.2d at 449. Defendants in Roberts appealed from a trial court order
dismissing their counterclaim for damages in excess of set-off to plaintiff's claims. The court of
appeals found that if the denial of the counterclaim in excess of the set-off amount were overturned
on defendant's appeal from a final judgment, defendants would be forced to undergo a second trial to
determine their full measure of damages.
96. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266 (citing North Carolina Consumers Power, Inc. v. Duke Power
Co., 285 N.C. 434, 436, 206 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1974)).
98. 285 N.C. 434, 206 S.E.2d 178 (1974).
99. Id. at 438, 206 S.E.2d at 181.
100. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 267 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 416, 313 S.E.2d at 266.
102. Id. at 414, 313 S.E.2d at 265.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 22.
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the merits of defendant's various petitions, despite clear evidence of patently
arbitrary judicial action." 10 5 The availability of prerogative writs did not offer
Jones adequate protection; it offered him no protection at all.
One commentator has suggested that in interpreting the substantial rights
language of section 1-277 North Carolina courts have shifted their focus from
the protection of individual rights to concern for judicial economy.10 6 It is conceivable that the majority in Jones was haunted by the "specter of dilatory appeals" when it endorsed an opinion that was founded neither in law nor in
logic. 10 7 Even assuming that concerns for adjudicatory efficiency may outweigh
considerations of constitutional rights in the context of appellate review, as a
practical matter the court's decision in Jones may not be justifiable even on
grounds of judicial economy. As a result of the denial of Jones' initial interlocutory appeal, the North Carolina judicial system was burdened with two full trials
on the merits, two appeals, and countless petitions for discretionary writs, all of
which might have been avoided by the grant of defendant's original appeal. 108
Even disregarding the misuse of precedent and the possible absence of judicial economy, the court's decision in Jones is not justifiable as a matter of fairness. Regarding the concept of judicial economy, the Supreme Court has stated
that "the Bill of Rights . . .[was] designed to protect the fragile values of a
vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency."' 1 9 A number
of state courts have recognized the wisdom of this sentiment and have permitted
interlocutory appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. 110 The court in Jones, however, was unwilling to recognize or
give protection to the fragile value of freedom from double jeopardy despite the
North Carolina courts' protection of seemingly less substantial rights in the past,
In contrast to the result in Jones, the courts have singled out for protection as
"substantial rights" the rights affected by court orders directing the opening of a
defendant's safe,"' prohibiting the defendant from deposing an out-of-state expert witness,1 12 and requiring litigants to elect between disputed land boundaries
in a land title action.11 3 It is difficult to see how an order to open a safe compares with an order that has the effect of requiring the defendant to defend a
second, or even third, criminal trial, in violation of that defendant's constitutional rights.

The cases relied on by the majority do not address the issue presented in
105. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 269 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
106. See Comment, supra note 30, at 857.
107. Jones, 67 N.C. App. at 418, 313 S.E.2d at 268 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
108. This analysis assumes that the North Carolina Court of Appeals would have reached the
same conclusion had it allowed Jones' interlocutory appeal as it did when Jones appealed from the
final judgment entered in his third trial.
109. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
110. See, eg., Gray v. State, 36 Md. App. 708, 375 A.2d 31 (1977); State v. Janvrin, 121 N.H.
370, 430 A.2d 152 (1981); State v. Berberian, 122 R.I. 693, 411 A.2d 308 (1980).
111. See State ex rel. Hooks v. Flowers, 247 N.C. 558, 562, 101 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1958).
112. See Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Strick Corp., 291 N.C. 618, 625, 231 S.E.2d 597,
601 (1977).
113. See Jenkins v. Trantham, 244 N.C. 422, 427, 94 S.E.2d 311, 316 (1956).
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Jones. The court's suggestion that prerogative writs can protect a defendant
who has been forced to endure two unconstitutional trials, when his efforts to
procure such writs failed, is illogical. While the majority was correct in concluding that the Supreme Court's decision in Abney v. United States was not dispositive, the logic of that decision, nevertheless, should have been persuasive.
Without an opportunity for immediate appeal of an order denying defendant's
motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, a defendant cannot enjoy the
"full protection" guaranteed by both the United States and the North Carolina
constitutions. Understandably, perhaps, criminal appeals are in disfavor. Constitutional rights, however, should not be. The decision of the court of appeals
in State v. Jones should not stand.
KAREN E. RHEW

Appellate Rule 16(b) and C.C. Walker Grading & Hauling, Inc.
v. S.R.F. Management Corp.: New Requirements for
Appeals of Right
On November 3, 1983, the North Carolina Supreme Court amended the
provisions of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure governing appeals of right from the court of appeals to the supreme court.' The amendment,
which became effective January 1, 1984,2 added a new subparagraph (b) to Rule
16, restricting the scope of the supreme court's review in appeals of right that are
based upon the existence of a dissent in the court of appeals. 3 The new section
provides that when the sole ground for an appeal of right is the existence of a

dissent in the court of appeals, review by the supreme court is limited to consideration of the issues specifically set forth in the opinion as the basis for the
4
dissent.
The supreme court first applied Rule 16(b) in C.C. Walker Grading &
Hauling,Inc. v. S.R.F Management Corp.5 The court stated that the purpose of
Rule 16(b) is to ensure that review by the supreme court is limited to those
questions on which there was a division in the intermediate appellate court. 6
Thus, the court held that when the dissenting judge in the court of appeals fails
1. Amendment to the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, 309 N.C. 830 (1983).
2. The amendment became effective with notices of appeal filed in the supreme court on or
after January 1, 1984. Id.
3. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2) (Supp. 1983), "an appeal lies of right to the Supreme
Court from any decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in a case . . [i]n which there is a
dissent." In addition, parties may appeal to the supreme court as of right any decision of the court
of appeals rendered in a case "[w]hich directly involves a substantial question arising under the
Constitution of the United States or of [North Carolina] .... " Id. § 7A-30(I). The only types of
decisions of the court of appeals that may not be appealed as a matter of right under the statute are
rulings upon motions for post-trial relief made more than ten days after the entry of judgment and
motions for valuation of property that is exempt from the enforcement ofjudgments. See id. §§ 7A28, -30 (Supp. 1983).
Decisions of the court of appeals also may be reviewed by the supreme court pursuant to § 7A31. Section 7A-31 provides that, except in cases involving appeals from certain administrative bodies
to the court of appeals, "the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, on motion of any party to the
cause or on its own motion, certify the cause for review by the Supreme Court, either before or after
it has been determined by the Court of Appeals." Id. § 7A-31 (1981 & Supp. 1983); see also N.C.R.
App. P. 15 (procedure for certifying a claim under § 7A-31).
When the right to prosecute an appeal of right under § 7A-30 or to petition for discretionary
review under § 7A-31 has been lost by failure to take timely action, or when no right of appeal exists,
the supreme court may review decisions of the court of appeals by issuance of a writ of certiorari.
N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(2); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-32(b) (1981) (statutory authorization for
issuance of prerogative writs, including writ of certiorari).
4. N.C.R1 App. P. 16(b) states:
Where the sole ground of the appeal of right is the existence of a dissent in the Court of
Appeals, review by the Supreme Court is limited to a consideration of those issues which
are specifically set out in the dissenting opinion as the basis for that dissent and are properly presented in the new briefs required by Rule 14(d)(1) to be filed in the Supreme Court.
Other questions in the case may properly be presented to the Supreme Court through a
petition for discretionary review, pursuant to Rule 15, or by petition for writ of certiorari,
pursuant to Rule 21.
5. 311 N.C. 170, 316 S.E.2d 298 (1984).
6. Id. at 175, 316 S.E.2d at 301.
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to set forth the issues on which the dissent is based, no issue is properly
7
presented for review, and Rule 16(b) requires dismissal of the appeal of right.
C.C. Walker involved a suit to collect money allegedly due plaintiff for
work performed for defendant. 8 The trial court granted summary judgment for
defendant, 9 and the court of appeals affirmed,10 with the chief judge noting a
dissent but not writing a dissenting opinion." Based on the existence of this
dissent in the court of appeals, plaintiff appealed to the supreme court as a matter of right. 12 Applying Rule 16(b), the supreme court dismissed the appeal on
the ground that the dissenting judge had not set forth the issues on which he
based his dissent. 13 On its own motion, however, the court certified certain issues in the case for discretionary review 14 and reversed the judgment of the

court of appeals. 15
In its application of Rule 16(b), the decision in C.C. Walker marks a departure from the supreme court's previous practice with respect to appeals of right.

Under section 7A-30 (2) of the North Carolina General Statutes, parties are entitled, as a matter of right, to appeal any decision of the court of appeals in which
there is a dissent. 16 Prior to the amendment of Rule 16, the supreme court
adhered to the literal language of section 7A-30 (2), recognizing a right of appeal
from any decision to which a judge in the court of appeals had dissented. 17 In
such cases, the scope of the supreme court's review was not limited to consideration of the issues raised in the dissenting opinion,' 8 but included all questions
properly presented by the parties in the briefs filed in the supreme court. 19
7. Id. at 176, 316 S.E.2d at 301.
8. Id. at 171, 316 S.E.2d at 299.
9. Id. at 174, 316 S.E.2d at 301.
10. C.C. Walker Grading & Hauling, Inc. v. S.R.F. Management Corp., 66 N.C. App. 170, 310
S.E.2d 615, rev'd, 311 N.C. 170, 316 S.E.2d 298 (1984).
11. Id. at 173, 310 S.E.2d at 616 (Vaughn, C.J., dissenting).
12. C.C. Walker, 311 N.C. at 171, 175, 316 S.E.2d at 299, 301.
13. The court stated:
Where an appeal of right is taken to this Court based solely on a dissent in the Court of
Appeals and the dissenter does not set out the issues upon which he bases his disagreement
with the majority, the appellant has no issue properly before this Court. Such appeals are
subject to dismissal. Application of this procedural amendment [Rule 16(b)] to the case at
bar precludes further review by appeal of right.
Id. at 176, 316 S.E.2d at 301-02.
14. Id. at 176, 316 S.E.2d at 302.
15. Id. at 183, 316 S.E.2d at 305.
16. See supra note 3.
17. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 191 S.E.2d 752 (1972) (aggrieved parties may
appeal to the supreme court as of right from any decision of the court of appeals in which there is a
dissent).
18. In Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980), the supreme court specifically addressed the question whether the scope of its review in appeals of right under § 7A-30 (2) was
limited to consideration of the issues discussed by the dissenting judge in the court of appeals. In
Williams, which involved questions concerning both alimony and child support, plaintiff argued that
the child support provisions of the trial court's order were not subject to review by the supreme court
because the dissent in the court of appeals concerned only the alimony issue. The supreme court
rejected this argument, holding that it was "not limited, in reviewing a decision of the Court of
Appeals, to consideration of only such matters as [might] be mentioned by the dissenting judge in
the Court of Appeals' opinion." Id. at 190, 261 S.E.2d at 860.
19. Prior to its amendment, Rule 16(a) provided:
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Rule 16(b) now restricts the scope of the supreme court's review in appeals

under section 7A-30(2) to consideration of the issues set forth in the dissenting
opinion in the court of appeals. 20 This limitation led the C.C. Walker court to
conclude that there can be no appeal of right under the statute from decisions of
the court of appeals in which the dissenting judge merely notes his dissent but

does not write an opinion discussing the grounds for his disagreement with the
majority. 21 On its face this result appears to conflict with the language of section 7A-30 (2), which provides for an appeal of right from any decision of the

court of appeals in which there is a dissent. The court avoided this potential
conflict, however, by stating that Rule 16(b) was intended to advance the existing policy limiting the scope of review in appeals of right under section 7A30(2) to questions on which there was a division in the court of appeals. 2 2 Relying on previous decisions construing the statute, 23 the court observed that re-

view by the supreme court had never been intended for questions on which there
24
was no disagreement in the intermediate appellate court.

If there is conflict between section 7A-30(2) and Rule 16(b) as construed in
C.C. Walker, the result reached by the supreme court is controlling. Under the
North Carolina Constitution, the supreme court has exclusive authority to proReview by the Supreme Court after a determination by the Court of Appeals, whether by
appeal of right or by discretionary review, is to determine whether there is error of law in
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Review is limited to consideration of the questions
properly presented in the new briefs required by Rules 14(d)(1) and 15(g)(2) to be filed in
the Supreme Court.
N.C.R1 App. P. 16(a), 287 N.C. 720 (1975). The amendment of November 3, 1983 retained this
statement of the scope of the supreme court's review but created an exception for appeals of right
based solely on the existence of a dissent in the court of appeals. See Amendment to the North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, 309 N.C. 830 (1983). The scope of review in such appeals is
now governed by Rule 16(b). See id.
20. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
21. See CC Walker, 311 N.C. at 176, 316 S.E.2d at 301.
22. See id. at 175, 316 S.E.2d at 301. The fact that a dissenting judge does not write an opinion
does not indicate the absence of disagreement in the court of appeals; it merely means that the
grounds for such disagreement are not apparent.
23. Before the adoption of Rule 16(b), the supreme court had held consistently that in enacting
§ 7A-30, the general assembly intended to ensure review by the supreme court of questions on which
there was a division in the court of appeals. See, eg., State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 6-7, 296 S.E.2d
433, 437 (1982); State v. Campbell, 282 N.C. 125, 127-28, 191 S.E.2d 752, 754-55 (1972); Hendrix v.
Alsop, 278 N.C. 549, 554, 180 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1971).
24. CC Walker, 311 N.C. at 175-76, 316 S.E.2d at 301. Based on this reasoning, the supreme
court has held that appeals of right under § 7A-30(2) must be dismissed in cases in which there is no
real disagreement in the court of appeals, even if there is an opinion labelled as a dissent. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 538, 319 S.E.2d 912, 914 (1984) (when all three judges in court of
appeals agreed as to result but disagreed as to reasoning, and two judges filed dissenting opinions
that were in effect concurrences, no dissent existed, and plaintiff had no right of appeal under § 7A30(2)); State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 6-7, 296 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1982) (when two criminal cases
were consolidated and court of appeals ruled unanimously in one case, dissent from court's decision
in other case gave defendant no right under § 7A-30(2) to appeal unanimous decision); Nantz v.
Employment See. Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473, 484, 226 S.E.2d 340, 347 (1976) (when one judge in court
of appeals filed an opinion designated a dissent but in effect a concurrence, such opinion did not
constitute ground for appeal under § 7A-30(2)); Hendrix v. Alsop, 278 N.C. 549, 554, 180 S.E.2d
802, 806 (1971) (when court of appeals ruled unanimously as to two defendants, dissent from court's
decision with respect to third defendant gave plaintiff no right to appeal unanimous decision as to
first two defendants under § 7A-30(2)).
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mulgate rules of practice and procedure in the appellate courts. 25 The general

assembly may not prescribe rules of appellate procedure or abridge rules
adopted by the supreme court. 26 In the event that a statute enacted by the general assembly conflicts with the appellate procedure adopted by the supreme
court, the rules and case law of the court are controlling, and the statute must
yield. 27 Thus, the apparent inconsistency between section 7A-30(2) and the
supreme court's new approach to appeals of right must be resolved in favor of
the court; Rule 16(b) as interpreted in C.C. Walker controls the scope of the
supreme court's review in such appeals and overrides section 7A-30(2) to the
extent it is inconsistent.

Although Rule 16(b) limits the scope of the supreme court's review in appeals of right under section 7A-30 (2), it does not prevent the court from consid-

ering issues that do not fall within its scope. Rule 16(b) does narrow the class of
questions that must be considered by the supreme court as a matter of right, but

the rule also specifically provides 2 8 that parties may obtain review of other issues
in the case by means of a petition for discretionary review 2 9 or certiorari. 30 In
25. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 13(2) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive authority to make rules of procedure and practice for the Appellate Division." The legislature specifically recognized the power of the supreme court to adopt rules of appellate procedure in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-33 (1981), which states that "It]he Supreme Court shall prescribe rules of practice and
procedure designed to procure the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of all litigation in the
appellate division." Although statutory recognition of the supreme court's rule-making authority
with respect to discretionary review and certiorari is included in the statutes specifically concerning
these procedures, see N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-31(d), -32(b) (1981), no similar provision appears in
§ 7A-30.
26. The supreme court has long held that the promulgation of rules of appellate procedure is
within its exclusive province, into which the general assembly cannot intrude. See, eg., Duke Power
Co. v. Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57, 69, 265 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1980); State v. Furmage, 250 N.C. 616,
624, 109 S.E.2d 563, 569 (1959); Lacy v. State, 195 N.C. 284, 287-88, 141 S.E. 886, 889 (1928);
Womble v. Moncure Mill & Gin Co., 194 N.C. 577, 579, 140 S.E. 230, 231 (1927); State v. Ward,
184 N.C. 618, 618-19, 113 S.E. 775, 775 (1922) (per curiam); State v. Johnson, 183 N.C. 730, 731,
110 S.E. 782, 782 (1922); Herndon v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 111 N.C. 384, 385-86, 16 S.E. 465, 46566 (1892). The general assembly does have authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for
the superior and district courts, but it has delegated this authority to the supreme court pursuant to
N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-34 (1981) (authorizing supreme court to
prescribe rules of practice and procedure for superior and district courts).
27. See, eg., State v. Bennett, 308 N.C. 530, 302 S.E.2d 786 (1983) (when statute conflicts with
rule of appellate procedure, statute must yield to the extent it is inconsistent with rule); State v.
Elam, 302 N.C. 157, 273 S.E.2d 661 (1981) (general assembly lacks constitutional authority to enact
statutes conflicting with rules of appellate procedure, and supreme court's rules and decisions are
authoritative with respect to appellate procedure); Duke Power Co. v. Winebarger, 300 N.C. 57, 265
S.E.2d 227 (1980) (under constitution, supreme court, not general assembly, has final authority over
questions of appellate procedure).
28. See supra note 4.
29. The decision whether to grant such petitions is within the discretion of the supreme court.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a) (1981 & Supp. 1983). Section 7A-31(c) sets forth the grounds for
allowing discretionary review by the supreme court in cases that have been decided by the court of
appeals. Under the statute, the supreme court may grant discretionary review when, in its opinion,
cause involves legal
"(1) [t]he subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or (2) [t]he
principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or (3) [t]he decision of the Court of
Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court." Id. § 7A-31(c).
Petitions for discretionary review of cases decided by the court of appeals must be based upon one or
more of these grounds. N.C.R. App. P. 15(a).
Grounds for allowing discretionary review before determination of a case by the court of appeals are set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b) (1981 & Supp. 1983). Consideration of this
provision is unnecessary here, however, since this discussion concerns cases in which an appeal of
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cases in which a party wishes to obtain review of issues in addition to those that
may be appealed as a matter of right, or in which a party is unsure whether
issues are appealable by right, a petition for discretionary review of those issues
should be filed along with the notice of appeal that is required for appeals of
right. 3 1 If Rule 16(b) requires dismissal of the appeal of right and no petition

for discretionary review or certiorari has been filed, however, the supreme court
32
may, in its discretion and on its own motion, certify the case for review.
As stated by the supreme court, the purpose of Rule 16(b) is to "ensure
that in appeals of right based solely upon dissent, review by [the supreme court]

shall be limited to those questions on which there was division in the intermediate appellate court."' 33 In cases in which the dissenting judge in the court of
appeals writes an opinion, the rule fulfills this purpose by denying parties the
right to appeal issues as to which the dissenter expressed no disagreement with

the majority. In cases in which the dissenter merely notes his dissent without
opinion, however, Rule 16(b) as construed in C.C. Walker precludes any appeal

of right, notwithstanding the obvious division among the judges of the court of
right exists under § 7A-30(2). Such cases necessarily must have been determined by the court of
appeals before being appealed to the supreme court. The decision whether to grant discretionary
review is based solely on the appellant's petition and any response filed by an adverse party, without
oral argument. N.C.R. Arp. P. 15(e)(1).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a) (1981 & Supp. 1983) provides that in most cases, the supreme
court may, in its discretion, certify a cause for review either before or after it has been determined by
the court of appeals. See supra note 3. When discretionary review is granted, the scope of the
supreme court's review includes all questions properly presented by the parties in the briefs filed in
the supreme court. N.C.R. App. P. 16(a).
30. Petitions for certiorari are fied when the right to prosecute an appeal of right does not exist
or when the right to petition for discretionary review has been lost by failure to take timely action.
See supra note 3.
In addition to the possibility of review by means of a petition for discretionary review or certiorari, an appeal of right will lie in cases directly involving a substantial question arising under the
constitution of the United States or North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(I) (Supp. 1983).
31. Appeals of right from the court of appeals to the supreme court are taken by the filing and
service of notices of appeal within 15 days after the mandate of the court of appeals is issued to the
trial court or within 15 days after the court of appeals denies a petition for rehearing. N.C.R. APP.
P. 14(a). When the appeal is based upon the existence of a dissent in the court of appeals, the notice
of appeal must state the grounds for the appeal under § 7A-30 and the issues which were the basis of
the dissenting opinion and which are to be presented to the supreme court for review. Id. 14(b)(1).
In addition to a party's notice of appeal, a petition for discretionary review may be filed to request
review of issues other than those set out in a dissenting opinion, or to request review of the entire
case in the event the appeal is determined not to be of right. Id. 14(a), 15(b).
32. The supreme court did just this in C C Walker. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981 & Supp. 1983) provides that in most cases, the supreme court may,
in its discretion and on its own motion, certify a cause for review either before or after it has been
determined by the court of appeals. See supranote 3. The grounds for review and scope of review in
cases certified by the supreme court on its own motion are the same as for cases certified on petition
of a party. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981 & Supp. 1983); N.C.R. APP. P. 16(a); see also supra
note 29 (discussing grounds for discretionary review and scope of review). The supreme court makes
the decision whether to certify a case for review on its own motion without prior notice to the parties
and without oral argument. N.C.R. App. P. 15(e)(2).
In view of the CC Walker decision, it is hazardous for parties merely to appeal as of right
decisions of the court of appeals in which a dissenting judge notes his dissent but writes no opinion.
Although the supreme court may certify such a case for review on its own motion, it is fully within
the court's discretion not to do so. Thus, in this situation parties who wish to obtain supreme court
review should file petitions for discretionary review or certiorari.
33. CC Walker, 311 N.C. at 175, 316 S.E.2d at 301.
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appeals. Thus, under Rule 16(b) as interpreted by the supreme court, the right
of appeal depends solely upon whether the dissenting judge in the court of appeals has chosen to write an opinion expressing and explaining his disagreement
34
with the majority.
Although this result may operate inequitably in some cases by denying parties the right to appeal when there is no dissenting opinion in the court of appeals, its potential unfairness to aggrieved parties is mitigated by the availability
of discretionary review. If Rule 16(b) deprives a party of the right to appeal an
adverse decision of the court of appeals, the supreme court may still allow discretionary review of the case upon petition of the party or on its own motion.
Thus, the rule preserves needed flexibility in the appellate review system while
precluding automatic review of issues on which the court of appeals was in
agreement.
The practical effect of Rule 16(b) and C.C. Walker will be to impel dissenting judges in the court of appeals to write opinions in cases which they believe
merit review by the supreme court. The filing of dissenting opinions in such
cases will likely encourage both majority and dissenting judges to evaluate and
present the contested issues in each case in a thoughtful manner. If such cases
are then appealed as a matter of right under Rule 16(b), the supreme court will
have the benefit of well-reasoned opinions setting forth both points of view in the
court below. These opinions will aid the supreme court in accomplishing the
purposes of the rule by ensuring that the court is fully informed of the grounds
of the disagreement in the court of appeals that it must resolve under Rule

16(b).
JANE WYLIE SAUNDERS

34. The mere presence of an opinion labelled as a "dissent" will not guarantee the right of
appeal if that opinion does not express clear disagreement with the majority. See supra note 24.

American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters: Green Light to
Territorial Security for Automobile Dealers
Motor vehicle dealers, through extensive lobbying efforts, 1 have obtained an
arsenal of statutory weapons to defend against manufacturers' abuses of the
franchise system. 2 In North Carolina, the dealers' main weapon is the Motor
Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law, 3 which includes a provision
regulating establishment of new franchises in the trade area of an existing
franchise that distributes the same line-make of motor vehicles for the manufac-

turer.4 In a recent case, American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters,5 a manufacturer
argued that giving such territorial security to a dealer created a monopoly 6 in
violation of the North Carolina Constitution. 7 The North Carolina Supreme
Court, however, held the statutory provision constitutional. 8 That finding,9

along with recent amendments to North Carolina General Statutes section 20305(5), firmly established North Carolina dealers' sovereignty within their trade
areas-to the detriment of the average car buyer. 10

James Pennell had maintained a Jeep franchise from American Motors
Corporation (AMC) in the North Wilkesboro market area since 1960.11 Even
though Pennell failed for several years to sell the quota that AMC desired, 12 in
1976 AMC granted Pennell a five-year extension on his franchise. 13 In the
1. Automobile dealers possess a great deal of political power in the state legislatures. Macaulay, Law and Society: Changinga Continuing RelationshipBetween a Large Corporation and Those
Who Deal With It Automobile Manufacturers, TheirDealers, and the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L.
REv. 483, 516; Smith, FranchiseRegulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictionson Automobile Distribution, 25 J. LAW & ECON. 125, 154 (1982). "Often several legislators are automobile
dealers. Dealers often are active in local and state politics and have close ties with legislators and
party leaders. Finally,. . . it costs the legislators little if anything to give benefits to the dealers
since the large automobile manufacturers have little influence." Macaulay, supra, at 522.
2. This arsenal includes licensing of manufacturers and restrictions on manufacturer-dealer
relations. Smith, supra note 1, at 133. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (listing various
types of provisions found in state statutes); Note, State Motor Vehicle FranchiseLegislation: A Survey andDue Process Challenge to Board Composition, 33 VAND. L. Rrv. 385 (1980) (tracing the rise
of the franchise as the primary automobile distribution device).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 to -308.2 (1983).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305 makes it unlawful for "any manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or distributor branch, or any field representative, officer, agent, or any representative whatsoever of any of them" to engage in certain enumerated conduct. See infra notes 102-122 and
accompanying text.
5. 311 N.C. 311, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984).
6. "Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be
allowed." N.C. CoNsr. art. I, § 34.
7. Peters, 311 N.C. at 315, 317 S.E.2d at 355.
8. Id. at 324, 317 S.E.2d at 360.
9. The court held the statute constitutional both on its face and as applied to the facts. Id.
10. See infra note 123.
11. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. 684, 685, 294 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1982),
affl'd in part, 311 N.C. 316, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984). The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles found that
the "North Wilkesboro Market Area" included "Wilkes County in its entirety and portions of Surry
and Alleghany Counties." Peters, 311 N.C. at 316, 317 S.E.2d at 356.
The amended version of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(5) (1983) specifically limits the size of the area
that can be labelled market area. See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.
12. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 765.
13. Id. Pennell argued in his appellate brief that because N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(6) (1983)
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midst of this extension period, AMC granted an additional Jeep franchise in the
North Wilkesboro Market Area to Hubert Vickers. 14 Pennell then requested a

hearing with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles pursuant to section 20305(5).15 The Commissioner conducted the hearing in March 1981 and ordered
that Vickers' franchise "be enjoined, invalidated, and revoked" 16 and that AMC
"be enjoined from granting Jeep franchises in the North Wilkesboro area without first complying with the procedure set forth in G.S. 20-305(5)."17 After a
series of procedural steps in superior court, 18 AMC and Vickers sought review

before the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
On appeal AMC and Vickers raised three principal issues. First, AMC
contended the Commissioner did not have the authority to issue an injunction. 19

Second, AMC argued that section 305(5) was unconstitutional on its face because it allowed monopolies. 20 Last, AMC said section 20-305(5) was unconsti-

tutional "as applied in this case because it granted a monopoly to Pennell."'21

The court of appeals held against the petitioners on each issue. 22 The court
noted that AMC could give Pennell an exclusive right to sell Jeeps in the North
Wilkesboro trade area without violating the antimonopoly section of the North

Carolina Constitution; the general assembly was not granting a monopoly by
severely restricts a manufacturer's ability to terminate a dealer, the manufacturer may find it easier
to establish a new franchise in the same market area. "Thus, the legislature enacted G.S. 305(5) to
prevent the distributor from doing indirectly what G.S. 305(6) prevents him from doing directly."
Brief for Respondent at 6-7. See also Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138
N.W.2d 214 (1965) (court examined legislative history of a statute similar to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 305(5) (1983) and stated that "it was designed to prevent the manufacturer from accomplishing by
new.. . dealerships what the law did not permit to be done directly"); S. MACAULAY, LAW AND
THE BALANCE OF POwER: THE AUToMoBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 139 (1966)

("if a dealer could not be cancelled, he could be induced . . .to... resign his franchise 'voluntarily' by adding another dealer").
14. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 765.
15. Id.; see supra note 4.
16. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 765-66
17. Id. at 685, 294 S.E.2d at 766.
18. The procedural aspects of this part of the case are rather involved. AMC and Vickers
petitioned for judicial review in superior court pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150A-43 (1983).
Superior Court Judge Bailey affirmed the Commissioner's conclusions solely because the required
written notice was not given. Peters, 311 N.C. at 314, 317 S.E.2d at 354-55. AMC and Vickers then
appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, AMC and Vickers petitioned the
Wake County Superior Court for an ex parte stay of the Commissioner's order pending judicial
review. Id. at 314, 317 S.E.2d at 355. Judge Godwin stayed the order in March 1981. Id. Pennell
intervened and prayed that the stay be lifted. Id. In April 1981 after a hearing, Judge Hobgood
concluded that Judge Godwin's exparte order had expired in March 1981 and denied a motion to
continue the stay. Id. AMC and Vickers also appealed this ruling to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, and the two appeals were consolidated. Id.
19. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 688, 294 S.E.2d at 767.
20. Id.
21. Id. The petitioners could have argued that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(5) (1983) violated the
Sherman Act, the commerce clause, or the police powers clause. These arguments, however, probably would have been rejected on the basis of prior decisions. See infra notes 67-72 & 79-81 and
accompanying text.
22. Regarding the Commissioner's power to grant an injunction, the court said:
We find no merit in this argument because we do not believe the Commissioner issued an
injunction. It is true that in the decretal portion of his order, he used the word "enjoin."
The order was not treated by any of the parties as an injunction, but as an order revoking
the franchising agreement.
American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 688, 294 S.E.2d at 767.
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requiring AMC "to do what it could bargain to do if it desires to execute a
contract."'23 Judge Martin dissented, pointing out that the Georgia Supreme
Court 24 found that a similar statute violated the Georgia Constitution's prohibi25
tion against monopolies.
The North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that
section 20-305(5) did not violate the prohibition against monopolies but disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles had not issued an injunction. 26 The court reasoned that the statute was
constitutional as applied to the facts of Peters because the restraint of intrabrand
competition does not constitute a monopoly. 27 The court stated that "many
consumers in the North Wilkesboro Market Area may, in fact, be geographically
closer to a Jeep dealer other than Pennell."128 Jeep franchises in contiguous
counties, the court noted, could compete with one another for consumers who
29
live near the boundaries of the trade area.
30
The court also ruled that section 20-305(5) was constitutional on its face,
3
1
rejecting petitioners' claim that it created and perpetuated monopolies.
The
court quoted a 1974 decision in distinguishing horizontal from vertical restraints
32
of trade:
The vertical agreement is one running from the producer down
through the distributor to the ultimate retailer. The horizontal agreement is one made between dealers at the same level. The horizontal
23. Id. at 688-89, 294 S.E.2d at 767.
24. Georgia Franchise Practices v. Massey-Ferguson, 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979). See
infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
25. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 58 N.C. App. at 690-91,294 S.E.2d at 768 (Martin,
J., dissenting).
26. Peters, 311 N.C. at 322-23, 317 S.E.2d at 355. The court of appeals had sustained the
commissioner's order "enjoining" AMC's grant of a franchise to Vicker on grounds that the commissioner had not issued an injunction in violation of the statute but had merely used this language
"inartfully." Id. at 322, 317 S.E.2d at 355. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that "insofar as
the Commissioner's order revoked. . . the franchise. . . it was within the Commission's statutorily
delegated powers. Insofar as the order enjoined future practices of American Motors or Vickers, the
order exceed[ed] the Commissioner's authority." Id. at 323, 317 S.E.2d at 360.
27. Id. at 317-18, 317 S.E.2d at 356.
28. Id.
29. Id. The court conceded that
prohibiting additional franchises amounts to a restraint of trade. But the restraint of intrabrand trade contemplated by the statute in question is not such as to amount to the creation of a monopoly. While competition may not be as full and free as with multiple AMC
Jeep franchises existing in the North Wilkesboro Market Area, it is by no means eliminated. More than a mere adverse effect on competition must arise before a restraint of
trade becomes monopolistic.
Id. (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 317-18, 317 S.E.2d at 357.
31. Petitioners argued:
Certainly, application of G.S. Sec. 20-305(5), in such a fashion as to permit an obviously
inefficient dealership to continue operation without competition cannot pass constitutional
muster under Article I, Sec. 34 of the State Constitution. Surely, it is not in the public
interest and public welfare for a dealership like Pennell Motor Company to operate as a
monopoly.
Brief for Petitioner at 8.
32. Peters, 311 N.C. at 318, 317 S.E.2d at 357 (citing Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of
North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 206 S.E.2d 141 (1974)).
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agreement is deemed contrary to the public interest because it stifles
competition, whereas the vertical agreement is thought to leave to the
public the 33benefit of competition at a given level of the marketing
procedure.
The court concluded that horizontal restraints "impede competition and lead
inexorably to increased prices,. . . the evil which the anti-monopoly provision
seeks to prevent."'34 Vertical restraints are not viewed as offensive because they
do not prevent competition among dealers. 35 The court distinguished two earlier decisions, 36 which had held that certain licensing requirements violated the
38
antimonopoly clause, 37 as involving horizontal restraints on trade.
After establishing that the statute was a vertical and thus legitimate restraint on trade, the court discussed the particular policy favoring protection of
dealers. The court noted that manufacturers occupy a dominant position when
bargaining with their franchisees. 39 To correct this imbalance, state legislatures
have enacted statutes to protect dealers. 4° The court concluded that this legisla33. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 480, 206
S.E.2d 141, 150 (1974).
The court apparently analogized the constitutional prohibition against monopolies to antitrust
law, quoting from United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), which applied the Sherman Act to
vertical trade restraints. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358; see also Continental T.V., Inc. v.
G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (announcing a "rule of reason" when applying the Sherman Act to vertical restraints). For a thorough discussion of the Sherman Act and vertical territorial restraints, see L. SULLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 413-19 (1977); Aycock,
North CarolinaLaw on Antitrust and Consumer Protection, 60 N.C.L. REv. 207 (1982); Note, Antitrust-Vertical TerritorialRestrictions Judged Under Rule of Reason, 12 TUL. L. REv. 389 (1978).
To complete the analogy, the court could have discussed Waldron Buick Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 254 N.C. 117, 118 S.E.2d 559 (1961). In Waldron, the court held that an exclusive franchise
agreement between General Motors and a franchisee did not violate North Carolina's version of the
Sherman Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1981), as an unreasonable restraint on trade. Waldron, 254
N.C. at 129, 118 S.E.2d at 568.
Automobile manufacturers in several jurisdictions have challenged statutes such as N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 305(5) (1983) as violating the antitrust laws. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
34. Peters, 311 N.C. at 318, 317 S.E.2d at 357.
35. Id.
36. In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973); State
v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
37. InIn re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973), the
court held that a statute regulating the construction of a private hospital on private property was
unconstitutional. Id. at 548, 193 S.E.2d at 733. The court was primarily concerned with containing
medical costs. Id. at 549, 193 S.E.2d at 734. In State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731
(1949), the court struck down as unconstitutional a licensing statute for photographers. Id. at 772,
51 S.E.2d at 736.
38. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
39. Id. at 319, 317 S.E.2d at 358. This imbalance in bargaining power has been noted often.
See, ag., Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract, 66 YALE L.J.
1135, 1140 (1957) ("[O]ften the dealer must comply simply because of economic power of the manufacturer."); Macaulay, supra note 1, at 492-95 (dealer has "relatively little to bargain with"); Smith,
supranote 1, at 131-32 (noting that manufacturers have greater bargaining power); Strand & French,
The Automobile DealerFranchiseAct: Another Experiment in Federal Class Legislation, 25 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 667, 667-70 (1957) (dealer franchise system described as one in which the manufacturer maintains all control); see also New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox, Co., 439 U.S. 96, 10001 (1978) (discussing due process aspects of territorial security statutes); Mazda Motors of Am., Inc.
v. Southwestern Motors, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978) (determining whether termination of franchise agreement violated statute), modified on other grounds, 296 N.C. 359, 250 S.E.2d
250 (1979); infra note 46 (discussing the superior bargaining power of automobile manufacturers).
40. "Currently, every state regulates at least some aspect of the distribution." Smith, supra
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tive response to the unequal bargaining power was a "valid exercise of the state's
extensive police power;"' 41 section 20-305(5) protects the "franchisees from

abuses of vertical integration." 42
The Peters court chose not to follow the Georgia Supreme Court, which
struck down a similar statute;4 3 the court noted that Georgia's constitution not

only prohibited monopolies, but also prohibited legislation that would diminish
competition. 44 In holding section 20-305(5) constitutional, the North Carolina
Supreme Court aligned itself with the majority of other jurisdictions. 45
Abusive tactics employed by automobile manufacturers after World War II
resulted in state and federal legislation to protect motor vehicle dealers. 46 In
note 1, at 133. "Of the fifty states, all but five have legislation that focuses directly upon the automobile manufacturer-dealer relationship." Note, supra note 2, at 399.
41. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. Accord Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwest Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobiles, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978). Contra Georgia Franchise Practices Comm'n
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979); General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 996 (1977). See infra
note 61 and accompanying text.
42. Peters, 311 N.C. at 321, 317 S.E.2d at 359. The introductory paragraph to the Motor
Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law states:
The General Assembly finds and declares that the distribution of motor vehicles in the
State of North Carolina vitally affects the general economy of the State and the public
interest and public welfare, and in the exercise of its police power, it is necessary to regulate
and license motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers, salesmen, and their representatives doing business in North Carolina, in order to prevent frauds, impositions and
other abuses upon its citizens and to protect and preserve the investments and priorities of
the citizens of this State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (1983). If the public interest is so in need of protection, why are dealers
the only parties who can object to a manufacturer's actions under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 305(5) (1983)?
The court in Tober Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobiles, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978),
in distinguishing the statute at issue there from that in General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194 (1977), stated: "These cases can be distinguished on the
ground that the laws seemed to make harm to existing dealers the only relevant criterion for judging
the propriety of a new franchise, a feature giving an anti-competitive cast to the statutes." Id. at
324, 381 N.E.2d at 913 (emphasis added). See infra notes 50 & 94 and accompanying text.
43. Peters, 311 N.C. at 321, 317 S.E.2d at 359; see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
44. Peters, 311 N.C. at 321, 317 S.E.2d at 359. The court stated: "We decline to follow Georgia Franchise, noting that the Georgia constitutional provision, unlike its North Carolina counterpart, concerns legislation having 'the effect. . . of defeating or lessening competition. . .' as well as
'encouraging a monopoly.' Thus, its scope seems considerably more far-reaching into the area of
commerce than our anti-monopoly provision." Id.
45. See infra notes 60-61, 66 and accompanying text.
46. S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 16-19 (1966). By the 1950s, supply caught up with demand in the auto
industry.
During this period all manufacturers sought to induce dealers to sell more cars ....
Promotions [for factory representatives] came to those who produced sales, and the more
the dealers were pushed, the more they sold . . . . Some dealers flourished. Some quit.
Others were cancelled by the factory or pushed into involuntary "voluntary" termination.
Id. at 16-19. It has been well-documented that manufacturers abused their superior bargaining
power over dealers. See Macaulay, supra note 1, at 495-506; Strand & French, supra note 39, at 66870. Manufacturers' power over dealers stems from the system of distribution.
[Tihe dealer pays for much of the distribution system in the automobile industry, and his
money rather than the manufacturer's is tied up in bricks and mortar, and, more importantly, in unsold new automobiles. . . . The selling agreement is drafted by the manufacturer's lawyers in fairly legal language and accepted without change by the dealer. ...
Typically, the manufacturer gets what it wants from its dealers. It often has more applicants who would like to be dealers than it has dealerships available.. . . A dealer is in a
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1956 Congress enacted the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act,47 which gave

dealers a federal cause of action against manufacturers who did not act in "good
faith." 48 The Act did not protect dealers' territorial security, despite lobbying
49
by the National Association of Automobile Dealers for such a provision.

very bad position if his franchise is terminated. Upon termination it is difficult to salvage
his large investment because a cancelled dealer has difficulty selling his building, tools,
inventory, and good will to another dealer.
Macaulay, supra note 1, at 489-95. Smith proposes an alternative hypothesis:
[F]ranchising is used by the industry because it provides a balance of retail incentives and
effective control which is favorable to the manufacturer. This alsertion differs from earlier
explanations of the use of franchising by the auto industry, most of which regard the
franchise system as a mechanism for raising capital quickly. Such explanations are not
sufficient since they fail to explain why alternative systems of organization do not arise
once the alleged capital shortage problem is solved.
Smith, supra note 1, at 126.
47. Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, ch. 1038, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1976)). This Act was the keystone of later state and federal legislation.
Mhe act provides legal remedies for dealers harmed by the actions of manufacturers which
are not ingood faith. . . . While a few states had enacted statutes pertaining to regulation of automobile distribution as early as the 1930's and 1940's, most of them did not
substantially strengthen the legal rights of dealers. Since the 1956 Dealers' Day in Court
Act, state regulation of automobile distributors has undergone significant changes.
Smith, supra note 1, at 132-33.
The Morroney Committee, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, studied automobile distribution. Three of the committee members were closely linked
with automobile dealers: Senator Paine was a former dealer; Senator Monroney's college roommate
was a General Motors dealer; and Senator Thurmond served in the Army Reserve with the legislative counsel for the National Automobile Dealers' Association. S. MACAULAY, supra note 46, at 4850.
The bill was amended significantly. For a description of the legislative history of the Act, see
Kessler, supra note 39.
48. The statute provides:
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile manufacturer. . . and shall
recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit by reason of the failure of
said automobile manufacturer. . . to act in good faith in performing.. . with any of the
terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating, cancelling, or not renewing the
franchise with said dealer ....
15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976).
49. The Eisenhower administration opposed a territorial security provision.
William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, wrote Senator O'Mahoney about the Eisenhower Administration's views on. . .the good faith bills. In short, he said that the Administration did not like them. While it had no strong objection to legislation dealing with
coercion, it opposed any legislative authorization for "territorial security" . . . because
such [provision] would protect franchised dealers at the cost of denying consumers the
benefits of competition. . . . These comments were consistent with the antitrust philosophy of the Department of Justice. Conveniently, they also pleased Ford and General Motors whose officers were supporters of the Eisenhower campaign for re-election.
S. MACAULAY, supra note 46, at 62-63.
Some dealers apparently opposed territorial protections. Strand & French, supra note 39, at
675. See also Macaulay, Law and Society: Changinga Continuing Relationship Between a Large
Corporationand Those Who Deal With It: Automobile Manufacturers, TheirDealers, and the Legal
System-PartII, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 704, 846 (describing the disagreement among auto dealers over
territorial security). The House Report on the Dealers' Day in Court Act states:
The bill does not freeze present channels or methods of automobile distribution and would
not prohibit a manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in a community provided
that the establishment of the new dealer is not a device by the manufacturer to coerce or
intimidate an existing dealer. The committee emphasizes that the bill does not afford the
dealer the right to be free from competition from additional franchise dealers. Appointment of added dealers in an area is a normal competitive method for securing better distri-
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The state legislative schemes protecting dealers vary widely and may contain, along with legislative findings and declarations, 50 provisions for licensing, 1
provisions for boards and commissions, 52 restrictions on franchise termination,5 3 restrictions on franchise establishment,5 4 and prohibitions on coercion
and price discrimination. 5 5 The North Carolina General Assembly acted even
before Congress in passing "An Act to provide for the licensing of Motor Vehicle Dealers, Salesmen, Manufacturers, Distributors, and Factory Representatives" in May 1955.56 No provision for territorial security was enacted,
57
however, until 1973.
Automobile manufacturers challenged the legislation protecting dealers on
constitutional grounds. 58 The manufacturers tried a number of different legal
theories but were largely unsuccessful. 59 Most courts rejected the manufacturers' argument that such statutes violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution 6° as well as the argument that the statutes represented spebution and curtailment of this right would be inconsistent with the antitrust objectives of
this legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4596,
4603-04; see also Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932 (5th Cir.
1967) (discussing legislative history), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1967); Garvin v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963) (discussing legislative history of Dealers' Day in Court
Act).
50. Note, supra note 2, at 400.
Many state regulatory schemes begin with a provision setting forth either legislative findings or declarations of public policy. These provisions are included because state legislatures may not use their powers to protect special groups from competition, and legislation
that is not "affected with the public interest" is outside the police power of the state.
Id. But "one must ask whether the public is actually benefitted by these laws." Id. at 401, n,106.
Justice Stevens answers this question in the negative in his dissent in New Motor Vehicle Bd. v.
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 120 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 42; infra notes
94-95 and accompanying text.
51. Note, supra note 2, at 403.
52. Id. at 403-05.
53. Id. at 405-08.
54. Id. at 408-10. Wisconsin was the first state to adopt a territorial security provision.
Some representatives of dealer associations have charged that the manufacturers have used
and still use another tactic to blunt the effect of the state statutes. If a dealer could not be
cancelled, he could be induced. . .to give up and resign his franchise "voluntarily" by
adding another franchised dealer selling his make in his area. . . . The Wisconsin Automotive Traders Association reacted to this device by successfully proposing an amendment
to the Wisconsin legislation.. . . Dealer associations in other states may push for similar
provisions now that it has been declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin; manufacturers view it with horror.
S. MACAULAY, supra note 46, at 139. The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld this provision against
equal protection, interstate commerce, and vagueness challenges in Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v.
Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138 N.W.2d 214 (1965).
55. Note, supra note 2, at 411.
56. Act of May 25, 1955, ch. 1243, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1282.
57. See Act of March 16, 1973, ch. 88, § 1-2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 68, 68-69. That provision
was amended recently. See Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 704, § 7, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 686, 688; infra
notes 102-24 and accompanying text.
58. Note, supra note 2, at 419.
59. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1173 (1966).
60. See, eg., Blenke Brothers Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 203 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ind. 1962) (Federal Dealers' Day in Court Act is not arbitrary and is constitutional); Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor
Vehicle Bd., 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979) (presence of dealers on the New Motor
Vehicle Board did not deprive manufacturers of an unbiased tribunal); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc.
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cial interest legislation and were therefore an improper exercise of the police
61
power.
The United States Supreme Court, in New Motor Vehicle Boardv. Orrin W.
Fox Co., 62 recently upheld a California statute similar to section 20-305(5)
against various challenges, including an attack based on the due process
clause. 63 The main issue before the Court was "whether California may, by rule
or statute, temporarily delay the establishment or relocation of automobile dealerships pending the Board's adjudication of the protests of existing dealers." 64
The Court held that, "[e]ven if the right to franchise had constituted a protected
interest when California enacted the Automobile Franchise Act, California's
Legislature was still constitutionally empowered to enact a general scheme of
business regulation that imposed reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of the
right."6 5s In short, the Court gave a green light to state regulation of franchise
areas for automobile dealers.

Many courts determining the validity of automobile dealer statutes have
considered whether such statutes violate the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution. 66 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cirv. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978) (statute specific enough for due
process); Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (upholding make-up of the
board), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960); General Motors Corp. v. Capitol Chevrolet, 645
S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1983) (presence of dealers on board does not violate due process).
But see American Motors Sales Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd., 69 Cal. App. 3d 983, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977) (statute requiring that dealers be on the board unconstitutional); Desert ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 95 Nev. 640, 600 P.2d 1189 (1979) (Nevada statute violates due
process "since appellants were able to obtain a de facto injunction simply by the filing of the action"), cert denied, 445 U.S. 964 (1980).
61. See, eg., E.L. Bowen & Co. v. American Motors Sales, 153 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Va. 1957)
(Virginia statute upheld because regulation benefits public); Willys Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern
Kaiser-Willys, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 469 (D. Minn. 1956) (Minnesota statute held valid exercise of
police power); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobiles, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d
908 (1978) (statute was prima facie within government's constitutional reach); Mazda Motors of
Am., Inc. v. Southwestern Motors, Inc., 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978)(statute presumed
constitutional), modified on othergrounds, 296 N.C. 357, 250 S.E.2d 250 (1979); Ford Motor Co. v.
Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (stating that no case holds such legislation beyond police
power), appealdismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960); Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78,
138 N.W.2d 214 (1965) (statute presumed constitutional); Kuhl Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 270
Wis. 488, 71 N.W.2d 420 (1955) (if regulation promotes fair dealing, it is legitimate exercise of police
power); see also Superior Motors, Inc. v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 359 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1973)
(unlikely that statute was valid exercise of police power, but not necessary to decide that issue). But
see General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956) (Colorado statute held unconstitutional because it required licensing of franchised dealers but not independent dealers).
The Georgia Supreme Court believed such provisions exceeded the proper use of police powers.
In General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 377, 237 S.E.2d 194, 197
(1977), the court said, "[W]e view this legislation. . .as purely anti-competitive and thus not 'affected with the public interest' and within the police power of the state." In Georgia Franchise
Practices Comm'n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 802, 262 S.E.2d 106, 108 (1979), the court
said, "m71he cited sections violate the due process clause by seeking to regulate an industry not
affected with a public interest.
62. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
63. Id. at 104.
64. Id. at 106. The Court also considered whether the statute violated the Sherman Act. See
infra note 73-75 and accompanying text (describing the Court's handling of the Sherman Act issue).
65. Orrin, 439 U.S. at 104.
66. The commerce clause of the United States Constitution grants Congress the power "to
regulate commerce. . . among the several states.
...U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. "Thus, when a
state regulation conflicts with federal regulations enacted under the commerce clause, the federal

1088

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

cuit recently held that the Virginia statute 67 providing territorial security did
not violate the commerce clause. 68 The court used a three-part test: whether
the statute promoted a legitimate local purpose; whether the statute treated interstate and intrastate commerce even-handedly; and whether the burden im-

69
posed on commerce was excessive when balanced against the state's interest.

Relying on Orrin, the court held that Virginia's statute promoted a legitimate

local purpose.70 The statute did not discriminate between "manufacturers that
produce cars within the state and those that do not."' 7 1 Finally, the court held
72
that the statute did not unduly burden interstate commerce.

Territorial security statutes also have survived antitrust challenges based on
74

the Sherman Act.73 The antitrust laws are intended to preserve competition.
The Supreme Court in Orrin settled-or perhaps circumvented-the Sherman

Act question in short order by finding the California dealer statute immune from
Sherman Act scrutiny:
The dispositive answer is that the Automobile Franchise Act's regulatory scheme is a system of regulation, clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in
the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships. The regulation is therefore outside the reach of the antitrust
laws under the "state action" exemption. 75
statute controls pursuant to the Supremacy Clause." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTr=trTONAL LAW 266 (2d ed. 1983).
See American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Virginia statute regulating number of new franchises did not violate commerce clause), rev'g 445 F.
Supp. 902 (E.D. Va. 1978); Chrysler Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Board, 89 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 153
Cal. Rptr. 135 (1979) (statute did not violate the commerce clause); Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v.
Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978) (statute valid under the commerce
clause); Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 206 Tenn. 559, 335 S.W.2d 360 (statute constitutional notwithstanding the commerce clause), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 444 (1960); Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v.
Karns, 29 Wis. 2d 78, 138 N.W.2d 214 (1965) (statute does not violate the commerce clause).
But see General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 237 S.E.2d 194
(1977) (statute violates commerce clause).
67. VA. CODE § 46.1-547(d) (1980).
68. American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219, 223 (4th Cir.
1978).
69. Id. at 222. "[Ain important factor in analyzing all such cases attacking state regulation
affecting interstate commerce is not only whether as an absolute matter the burden on interstate
commerce is substantial but in addition whether the burden imposed on such commerce is discriminating in favor of local concerns." J.NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 66, at 277.
70. American Motors Sales v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1978).
The court found support for this proposition in a footnote in Orrin, which stated, "For a helpful
discussion of the purpose served by such laws-the promotion of fair dealing and protection of small
business-see ForestHome Dodge, Inc . . . ." Orrin, 439 U.S. at 102 n.7.
71. American Motors Sales v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 592 F.2d 219, 223 (4th Cir. 1978).
72. Id.at 224. Note that in General GMC Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373,
376, 237 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1977), the Georgia Supreme Court stated, "There can be no question but
that the regulation limiting the available market for General Motors imposes a burden on interstate
commerce."

73. See Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 313, 381 N.E.2d 908
(1978) (state action a valid exception to the Sherman Act). The issue was raised in General GMC
Trucks, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 239 Ga. 373, 380, 237 S.E.2d 194, 198 (1977), but the court
failed to reach it.
74. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRuST 20 (1977).
75. Orrin, 439 U.S. at 109.
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The holding that such statutes come under the "state action" exemption complements several cases upholding a manufacturer's right to contract privately for

exclusive dealership arrangements. 76 The statutory schemes establish territorial
security analogous to an exclusive dealership arranged by contract. In either
case, territorial security may be obtained without violating the Sherman Act.
Given manufacturers' general lack of success in challenging these statutes,
the court's decision in Peters is not surprising. In fact, it is consistent with deci-

sions in other jurisdictions. Manufacturers have been so unsuccessful in challenging dealer franchise statutes on federal constitutional and antitrust grounds
that AMC had little choice in Peters but to challenge section 20-305(5) on the
grounds that it violated the antimonopoly provision of the North Carolina Constitution. Orrin prevented any due process or Sherman Act challenges, 77 and
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit up-

holding a similar Virginia statute suggested that a commerce clause claim would
not be successful. 78 The argument that the general assembly exceeded its police
powers was unattractive because the introductory paragraph to the Motor Vehicle Dealers and Manufacturers Licensing Law affirmatively declares a public
interest in regulating the relationship, 79 and Mazda Motors v. Southwestern Motors80 had indicated that the courts probably would not ignore the general as-

sembly's declaration of public interest.81
AMC's argument that the statute violated the antimonopolies clause was
the only avenue unresolved by a court of authority. The supreme courts of
Georgia and Tennessee had reached contrary conclusions on whether the dealer
statutes sanctioned unconstitutional monopolies. In Georgia FranchisePractices
76. See Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 542 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that
reasonableness of vertical restraints of trade depends on whether effect is anticompetitive), cert denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Schwing Motor Co., v. Hudson Sales Corp., 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956)
(holding that the Sherman Act did not destroy the common-law right to choose dealers), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957); Kapiolani Motors, Ltd. v. General Motors Corp., 300 F. Supp. 784 (D.C.
Hawaii 1969) (granting motion to dismiss antitrust claim).
Courts generally state that exclusive arrangements create "a monopoly only in the manufacturer's brand of a product, and not in the product itself." Annot., 9 L. ED. 2d 1235, 1237 (1963).
See generally Aycock, supra note 33, at 237-38 (describing the exclusive selling arrangement); Note,
supra note 33 (discussing vertical territorial restrictions); 9 N.C. INDEX 3D Monopolies § 2.2 (1977)
(auto manufacturer may execute contracts giving dealers exclusive rights); 54 Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies § 74 (1971) (vertical restrictions as to sales territories are not per se violations of the Sherman
Act).
H. BROWN, FRANCHIsING REALITIES AND REMEDIES 311 (2d ed. 1978) states:
Where the franchisor is only in a vertical position with its franchisees, the present rule
appears to be that, in the absence of other anticompetitive practices, a franchisor may grant
its dealers exclusive territories for products or services which are in free and open competition with those of a similar kind.
77. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
79. N.C. GEN STAT. § 20-285 (1983); see supra note 42.
80. 36 N.C. App. 1, 243 S.E.2d 793 (1978), modified on other grounds, 296 N.C. 357, 250
S.E.2d 250 (1979).
81. "Additionally, the presumption is that the judgment of the General Assembly is correct and
constitutional, and a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless the conclusion is so clear
that no reasonable doubt can arise." Id at 7, 243 S.E.2d at 798; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (citing cases upholding similar statutes in the face of police power challenges).
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v. Massey-Ferguson,82 the Georgia Supreme Court held that certain sections of
the Georgia Franchise Practices Act 83 violated a provision of the Georgia Constitution "declaring illegal all contracts and agreements that may have the effect
or be intended to have the effect to defeat or lessen competition, or to encourage
monopoly."' 84 The Tennessee Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion
in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Capital Chevrolet Co.,85 holding that the territorial
security statute86 did not violate the state constitutional prohibition against mo-

nopolies. 87 Armed with little better than that split in decisions, AMC brought

88
the state constitutional issue before the North Carolina Supreme Court.
In holding section 20-305(5) to be constitutional on its face, the court focused on three points. First, the court determined that the statute represented a
"valid exercise of the state's extensive police power . ... "89 Second, the court

distinguished between impermissible horizontal and permissible vertical restraints on trade. 90 The court characterized section 20-305(5) as a vertical re-

straint, whereas the cases relied on by AMC involved illegal horizontal
restraints. 9 1 "Vertical restraints," the court said, "do not in and of themselves,

result in monopolies."192 Last, the court emphasized
the public policy in favor of
93
regulating the establishment of new franchises.

Justice Stevens, dissenting in Orrin, noted a weakness in the determination
that dealer monopoly statutes are a valid exercise of the state's police power:
The conclusion that there is no state policy against new dealerships is

further confirmed by the statutory limitation on the persons who have
standing to object to a proposed new opening. Most significantly, no
public agency has any independent right to initiate an objection, to
82. 244 Ga. 800, 262 S.E.2d 106 (1979).
83. Act of April 25, 1979, No. 671, §§ 1, 3, 1979 Ga. Laws 1625, 1626-28.
84. GeorgiaFranchisePractices, 244 Ga. at 801, 262 S.E.2d at 107.
85. 645 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1983).
86. TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-17-114(c)(17) (Supp. 1983):
(c) [Tihe commission may deny an application for a license or revoke or suspend the license of a manufacturer. . . who:
(17) Has competed with a dealer in the same line-make operating under an
agreement or franchise from a manufacturer or distributor in the relevant market
area.
This provision is similar to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1983). See infra note 116.
87. Capital Chevrolet Co., 645 S.W.2d at 238. The Tennesee Supreme Court stated: "We find
no merit whatever in the suggestion of General Motors that the statutes in question purport to create
a monopoly and do not consider that the matter warrants extended discussion." Id.
The Tennessee Constitution states, "Monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state."
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22.
88. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
89. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
91. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at 358. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
92. Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 217 S.E.2d at 358. The court, quoting United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvannia, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977), stated that "'if nothing more is involved than vertical "confinement" of the
manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive products are
readily available to others,. . .' then no monopoly results." Peters, 311 N.C. at 320, 317 S.E.2d at
358 (quoting Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 376). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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schedule a hearing, or to prohibit such a charge. Nor does any member of the consuming public have standing to complain. 94
The majority in Orrin, however, was not impressed with this argument, 95 and
the North Carolina court did not consider it. Nonetheless, it is contradictory to
declare that the public needs protection by way of the state's police power, but
to deny the consuming public standing to complain.
The Peters court's analysis is also weak in that, to distinguish the two cases
relied on by AMC, the court had to rely on antitrust law. The cases could have
been distinguished more easily from Peters: both involved statutes enacted in
excess of the legislature's police power. 96 Since the court established that section
20-305(5) was a valid exercise of police power, these cases were not persuasive.
Furthermore, in each of these cases, the discussion of the antimonopolies clause
was merely tangential to the outcome.
The most troubling weakness in the court's analysis is that in emphasizing
the public policy in favor of regulating the establishment of new franchises, 97 the
court failed to note the public policy arguments against such statutory protection of dealers. There is evidence that territorial protection results in "a large
wealth transfer from consumers to dealers and a reduction in the volume of newvehicle sales." 98 Furthermore, "[i]n growing markets this restriction will lead to
substantial increases in the market power of existing dealers." 99 It also can be
argued that protection for existing dealers comes at the expense of future dealers. 100 New dealers must make significant capital investments in the early stages
of the franchise. 10 1 If actual operation of franchises is delayed a long time, new
investors will be discouraged from entering the industry, because few can afford
to tie up large amounts of capital awaiting administrative action. Clearly, some
public policy arguments cut against legislated territorial restraints on automobile franchises. Even if these arguments were not strong enough to mandate a
94. Orrin, 439 U.S. 96, 120 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 50.
95. Orrin, 439 U.S. 96, 106-07 (1978).
96. In In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 551, 193 S.E.2d 729,
735 (1973), the court said of the police power: "[w]e find no such reasonable relation between the
denial of the right of a person, association or corporation to construct and operate upon his or its
own property, with his or its own funds, an adequately staffed and equipped hospital and the promotion of public health." In State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 770, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (1949), the court
said: "[I]n consequence, a statute which prevents any person from engaging in any legitimate business, occupation, or trade cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power unless the
promotion or protection of the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare makes it
reasonably necessary."
97. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
98. Smith, supra note 1, at 154.
99. Smith, supra note 1, at 138.
100. Justice Stevens stated in his Orrin dissent:
By the same token, the legislative judgment that manufacturers have greater bargaining
power than dealers and may have sometimes used it abusively by threatening to overload
dealers' markets with intrabrand competition does not provide a justification for a statutory procedure that deprives all manufacturers and all new dealers of their liberty and
property without due process.
Orrin, 439 U.S. 96, 116 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Brown & Conwill, Automobile Manufacturer-DealerLegislation, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 219,
387 (1957).
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different conclusion, they should have been mentioned to indicate possible limits
to the territorial protections that the court would accept.
The Peters court upheld section 20-305(5), giving automobile dealers a commanding position with respect to both manufacturers and consumers. In 1983
the general assembly amended section 20-305(5) to increase the dealers' already
superior position. 10 2 The significant additions are: (1) a definition of the relevant market area;10 3 (2) an increase in the time limits for administrative hearings; (3) a provision regulating the relocation of existing dealers; and (4) a listing
of standards to be considered in deciding whether a new franchise is justified.
The net effect of these changes, along with the North Carolina Supreme Court's
holding that the concept of statutory territorial security is constitutional on its
face, exacerbates problems for the consumer.
As originally enacted, section 20-305(5) regulated a manufacturer's efforts
to "grant an additional franchise for a particular line-make of motor vehicle in a
trade area already served by a dealer or dealers in that line-make . ..

."104

"Trade area" was defined simply as "those areas specified in the franchise agreement or determined by the Motor Vehicle Dealers' Advisory Board." 105 Section
20-305(5) as amended uses the term "relevant market area," 10 6 which is defined
as an area within a ten, fifteen, or twenty mile radius of the existing dealer; the
distance of the radius is to be determined by the population of that area. 10 7 The
population criterion, however, is vague,108 and one could argue that a twenty
mile radius is too protective of dealers in rural areas. Nevertheless, considering
that the trade area in Peters included an area larger than the statute's twenty
mile radius area, 1°9 the court can be expected to uphold this portion of the
statute.
The most disturbing change in section 20-305(5) is the new time frame for
administrative procedures under the Act. 10 Section 20-305(5) requires a manufacturer to notify existing dealers and the Commissioner of plans to establish a
new dealership in the relevant market area.I 1 Existing dealers in the same line112
make then have thirty days in which to file a protest with the Commissioner.
"The Commissioner must conduct the hearing and render his final determination. . . no later than 180 days after a protest is filed." 113 Thus, an existing
dealer effectively can block the establishment of a new dealership for up to 210
102. Act of July 7, 1983, ch. 704, § 7, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 686, 688-89.
103. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-286(13)(b) (1983).
104. Id. § 20-305(5) (1978).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 20-305(5) (1983).
107. Id. § 20-286(13)(b).
108. One problem is readily identifiable: For a dealership near a state boundary, does the population count include census tracts outside the state?
109. Peters, 311 N.C. at 313 n.2, 317 S.E.2d at 354 n.2.
110. As originally enacted, the only time requirement was that an existing dealer file a complaint

with the Commissioner within 30 days of receiving notice from the franchisor that a new dealership
was planned. Act of March 16, 1973, ch. 88, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 68, 68.
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1983).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 20-305(5)(c) (1983).
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days' 14-arguably an excessive waiting period. 115
The amended version of section 20-305(5) also regulates the relocation of an

existing dealer in the relevant market area of another existing dealer of the same
line-make. The original statute regulated only the granting of "an additional

franchise for a particular line-make ....-116 The new provision will discourage dealers from relocating, even though population shifts and neighborhood
changes might make such a change beneficial.' 17 This reluctance to relocate
could affect consumers adversely because they might have to return to decaying
neighborhoods after the sale to have their autos serviced.
Finally, section 20-305(5) as amended provides a list, which is not exclusive, 118 of criteria to be used in "determining whether good cause has been established for not entering into or relocating an additional. . . dealer for the
same line-make. . . ."119 The original act required only "reasonable evidence
that after the grant of the new franchise, the market will not support all of the
dealerships in that line-make in the trade area."120 Several of the listed criteria
encompass the effect of a new franchise on consumers' 2 1 and thus, this addition
is a welcome change. The final criterion is "[tihe effect on the relocating dealer

of a denial of its relocation into the relevant market area." 12 2 This provision, if
considered carefully, might alleviate the negative effects of the new provision
regulating relocation and dispel some of the reluctance to relocate that the new
regulation could engender.

The net result of the amendment of section 20-305(5) is to entrench further
the existing dealers, at the expense of the consuming public and prospective

franchisees. Consumers will pay higher prices for new automobiles and receive
less service than desired after purchase.' 2 3 The entrenched dealers now have no
114. Furthermore, any party to the hearing "shall have a right of review of the decision in a
court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to Chapter 105A of the General Statutes." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-305(5)(d) (1983). Thus, a protesting dealer could block establishment of a new dealership for far longer than 210 days.
115. The Court in Orrin faced a similar statute. The California statute has a time frame of 90
days; however, a 90 day extension can be granted on a showing of good cause. CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 3066 (West Supp. 1978). The Court did not discuss the possibility that 180 days was an excessive
waiting period for the new dealership.
116. Act of March 16, 1973, ch. 88, § 2, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 68, 68-69. The amended version
regulates manufacturers "establishing an additional new motor vehicle dealer or relocating an existing new motor vehicle dealer into a relevant market area where the same line make is then represented." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5) (1983).
117. See S. MACAULAY, supra note 45, at 172:
[A]s the population of a city moves to the suburbs, .. some older dealerships lose their
customers and find themselves in undesirable locations. The solution is obvious and expensive: move the location of the dealership and build new facilities.

Id.
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(5)(b) (1983).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 20-305(5) (1978).
121. The statutes consumer-oriented criteria include the following: "effect on the consuming
public"; "[w]hether it is injurious or beneficial to the public welfare for an additional new motor
vehicle dealer to be established"; "[w]hether. . .dealers. . . are providing adequate competition
and convenient customer care"; and "[w]hether [the relocated franchise]. . . would increase competition in a manner such as to be in the long-term public interest." Id. § 20-305(5)(b)(3-6) (1983).
122. Id. § 20-305(5)(b)(7) (1983).
123. One writer stated, "Automobile consumers are not an organized interest group, and they
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motivation to offer competitive prices within their line-make or to provide qual-

ity service after sales. It is ironic that the purported justification for these adverse effects on consumers is to protect "the investments and priorities of the
citizens of this State." 124
The North Carolina Supreme Court correctly answered the constitutional

questions before it in American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters.'25 The court's decision, along with the recent United States Supreme Court decision in New Motor

Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 126 and the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in American Motors Sales Corp. v. Division ofMotor Vehicles, 127 firmly establishes that statutes providing existing dealers with territorial security will be upheld, at least against challenges that the
statutes violate antimonopoly clauses, the due process clause, the commerce

clause, or federal antitrust legislation. Although the court correctly held section
20-305(5) constitutional, the court should have discussed the statute's adverse

effect on consumers. By discussing only the manufacturers' disproportionate
bargaining power, 128 the court failed to counter the dealers' erroneous assertion

that such legislation is unqualifiedly for the public good. So far, consumers of
new automobiles have not organized themselves politically 129 and have failed to

object loudly enough to prevent legislation that benefits dealers at the expense of
the buying public. Peters proves that relief cannot come from the courts; if consumers want healthy competition to determine new automobile prices and the
quality of service after the sale, they should target section 20-305(5) for
130
repeal.
CHARLES NOEL ANDERSON, JR.

could be the ones to pay the price of some types of accomodation between dealers and manufacturers
in the form of higher prices, poorer products, and less reliable service." S, MACAULAY, supra note
46, at 181. A Raleigh, North Carolina, newspaper editor sounded the same concern:
The prime effect of [the] bill would be to entrench dealers and even extend their trade
areas. Anybody who believes this will work to the benefit of the average car buyer should
be checked for missing sparkplugs. The so-called model law of the National Automobile
Dealers Association should be junked.
The News and Observer, June 1, 1983, at A4, col. 1. A Greensboro editorialist stated, "North
Carolina doesn't need to set up further special protection for its auto dealers. The General Assembly
ought to have this bill towed to thejunkyard. It's just another legislative lemon." Greensboro Daily
News, June 4, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (1983). See supra note 42.
125. 311 N.C. 311, 317 S.E.2d 351 (1984).
126. 439 U.S. 96 (1978). See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
127. 592 F.2d 219 (4th Cir. 1978). See supra notes 67-72 arid accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
129. "As to why consumers have tacitly permitted themselves to be taxed for the benefit of
dealers, the answer must lie in the cost of learning about the transfer, and then organizing an effective political coalition to deal with it." Smith, supra note 1, at 154.
130. Repeal of section 20-305(5) would not leave dealers without protection from manufacturers
that abuse their superior bargaining power. Section 20-305(6) regulates the termination of existing
dealers. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-305(6) (1983). Furthermore, dealers injured by a manufacturer who
fails to act in "good faith" may bring a federal cause of action. 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1976). See supra
note 48.

Utilities-Extension of Electric Service:
The Municipalities' Power Play
In two recent decisions, the North Carolina Supreme Court has undermined the ability of investor-owned utilities and electric membership corporations (EMCs)' to compete with municipalities for utility customers outside the
municipalities' corporate limits. This Note considers the court's decisions in
Lumbee River ElectricMembership Corp. v. City ofFayetteville2 and North Carolina ex rel Utilities Commission v. VirginiaElectric and Power Co. 3 and analyzes
the court's interpretation of the statutes that govern the rights of competing
suppliers of electricity. The Note concludes that in these decisions the court
subverts the purpose and language of the applicable statutes, particularly because it fails to harmonize them. The court's holdings may signal the end of fair
competition for EMCs and investor-owned utility companies.
Prior to 1965, publicly owned utility companies, EMCs, and municipalities
supplying electricity were free to compete for utility customers outside the
boundaries of municipal corporate limits. 4 In 1965, reacting to the wasteful du-5
plication of facilities and frequent litigation that resulted from free competition,
the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Electric Act.6 The Electric
Act is codified at North Carolina General Statutes section 62-110.2 and sections
160A-331 to 160A-338. 7 This Act, together with North Carolina General Statutes section 160A-312 (a provision that confers general authority on a municipal
corporation to act outside its boundaries), governs competition among suppliers
of electricity.
The Electric Act has two parts. Section 62-110.2 applies to competition for
customers outside the corporate limits of municipalities, and sections 160A-331
to 160A-338 apply to competition within the corporate limits. Both parts enumerate circumstances in which one supplier exclusively is entitled to serve customers; such exclusivity of service is based on the location of a supplier's
facilities relative to the facilities of other suppliers and on whether a supplier
previously has been serving a particular customer.8 Exclusivity also may be
1. EMCs are governed by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 117-6 to -26 (1981).
2. 309 N.C. 726, 309 S.E.2d 209 (1983).
3. 310 N.C. 302, 311 S.E.2d 586 (1984).
4. See, eg., Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v. City of Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 139-40, 203
S.E.2d 838, 841 (1974).
5. Id. at 141, 203 S.E.2d at 842; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.2(c)(1) (1982) ("In order
to avoid unnecessary duplication of electric facilities, the Commission is authorized and directed to
assign... all areas... that are outside the corporate limits of municipalities.").

6. Act of April 20, 1965, ch. 287, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 328 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.

§§ 62-110.2, 160A-331 to -338 (1982)). The municipalities chose not to participate in the formulation of the act, but the EMCs and investor-owned utilities did collaborate in recommending the Act
to the general assembly. Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v. City of Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 141, 203
S.E.2d 838, 842 (1974); North Carolina ex reL Utilities Commission v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 258, 166 S.E.2d 663, 669 (1969).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-110.2, 160A-331 to -338 (1982).

8. See id. §§ 62-110.2(b)(4)-(7), 160A-332(a)(3)-(7).

1096

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

granted to a supplier under section 62-110.2(c), a provision giving the North
Carolina Utilities Commission authority to assign to an "electric supplier" exclusive rights to serve a particular territory. 9
As used in section 62-110.2, "electric supplier" includes EMCs and public
utilities, but not municipalities;10 therefore, only an EMC or investor-owned
utility may be assigned exclusive territory under section 62-110.2(c). The exclusivity granted to an electric supplier cannot be invoked to exclude service by a
municipality." In fact, any exclusivity outside corporate boundaries pursuant
to section 62-110.2 operates only to the exclusion of other electric suppliers, not
to the exclusion of municipalities. On the other hand, the portion of the Electric
Act pertaining to service inside municipal boundaries, codified at sections 160A331 to 160A-338, is not addressed solely to "electric suppliers"; once any supplier of electricity has the exclusive right to serve a customer within corporate
limits, that right may be exercised to the exclusion of any other supplier of electricity.' 2 Theoretically, therefore, the Electric Act provides that municipalities
may acquire exclusive rights of service within their borders but not outside
them, although a municipality is free to compete outside its borders with an
otherwise exclusive electric supplier.
In addition to the Electric Act, when disputes arise over competition between municipalities and either EMCs or power companies, courts usually invoke section 160A-312.13 Section 160A-312 is relevant in such disputes because
it permits municipal corporations to extend electric service beyond their corporate boundaries. The statute provides that "a city may acquire, construct, establish, enlarge, improve, maintain, own, and operate any public enterprise outside
its corporate limits, within reasonable limitations."' 14 "Within reasonable limitations" is the key phrase in determining whether extension of electric service by
a municipality is permissible. In three recent North Carolina decisions, North
Carolina courts have not restricted the "within reasonable limitations" language
to an enabling purpose,' 5 but have held that this language in section 160A-312
9. Id. § 62-110.2(c) (1982). Section 62-110.2(c)(1) prescribes factors the Utilities Commission
should consider in assigning a territory to an electric supplier.
[]he Commission is authorized and directed to assign ...

areas ...

that are outside the

corporate limits of municipalities and that are more than 300 feet from the lines of all
electric suppliers as such lines exist on the dates of the assignments.... The Commission
shall make assignments of areas in accordance with public convenience and necessity, considering, among other things, the location of existing lines and facilities of electric suppliers
and the adequacy and dependability of the service of electric suppliers, but not considering
rate differentials among electric suppliers.
Id.

10. Id. § 62-110.2(a)(3). This Note uses the term "electric supplier" only in this limited sense.
11. Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v. City of Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 143-44, 203 S.E.2d 838,

843 (1974).

12. In North Carolina electricity is supplied by publicly owned utility companies, EMCs, and
municipalities. See id. at 139-44, 203 S.E.2d at 841-43.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-312 (1982); see, e.g., Virginia Elec, 310 N.C. at 303, 311 S.E.2d
at 587; Lumbee River, 309 N.C. at 729, 309 S.E.2d at 212; Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v. City of
Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 144, 203 S.E.2d 838, 843-44 (1974).
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-312 (1982).
15. The predecessor to section 160A-312 was construed as an enabling statute in Town of
Grimesland v. City of Washington, 234 N.C. 117, 122-23, 66 S.E.2d 794, 797-98 (1951).
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serves as the sole authority for resolution of competitive disputes involving mu16
nicipal suppliers of electricity acting outside their corporate boundaries.
Courts making decisions about competition outside municipal borders,
however, should not apply section 160A-312 in a vacuum. Instead, the "within
reasonable limitations" language must be applied with the provisions of the
Electric Act and the case law construing that act in mind. Because section
160A-312 has not been applied in conjunction with the Electric Act, competition
among the suppliers of electric power has been undermined, and municipalities
have a striking competitive advantage. Moreover, the Lumbee River and Virginia Electric decisions have undermined the right of electric suppliers to serve
customers allocated to them by the Electric Act. A further, anomalous result of
applying section 160A-312 independently of the Electric Act is to give more
rights to electric suppliers when they serve inside corporate borders than when
they serve outside them.
In Lumbee River plaintiff EMC sought to enjoin defendant municipality
from providing electric service to a new customer, the Montibello subdivision,
located outside the municipality's corporate limits and entirely within territory
assigned to the EMC under section 62-110.2(c). 17 The subdivision had requested that Fayetteville supply service.' 8 The North Carolina Supreme Court
framed the issue in the case as whether Fayetteville's extension of service to the
new customer was within the "reasonable limitations" required by section 160A312; the court found no provision of the Electric Act apposite to resolution of
the case.19 Persuaded by the city's current level of service and by its readiness,
willingness, and ability to serve relative to Lumbee River's current service locations, the court found Fayetteville's extension of service within reasonable limits.20 In arriving at its conclusion, the court did not consider as a
"determinative factor" the assignment of the territory to Lumbee River by the
21
Utilities Commission.
Because section 62-110.2 applies only to electric suppliers, the exclusive
privilege to serve conferred upon Lumbee River by the assignment under section
62-110.2(c) did not automatically exclude Fayetteville from servicing the assigned area. That the area was assigned, however, should have been a factor
considered by the court when it determined whether extension of Fayetteville's
service outside its boundaries was reasonable under section 160A-312. The relevance of a prior assignment had been suggested earlier in Domestic Electric Service v. City of Rocky Mount,2 2 the first case to resolve a dispute over competition
between a municipality and an electric supplier after passage of the Electric Act.
16. Virginia Elea, 310 N.C. at 305-06, 311 S.E.2d at 588-89; Lumbee River, 309 N.C. at 73233, 309 S.E.2d at 214; Duke Power Co. v. City of High Point, 69 N.C. App. 378, 383, 317 S.E.2d
701, 703, appeal denied, 312 N.C. 82, 321 S.E.2d 895 (1984).
17. Id. at 727-29, 309 S.E.2d at 211-12.
18. Id. at 729, 309 S.E.2d at 212.
19. Id. at 732-33, 309 S.E.2d at 214.
20. Id. at 738-40, 309 S.E.2d at 217-18.
21. Id. at 738-39, 309 S.E.2d at 217.
22. 285 N.C. 135, 144-45, 203 S.E.2d 838, 844 (1974).
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The Lumbee River court believed that this case governed its own decision. 23
The Domestic Electric Service court appeared to recognize that a prior assignment of territory under section 62-110.2(c) meant that there would be a supplier
ready and willing to serve any customer in the assigned area. It considered this
assignment an important factor in deciding whether extension of service by a
new municipal supplier was "within reasonable limitations."'24
Elaborating on' its view of the "within reasonable limitations" phrase, the
Domestic Electric Service court noted that "[a]n extension of a city's electric
system, reasonable at the time of and under the circumstances prevailing in
[Town ofl Grimesland v. [City oil Washington2 5 [decided prior to the Electric
Act]

. .

. would not necessarily be reasonable in the present day under the cir-

cumstances disclosed in the record before us."'26 One circumstance existing in
1974 when Domestic Electric Service was decided, but not in 1951 when Grimesland was before the court, was the existence of the Electric Act with its provisions allowing assignment of territory. Thus, assignment of territory under
section 62-110.2(c) should be taken into account in a modern reading of the
"within reasonable limitations" language.
That an assignment of territory outside municipal boundaries should be a
factor in evaluating "reasonable limitations" under section 160A-312 follows not
only from a careful reading of Domestic ElectricService but also from an understanding of the motivations that persuaded the general assembly to adopt the
Electric Act. A major impetus for the act was the concern that unfettered competition was causing wasteful duplication of service facilities. 27 Although it was
specifically the duplication created by facilities of EMCs and power companies
that led to the adoption of the Electric Act,28 duplication caused by installation
of a municipality's facilities should not escape objection. To permit a municipality to duplicate already existing facilities of a competitor would be to ignore the
general assembly's motivations in enacting the Electric Act. The municipalities'
choice not to participate in the drafting of the Electric Act 29 should not allow
them to avoid being affected by measures taken in response to legislative concern. While a municipality is not automatically excluded from serving an assigned or otherwise exclusive area outside its boundaries simply because there
will be duplication of the facilities of an electric supplier who has exclusive
rights in that area, 30 the duplication factor should be weighed in the "reasonable
limitations" balance.

Arguably, the Lumbee River court did consider duplication, even though
the statute did not require that it do so and even though the court did not ex23. Lumbee River, 309 N.C. at 733, 309 S.E.2d at 214.
24. See Domestic Elect Serv., 285 N.C. at 144-45, 203 S.E.2d at 844.
25. 234 N.C. 117, 66 S.E.2d 794 (1951).
26. Domestic Elec. Ser'., 285 N.C. at 144-45, 203 S.E.2d at 844.
27. Id. at 141, 203 S.E.2d at 842.
28. See, eg., id.; North Carolina ex reL Utilities Commission v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 257-58, 166 S.E.2d 663, 668-69 (1969).
29. See supra note 6.
30. E.g., Lumbee River, 309 N.C. at 736-37, 309 S.E.2d at 216; Domestic Elec. Serv., 285 N.C.
at 143-44, 203 S.E.2d at 843-44.
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pressly articulate that it was doing so. Fayetteville already had facilities near the
disputed territory. Thus, allowing the city to serve in the territory would not
effect a gross duplication of facilities, even though the territory had been assigned to the EMC under section 62-110.2(c). Because the court did not indicate
specifically that lack of duplication was a factor in its decision, however, it left
unresolved the issue whether duplication arguments will be heard when the statute does not expressly bar a supplier from an already serviced territory.
If the duplication argument is valid even when duplicative service is not
specifically precluded by the statute, then any exclusive rights granted under
section 62-110.2 must be considered when section 160A-312 is applied. The duplication question actually is quite complicated. 3 1 Courts have held that since
the general assembly set out in the Electric Act to remedy problems of duplication, such duplication may continue unless the statute prohibits it in the context
of the facts of a particular case. 32 If this interpretation of the statutes prevails,
then there is no room for a duplication argument when the statute does not
explicitly give exclusive rights.
Applying section 160A-312 without considering the Electric Act is most
injurious when a court finds, as it did in Virginia Electric,that once a municipality satisfies the requirements of section 160A-312 it obtains an exclusive right to
serve a customer. 33 In Virginia Electric the customer, Polylok Corporation,
originally received electric service from the city of Tarboro. Polylok was located
outside Tarboro's municipal boundaries in an area unassigned to any electric
supplier under section 62-110.2(c). Polylok sought to change its supplier of electric service from Tarboro to Virginia Electric and Power Co. (VEPCO). In arguing over the propriety of the requested change in suppliers, the parties to the
action never urged application of section 160A-312 because neither party contended that Tarboro did not have the authority to serve a customer outside its
boundaries. Instead, the parties based their arguments on section 62110.2(b)(5), which provides:
Any premises initially requiring electric service after April 20, 1965,
which are not located wholly within 300 feet of the lines of any electric
supplier and are not located partially within 300 feet of the lines of two
or more electric suppliers may be served by any electric supplier which
the customer chooses, unless such premises are located wholly or partially within an area assigned to an electric supplier. . . , and any
the consumer shall not thereafter
electric supplier not so chosen by
34
furnish service to such premises.
Tarboro argued that this statute gave it a continuing, exclusive privilege to
serve, regardless of Polylok's preference, because Tarboro had been the initial
supplier of service to Polylok. 35 The court ignored both Tarboro's and
31. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (discussion of Virginia Elec.).
32. E.g., North Carolina ex reL Utilities Commission v. Lumbee Rfver Elec. Membership
Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 257, 166 S.E.2d 663, 668 (1969).
33. Virginia Elec., 310 N.C. at 303, 311 S.E.2d at 587.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.2(b)(5) (1982).
35. Virginia Elea, 62 N.C. App. at 265, 302 S.E.2d at 644, rev'd, 310 N.C. 302, 311 S.E.2d 586
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VEPCO's arguments based on section 62-110.2(b)(5), correctly deciding that because section 62-110.2(b)(5) applies to "electric suppliers," its provisions are not
applicable to disputes involving municipalities. 36 Instead, the court found sec-

tion 160A-312 the only applicable statute. The court determined that section
160A-312 provided exclusivity of service rights for municipalities that satisfy
section 160A-312's "within reasonable limitations" requirement. 37 The court
held that Tarboro satisfied 160A-312 and thereby acquired an exclusive right to
38
serve Polylok.
It is difficult to understand where in section 160A-312 the court found this
exclusive privilege. Unfortunately, the court's opinion is of no help; the conclusion of exclusivity is drawn without supporting arguments from case law, legislative history, or statutory language. The finding of exclusivity appears as a
sweeping statement at the end of the opinion. 39 Not only is there nothing in the
language of the statute to support the Virginia Electric court's conclusion, but
there also is nothing in the purposes of section 160A-312 to support the finding.
Because municipalities act only under authority of statutes or corporate charters,4° section 160A-312 is necessary to permit a municipality to venture beyond
its borders. Giving municipalities permission to do something, however, is
hardly the same as giving them an exclusive right to take part in that activity.
Because section 160A-312 does not expressly confer an exclusive right on
municipalities to provide electric service outside their boundaries, any ambiguity
in this regard should have been resolved against the municipality in Virginia
Electric. "[S]tatutory delegations of power to municipalities should be strictly
construed, resolving any ambiguity against the corporation's authority to exercise the power. [The North Carolina Supreme] Court has long held that '[a]ny
fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved against
the corporation.' "41 To concede that there is ambiguity in section 160A-312
would be generous; nothing in the language of the statute hints at an exclusive
right to serve. Because the primary duties of a municipality are to be performed
within its borders, 42 any extension of authority to act outside those borders
(1984) (supreme court opinion never specifically referred to the parties' arguments concerning application of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.2(c) (1982)).
36. Virginia Elec., 310 N.C. at 305, 311 S.E.2d at 588.
37. See id. at 303-04, 311 S.E.2d at 588.
38. Id. at 307, 311 S.E.2d at 589.
39. The court stated:
We conclude, on these facts, that Tarboro's decision to provide electric service to Polylok
in 1970 and 1973 at Polylok's request was "within reasonable limitations" as a matter of

law. Its continuation of that service has been and is now "within reasonable limitations."

Tarboro, therefore, has the exclusive right to continue this service. The desire of its customer, Polylok, to discontinue the service has not diminished this right.
Id.
40. E.g., Lumbee River, 309 N.C. at 732, 309 S.E.2d at 213; Williamson v. City of High Point,

213 N.C. 96, 106, 195 S.E. 90, 96 (1938).

41. Porsh Builders v. City of Winston-Salem, 302 N.C. 550, 554, 276 S.E.2d 443, 445 (1981)
(quoting Shaw v. City of Asheville, 269 N.C. 90, 97, 152 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1967)).
42. Domestic Elea Serv., 285 N.C. at 144, 203 S.E.2d at 844.
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should be construed even more narrowly than authority to act within those
borders.
The nonexclusivity of a municipality's specific right to serve utility customers outside corporate boundaries was established in Town of Grimeslandv. City
of Washington.4 3 In Grimesland the court determined that
legislative authority would not be regarded as conferring the right to
exclude competition in the territory served. Having the right to engage
in this business gives no exclusive franchise, and if from lawful competition [the municipality's] business be curtailed, it would seem that no
actionable wrong would result, nor would it be entitled to injunctive
relief therefrom. 44
Although Grimesland preceded the current version of section 160A-312, its in45
terpretation of a right granted by the statute still is applicable.
Moreover, similar rights to serve granted by the terms of the Electric Act
have been construed by case law as not conferring exclusive rights on electric
suppliers. 4 6 When the Electric Act specifically grants an exclusive right to
serve, it is very clear on this point.47 Similar statutory language should not give
exclusive rights to one competitor while withholding exclusive rights from another. Holding otherwise in this scenario creates a severe discriminatory effect
against electric suppliers.
Not only is there discrimination in the court's granting exclusive rights to
municipalities under section 160A-312, but there also is an undermining of the
rights to serve given electric suppliers by various provisions of the Electric
Act.48 Rights granted by the Electric Act would be eroded by the municipalities' gradual accretion of exclusive privileges. What good is an assignment
under section 62-110.2(c) if, theoretically, a municipality eventually could annul
the rights in that assignment by acquiring exclusive rights to the entire assigned
territory? What good is it to have an exclusive right as to any other electric
supplier under section 62-110.2(b) if municipalities leave no territory within
which those rights can operate? If the court continues to apply the "within
reasonable limitations" language as it did in Lumbee River, without regard to
43. 234 N.C. 117, 66 S.E.2d 794 (1951).
44. Id. at 122, 66 S.E.2d at 797 (construing Act of March 19, 1929, ch. 285, 1929 N.C. Public
Laws 342, the precursor of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-312 (1982)). Although the earlier law did not
contain the "within reasonable limitations" language, the court, in dictum, imposed that condition
on extension of service beyond corporate boundaries. Id. at 122, 66 S.E.2d at 798.
45. Eg., State v. McGraw, 249 N.C. 205, 208, 105 S.E.2d 659, 662 (1958).
46. Eg., Domestic Elec. Serv., 285 N.C. at 143, 203 S.E.2d at 843.
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.2(b)(4)-(7) (1982) (language of exclusivity is that suppliers
other than the one initially selected by a customer for a particular premises "shall not thereafter
furnish service to such premises"); id. § 160A-332(a)(4)-(7) (statutory language is that another supplier "shall not" serve or that "no other supplier shall thereafter furnish service," explicitly denoting
the exclusivity given suppliers servicing a particular premises inside municipal corporate limits).
48. For example, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.2(b)(2)-(3) (1982), which gives any electric supplier the right to serve certain premises located wholly within 300 feet of that supplier's lines, is
subject only to the exclusive right of another electric supplier to serve those premises. The rights
given by § 62-110.2(b)(2)-(3) can be empty grants if a municipality, merely by satisfying the requirements of § 160A-312, attained an exclusive right to continue to serve premises located within 300
feet of an electric supplier's lines.
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whether territory is assigned or otherwise deemed even qualifiedly "exclusive"

under section 62-110.2, and then applies the Virginia Electric result of exclusivity, electric suppliers effectively will have no rights outside municipal
boundaries.

Anomalously, as the electric suppliers' rights to serve outside municipal
boundaries diminish, the rights they have inside corporate boundaries in relative
terms become greater. This is true because there are at least some absolutely

exclusive rights recognized for electric suppliers inside corporate boundaries
under sections 160A-331 to 160A-338, while all absolutely exclusive rights
outside municipalities are reserved to the municipalities after Virginia Electric.

This result might have been prevented if the court had considered the Electric
Act in applying section 160A-312. It the court had considered the Electric Act,
the court at least would have seen a statute that is more explicit than is section
160A-312 when it confers on a competitor exclusive rights to serve. The court,

however, continues to resolve disputes between municipalities and electric sup-

49
pliers without such consideration.
The Virginia Electric result may not find the support it needs in a duplica-

tion-of-facilities argument. Although a primary purpose of the Electric Act was
to prohibit free competition when it led to wasteful duplication of facilities, if the
general assembly did not specifically prohibit duplication, free competition
might continue as before the Electric Act, despite a seemingly wasteful overlap
of facilities. 50 Thus the Virginia Electric finding of exclusivity has only shaky
49. Duke Power Co. v. City of High Point, 69 N.C. App. 378, 385, 317 S.E.2d 701, 705, appeal
denied, 312 N.C. 82, 321 S.E.2d 895 (1984).
In Duke Power plaintiff electric company sought to enjoin the city of High Point from extending
electric service outside its municipal boundaries into an area proposed for annexation. The proposed
annexation area had been assigned to Duke Power under § 62-110.2(c). Id. at 380, 317 S.E.2d at
702. The court of appeals acknowledged that the city desired to serve the area in question prior to
annexation because after annexation, according to the Electric Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-332(a)
(1982), Duke Power would have an exclusive right to continue any service provided in the area up to
the annexation date. See Duke Power, 69 N.C. App. at 387-88, 317 S.E.2d at 706. The court nonetheless insisted on ignoring the imminent operation of this provision of the Electric Act; the court
relied solely on the authority given by the "within reasonable limitations" language of § 160A-312
and permitted the municipality to extend its service to the area.
The court's refusal to consider the operation of the Electric Act meant that it condoned the
city's attempts to circumvent rights about to accrue to Duke Power under the Electric Act. Duke
Power would have been better off had its service initially been inside rather than outside municipal
borders because exclusivity of service given any supplier inside municipal boundaries is operative
against all other suppliers and does not yield to the municipal supplier. Furthermore, the assignment of the about-to-be annexed territory to Duke Power created an empty privilege. Had the court
weighed into the "reasonable limitations" balance of § 160A-312 the provisions of the Electric Act,
its decision might have been different. The ease with which High Point was permitted to serve
customers in the assigned, proposed annexation area, is an interesting contrast to the insurmountable
barrier placed before VEPCO when it tried to serve Polylok.
50. When the general assembly has not restricted free competition, "neither [the supreme
court] nor the Utilities Commission may forbid service by such supplier merely because it will necessitate an uneconomic or unsightly duplication of transmission or distribution lines." North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 257, 166
S.E.2d 633, 668 (1969).
In many sections of the Electric Act, the general assembly has specifically established a 300-foot
measure as a guideline for desired distance between facilities of different suppliers, thus buttressing
the argument that when the 300-foot measure is not prescribed, overlap of facilities is condoned.
Because the Electric Act provides this 300-foot measure between electric suppliers outside municipal

1985]

COMMERCIAL LAW

1103

support in an argument that Tarboro was already equipped to service Polylok
and that to allow VEPCO to serve would create wasteful duplication. Furthermore, to rest the basis for the Virginia Electric decision on a duplication argument is inconsistent with Lumbee River because the Lumbee River court did not
openly consider any duplication that might result from allowing a particular
supplier to serve a customer.
Besides duplication, another tenet of free competition that theoretically
continues to govern unless statutes specify otherwise is that one supplier does
not acquire an exclusive right merely by being an initial provider.51 The general
assembly did not specify exclusive rights for cities to serve customers outside
their city limits; therefore, despite duplicative results, cities do not have a monopoly on potential users or on users they already serve in such areas.
Customer choice was another hallmark of the pre-Electric Act competition
for customers. 52 Like duplication and non-exclusivity, customer choice presumably remains a characteristic of competition for customers even after passage of
the Electric Act unless the Electric Act specifies otherwise. The exclusivity
found by the Virginia Electric court-unsupported as it is by specific provisions
of the Electric Act-is inconsistent with the right of a customer to choose his
supplier. In Virginia Electric the court dismissed the customer's right to choose
as brashly as it found an exclusive right in the municipality to serve. If the
Virginia Electric court had heeded the words of other cases which have cautioned that customer choice is not to be denied lightly, it might have weighed
53
customer choice into the section 160A-312 balance.
boundaries and among all types of suppliers inside municipal boundaries, it is curious that due to a
gap left in the statutes, there is no measurement restricting service by municipalities outside their
borders. This gap in the legislative attempt to prevent duplication might be an oversight by the
general assembly, or it might evince the desire of the general assembly to ignore duplication when
municipalities venture beyond their borders to compete with electric suppliers. If the general assembly intended to ignore duplication when municipalities serve beyond their borders, then a duplication argument should not support either Tarboro's attempt to prevent VEPCO from serving Polylok
in Virginia Elec. or Lumbee River's attempt to prevent Fayetteville from serving the Montibeilo
subdivision in the Lumbee River case; consistency should be required. If courts refuse to consider
duplication of an electric supplier's facilities when a municipality seeks to set up new facilities beyond its borders, they also should refuse to consider a duplication argument when an electric supplier seeks to duplicate the municipality's facilities in that area. Municipalities should not be entitled
to favoritism in both situations.
Legislative clarification would be helpful on this point. The general assembly could-if it is
concerned about duplication in all circumstances-make § 160A-312 more specific, tying the "reasonable limitations" language to some measure such as the 300-foot measure in the remainder of the
statute. Perhaps a measure less than 300 feet would be more fair. A municipality's advance beyond
its borders would not be "within reasonable limitations" if it proposed to set up facilities that came
too near those of another supplier. Municipalities would thus be subject to the same restrictions that
govern competition among electric suppliers outside as weli as inside municipal borders. Another
effect of making § 160A-312 more specific would be to make § 160A-312 more closely resemble the
Electric Act in form, thereby hinting to the courts that the two should be applied together.
51. Domestic Elec. Serv., 285 N.C. at 139, 203 S.E.2d at 841.
52. See, eg., Blue Ridge Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C. 278, 281, 128
S.E.2d 405, 407 (1962).
53. See, eg., North Carolina ex rel. Utilities Comm'n v. Woodstock Elec. Membership Corp.,
276 N.C. 108, 118, 171 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1970); North Carolina ex reL Utilities Commission v.
Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 256, 166 S.E.2d 663, 668 (1969); Blue Ridge
Elec. Membership Corp. v. Duke Power Co., 258 N.C. 278, 281, 128 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1962).
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Because section 160A-312 and the statutory provisions comprising the
Electric Act were not enacted at the same time, it is understandable that one
statute might be applied without automatic reference to the other. In enacting
the Electric Act the general assembly probably did not consciously envision a
unified scheme that included the act and section 160A-312. Because both the
Electric Act and section 160A-312 address the rights of different suppliers to
extend electric service to customers, however, a court should seek to harmonize
the two when resolving a dispute over that service.
The primary result of failure to interpret section 160A-312 with regard to
the Electric Act is to undermine the ability of electric suppliers to compete on
equal grounds with municipalities. Free competition is precluded when a court
ties one competitor's hands at the same time that it gives another competitor a
head start.
The decisions in Lumbee River and Virginia Electric also bestow upon electric suppliers greater rights to serve inside municipal boundaries than outside
them. Electric suppliers may maintain service within a municipality without
fear of poaching by the municipality. Outside municipalities, however, electric
suppliers face not only competition for new customers but also the inability to
compete for customers served by the municipality. This result will become more
pointed as municipalities acquire customers outside their boundaries and thereafter exclusively serve those customers with the blessing of the North Carolina
courts.
The fault in the narrow application of section 160A-312 lies with the general assembly. The general assembly should express more clearly its purposes in
controlling competition among providers of electricity. Is duplication of facilities a primary concern that must be considered even apart from statutory direction? Are the rules of an act whose provisions are scattered throughout the
statute books to be read in a unified way? The answers given these questions by
the courts have skewed the rules of the game in favor of municipalities and
undermined the ability of "electric suppliers" to compete for and maintain
customers.
JONI WALSER CRICHLOW

The Application of the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act and

the Uniform Commercial Code to the Sale of Motor Vehicles by
Consignment: American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton
Approximately two-thirds of the automobiles sold in the United States are
sold on an installment sale basis,1 and credit extended for automobile purchases
accounts for more than one-third of the total consumer credit extended in the
American economy. 2 Regulating automobile credit is a concern of state legislatures, nearly all of which have enacted statutes to protect automobile buyers,
sellers, and financiers. 3 Commentators have noted, however, that these statutory schemes (usually embodied in certificate of title statutes) 4 are more suitable
to the turn of the century, horse-and-buggy era than to today's national automobile market. 5 Indeed, the present system '6is so unworkable that "[e]uthanasia
[may be] the only merciful answer for it."
Much of this unworkability is caused by internal conflicts in the statutory
schemes for regulating automobile transfers. The North Carolina Supreme
Court in American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton7 recently addressed a conflict in

the North Carolina statutes regarding transfers of automobiles. The conflicting8
statutes examined by the Howerton court were the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA)
and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 9 Section 52.1 of the MVA provides
1. In a typical installment sale arrangement, the vendor tenders title and delivers the goods to
the purchaser, who contracts with the vendor to pay the sales price in the future. The purchaser's
debt is to be paid a portion at a time, at given intervals. Such installments generally include a
predetermined finance charge. The vendor usually will attempt to reserve some interest in the goods
delivered, so that the vendor may repossess the goods should the purchaser fail to pay the agreed
installments. See J.WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-1 to -11 (2d ed. 1980); Note, Retail Installment Sales-UnruhAct Permits Use
ofPrevious BalanceMethod in ComputingFinance Chargeson Revolving CreditAccounts-Siebert v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 416 (1976).
2. Myers, Multi-State Motor Vehicle Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code" An
Update, in IC SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC (MB) § 30A.01(2)(a) (1984).
3. See Comment, The California Used CarDealer and the Foreign Lien-A Study in the Conflict of Laws, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 543, 573-89 (1959).
4. A certificate of title statute requires that owners of automobiles register their ownership
with the state. The state usually will issue a written certificate of title, evidencing that ownership.
See id.; infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
5. See Myers, supranote 2, at § 30A.01; see also Leary, Horseand Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REV.455, 457 (1948); Welsh, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles
Under Section 9-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 265 (1968); Note, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the UCC: A New Chassisfor Certificateof Title Legislation, 70
YALE L.J. 995 (1961).
6. Myers, supra note 2, § 30A.01(2)(a).
7. 311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).
8. The Motor Vehicle Act was enacted piecemeal, beginning in 1937. See Act of March 23,
1937, ch. 407, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 787. It reached its present state in 1963 and is codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 20-1 to 20-372 (1983). See infra notes 51-78 and accompanying text for a description
of the statute's history.
9. The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted by North Carolina in 1965. See Act of May
26, 1965, ch. 700, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 768. The general assembly amended certain provisions
dealing with automobile sales in 1975. Act of June 26th, 1975, ch. 862, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1228.
The UCC is found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to 25-11-108 (1965 & Supp. 1983). See infra
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that unless an automobile dealer transfers a state issued certificate of title 10 to
the purchaser, no title to the automobile passes.11 Section 2-401(2) of the UCC
12
provides that when the vendor delivers the car, title passes to the purchaser.
The Howerton court resolved this conflict in favor of the UCC title-passing pro-

visions. 13 This Note examines that resolution in light of the historical and practical underpinnings of the MVA and the UCC.

In October 1978 plaintiff American Clipper Corp. (Clipper), a manufacturer of recreational vehicles, delivered a recreational vehicle to Adventure

America, Inc. (Adventure).1 4 Adventure, a dealer, maintained a lot on which it
displayed other parties' vehicles to prospective buyers. 15 Adventure did not pay
Clipper for the vehicle when it was delivered. Instead, the arrangement between

Clipper and Adventure, based on an informal understanding, 16 called for Adventure to secure a willing purchaser for the vehicle and to notify Clipper when
a purchaser had been found. Adventure then would make arrangements to

purchase the vehicle from Clipper. The supreme court characterized this informal arrangement as a consignment, 17 although the parties had never expressly

termed it as such.' 8 Clipper could reclaim possession of the vehicle at any time
prior to Adventure's purchase from Clipper. 19 Clipper retained possession of its
manufacturer's statement of origin (MSO). 20 Clipper neither executed a securnotes 82-85, 127 and accompanying text and note 109 for a description of the UCC's history in
North Carolina.
10. The precise issue in Howerton was more problematic because when the vendor in Howerton
sold the car, no certificate of title had yet been issued by the state. For a discussion of the North
Carolina certificate of title statutes, see infra notes 120, 122 and accompanying text.
11. "Upon sale of a new vehicle by a dealer to a consumer-purchaser, the dealer shall execute
. . .an assignment of the manufacturer's certificate of origin. . . and no title to a new motor vehicle
. . . shall pass or vest until such assignment is executed ...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1(c)
(1983). For a fuller discussion of this and other title passing provisions of the MVA, see infra notes
51-74 and accompanying text.
12. "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which
the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods,. . . even
though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place ..
" N.C. GEN. STAT
§ 25-2-401(2) (1965).
13. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 192-93.
14. 'The only written document related to [this] shipment was a writing dated October 10,
1978, on Clipper stationary ...
. This document... identified the vehicle and revealed a price of
$15,076.00. The document specified at the bottom, 'This is not a [sic] invoice.'" Record at 10.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id.
17. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193. "'Ihe hallmark of the consignment. . . is
the absence of an absolute obligation on the part of the consignee to pay for the goods.'" Hawkland,
ConsignmentSelling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 COM. L.J. 146, 147 (1962). See Duesenberg, Consignments Under the UCC, A Comment on Emerging Principles, 26 Bus. LAw 565
(1970); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3D 1078 (1971).
18. The supreme court found that the arrangement between Adventure and Clipper implied
that a sale by Adventure to a consumer would be contemporaneous with a sale by Clipper to Adventure. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193.
19. Record at 11.
20. A manufacturer's certificate is described as "[a] certification on a form ... signed by the
manufacturer, indicating the name of the person or dealer to whom the. . . vehicle is transferred,
the date of transfer, and that such vehicle is the first transfer of such vehicle in ordinary trade and
commerce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(20) (1983). The certificate also must describe the vehicle
in detail. Id.
Clipper had purchased parts of the vehicle from Chrysler, which had obtained the original MSO
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ity agreement 21 with Adventure, nor filed a financing statement 22 with the state
of North Carolina.
In April 1979 defendant Walter S. Howerton agreed to purchase the vehicle
23
from Adventure. Adventure agreed to arrange financing of the purchase price.
Adventure had established a regular business practice of arranging financing for
its customers with defendant financing company Finance America, Inc. (Finance). 2 4 Upon Finance's approval of Howerton's credit, Adventure and Howerton executed an installment sales contract. 25 Adventure then assigned its
interest in the installment sales contract to Finance, which paid the purchase
price to Adventure. 26 After Howerton completed and forwarded to Adventure
an application for a North Carolina certificate of title,27 Adventure abandoned

its normal financing procedure. Based on past practice, Finance relied on Adventure to submit Howerton's application for title, together with the appropriate

MSO, to the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Adventure never submitted
Howerton's application; as a result, the vehicle remained untitled. 28 In addition,
for the vehicle. Chrysler supplied Clipper with the original MSO, and Clipper obtained a supplemental MSO in accordance with California law. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 5600 (West 1971). Clipper
obtained a duplicate MSO from Chrysler after the original was lost, and retained this duplicate and
its own supplemental MSO. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 154, 316 S.E.2d at 187.
21. "'Security agreement' means an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-105(1) (Supp. 1983). A " '[s]ecurity interest' means an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id. § 25-1201(37). If Clipper had entered into an express security agreement with Adventure, Clipper could
have obtained a security interest in the vehicle. (Clipper claimed that a security interest had been
created despite the absence of an express agreement. See infra notes 107-110 and accompanying
text.) Possessing a security interest in the vehicle could have helped Clipper in either of two ways.
Possessing the interest would have given Clipper an interest to assert against defendant financing
company. (The litigation was framed basically as a contest to see whether Clipper or the financing
company could assert superior interest in the vehicle. See infra notes 32-34.) In addition, if Clipper
had possessed a security interest, it could have taken steps to ensure that if Adventure defaulted,
Clipper could take possession of the vehicle. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-403 (Supp. 1983). See
generally J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note I, §§ 26-1 to -11 (describing creditor's options in
case of default on a secured obligation, including self-help, repossession, foreclosure, and resale).
22. A financing statement is a document signed by both the debtor and the secured party and
includes a description of the property in which the security interest has been created. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-9-402(a) (Supp. 1983). In order to render most types of security interests completely
enforceable, the party in whose favor the interest has been created must file a financing statement
with the office prescribed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-401 (Supp. 1983). See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 23-11 to -16; infra note 132 and accompanying text.
23. Record at 11-12.
24. Id. at 12.
25. For a general description of instalhlient sale arrangements, see supra note 1. In this particular instance, Howerton made a cash down payment, was allowed a trade-in credit, and was obligated to pay a remaining balance of $15,500. This debt was payable to Adventure in monthly
installments. The record does not show whether an express security agreement between Adventure
and Howerton existed. See Record at 11-12.
26. Record at 12-13.
27. The owner of a new vehicle is required to submit to the Division of Motor Vehicles an
application for a certificate of title, including the owner's name and address, a description of the
vehicle, and a description of the owner's title and of all liens on the vehicle. This application must be
accompanied by the manufacturer's certificate of origin, assigned to the owner. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-52 (1983). The Division then issues a certificate of title on which is recorded all the information
supplied by the application. Id. § 20-57. Security interests may be noted on the certificate. Id. § 2058 to -58.10. It is unlawful to operate a vehicle for which a certificate has not been issued. Id. § 20Ill.
28. Record at 12.
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Adventure never notified Clipper that the vehicle had been sold, nor did it make
29
any payment to Clipper.
Clipper discovered in June 1979 that the vehicle was no longer on Adventure's lot.30 After learning of the sale and of the nature of the financing, Clipper
entered into negotiations with Finance, the assignee of Adventure's interest in
the installment sales contract, and Howerton. These negotiations resulted in a
partial settlement agreement. 3 1 The agreement provided that Howerton would
retain possession of the vehicle and that Clipper would institute a declaratory
judgment proceeding against Finance for the purpose of adjudicating title to the
vehicle. In addition, Clipper agreed to forward its MSO to Finance. Upon receipt of the MSO, Finance agreed to forward the MSO and application for a
certificate of title to the DMV. The certificate of title was to list Howerton as
owner and was to note a lien in favor of Finance for the sole purpose of defending the declaratory judgment action brought by Clipper. Howerton assigned his
right, title, and interest in the vehicle to Finance. Finance thereby became obli32
gated to defend both Howerton's interest in the vehicle and its own. Most
importantly, the parties agreed that if, in the declaratory judgment proceeding,
Clipper's right to the vehicle was declared to be superior 33 to that of either Fi34
nance or Howerton, Finance would be liable to Clipper.
At trial Clipper argued that "neither defendant acquired rights in and to
the vehicle superior to [Clipper's] own by reason of [Adventure's] attempted
conversion of [the vehicle]." '3 5 Clipper claimed that, under section 52.1 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, a motor vehicle dealer cannot transfer title to
a new vehicle to a purchaser without proper assignment of an MSO. 3 6 Since an
MSO was not assigned to Howerton, no title had passed to him. Clipper argued
that because the sale by Adventure to Howerton was not valid and because no
sale had been made by Clipper to Adventure, Clipper retained title to the vehicle. Clipper argued in the alternative that if title had in fact passed to Howerton, retention of the MSO had reserved a security interest in Clipper. This
interest, Clipper asserted, had attached to the installment sales contract and
vested in Clipper title superior to the title Finance claimed. 37
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The basic terms of this agreement are set forth in Howerton, 311 N.C. at 155-56, 316 S.E.2d

at 188-89.
32. See Record at 4-8. The partial settlement agreement further provided that Howerton's only
liability was to stem from the installment sales contract, and that he could incur no liability as a
result of a judgment in the action brought by Clipper. Id. at 7.
33. The parties never defined in the agreement what constituted "superiority" of title. See
Howerton, 311 N.C. at 156, 316 S.E.2d at 189.
34. Adventure was not made party to the settlement negotiations or to the litigation. Id. at
155, 316 S.E.2d at 188.
35. Plaintiff Appellee's Brief at 6, Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 277 S.E.2d 136.

36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1(c), which provides that "no title to a new motor vehicle
• ..shall pass or vest"until such assignment is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to the
transferee." The provision does not state expressly the result of the manufacturer's rather than the
dealer's retention of the MSO. See infra note 125.
37. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.

1985]

COMMERCIAL LAW

1109

Finance argued that the UCC, not the MVA, should apply to resolve the
question of title. Finance argued that, under the UCC, title to the vehicle had
passed to Howerton when he purchased the vehicle. Thus, Clipper had no title
to assert against either Howerton or Finance. The UCC explicity states the time
and place in which title passes to a good faith purchaser, such as Howerton.3 8
The North Carolina version of the UCC provides that unless otherwise agreed,
title passes when the goods are delivered, even though a document of title is to
be delivered later. 39 Since title passed completely to Howerton when the vehicle
was delivered to him, Finance argued, Clipper could not prevail against either
Finance or Howerton.
Before trial the parties stipulated that no material facts were at issue. Both
Finance and Clipper moved for summary judgment. The trial court, in granting
Clipper's motion, found that Clipper could assert title superior to Finance's
"under applicable law." 4 The court therefore found Finance liable to Clipper
under the parties' partial settlement agreement.
The court of appeals affirmed. 4 1 Judge Becton, writing for a unanimous
court, agreed with Clipper's contention that Clipper's title was superior to Finance's. The court based its opinion on the title passage provisions set forth in
the North Carolina MVA. The court reasoned that title could not pass until the
MSO was properly assigned, 42 hence, record title remained in Clipper. 43 The
court found that Finance assumed the risk of loss when it loaned money on
collateral without first determining whether its assignor, Adventure, or its
debtor, Howerton, had record title to that collateral. 44 The court further found
that Clipper, by retaining its MSO, did the most it could to protect its interest. 45
A unanimous supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Exum, reversed the
court of appeals, holding that the UCC, not the MVA, controlled. 46 Analyzing
the case as a consignment under the UCC, the court found that Clipper had
taken none of the steps by which a consignor can protect his interest in consigned goods. 47 In addition the court found that Clipper had taken no steps to
protect any interest it might have had in the installment sales contract. 48 Since
Clipper had no interest in the vehicle or the contract, it could not assert a title
superior to that claimed by Finance or Howerton. The supreme court then
38. The parties stipulated that Howerton was a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" as
that term is defined by the UCC. Record at 12.
39. N.C. GE. STAT. § 25-2-401(2) (1965). See supra note 12 for language of the statute.
40. Record at 19. Judge Riddle, the trial judge, did not decide expressly whether the UCC or
the MVA was "the applicable law." Id.
41. American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 545, 277 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1981),
rev'd, 311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1(c) (1983), set forth supra note 11.
43. American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 544, 277 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1981),
rev'd, 311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 192-93.
Id. at 164-65, 316 S.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 166-68, 316 S.E.2d at 194-95.
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granted summary judgment for Finance.4 9
The MVA and the UCC have generated voluminous litigation.50 The original version of the MVA, enacted in 1937,51 provided that once the purchaser
tendered payment for a motor vehicle, and received delivery of the vehicle, the
transfer was valid. 5 2 Transfer of ownership without delivery of a certificate of
title on which were recorded all existing liens did not invalidate the transfer, but
did constitute a misdemeanor. 53 Soon after this statute was enacted, litigants
attempted to secure a judicial declaration that the statute served as a recordation
device for title to, and liens on, automobiles. 54 North Carolina previously had
enacted statutes invalidating titles to, and mortgages on, realty and some forms
of personalty, unless the title or mortgage was registered with the state.5 5 The
North Carolina Supreme Court, however, had rejected this interpretation of the
predecessor to the MVA in 1925.56 In CarolinaDiscount Corp. v. Landis Motor
Co.57 the court characterized the statute as a police regulation, with penal provisions "to protect the general public from fraud, imposition and theft of motor
vehicles." 5 8 The court also determined that the statute did not change the common-law rule that sales of personal property were not required to be evidenced
by a writing and held that certificates of title to automobiles did not determine
rights of litigants in disputes arising out of automobile transfers. 59
Courts accepted this interpretation for several decades, not because this interpretation presented the soundest public policy, but because of the courts' deference to the general assembly. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
the rule of Carolina Discount Corp. in 1960 in Southern Auto Finance Co. v.
Pittman.6° The Pittman court examined sections of the 1937 MVA which provided that the owner of a motor vehicle must be registered with the Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV). 6 1 When the owner made proper application, the
DMV provided a certificate indicating all liens and encumbrances. 62 The Pittman court found that the general assembly, in enacting these sections, did not
intend to exempt motor vehicles from the recordation statutes, 63 which provided
a separate system for establishing ownership of personal property. 4 The court
49. Id. at 170, 316 $.E.2d at 197.

50. See, ag., cases cited infra note 101.
51. Act of March 23, 1937, ch. 407, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 787.
52. Id. § 38, 804-05.
53. Id.
54. See, eg., National Bank v. Greensboro Motor Co., 264 N.C. 568, 142 S.E.2d 166 (1965).
55. See N.C. GEN.STAT. §§ 47-1 to 47-120 (1984).
56. Act of March 5, 1923, ch. 236, 1923 N.C. Sess. Laws 554 was the predecessor to the MVA,
This Act required a centralized registration of all motor vehicles with the Department of Revenue.
It did not invalidate sales made without transfer of title certificates.
57. 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414 (1925).
58. Id. at 160, 129 S.E. at 416.
59. Id.
60. 253 N.C. 550, 117 S.E.2d 423 (1960).
61. Act of March 23, 1937, ch. 407, §§ 37-38, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 787, 804-05.
62. Id. §§ 12, 36-38, at 793, 804-05.
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-1 to 47-120 (1984).
64. Pittman, 253 N.C. at 553-54, 117 S.E.2d at 425.
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did state, however, that "if public policy [required] a different system of establishing ownership and encumbrances on motor vehicles, such policy must be
'65
declared by the Legislature."
The general assembly soon responded to the needs of public policy. The
lien recordation statute in existence at the time of Pittman provided that mortgages on personal property were to be recorded, in many cases, in the office of
the register of deeds in the county in which the property was located. 66 Since
cars are easily driven from one county to another, chances are great that a car on
which there is a mortgage will not be sold in the county in which it was located
when mortgaged. A prospective purchaser of an automobile would have had to
investigate title records in many, if not all, of the counties in the state to discover
the nature of the title to any motor vehicle. By 1960, when Pittman was decided, the volume of vehicle sales and the ease of vehicle transportation had
become so great that the general assembly decided to lighten this burden on the
prospective purchaser.
The general assembly amended the MVA in 1961.67 Under the amended
act every owner of a motor vehicle still was required to register his vehicle with
the DMV, and the DMV continued to issue certificates of title noting all liens
and encumbrances. 68 The 1961 amendments expressly provided that "[tiransfer
of ownership in a vehicle by an owner [was] not effective" until the vendor's
certificate of title had been assigned and transferred to the purchaser, and the
new vehicle had been delivered. 69 The purchaser then was required to present
the assigned certificate to the DMV, which issued a new certificate to the purchaser. 70 The general assembly hoped to provide, by means of the title certification procedure, a method whereby all legal interests in motor vehicles could be
determined easily. 71 These amendments took several important steps toward
achieving that legislative goal. Liens no longer had to be recorded in the county
in which the lienor or the vehicle was located. 72 A purchaser, after the 1961
amendments, merely had to look at the certificate of title to discover liens.
The 1961 amendments, for the first time, also made provision for a manufacturer's certificate of origin. A manufacturer was required to supply a dealer
to whom he transferred a newly manufactured vehicle with a DMV form which
certified that the vehicle had not previously been transferred. 73 When the dealer
sold the vehicle to a consumer, the amendment required the dealer to transfer
the MSO to the consumer. The consumer then was obligated to submit the
65. Id. at 553, 117 S.E.2d at 425.
66. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20.2 (1984) for the corresponding present provisions regarding
mortgages on personalty.
67. Act of June 15, 1961, ch. 835, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134.
68. Id. § 8, at 1139.
69. Id.
70. See id. § 3, at 1135.
71. Id. at 1134.
72. Id. § 12. The amendments stated that the mortgage recordation provisions no longer applied to motor vehicles. All vehicle mortgages were required by the amendments to be recorded
directly on the title certificate.
73. Id. §§ 1-4, at 1134-35.
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74
MSO to the DMV, along with his application for a certification of title.

The first decision interpreting the 1961 amendments was Community Credit
Co., Inc. v. Norwood.75 The Norwood court found that the amendments

make it the duty of the purchaser to secure from his vendor the old
certificate duly endorsed or assigned and to apply for a new certificate. . . . The vesting of title is deferred until the purchaser has the
old certificate 76
endorsed to him and makes application for a new certificate [of title].
The general assembly further refined the title-passing provisions of the

MVA in 1963. The language of the provisions was changed slightly to mandate
that "no title to any motor vehicle shall pass or vest until assignment [of the title
'77
certificate] is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to the transferee."

These sections of the MVA were strengthened in 1967. The provisions added in
1967 stated that a dealer, having obtained title to a new vehicle from a manufac-

turer, could not transfer that title to a consumer without also transferring the
MSO to the consumer. 78 These amendments, however, contained no provision

to control consignment situations, like the one in Howerton, in which the manufacturer originally made no transfer of the MSO to the dealer.

The supreme court offered its interpretation of the revised wording in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hayes.79 The Hayes court ruled that the
amendment imposed three conditions precedent on any transfer of title to a motor vehicle. First, the vendor must execute an assignment of the certificate of

title to the purchaser. Second, there must be actual or constructive delivery of
the vehicle to the purchaser. Last, the duly assigned title certificate must be
delivered to the purchaser.80 The Hayes court expressly limited its decision,
74. See id. § 3, at 1135.
75. 257 N.C. 87, 125 S.E.2d 369 (1962).
76. Id. at 90, 125 S.E.2d at 371. The court in National Bank v. Greensboro Motor Co., 264
N.C. 568, 142 S.E.2d 166 (1965), also relied on the language in the 1961 amendments which provided that "transfer of ownership . . . is not effective" until the title certificate is transferred, in
determining that a mortgage created on two trucks was invalid. The mortgagor had taken possession of the trucks from a vendor, and prior to receiving the title certificate had created a mortgage on
the trucks. See also Seymour v. W. S. Boyd Sales Co., 257 N.C. 603, 127 S.E.2d 265 (1962).
77. Act of May 24, 1963, ch. 552, § 4, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 648 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-72 (b) (1983)). The wording of the 1961 amendments had provided that "transfer of ownership
in a vehicle was not effective" until assignment and transfer of the title certificate. Act of June 15,
1961, ch. 835, §8, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134.
78. Act of June 21, 1967, ch. 863, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws I110 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-52.1(c) (1983)).
79. 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970).
80. Id. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524. The Hayes court had to determine whether an insurance
policy afforded protection for defendant against certain claims resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiffhad issued defendant a non-owner's policy. The non-owner's policy provided that if
defendant acquired ownership of an automobile during the period covered by the policy, policy
coverage would lapse 30 days after acquisition of the automobile. Defendant thereafter contracted
to purchase a car. The car was delivered December 26th. Defendant tendered payment on December 27th. On December 28th, the seller assigned and delivered the title certificate to defendant. On
January 27th, defendant was involved in the accident in question. Id. at 622-25, 174 S.E.2d at 51214. If the court had found that defendant acquired ownership when payment was made and the car
delivered, the policy would have lapsed before the accident. If the court had found defendant did
not acquire ownership until the certificate of title was delivered, however, the policy would have
remained in effect through the date of the accident. Although the 1961 amendments spoke in terms
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declaring that the three conditions it announced as prerequisite to transfer of
purposes of determining tort law liability and liability intitle only applied 8for
1
surance coverage.

The UCC was enacted in North Carolina in 1965,82 two years after the
enactment of the MVA amendments from which the Hayes court derived its
standard for determining passage of automobile title. The Hayes court held that
the UCC did not replace the 1963 amendments to the MVA as a means for
determining legal interests in automobiles.8 3 The court relied on the express
language of the UCC in declaring that the UCC did not supplant the transfer of
title provisions of the MVA. Section 10-102 of the UCC lists the statutes re84
pealed by the passage of the UCC; the MA is not listed. Section 10-103 of
85
the UCC, however, repeals all other statutes inconsistent with the UCC.
The Hayes court relied on the official commentary to section 2-401 to refute
the contention that insofar as the MVA title passage provisions were inconsistent
with section 2-401 of the UCC, the MVA provisions were repealed by passage of
the UCC. This commentary indicates that section 2-401 is designed to govern
private transactions and not to guide the court's interpretation of public regulation. 86 Courts remain free to decide how title passes in situations in which public regulations call for such determination. Thus, the Hayes court found that,
because the MVA was a public regulation, passage of title thereunder was not
governed by the "private sale" rules of the UCC.8 7 In addition the Hayes court
declared that section 2-401 of the UCC was general in scope and governed passage of title to "goods." Thus, section 2-401 should not affect statutes governing
of ownership, the 1963 revisions provided that "title will not pass or vest" until the certificate of title
is transferred. Act of May 24, 1963, ch. 552, § 4, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 648. The Hayes court found,
after a lengthy restatement of previous definitions, that "title" and "ownership" are synonymous,
276 N.C. at 630, 174 S.E.2d at 517, and thus, because the policy revoked coverage if the defendant
acquired ownership of a motor vehicle, the court decided that defendant did not acquire title to the
car until the certificate of title was delivered to him. Id. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524.
81. Hayes, 276 N.C. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524. The MVA has long provided that the certificate
of title is "prima facie evidence" of ownership in tort cases arising out of automobile accidents. Act
of March 30, 1951, ch. 494, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 405-06 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2071.1 (1983)). The Howerton court did not expressly consider this section of the MVA.
82. Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 700, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 768, enacted the UCC in North Carolina. The UCC became effective July 1, 1967. Id.
83. Hayes, 276 N.C. at 638-40, 174 S.E.2d at 522-24 (1970).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-10-102(1) (1965).
85. Id. § 25-10-103 (1965).
86. The commentary states:
[Section 2-401] in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regulation depends upon "sale" or upon
location of "title" without further definition. The basic policy of this Article that known
purpose and reason should govern interpretation cannot extend beyond the scope of its
own provisions. It is therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes
under this Article in case the courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined
term of the private law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401 official comment (1965). The drafters of the UCC did not intend the
UCC to supplement the MVA in the operation of the MVA as aid to government regulation of
automobile registration. The drafters made it clear that, when necessary, courts should interpret
"sale" or "location of title" for purposes of regulatory statutes such as the MVA, to best further the
goals of those regulatory statutes.
87. Hayes, 276 N.C. at 639, 174 S.E.2d at 523.
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passage of title to more specific categories of goods. Because the MVA dealt
specifically and definitely with passage of title to motor vehicles, the Hayes court
found that the MVA could not be supplanted or repealed by the UCC, even
88
though the UCC was enacted after the MVA.
The Howerton court addressed whether the three conditions in Hayes applied to a question of title not involving tort liability or insurance coverage and
whether passage of the UCC in 1965 rendered the 1963 amendments to the
MVA obsolete as a means for settling disputes over transfers of automobile ownership. To decide these two issues, the Howerton court initially had to determine
whether a party could acquire ownership of a vehicle without assignment and
delivery of a title certificate.
If the Hayes standard for transfer of ownership applied, no ownership
would have been transferred to Adventure; to its assignee, Finance; or to Howerton. Finance contended that under section 2-401(2) 89 of the North Carolina
version of the UCC, title passed to Howerton when the vehicle was delivered to
him, even though the certificate of title was never assigned or delivered to
Howerton.
The Howerton court distinguished Hayes on two grounds. First, Hayes
dealt with the rights of third parties not involved in the sale of the automobileinsurance carriers-while Howerton involved a determination of the rights of the
vendor and purchaser of the automobile. 90 In addition, the Hayes court limited
its decision to a determination of tort liability and insurance coverage, thus leaving "open the question whether the MVA, as opposed to the UCC, would control in all circumstances." 9 1
The Howerton court did not directly refute the reasoning that led the Hayes
court to apply the MVA. Instead, it offered an alternative rationale for adopting
the UCC standards for passage of title. The court examined the North Carolina
commentary to section 2-401 and deduced the legislative intent behind the UCC.
The commentary states that the UCC abandons the examination of sales disputes that made "rights, obligations and remedies of sellers, buyers, and third
parties dependent on the location of title of goods at a particular time. . . providing [instead] specific provisions with respect to the various rights and duties
of the buyer and seller which are not predicated on location of title."'92 The
Howerton court stressed that this commentary evidenced the intent of the general assembly that the courts no longer should employ "the concept of title as a
'93
tool for resolving sales problems."
88. Id. at 639-40, 174 S.E.2d at 523.
89. See supra note 12.
90. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 151, 153, 161, 316 S.E.2d at 186, 187, 192 (1984). Cf. Hayes, 276
N.C. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524.
91. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 162, 316 S.E.2d at 192.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401 North Carolina comment (1965).
93. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 162, 316 S.E.2d at 192 (quoting Nasco Equipment Co. v. Mason,
291 N.C. 145, 153, 229 S.E.2d 278, 283-84 (1976)). See Clifford, Article Two: Sales, 44 N.C.L. REv.
539, 551 (1966); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1968)
(theory of the UCC relegates the issue of title to a subordinate position in determining legal interests
in automobiles).
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Justice Exum noted that the Howerton court was not the first to resolve a
dispute involving transfer of title to an automobile without relying on the MVA.
He cited two pre-UCC cases, Hawkins v. M & J Finance Corp.9 4 and King
Homes, Inc. v. Bryson, 95 in which the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on
96
the common law of sales, not the MVA, to resolve title disputes.
In Hawkins plaintiff delivered two cars to a used car dealer, authorizing the
dealer to sell the cars. Plaintiff also delivered the certificates of title, but did not
execute an assignment of the certificates. The car dealer used the cars to secure
a loan from defendant, without plaintiff's permission. The dealer defaulted on
the loan, and the defendant took possession of one car. When plaintiff brought
an action for return of the car, the court relied on the common-law principles of
agency and entrustment, not on the provisions of the MVA, in reaching its decision. The court concluded that defendant had not acquired any rights to the
vehicle. 97 The Howerton court viewed the Hawkins decision as authority that
the MVA title provisions did not properly resolve all questions pertaining to
98
transfer of title to motor vehicles.
The Howerton court derived further support for this view from the decision
in King Homes. In King Homes a mobile home manufacturer delivered a mobile
home to a dealer, but did not assign or deliver a title certificate along with the
vehicle. The dealer paid for the mobile home by check. After delivering the
check to the manufacturer, the dealer sold the mobile home to defendant. When

the dealer's check was returned due to insufficient funds, the manufacturer
brought an action for return of the mobile home. The court held that title had
never passed to the dealer; therefore, the sale by the dealer to defendant was
invalid. The King Homes court reached this decision, not because a title certificate had not been delivered to the dealer, but because the dealer had never paid
the manufacturer.99
The Howerton court cited Hawkins and King Homes to demonstrate that
the decision to rely on the UCC instead of the MVA did not represent a break
with North Carolina precedent. 100 The Howerton court then decided not to ap94. 238 N.C. 174, 77 S.E.2d 669 (1953).
95. 273 N.C. 84, 159 S.E.2d 329 (1968).
96. The Howerton case itself was never framed as a wrongful sale by a bailee. It is possible that
application of these common-law concepts would have altered the court's analysis or decision.
97. Hawkins, 238 N.C. at 178-85, 77 S.E.2d at 672-77.
98. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 160, 316 S.E.2d at 190-91.
99. King Homes, 273 N.C. at 90-91, 159 S.E.2d at 333.
100. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 162-63, 316 S.E.2d at 191-92. Neither the Hawkins nor the King
Homes court, however, ignored the MVA completely. The Hawkins court stated that a bailee could
rightfully mortgage entrusted goods if the entruster had clothed the entrustee with sufficient indicia
of ownership. The Hawkins court used the MVA as an aid in applying this common-law principle.
The court found that because the certificates of title delivered to the dealer were not assigned in
compliance with the MVA, they could not constitute sufficient indicia of ownership. Hawkins, 238
N.C. at 179-80, 77 S.E.2d at 674-75. Likewise in King Homes, after holding that a mobile home was
a motor vehicle within the meaning of the MVA, the court found that the entrustee had not been
clothed with indicia of ownership sufficient to induce reasonable reliance on the part of the defendant, because the dealer had not delivered a Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin in compliance with
the MVA in force at the time. 273 N.C. at 91, 159 S.E.2d at 333. Today, under the UCC, it is
possible for an entrustee to convey ownership to a bona fide purchaser, regardless of the sufficiency
of the indicia of ownership with which the entrustee has been clothed. See infra note 104.
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ply the three-step standard adopted by the Hayes court, concluding that "the
provisions of the UCC and not the MVA properly resolve the contest" between
Clipper and Finance. 10 1
The drafters of the UCC, the court believed, intended the UCC to resolve
the type of title question presented in Howerton.10 2 Therefore, the court must
have believed that the provisions of the UCC established a more efficient and
more just means of determining legal interest in motor vehicles than the methods that the MVA provides. 103
The court, however, belied its own beliefs as it applied the provisions of the
UCC to the facts presented by Howerton. The court first dealt with the question
whether Clipper or Howerton had a superior right to the vehicle. The court
found the answer in section 2-403 of the UCC. 1 0 4 Under this section, title transferred completely to Howerton when he purchased the vehicle. Clipper transferred the vehicle to Adventure, a party in the business of selling such
vehicles, 10 5 clothing Adventure with the authority to transfer absolute ownership of the vehicle. Howerton purchased as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business,10 6 without notice that Adventure did not have absolute ownership of
the vehicle. Adventure, therefore, could transfer to Howerton all of Clipper's
right, title, and interest in the vehicle.
Clipper acknowledged that under the UCC it could not assert title superior
to Howerton's, but argued that its interest was greater than the interest held by
Finance. Clipper claimed its retention of the MSO to the vehicle reserved a
security interest in the vehicle, or in the alternative, in the installment sales con101. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 192-93. Other jurisdictions also have decided
that the UCC prevails over motor vehicle registration schemes and that title passes pursuant to the
UCC without completion of the statutory registration formalities. See, e.g., Indiana Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1968) (ownership is question for jury); Semple v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Metropolitan Auto Sales v. Koneski,
252 Md. 145, 249 A.2d 141 (1969) (ownership is question for jury); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
v. Boykin, 251 S.C. 236, 161 S.E.2d 818 (1968) (title to vehicle passes notwithstanding want of
compliance with title certificate law); Park County Implement CoM'. Craig, 397 P.2d 800 (Wyo.
1964). The South Carolina rule stated in Boykin modified the rule established by a federal court
sitting in diversity in Lynch v. United States Gen. Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 327
F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1964) (under South Carolina law, passage of title effective only between buyer and
seller and does not affect rights of third-party insurance carrier). Several jurisdictions in which the
UCC has been adopted have decided that ownership does not pass until motor vehicle statute requirements are met. See, eg., Merchants Produce Bank v. Mack Trucks, 411 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir.
1969); Melton v. Prickett, 203 Kan. 501, 456 P.2d 34 (1969); Roe v. Flamegas Indus. Corp., 16
Mich. App. 210, 167 N.W.2d 835 (1969); McIntosh v. White, 447 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1969); Irion v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 54 Mont. 156, 461 P.2d 199 (1969); Forman v. Anderson, 183 Neb. 715, 163

N.W.2d 894 (1969).
102. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193.
103. The MVA is designed to provide "a ready means by which all legal interests in motor
vehicles may be determined." Act of June 15, 1961, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134. The contest between Finance and Clipper, framed by the parties as a question of who had "superior title," clearly
seems to be a contest to decide who has a greater "legal interest."
104. "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-2-403(2) (1965).

105. Adventure maintained a lot for display of vehicles, and had had prior business dealings with
Clipper. Record at 9-11.
106. Id. at 12.
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tract to which Adventure and Howerton were the original parties. Finance
claimed a competing interest. Neither party had filed a financing statement to
protect and register its interest.
The court declined to decide whether retention of the MSO by Clipper created a security interest. 10 7 Clipper's failure to properly perfect its security interest, if any, prevented it from defeating Finance's interest, despite its retention of
10
the MSO.

s

The MVA sets forth some guidelines for determining the order of certain
competing security interests.l 0 9 The MVA expressly provides, however, that if a
manufacturer claims a security interest in a vehicle held in the inventory of that
manufacturer, the interest must be perfected by filing a financing statement in
accordance with the provisions of the UCC." 0 Clipper admitted that it had
retained the vehicle in inventory and had not filed a financing statement."'

Therefore, Clipper could not claim a security interest under the MVA.
Under the UCC, because Clipper's entire interest in the car had been trans107. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195. The UCC as adopted by North Carolina
states that "any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to reservation of a security interest." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-401(1) (1965). For other North Carolina decisions stating that retention of documents of title
creates only a security interest, see Toyomenka, Inc. v. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 432 F.2d 722,
728 (4th Cir. 1970) (applying North Carolina law); Nasco Equipment Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145,
155, 229 S.E.2d 278, 285 (1976). Some courts have held that automobile certificates of title are not
documents of title. See, e-g., Semple v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970). The Howerton court did
not address that question.
108. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58 to -58.10 (1983). The UCC expressly provides that these sections
of the MVA apply to security interests in automobiles. The original version of the UCC enacted in
North Carolina provided that "[t]he filing provisions [of the UCC] do not apply to a security interest
in property subject to a statute. . . of this state which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in such property." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-9-302(3), (3)(b) (1965).
The effect [of this provision] is to preserve the operation of the North Carolina certificate of
title law relating to motor vehicles and the perfection of security interests therein ...
This North Carolina statute does not apply to security interests created by a dealer or
manufacturer who holds the vehicle for resale. . .; therefore, those security interests are
governed by the [UCC] filing provisions.
Id. § 25-9-302 North Carolina comment. This section was revised in 1975, to provide that although
filing a UCC statement is still not required to perfect a security interest in a vehicle that may be
perfected under the MVA, "during any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale by a
person who is in the business of selling goods of that kind, the filing provisions [of the UCC] apply to
a security interest in that collateral created by him as debtor." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-302(3)(b)
(Supp. 1983). See Myers, supra note 2,at § 30A.03(1). Adventure was a merchant in the business of
selling motor vehicles. See supra note 105. Clipper, however, maintained the vehicle in Clipper's
own inventory. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 166, 316 S.E.2d at 195. The Howerton court therefore concluded that, before it could be enforceable, any security interest created by Adventure as debtor
would have to be recorded by means of a financing statement. Id. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195. The
court also relied on N.C. GEN.STAT. § 20-58.8(b) (1983): "The provisions of [the MVA] shall not
apply to or affect. . .(3) A security interest in a vehicle created by a manufacturer. . . who holds
the vehicle in his inventory. Such security interest shall be perfected by filing a financing statement
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code." See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at
§ 22-4.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.1 (1983). For legislative considerations in the enactment of this
provision, see infra note 127.
111. Record at 10.
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ferred (albeit arguably wrongly transferred) 112 to Howerton, Clipper could not
assert an interest in the car. 113 Clipper argued instead that it could claim an
interest in the installment sales contract. Clipper claimed this interest arose
when the vehicle, in which Clipper had an unperfected security interest, 114 was
sold. Clipper claimed it could assert an interest in the proceeds of this sale, 1 15
the installment sales contract. Finance also claimed an interest in this contract.
Finance argued that because Howerton had acquired an unqualified interest in
the vehicle, he could freely assign all or part of this title. Finance asserted that
Howerton had assigned a security interest to Adventure by means of the installment sales contract. Finance then purchased this interest from Adventure.
The court viewed the installment sales contract as chattel paper under the
UCC. 1 16 Under the UCC, if Finance had no knowledge 1 7 that Clipper was
asserting an interest in the contract, Clipper could not prevail against Finance.
If Finance knew the contract was subject to Clipper's interest, Finance would
still prevail if Clipper could claim an interest only because the contract was the
result of a sale of property in which Clipper had a security interest.1 18 Because
this was Clipper's only claim to an interest in the contract, Finance would prevail even if Finance could be charged with knowledge of Clipper's interest. The
Howerton court concluded, therefore, that there were no conceivable circumstances under which Clipper could assert title superior to Finance's."19
It is debatable whether the Howerton decision is in accord with the legislative policies that fostered the MVA and the UCC. The decision may conflict
with broad policy goals because the facts presented to the court slipped through
112. Finance argued that Adventure's action amounted to conversion. Defendant Appellant's
Brief at 5, American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 277 S.E.2d 136 (1981), rev'd,
311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).
113. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
114. Clipper argued that this unperfected interest arose by means of Clipper's retention of the
MSO. See Howerton, 311 N.C. at 166-67, 316 S.E.2d at 194-95.
115. Proceeds "includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." With certain exceptions, the security interest in the collateral "continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-9-306(1), (2) (Supp. 1983).
116. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195. Chattel paper "means a writing or writings
which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-105(l)(b) (Supp. 1983). The court of appeals did not determine whether
the installment sales contract was chattel paper, or what interests the contract created as between
Howerton and Clipper. See Howerton, 51 N.C. App. at 545, 277 S.E.2d at 139 (1981). The installment sales contract does not appear in the record, and it is unclear on what evidence the supreme
court based its finding that the contract was chattel paper.
117. Under the UCC, knowledge means actual knowledge. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(25)
(1965).
118. Clipper might have prevailed if it had filed a financing statement, recording a separate security agreement with the contract as collateral. See Coogan, PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditors
and the "FloatingLien" in IA SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (MB) § 7.09(3)0b) (1984); Clark, Abstract Rights Versus PaperRights Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 450 (1974); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. RPv. 282 (1965).
119. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 168, 316 S.E.2d at 195. Since Clipper could assert neither title nor
security interest superior to Howerton or Finance, Finance prevailed in the declaratory judgment
action. Id. at 170, 316 S.E.2d at 196-97. The supreme court therefore reversed the court of appeals.
Id. at 170, 316 S.E.2d at 197.
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some cracks in the latticework of the statutes. For example, the 1961 amendments to the MVA declared that "a certificate of title that can be relied upon as a

ready means by which all legal interests in motor vehicles may be determined
would be to the public interest." 1 2z0 The vehicle in question in Howerton, how-

ever, was not titled in North Carolina. 12 1 The provisions in the 1961 amend-

ments for determining interests in untitled vehicles were rather weak; even the

strengthening language added to the provisions in 1970 did not encompass all
situations. 122 No provisions yet have been made for cases in which a manufac-

turer fails to supply an MSO to the dealer to whom he transfers a vehicle. This
situtation occurs most often when, as in Howerton, a manufacturer consigns a
car to a dealer. There is no sale or contract to sell between the manufacturer
and the dealer at the time the car is transferred to the dealer. The manufacturer

retains the car in his inventory. The arrangement is viewed as an offer by the
manufacturer to sell the car to the dealer. When the dealer sells the car to a
consumer, he may be held to have accepted the offer of the manufacturer, and is
bound to pay the manufacturer. 123 Cases such as these are expressly removed
from the purview of the MVA. 124 The MVA is silent about the means by which
a consumer buying from a consignee-dealer is to learn about the manufacturer's
interest in the vehicle. The provisions regarding MSOs do not state whether a
transfer to a consumer from a dealer can be valid if the manufacturer has not
transferred an MSO to a dealer. 12 5 Also, the provisions of the MVA regarding
the perfection of security interests by notation on the title certificate do not ap120. Act of June 15, 1961, ch. 835, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134.
121. Record at 13.
122. See supranotes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of 1961 amendments).
The applicable UCC sections provide specifically that a purchaser of chattel paper who gives value
for it takes priority over a security interest in that chattel paper if he acts without knowledge of the
interest, or "which is claimed merely as proceeds . . . even though [the purchaser of the chattel
paper] knows that the specific paper. . . is subject to a security interest." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9308 (1965). "The obvious intended effect of this provision is to prevent the supplier or financier of a
merchant from acquiring an automatic monopoly on the chattel paper of that merchant that results
from the sale of the inventory in which the supplier of financier had a security interest." Smith,
Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Perfectionsand Priorities,44 N.C.L. REv.753, 790-91 (1966);
see Coogan, PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditorsand the "FloatingLien" in 1A SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (MB) (1984).

123. "A principal purpose of consignments is to finance the buyer and maintain a kind of security interest in the seller." Hawkland, ConsignmentSelling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67
COM. L.J. 146, 147 (1962). The mere act of consignment does not maintain a true security because
the seller may lose the interest in the vehicle when it is sold to a bona fide consumer, and may have
no interest in the proceeds. See supra notes 104-118 and accompanying text. Note also that a
consignment differs from a "sale or return." In a sale or return, the buyer gets complete title to the
goods, with an option to return them if unsatisfactory. The seller maintains no interest. See 2
WILLISTON, SALES § 270 (Rev. ed. 1948). The Howerton court found the transaction between Clipper and Adventure to be a consignment. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193.
124. "The provisions of [the MVA] shall not apply to or affect. . .(3) A security interest in a
vehicle created by a manufacturer. . . who holds the vehicle in his inventory." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-58.1 (1983). See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
125. "(a) Any manufacturer. . . shall. .. supply the transferee with a manufacturer's certificate of origin assigned to the transferee. . .(c) no title to a new motor vehicle acquired by a dealer
under the provisions of [subsection] (a). . .shall pass or vest until" the dealer assigns the MSO to
the consumer purchaser. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1 (1983). It is clear that the dealer cannot transfer the title the manufacturer has transferred to the dealer, unless the dealer assigns the MSO. This
section is unclear about the state of title that results from the failure of a manufacturer to deliver an
MSO.
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ply if a manufacturer has consigned the vehicle to a dealer and maintained the

vehicle in the manufacturer's own inventory. 1 26 In this situation, the MVA system for utilizing the title certificate (or MSO if no certificate has yet been issued)

as a determinative representation of legal interests breaks down.
North Carolina, with the amendments to section 9-302 of the UCC in
1975127 and with the Howerton decision, has utilized the UCC to prop up the
MVA in these situations. A more equitable and efficient system, however, could
be constructed by fleshing out the provisions of the MVA.

The provisions of the UCC often are inadequate to resolve disputes arising
out of consignment situations such as the one in Howerton. In the words of two

leading commentators, "the Code's handling of consignments is fraught with
uncertainty, and the Code cases on the subject clear up little."' 128 Much of the

confusion lies in the interpretation of the UCC sections which provide that consignors may perfect security interests in consigned goods in ways other than by
filing financing statements. 129 Clipper clearly did none of the things which,
under the UCC, would have perfected its interest. Even had Clipper attempted

perfection as the UCC consignment sections direct, however, Clipper still may
not have prevailed; courts often are reluctant to allow such perfection, and cases
interpreting these sections have been conflicting. 130 If the consignor chooses not
to file a financing statement, the UCC provides that he can perfect his security

interest by posting a sign at the consignee's premises as evidence of his interest. 13 1 This provision certainly may help to provide notice to bona fide purchasers of consigned vehicles, but it may hinder the DMV in its efforts to centralize
recordation of liens. If, on the other hand, the consignor elects to file a financing

statement, the bona fide purchaser is put in jeopardy. He may not know that he
must search the office of the county register of deeds, where the financing statement may be filed,13 2 to investigate possible liens on consigned vehicles. In ad126. Id. § 20-58.1.
127. These amendments were basically a compromise. The buying public has come to rely on
the MVA "as the primary source of protection and information as to prior liens," while professional
lenders and borrowers who deal with inventory as inventory want to retain one-stop financing, and
rely solely on the UCC registration system as a recordation device for all liens. Mack Financial
Corp. v. Western Leasing, Inc., Bankruptcy No. B74-4082 (C-8) (D. Or. 1975) (unpublished op.),
reprinted in SECURED FINANCING FOR THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 153 (PLI 1980); see also
Josephson, Financingof Trucks in SECURED FINANCING FOR THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 41,
45-63 (PLI 1980) (discussion of most common problems arising out of motor vehicles).
128. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 22-4, at 883.
129. The North Carolina UCC provisions allow priority to the consignor's interest if the consignor files a UCC financing statement, places a sign evidencing his interest at the consignee's place
of business, or establishes that the consignee is generally known to be in the business of selling the
goods of others. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-326(3) (1965). The Howerton court found that Clipper
had done none of these things. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 164-65, 316 S.E.2d at 193-94.
130. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 22-4, at 883.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-326 (3)(a) (1965).
132. If the collateral which is the subject of the security interest is consumer goods, the financing
statement must be filed in the county in which the debtor resides, or if the debtor is not a state
resident, then in the county where the collateral is located. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-401 (1965).
Consumer goods are goods bought for personal, family, or household use. Id. § 25-9-109. Motor
vehicles purchased for personal use are consumer goods. See J. WHirE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1,
§ 23-7, at 923.
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dition, filing financing statements with the county registers of deeds undermines
the centralization of lien recordation with the DMV.
Certain other provisions of the UCC may put a consignor such as Clipper
at the mercy of a dishonest consignee. The consignee may transfer the consignor's entire title to a consigned vehicle. 133 Some courts have suggested that a
consignor can curtail these risks "by audits and accounting procedures or he can
1 34
refuse to knowingly expose himself to the risk with the particular dealer."'
Many vehicles are transferred to consignees located at some distance from the
consignor, however, so these procedures may be particularly burdensome.
It may be possible to relieve burdens on consignors and consumers by
strengthening the provisions of the MVA. Consignors should be required to
transfer an MSO to a consignee/dealer. Furthermore, the MSO should indicate
the consignment arrangement and any security interest created by the arrangement. The MVA should not allow a dealer to transfer any title to such a vehicle
without transfer of this MSO marked "consigned vehicle." When the consumer
applies for a title certificate, he would be required to submit this MSO. The
DMV thus would have a record of the security interest, and it would be noted on
the certificate of title. This security interest would then be treated as other interests recorded under the MVA.
In conclusion, it seems that the Howerton court correctly applied the letter
of the law existing at the time of the decision. This decision, however, should
alert the general assembly to possible flaws in the framework of the MVA. The
general assembly should take steps to shore up this framework by lessening the
scope of the Howerton court's decision to apply the UCC over the MA. It
would be inconsistent with the policy of the state if the UCC were to be substituted for the MVA as the guide for determining all legal interests in motor vehicles. The general assembly has spent fifty years fashioning a reliable certificate
of title statute. The Howerton decision should not be allowed to eviscerate the
statute. An updating of the MVA to regulate consignment sales more strictly
will ensure the continuing vitality of the MVA.
PETER JAMES MCGRATH, JR.

133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-403(2) (1965). See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
134. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533 (1968).

State v. Huffstetler: Denying Mitigating Instructions in Capital

Cases on Grounds of Relevancy
To ensure that capital punishment is imposed fairly and with reasonable
consistency, North Carolina's capital punishment statute1 requires the sentencing jury to determine whether enumerated aggravating circumstances outweigh
any mitigating factors. 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court has explicitly declared that during the sentencing phase of a capital case any reasonable doubt
regarding the submission of a proposed jury instruction concerning mitigating4
3
factors should be resolved in the defendant's favor. In State v. Huffstetler,
however, the supreme court indicated that the trial judge will be afforded discretion in determining whether evidence is sufficient to instruct the jury on a proposed mitigating factor. 5 This decision differs from the manner 6in which the
capital punishment statutes of other states have been interpreted.
David Earl Huffstetler had been having marital trouble. On the morning of
January 1, 1982, he visited his mother-in-law, Edna Powell, to find out where his
wife had been staying. 7 Before arriving at Mrs. Powell's trailer Huffstetler had
injected himself with a solution made from two dissolved Dilaudid pills (a highly
potent painkiller) and had ingested an unknown quantity of alcohol; he had engaged in similar consumption the prior evening. 8 After an argument concerning
whether Mrs. Powell knew where Huffstetler's wife was staying, Huffstetler
grabbed a frying pan and began beating Mrs. Powell. 9 Mrs. Powell's body was
found that evening; she had been beaten so violently and extensively about the
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983). Based on its interpretation of Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C.

431, 194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), held that the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution preclude either ajudge or jury from exercising discretion in imposing the death penalty.
Id. at 439, 194 S.E.2d at 25. The court invalidated and severed the portions of the death penalty
statute that granted sentencing discretion to the jury, leaving the state with a mandatory punishment
of death for certain offenses. Id. at 444-45, 194 S.E.2d at 28. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280 (1976), the United States Supreme Court invalidated North Carolina's mandatory death
penalty statute. The statute was constitutionally defective for three reasons: (1) evolving standards
of decency were contrary to the mandatory death penalty, (2) mandatory punishment failed to remove effectively the element of arbitrary jury discretion, and (3) the statute failed to allow specific
consideration of the accused's character and record. Id. at 288-305 (plurality opinion). Following
Woodson the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the current capital punishment statue. See
Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, 1977 N.C. Sass. LAWS 407 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000
(1983)). The constitutionality of this statute was first upheld in State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 34954, 259 S.E.2d 510, 537-44 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980). For a fuller discussion of the
history of enactment of North Carolina's current statute, see State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 56-63,
257 S.E.2d 597, 606-10 (1979); Comment, CapitalPunishment in North Carolina:The 1977 Death
Penalty Statute and the North CarolinaSupreme Court, 59 N.C.L. REv. 911, 911-13 (1981).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983).
3. State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 27, 292 S.E.2d 203, 223, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
4. 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1877 (1985).
5. Id. at 116-17, 322 S.E.2d at 125-26.
6. See infra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
7. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. at 99, 322 S.E.2d at 115-16.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 100, 322 S.E.2d at 116.
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head, neck, and shoulders that the metal frying pan had fractured.10 After disposing of the frying pan and his bloodstained clothing, Huffstetler went to visit a
friend, Alice Cantrell, with whom he stayed until his arrest two days later on
January 3rd.11
At the guilt determination phase of his trial, Huffstetler refused to testify or
to offer evidence. After he was convicted of first degree murder, but before he
was sentenced, Huffstetler admitted his guilt and was permitted to testify before
the jury. 12 During the sentencing phase, he submitted the following instruction
among the proposed list of mitigating factors to be considered by the jury:
"'That during the sentencing phase, the defendant testified under oath and admitted his role in the victim's death. That this admission of wrongdoing reflects
a potential for rehabilitation.'"13 This instruction was refused by the trial
15
judge. 14 The jury sentenced Huffstetler to death.
On appeal the North Carolina Supreme Court held that Huffstetler had
failed to produce sufficient evidence to require submission of the requested instruction. The court noted that Huffstetler had testified only after he had been
convicted of first degree murder, that he originally had not wished to testify but
had been persuaded to do so by his family, and that his testimony had been selfserving since he had testified as to his addiction to drugs and alcohol at the time
of the murder in an attempt to show evidence of his impaired condition as a
mitigating factor. Justice Exum strongly dissented because he felt the court
should not determine that certain evidence is nonmitigating as a matter of law.
It is the jury's function, Exum wrote, to weigh all evidence of mitigating
circumstances:
A jury could reasonably find that defendant's admission of his guilt
was a first step toward recognition of his wrongdoing and his ultimate
potential rehabilitation. . . . The question is not whether this Court
thinks the defendant's admission is or is not a mitigating circumstance.
16
The question is whether a jury could reasonably find it to be one.
Justice Exum's dissenting opinion relied heavily on the standards established by the United States Supreme Court concerning evidence of mitigating
circumstances in capital cases. The United States Supreme Court in Lockett v.
Ohio17 struck down Ohio's capital punishment statute because the statute
permitted the sentencing judge to consider only three enumerated mitigating
factors.18 Under the Ohio statute, other circumstances pertaining to the defend10. Id. at 98, 322 S.E.2d at 115. Fragments of the frying pan were found near the victim's
head. Id.
11. Id. at 100, 322 S.E.2d at 116.
12. Id. at 99, 322 S.E.2d at 115.
13. Id. at 116, 322 S.E.2d at 125.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 101, 322 S.E.2d at 116.
16. Id. at 122-23, 322 S.E.2d at 128-29 (Exum, J., dissenting).
17. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
18. Upon the finding of one of the specified aggravating circumstances, the Ohio statute required the trial judge to determine whether one of the following three mitigating factors existed:

(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
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ant's character, record, and offense could not be considered. The Court concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer
• . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."' 19 Individualized sentencing, the Court reasoned, is an essential element in the equitable imposition of capital punishment. Without the sentencer's consideration of all
relevant mitigating circumstances, "guided discretion" 20 in the imposition of
the death penalty would fail. In a footnote, the Court emphasized that its decision would not limit "the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the
21
circumstances of his offense."
The standard established by the Supreme Court in Lockett was applied one
year later by the same Court in Green v. Georgia.22 In Green the Court held that
during the sentencing phase of a capital case the hearsay rule could not prevent
introduction of the testimony of a third party to whom a confession was made
by Green's codefendant. This confession absolved Green of any part in the murder. Green, therefore, stands for the proposition that state rules of evidence cannot bar proof of relevant mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase
of a capital case.
Although Lockett v. Ohio involved a statute that failed to permit consideration of all relevant mitigating factors, the Supreme Court has extended the rationale of Lockett to a sentencing judge's exclusion, as a matter of law, of
relevant evidence. In Eddings v. Oklahoma23 the sentencing judge believed that
he was precluded from considering the sixteen year-old defendant's troubled
youth because the defendant was capable of comprehending the difference between right and wrong. The Supreme Court found the sentencer's failure to
consider all relevant evidence reversible error: "[S]entencer[s] . . . may deter-

mine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental deficiency,
though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
Id. at 607 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 292.04(B) (1975)). If the trial judge failed to find the
existence of one of these mitigating factors, the Ohio statute required that the death penalty be
imposed. Id.
19. Id. at 604.
20. The common denominator among the concurring opinions of the Supreme Court justices in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), was a belief that juries should not have arbitrary discretion

in imposing capital punishment. See id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[The statutes before the
Court leave] to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants

committing these crimes should die or be imprisoned."); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at
313 (White, J., concurring). In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976), the case
invalidating North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute, the United States Supreme Court
ruled: "North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the jury in
its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live and which
shall die." Id.
21. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12.
22. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
23. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration." 24

North Carolina's capital punishment statute conforms to the requirements
of Lockett by providing in its list of enumerated factors that the jury is to con-

sider: "[a]ny other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems

to have mitigating value."'25 The North Carolina statute, which to a large extent
follows the Model Penal Code, 26 was enacted prior to the Lockett decision.
Upon convicting a defendant for first degree murder,2 7 the trial court is
required under North Carolina's capital punishment statute to conduct a separate sentencing proceeding before a jury to determine whether the death penalty
should be imposed. 28 Except in extraordinary circumstances the sentencing
phase is to be tried before the same jury that sat during the guilt determination
phase. 29 During the sentencing proceeding both the State and the defendant are

permitted to present evidence and argument concerning the imposition of the
death penalty. 30 The State must prove the existence of an aggravating factor
beyond a reasonable doubt; 3 1 the defendant, however, need only prove the exist32
ence of a mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury then

determines whether any aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist. 33 Fol-

lowing this determination the jury is to weigh all mitigating circumstances
against the aggravating factors. Should this balance fall in favor of the State, the
jury is required to impose capital punishment.3 4 Although the jury may con24. Id. at 114-15.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (1983).
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.66 (Tent. Draft No. 9 (1959)); see State v. Johnson (Johnson
I), 298 N.C. 47, 60-63, 257 S.E.2d 597, 608-10 (1979).
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981) (definition of first degree murder).
28. Id. § 15A-2000(a)(1) (1983). The trial judge is permitted to impose a life sentence only
when (1) the prosecution declares it has no evidence of an aggravating factor, (2) the evidence of all
aggravating factors is insufficient as a matter of law, or (3) the jury is unable to agree unanimously
upon sentencing within a reasonable time. Comment, Vague and OverlappingGuidelines A Study of
North Carolina'sCapitalSentencing Statute, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 765, 773-74 (1980).
29. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(2) (1983).
30. Id. § lSA-2000(a)(4).
31. Id. § 15A-2000(c)(1).
32. State v. Johnson (Johnson 1), 298 N.C. 47, 76, 257 S.E.2d 597, 618 (1979). The court in
Johnson I also stated that the judge must provide a peremptory instruction when all of the evidence,
"if believed, tends to show that a particular mitigating circumstance does exist." Id. The trial judge
need not give a peremptory instruction when there is conflicting evidence. State v. Smith, 305 N.C.
691, 704-07, 292 S.E.2d 264, 272-74, cert denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). When the defendant fails to
offer any evidence as to the existence of a mitigating circumstance, the defendant is not entitled to an
instruction related to that circumstance. State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 277, 283 S.E.2d 761, 779
(1981), cerL denied, 103 S. Ct. 3552 (1983); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 356, 279 S.E.2d 788,
809 (1981) ("It is the responsibility of the defendant to go forward with evidence that tends to show
the existence of a given mitigating circumstance ... ").
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983). Although § 15A-2000(c) requires the jury to return in writing its determination of those aggravating circumstances that it finds beyond a reasonable
doubt, there is no similar requirement that mitigating circumstances be returned in writing. The
North Carolina Supreme Court has declined to interpret the statute as requiring that the mitigating
factors found be returned in writing. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 231-32, 283 S.E.2d 732, 750-51
(1981); cert denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1983). In State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 78, 301
S.E.2d 335, 354, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983), the court stated that the proper instruction
pertaining to this balancing role of the jury is:
Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance or circum-
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sider only the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute,35 no such
restriction exists with regard to mitigating factors. 36 The North Carolina
Supreme Court has defined a mitigating factor as:
a fact or group of facts which do not constitute any justification or
excuse for killing or reduce it to a lesser degree of. . . murder, but
which may be considered as extenuating, or reducing the moral culpastances found by you is, or are, sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the
death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found
by you?
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1983) provides that only the following aggravating circumstances may be considered:
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony.
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person.
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider or
abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive
device or bomb.
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, employee of the
Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former judge or justice, prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or former witness against the
defendant, while engaged in the performance of his official duties or because of the exercise
of his duty.
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than
one person.
(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct
in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of
other crimes of violence against person or persons.
36. Section 15A-2000(f) provides that mitigating circumstances include, but are not limited to,
the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truthfully
on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony.
(9) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value.
N.C GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (1983). Trial courts have been admonished by the North Carolina
Supreme Court not to deviate from the wording of both aggravating and mitigating factors, except
when instructing on additional mitigating factors. State v. Williams (Douglas), 308 N.C. 47, 77, 301
S.E.2d 335, 354, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
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of the extreme punishbility of the killing, or making it less deserving
37
ment than other first degree murders.
North Carolina's capital punishment statute has been criticized for not
38
clearly defining "the proper scope and character of evidence to be received."
The North Carolina Supreme Court initially clarified the statute's ambiguity by
declaring that the rules of evidence are not altered during the sentencing
phase. 39 The court in later decisions retreated from this statement and granted
defendants broad rights in presenting evidence to the jury.4° Defendants facing
the death penalty also were granted broad rights in instructing the jury as to
proposed mitigating factors. The rationale for this broad interpretation of evidentiary rules during the sentencing phase of a capital case is that the jury,
which is vested with the sole power under North Carolina law to determine
whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, should be presented
with and properly instructed on all evidence potentially affecting the decision to
impose death.4 1 In a recent line of cases, however, the court has applied a more
stringent standard that limits a defendant's right to present evidence and to submit proposed instructions to the jury.42
In State v. Cherry43 the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the standard for admissibility of evidence of mitigating factors. The court held that evidence concerning the general nature of the death penalty was irrelevant to
44
sentencing; therefore, such evidence was properly excluded by the trial judge.
The court noted that the proffered evidence did not refer to the defendant's character or record, or to circumstances of the charged offense as required by Lockett. Referring to the language of the statute that any evidence having "probative
value may be received," '45 the court declared that "[tihe language of this statute
does not alter the usual rules of evidence or impair the trial judge's power to rule
on the admissibility of evidence."'46 Although a state court would not be precluded from restricting the admission of irrelevant evidence during the sentencing phase, a restriction on the admissibility of evidence as broad as that
enunciated in Cherry was invalidated by the United States Supreme Court in
37. State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 104, 282 S.E.2d 439, 446-47 (1981).
38. Comment, supra note 28, at 775.
39. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
43. 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980).
44. Cherry sought to introduce the affidavit of a newspaper reporter that innocent people sometimes were executed, the affidavit of a convicted murderer who had been successfully rehabilitated,
and evidence that capital punishment lacked deterrent effect. Id. at 97, 257 S.E.2d at 559; see also
State v. Williams (Larry), 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243, cert denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (evidence
of plea bargaining agreement excluded); State v. Irwin, 304 N.C. 93, 282 S.E.2d 439 (1981) (evidence of plea bargaining agreement between State and codefendant was irrelevant and properly excluded as mitigating factor); cf State v. Kirkley, 308 N.C. 196, 302 S.E.2d 144 (1983) (State's
request that jury impose death penalty as a deterrent was improper, but was not error because defendant failed to object).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (1983).
46. Cherry, 298 N.C. at 98, 257 S.E.2d at 559.
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Green v. Georgia.47

In State v. Pinch4 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified the statements made in Cherry concerning the admissibility of evidence. In a retreat
from the wording of Cherry, the court explained the extent to which normal
rules of admissibility were to be applied during the sentencing phase of capital

cases; the trial judge may, in his discretion, exclude "repetitive or unreliable
evidence or that lacking an adequate foundation." 49 Apparently the court never

intended that the state's rules of evidence (beyond those pertaining to relevancy)
be used to exclude mitigating circumstances during the sentencing phase. The

court further solidified this position by emphatically declaring: "[C]ommon
sense, fundamental fairness and judicial economy dictate that any reasonable

doubt concerning the submission of a statutory or requested mitigating factor be
resolved in the defendant's favor to ensure the accomplishment of complete justice ....-50 Reversible error in the failure to present to the jury a mitigating
factor, however, would be found only when (1) the factor was one that the jury
might reasonably have found to have mitigating value, (2) sufficient evidence of
the existence of that factor had been offered, and (3) the exclusion of this evi51
dence had resulted in ascertainable prejudice.

In State v. Huffstetler the defendant was allowed to testify before the jury,

but his proposed instruction pertaining to his potential for rehabilitation as a
mitigating factor was rejected. Under North Carolina law, a proposed instruction on a mitigating factor must be submitted to the jury when that instruction is
supported by the evidence and relates to the defendant's character or prior record, or to circumstances of the offense; 52 "[the] legislature intended that all miti-

gating circumstances, both those expressly mentioned in the statute and others
which might be submitted under G.S. 15A-2000 (f)(9), be on an equal footing
before the jury."' 53 Whether the United States Supreme Court decision in Lock47. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
48. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
49. Id. at 19, 292 S.E.2d at 219. The court commented on relevancy again in State v. Silhan,
302 N.C. 223, 245, 275 S.E.2d 450, 468 (1981) ("Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency,
however slight, to prove a fact in issue.").
50. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 27, 292 S.E.2d at 223.
51. Id. at 27, 292 S.E.2d at 223-24.
52. State v. Johnson (Johnson I), 298 N.C. 47, 74, 257 S.E.2d 597, 617 (1979). Although Johnson I requires that any relevant circumstance must be submitted to the jury upon a defendant's
timely request, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that when a proper request is not made,
failure to submit the circumstance to the jury is not error. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 24-25,
301 S.E.2d 308, 322-23 (when proper request is not made, trial court may in its discretion list only
the enumerated mitigating circumstances),cert.denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983); State v. Goodman, 298
N.C. 1, 34, 257 S.E.2d 569, 590 (1979) ("ITihe court is not required to sift through the evidence and
search out every possible circumstance which the jury might find to have mitigating value."). Even
when a proper request is made, however, a mitigating circumstance need not be submitted to the jury
if the existence of this circumstance would be contrary to a conclusion made during the guilt determination phase. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (because defendant was convicted of
murder and breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, requested instruction during sentencing concerning intoxication would be contrary to previous determination that defendant had the
specific intent to commit larceny), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983). In State v. Huffstetler defendant had made a proper request to instruct the jury as to the mitigating factors requested for submission. Huffstetier, 312 N.C. at 121, 322 S.E.2d at 128 (Exum, J., dissenting).
53. Johnson I, 298 N.C. at 74, 257 S.E.2d at 617.
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ett mandates that the jury be instructed on all mitigating factors pertaining to the
defendant's character, record, and offense has not yet been resolved. Currently,
the federal courts of appeals are in conflict on this issue. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that failure to instruct the jury
as to a mitigating factor may constitute error under state law, but a constitutional violation occurs only if the defendant is prevented from presenting mitigating evidence.5 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held that state courts are constitutionally required to give clear instructions on
55
mitigating factors in capital cases.
Two cases, State v. Brown 56 and State v. Stokes, 57 exemplify the approach
taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court in determining whether the defendant has presented evidence sufficient to support a jury instruction on the proposed mitigating factor. In Brown defendant requested that his failure to act in a
calculated manner in killing his victim be submitted to the jury as a mitigating
factor. During the guilt determination phase the state had presented evidence
that defendant carried the murder weapon (a knife) from his home to the murder scene,58 which tended to discredit defendant's assertion that he had not acted in a calculated manner. Although defendant presented virtually no evidence
pertaining to the requested instruction, the court rested its decision on the
grounds that it would be beyond reason to speculate that defendant acted with
premeditation, but had not acted in a calculated manner. 59 Defendant had no
right to receive an instruction on a mitigating factor that, if believed, would
require the jury to engage in unreasonable, fanciful speculation.
The requested instruction considered by the court in Stokes was supported
only by minimal evidence, but a finding in the defendant's favor by the jury
would not have required an exercise in unreasonable speculation. Although
Stokes had been adjudged competent to stand trial, he presented evidence showing he had been treated at the age of ten at a mental health center where he was
diagnosed as having "unsocialized aggressive behavior." 6 The defense also submitted evidence that Stokes had an IQ of 63. Although the weight of the evidence was questionable given the length of time between his treatment at age ten
and the date of the homicide, the court held that the jury would not have been
acting without reason if it had found that the defendant was under the influence
54. Hutchins v. Garrison, 724 F.2d 1425, 1436-37 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 750
(1984); see also Barfield v. Harris, 540 F. Supp. 451, 472 (E.D.N.C. 1982) ("There was no constitutional violation because the jury was not precluded from considering non-statutory mitigating factors."), aff'd., 719 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2401 (1984).
55. Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); Chenault v.
Stynchcombe, 581 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1496 (1lth
Cir. 1983) ("We interpret Lockett v. Ohio and Gregg v. Georgia as vehicles for extending a capital
defendant's right to present evidence in mitigation to the placing of an affirmative duty on the state
to provide the funds necessary for production of. . . evidence."). The court in Westbrook, however,
held that the defendant's trial had not been fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1497.
56. 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1080 (1982).
57. 308 N.C. 634, 304 S.E.2d 184 (1983).
58. Brown, 306 N.C. at 178-79, 293 S.E.2d at 587.
59. Id. at 178, 293 S.E.2d at 586.
60. Stokes, 308 N.C. at 654, 304 S.E.2d at 196.
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of an emotional disturbance at the time he committed the homicide. The North
Carolina Supreme Court, therefore, reversed the trial court because it had failed
to present the proposed instruction to the jury. In both Stokes and Brown the
court did not undertake to weigh the evidence before it, but rather concentrated
on what a jury reasonably could have found.
In three other recent North Carolina cases, the court weighed the credibility of the proposed evidence instead of determining whether such evidence had
probative value. The court in these cases established a minimum (though unstated) requirement for the sufficiency of evidence necessary for the defendant to
receive a requested instruction on a mitigating factor.
In State v. Moose 61 the North Carolina Supreme Court held, on facts very
similar to those in State v. Stokes-defendant presented minimal evidence concerning psychiatric disorders-that defendant was properly denied an instruction concerning emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor. The defense in
Moose presented testimony of a forensic psychiatrist who classified defendant as
having "'a mixed personality disorder' which was manifested by his inability to
deal adequately with frustrations which led to outbursts of temper." 62 Defendant also was shown to have a history of repeated alcohol abuse. Despite the
expert testimony concerning defendant's emotional disorders, the court held
that the evidence weighed in favor of the State's theory that the defendant
merely had "a penchant for alcohol" and a bad temper: "[the defendant's] evidence falls short of that necessary to support the submission of G.S. § 15A2000(f)(2), that the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance when he murdered [the deceased]." '63 The trial judge, according to
Justice Meyer's majority opinion, correctly instructed the jury on intoxication as
a mitigating circumstance; defendant, however, had failed to come forward with
the necessary quantum of evidence concerning an emotional disturbance at the
time of the homicide, so a jury instruction on this mitigating factor was properly
refused.
In State v. Craig64 defendants requested that the trial court submit as a
mitigating factor their willingness to undergo a polygraph examination. The
supreme court, affirming the decision not to submit the requested mitigating
factor, responded that defendants' willingness to take a polygraph examination
was wholly self-serving and, therefore, was not a relevant factor to be submitted
to the jury. Supporting its view of the evidence, the court explained that the
State, during the course of its investigation, never asked defendants to take a
polygraph examination. Defendants' evidence, therefore, did not show a willingness to cooperate with the police. Justice Exum dissented, stating that a defendant's offer to take a polygraph examination during the investigatory stages of a
criminal case is a "circumstance relating to. . . character which the jury might
61.
62.
63.
64.

310 N.C. 482, 313 S.E.2d 507 (1984).
Id. at 498-99, 313 S.E.2d 518.
Id. at 499, 313 S.E.2d at 518.
308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740, cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 263 (1983).
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reasonably deem to have mitigating value." 65 Justice Exum noted that a polygraph examination might have assisted the investigation of the homicide.
In State v. Boyd 66 the court again embarked on a path of weighing the
evidence before it. The trial court excluded the testimony of one of defendant's
witnesses, Dr. Jack Humphrey, a criminologist and university professor who
would have testified concerning his scientific study of inmates. Dr. Humphrey's
study tended to show that the act of killing a family member or loved one is
essentially an act of self-destruction. 67 The defendant sought to use this testimony to draw together all other mitigating evidence into a unified theory--" 'a
unified whole which explained the apparent contradiction of killing the person
the defendant loved most.' 68 The court, rejecting the relevancy of Dr.
Humphrey's testimony, began by attacking the report as lacking comprehensive69
ness and having "questionable" scientific value as a mitigating circumstance.
The court balanced the defendant's claim concerning the reliability of the proposed evidence against the contrary assertions of the State: "[The defendant's
evidence] would not, we believe, have added credibility to any of the individual
mitigating factors which were supported by the evidence and considered by the
jury."'70 Justice Exum rejoined with a sharp criticism of the decision: "That an
expert's opinions may be 'questionable' has never been a ground for excluding
them from evidence. It goes to the weight not the admissibility of expert
testimony."'7 1
Unlike the approach taken by the North Carolina Supreme Court in these
three cases, the state supreme courts of Georgia, Florida, and-to a lesser extent-Texas have interpreted their respective capital punishment statutes as creating a permissive standard of admissibility when considering mitigating
evidence. This permissive standard is based on the premise that the potential
harm resulting from restricting the information which the jury may consider
outweighs the harm that may result from repetitive and time consuming presentation of evidence. If the defendant's evidence is of marginal probative value,
the greatest harm that could occur from the presentation of that evidence would
be that the jury would decline to give such evidence any weight, and that the
time required for its introduction would be wasted. The harm that could occur
from the exclusion of the marginally probative evidence would be of greater consequence. When the jury is balancing aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors, even evidence considered by a trial judge to be of marginal
probative value has the potential to tip the scales of this balancing process on
behalf of the defendant and to lead the jury to conclude that the death penalty is
not appropriate for this defendant when all the evidence is considered.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 469, 302 S.E.2d at 754 (Exum, J., dissenting).
311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 2052 (1985).
Id. at 414-15, 319 S.E.2d at 195.
Id. at 419, 319 S.E.2d at 197.
Id. at 421, 319 S.E.2d at 198-99.
Id. at 422, 319 S.E.2d at 199 (emphasis added).
Id. at 437, 319 S.E.2d at 208 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted its statute 72 as requiring a
much broader degree of admissibility than that imposed by Lockett. Chief Justice Burger praised the broad rules of admissibility created by the Georgia statute in Gregg v. Georgia 73
We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered. . . . So
long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made. . . do not
prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. We
think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as
possible when it makes the sentencing decision. 74
In two cases 75 the Georgia Supreme Court has allowed relatives of the defendant to testify concerning their love for the defendant and their wish not to
see the defendant executed: "We are unwilling to foreclose a defendant seeking
to avoid the imposition of the death penalty from appealing to the mercy of the
jury by having his parents testify briefly to their love for him. '76 This broad
interpretation of the Georgia statute is clearly reflected in Brooks v. State :77
This court is of the opinion that evidence as to mitigation should not
necessarily be confined to the strict rules of evidence. The trial court
should exercise a broad discretion
in allowing any evidence reasonably
78
tending toward mitigation.
The only restriction placed on this broad definition of relevancy by the Georgia
Supreme Court is that the proposed evidence must pertain to the particular defendant, rather than to the death penalty in general. Such evidence as descriptions of executions and testimony concerning religious theology has been ruled
79
inadmissible because it lacks relevancy.
The Florida Supreme Court also has interpreted its statute80 liberally in
determining the admissibility and relevancy of evidence during the sentencing
phase of a capital case:
In the penalty proceedings certain types of evidence which may be
inadmissible in a trial on guilt may be admissible and relevant to enable the jury to make an informed recommendation based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances concerning the acts
committed. . . . There should not be a narrow application or interpretation of the rules of evidence in the penalty hearing, whether in
regard to relevance or to any other matter except illegally seized
evidence. 8'
72. GA. CODE ANN.§ 17-10-30 (1981).
73. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
74. Id. at 203-04.
75. Romine v. State, 251 Ga. 208, 305 S.E.2d 93 (1983); Cofield v. State, 247 Ga. 98, 274 S.E.2d
530 (1981).
76. Cofield, 247 Ga. at 112, 274 S.E.2d at 542.
77. 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979), vacated on othergrounds, 446 U.S. 961 (1980).
78. Id. at 584, 261 S.E.2d at 387.

79. See Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930 (1980).
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
81. Alvord v. State, 322 So. 2d 533, 538-39 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923 (1976). The
trial judge may consider information that neither the State nor the defendant attempted to introduce
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Due to the broad rules of admissibility under Florida law, there is a paucity of
cases in which evidence of a mitigating factor has been excluded by the trial
court as inadmissible. 82 This sparsity of cases suggests that, with regard to questions of relevancy, the Florida trial bench tends to err in favor of the defendant.
Although the Florida Supreme Court frequently is confronted with defendants
arguing to have the existence of a mitigating factor determined as a matter of
law, 83 cases in which the court must decide whether proffered evidence was improperly rejected as irrelevant are rare. The court has had occasion to rule that
the trial court's exclusion of the record of a plea bargaining agreement between
the State and the defendant's accomplice was reversible error. 84 The court also
has found reversible error when a psychiatrist's evaluation of the defendant was
85
rejected as irrelevant.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted Texas' capital punishment statute 86 as allowing the trial judge broad discretion in determining the
relevancy and admissibility of evidence during the sentencing phase. This interpretation of the statute is based upon its wording: "In the proceeding, evidence
' 87
may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence."
By including this provision in the Texas statute, the legislature "intended for
sentencing evidence in a capital murder case to be as complete as possible." 88
The Texas statute, therefore, should be interpreted as allowing the trial judge
broad discretion in admitting evidence but requiring greater restraint in the exclusion of evidence. 89 Generally, the Texas trial courts have excluded mitigating
evidence offered by a defendant only when such evidence pertained to the defendant's early family history.90
The North Carolina Supreme Court should follow the precedent set by
Georgia, Florida, and Texas and apply a nonrestrictive definition of relevancy
as relevant to sentencing. See Sawyer v. State, 313 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1975), cert denied, 428 U.S. 911

(1976).
82. Cf. Boyd & Logue, Developments in the Application of Florida'sCapitalFelony Sentencing

Law, 34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 441, 463 (1980) ("court's approach to what is relevant should be broad
rather than narrow").
83. See, eg., Daugherty v. State, 419 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228

(1983); Riley v. State, 413 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1983); Smith v. State,
407 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982); Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla.
1979).
84. Messer v. State, 330 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1976).
85. Simmons v. State, 419 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1982).
86. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981).

87. Id. art 37.071(a).
88. Crump, CapitalMurder The Issues in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 531, 565 (1977).
89. Cases in which the trial judge has exercised this broad discretion in favor of admitting
evidence on behalf of the State abound. See, eg., Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981); McManus v. State, 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979); Rumbaugh v. State, 589 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d
699 (rex. Crim. App. 1979), cert withdrawn, 448 U.S. 725 (1980). This broad discretion has been
used to limit the defendant's evidence in a few cases. For a case in which such discretion has been
erroneously used to exclude the defendant's evidence, see Robinson v. State, 548 S.W.2d 63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977) (error for trial court to exercise discretion to exclude testimony of psychologist on
behalf of defendant).
90. Dix, Administrationof the Texas Death Penalty Statutes ConstitutionalInfirmities Related

to the Predictionof Dangerousness,55 TEx. L. REv. 1343, 1400-01 (1977).
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when examining the mitigating evidence offered by the defendant in a capital
case. The wording of North Carolina's capital punishment statute indicates that
the legislature intended for the courts to apply a liberal standard when determining whether evidence offered by a defendant should be excluded or a supportive
jury instruction denied. The statute provides that "[a]ny evidence which the
court deems to have probative value may be received." 9 1 The trial judge is required to instruct the jury that it must consider any mitigating circumstances
which may be supported by the evidence. 92 Among the list of enumerated mitigating factors, the jury is told that it is to consider any other circumstances that
would weigh against the death penalty.93 Further, the legislature has specifi94
cally provided that a liberal standard be applied in noncapital cases.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in the well-reasoned decision of State
v. Pinch,9 5 indicated that any reasonable doubt concerning the submission of a
mitigating instruction to the jury should be resolved in the defendant's favor. In
a recent line of cases, however, the court has abandoned the reasoning of Pinch
in favor of stricter rules of relevancy. The court should reestablish its prior
position that any instruction not requiring the jury to engage in unreasonable
speculation must be submitted upon a proper request by the defendant.
When the jury is left without standards in imposing the death penalty, such
punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment. 96 Death is a unique punishment requiring the most exacting precautions against its arbitrary imposition. Failure to allow the jury in a capital
case to examine all available information and to determine the weight to be
given this evidence risks imposing the death penalty without appropriate standards. Similarly, when the jury is not properly instructed on the evidence offered by the defendant to mitigate the offense, an element of arbitrariness is
infused into the jury's determination. The very purpose of requiring the jury to
consider mitigating factors is to give "the sentencer all the information which
might be necessary to determine whether the defendant should be singled out for
this extremely rare penalty." 97 This purpose is defeated when the information
the jury is to receive is limited.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Huffstetler9 s indicates that it is permissible for trial courts to weigh the evidence in determining
whether a proposed instruction in a capital case is supported by the defendant's
evidence. The weighing of evidence, however, is a function that North Caroina's capital punishment statute reserves exclusively for the jury. In a capital
case the defendant's life hangs in the balance; the court should admit all evi91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(3) (1983).
92. Id. § 15A-2000(b).

93. Id. § 15A-2000(f)(9). This subsection of the statute is particularly significant in that the
legislature required the jury to consider all possible mitigating evidence before such a requirement
was constitutionally imposed.

94. Id. § 15A-1334(b) ("Formal rules of evidence do not apply at the [sentencing] hearing.").
95. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
96. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
97. Kaplan, Evidence in Capital Cases,

11 FLA. ST. U. L. RPV. 369, 372 (1983).
98. 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1877 (1985).
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dence from which the jury could reasonably find that the defendant's moral
culpability has been reduced, even if the evidence has minimal probative value.
To prevent confusion of the issues, however, the court should only admit evidence pertaining specifically to the defendant; the court should exclude evidence
pertaining to the death penalty in general. Any other restriction, under the guise
of relevancy, prevents the jury from making a fair and fully informed decision as
it determines which defendants are to live and which are to die.
CHRISTOPHER GRAFFLIN BROWNING, JR.

State v. Wilson: The Improper Use of Prosecutorial Discretion
in Capital Punishment Cases
In State v. Wilson' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a prosecutor may consider the victim's family's feelings about the case when deciding
whether to seek the death penalty against an alleged murderer. A prosecutor's
decision to pursue capital punishment can be overturned only if he used an unjustifiable standard such as "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." '2
Absent abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the case may proceed toward a death
conviction.
The current status of capital punishment in the United States is founded on
the 1972 landmark case Furman v. Georgia.3 In Furman a majority of the
United States Supreme Court agreed that the death penalty constituted cruel
4
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
5
As a result, virtually every existing capital punishment statute was invalidated.
The death penalty, however, was not found unconstitutional per se; Furman
invalidated only those procedures that allowed capital punishment to be administered in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 6 Many of the statutes were rewritten, and in Gregg v. Georgia7 the Supreme Court approved a procedurally
modified capital punishment statute. 8
In Gregg the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that arbitrary
capital convictions would result from prosecutorial discretion. 9 Nevertheless,
the procedural fairness mandated in the Furman opinions 10 conflicts with the
1. 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
2. Id. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
4. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam). "The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings." Id. All
nine justices expressed their views on capital punishment in separate opinions, but a majority of the
Court agreed that the Georgia capital punishment statute violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
5. Id. at 417 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Forty states had capital punishment statutes; of
these, 39 were invalidated. Rhode Island's capital punishment statute imposed the death penalty for
murder committed by a life term prisoner; it was the only valid capital punishment statute after
Furman.
6. "Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
7. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
8. Id. at 207. See also infra note 46 and accompanying text (the statute provided for separate
guilt and sentencing stages of the trial, required the finding of specific aggravating factors to impose
the death penalty, and made appeal automatic).
9. Id. at 199. See also infra note 47 and accompanying text (the statutory requirements in
Gregg pertained only to the sentencing authority).
10. The Court in Gregg read Furman to require only that capital punishment statutes include
sentencing guidelines that compel juries to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of
the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The separate opinions in Furman, however, were more result oriented. The justices did not pinpoint certain stages of prosecution as problematic; they objected to the arbitrary and discriminatory results of capital punishment as it existed
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arbitrary and prejudicial effects that can occur if the prosecutor considers the
desire of the murder victim's family to seek the death penalty against the defendant. Furthermore, Justice White, representing three concurring votes in
Gregg, noted, "Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the
strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death
penalty if it convicts." 1 1 State v. Wilson, however, presented a case in which the
prosecuting attorney was motivated by other than the legal considerations Justice White believed should be imputed to prosecutors.
On October 22, 1981, Luther R. Wilson, Jr. burglarized two Randolph
County homes. 12 Wilson broke into the first house and stole a gun, two
watches, and a small amount of money. In plain view of neighbors, he then
proceeded to the home of Leonard A. Teel, whose presence apparently surprised
Wilson. They may have fought. 13 In any event, Wilson was seen by the same
neighbors as he escaped with a ski mask pulled over his face and a "long gun in
his left hand."' 14 The homeowner was not so lucky: dead or dying, Teel lay in
his house for two days until his body was discovered. Wilson was convicted of
armed robbery and first degree murder. The jury recommended that he be sen15
tenced to life imprisonment.
in 1972. Justice Douglas noted: "'A penalty. . . should be considered "unusually" imposed if it is
administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily.'" Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaringthe Death Penalty Unconstitutional,83 HARV. L. REv.
1773, 1790 (1970)). Referring to the cruel and unusual punishment clause, Douglas held the eighth
amendment to "require legislatures to write penal laws that are even-handed, nonselective, and
nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively,
and spottily to unpopular groups." Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan compared
the imposition of the death penalty to a lottery system. "When the punishment of death is inflicted
in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable
that it is being inflicted arbitrarily." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concluded
that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White objected that "no meaningful basis [exists] for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall noted: "Regarding discrimination, it
has been said that '[lt is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the
minority group-the man who, because he is without means, and is defended by a court-appointed
attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial lamb....'" Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Hearings on S. 1760 before the Subcomm. on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate

Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 2d Sess. ii (1968)). Justice Powell conceded that if a minority
could "demonstrate that members of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment
than others charged with the same offense,'a constitutional violation might be established." Id. at
449 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell, however, rejected discrimination arguments as "hypothetical
assumptions that may or may not be realistic." Id. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting).
11. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
12. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 120, 316 S.E.2d at 49.
13. Two witnesses testified that on different occasions defendant told them that he had broken
into a man's house with the intention of robbing him and subsequently had to kill him after the man
pointed a gun at him. Id. at 121, 316 S.E.2d at 49. An unexpected conflict between a defendant and
the victim may be considered by the jury as a mitigating circumstance in deciding whether to impose
the death penalty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (1977).
14. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 120, 316 S.E.2d at 49.
15. Id. at 119, 316 S.E.2d at 48. "[The] jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a firearm,
guilty of murder in the first degree based upon the felony-murder rule, and not guilty of murder in
the first degree based upon premeditation and deliberation." Id.
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Wilson appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to reduce the
crime charged to second degree murder. 16 The motion to reduce the crime had
been denied at a pre-trial hearing at which the defense attorney tried to establish
that most defendants charged with first degree murder in Randolph County had
been offered a chance to plead guilty to a lesser offense. 17 The prosecuting attorney testified that he had not plea-bargained with the defendant because he had
consulted with the victim's family: "It's their feeling that they want to pursue
first degree murder. Only if the family wanted a plea to second degree murder
would it be possible for that plea to be entered." 18 The prosecuting attorney
added that he "always, if possible, consulted with the victim's family to consider
their feelings about the case." 19
Wilson contended that his case was treated differently because Teel's family
wanted him to be tried for first degree murder. He argued that allowing the
family to decide whether a capital crime would be charged was an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion. 20 The district attorney abdicated his responsibility and
delegated it to the victim's family, thus denying Wilson due process and equal
protection. 21 The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the decision to prosecute for first degree murder and held that absent proof of discrimination the
prosecutor is presumed to have acted within legal bounds. 22 The court concluded that the "district attorney's consideration of the wishes of the family as
one factor in determining which defendant will be prosecuted for murder and
23
thereby subjected to the death penalty" was permissible.
Although North Carolina may be the only state that has expressly permitted a prosecutor to consider the wishes of the victim's family in a potential capital case,24 the use of prosecutorial discretion has been widely recognized as
necessary. 25 District attorneys are forced to balance limited prosecutorial re16. Id. at 121, 316 S.E.2d at 50. The defense argued that if Wilson had been allowed to plead
guilty to second degree murder, he would have been sentenced as a Class B Felon and would have
been eligible for early release or parole. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 16.
17. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 122, 316 S.E.2d at 50. Defendant introduced evidence that during the
tenure of the then-present district attorney in Randolph County, in "eight out of nine cases where
the defendant had been charged with murder in the first degree (exclusive of defendant's case), the
defendant was subsequently allowed to plead guilty to a lesser-included offense or the defendant had
been tried on a lesser-included offense." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 121, 316 S.E.2d at 50.
21. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 19. The defense argued that this practice would "convert
a system of justice into a system of irrational retribution." Id.
22. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51; see also infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text
(requirements for the defense of discriminatory prosecution).
23. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51.
24. Capital punishment studies have recognized that prosecutors may be influenced by the victim's family. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrarinessand Discrimination Under Post-Furman
CapitalStatutes, 74 . CRiM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1967, 1976 (1983). Apparently, however, no other
courts have allowed consideration of the wishes of the victim's family.
25. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.
Ill. 1945) (dictum that the discretion of the prosecutor derives from the common law); State v.
Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 261 S.E.2d 893 (1980). In Spicer the court recognized that the charging function of the district attorney includes weighing "many factors such as 'the likelihood of a successful
prosecution, the social value of obtaining a conviction as against the time and expense to the State,
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sources against the likelihood of a conviction. 26 Moreover, because every case is
different and may not fit clearly into one statutory classification of a crime, the

prosecutor must decide which crime or crimes best fit the facts. 27 Prosecutorial

discretion helps bridge the gap between textbook criminal prosecution and the
actual charging of criminals on a day-to-day basis.
If the prosecutor abuses his discretion, however, the accused may raise the
defense of "discriminatory prosecution," which usually is based on the four-

teenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection.2 8 North Carolina recognizes

this defense 2 9 and follows the standards set by the United States Supreme Court

in Oyler v. Boles.30 In Oyler the Supreme Court ruled that a criminal prosecution "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or

other arbitrary classification" violated the equal protection clause. 3 1 The unequal application of the law must be purposeful or intentional; 32 mere unequal

effects on an individual only demonstrate that the prosecutor exercised his
33

discretion.
By approaching the abuse of prosecutorial discretion as a defense, courts
analyzing the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty ask only whether
certain unjustifiable standards such as race or religion were used. Thus, the
legally relevant factors a prosecutor may use to decide whether to charge a capital crime remain undefined. Although Wilson recognized one prosecutorial fac-

tor-the wishes of the victim's family-the North Carolina Supreme Court
expressly has avoided the task of establishing specific standards for when the
death penalty will be sought.3 4 The court, however, has stated that the general
and his own sense ofjustice in the particular case.'" Id. at 311, 261 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Comment,
The Right to NondiscriminatoryEnforcement of State PenalLaws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1119
(1961)).
26. See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1119 (1961).
27. See Wilson, 311 N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51.
28. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1.
29. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644, 314 S.E.2d 493, 500-01 (1984); State v. Cherry, 298
N.C. 86, 103, 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980).
30. 368 U.S. 448 (1961). In Oyler defendant claimed that he was the only person prosecuted as
a habitual offender in Taylor County, West Virginia, from January 1940 to June 1955; five other
defendants in that period could have been prosecuted as habitual offenders. Id. at 455. Defendant
argued that the more severe penalty under the habitual offender statute was imposed only in a minority of cases and that this denied equal protection to those against whom the heavier penalty was
enforced. The Court held: "Even though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective
enforcement, it was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds supporting a finding
of denial of equal protection were not alleged." Id. at 454-56.
31. Id. at 456.
32. See State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 312, 261 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1980) (citing Oyler, 368 U.S. at
456, in which the Court said that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation."); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103, 257 S.E.2d 551, 562
(1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980).
33. State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 312, 261 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1980). "A defendant must show
more than simply that discretion has been exercised in the application of a law resulting in unequal
treatment among individuals. He must show that in the exercise of that discretion there has been
intentional or deliberate discrimination by design." Id.
34. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644 n.2, 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 n.2 (1984).

1140

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

assembly could define prosecutorial considerations. 35 Unless the general assem-

bly acts, the prosecutor's charging function in capital punishment cases will continue on an ad hoc basis.

The danger in not prescribing legally relevant prosecutorial factors lies in
the possibility that not all arbitrary or capricious charging decisions will be
checked by the defense of discriminatory prosecution. Some unfair criteria may

not rise to the level required for a defense based on prosecutorial abuse, and
other discrimination may not be subject to proof. 36 Capital punishment studies
are split on whether discrimination based on socio- economic and racial grounds
occurs in prosecutions despite post-Furman protections. 37 Most studies, how-

ever, recognize that prosecutors consider such non-legal factors as a judge's reputation for imposing capital punishment, pressure from police and media, and
public reaction to the crime. 38 Legally relevant considerations generally include
35. Id. ("If prosecutors are to be 'guided' in the exercise of this kind of discretion, we think it is
the province of the legislature and not this Court to so provide.").
36. North Carolina currently recognizes race, religion, or other arbitrary classification as unjustifiable standards for imposing the death penalty. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
Allowing the victim's family to help decide whether to pursue capital punishment also may be an
unfair or arbitrary standard; however, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Wilson that this
procedure is not sufficiently unjustifiable to be considered discriminatory prosecution. Wilson, 311
N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51. Considerations such as the prosecutor's inclination towards capital
punishment or the scheduled judge's reputation also may not rise to the level of discriminatory
prosecution.
Even the use of clearly unjustifiable standards such as race or religion will be difficult to prove.
With an unlimited number of factors on which a district attorney can base his decision to prosecute,
any unjustifiable standards can be masked by allowable standards.
37. Bowers, supranote 24, at 1071-78. This study, conducted in Florida during 1976-77, found
a 19 percent greater chance of a first degree murder indictment when a black killed a white than
when a black killed a black. The study also found a 17 percent difference between first degree
indictments of defendants with court appointed attorneys as compared with defendants who retained
private attorneys. Id.
A study of all homicides in South Carolina between June 1977 and November 1979 in which the
death penalty could have been sought found that "[w]hile prosecutors sought the death penalty
nearly four times as often for blacks accused of killing whites as they did when blacks were accused
of killing other blacks, they were only twice as likely to seek the death sentence when white defendants had white rather than black victims." Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury
Packing: FurtherChallenges To the Death Penalty, 73 J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 384-85
(1982); see also Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death
Penalty in South Carolina,74 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983) (disparity between rural and
urban death penalty charges).
Other studies have not found conclusive evidence of discrimination in death penalty convictions. Redelet, Racial Characteristicsand the Impostion of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv.
918, 922-23 (1981). This study was cited in Paternoster, supra ("Radelet found that murderers of
whites were significantly more likely to be indicted for first-degree murder than were killers of
blacks. . . . Radelet, however, found no evidence of discrimination by race of offender once the
victim's race was controlled."); see also Note, Discriminationand Arbitrarinessin CapitalPunishment: An Analysis ofPost-FurmanMurderCases in Dade County, Florida,1973-1976, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 75, 76 (1980) ("Although sentences were the most severe in cases where blacks killed whites,
there is no conclusive evidence of racial discrimination after taking into account the differences
between felony murders and nonfelony killings.").
38. Bowers, supra note 24, at 1076. Interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
revealed the following nonlegal influences on the prosecutor's decision to bring a capital charge:
1) Personal orientations or values of prosecutors which include aggressiveness of the prosecutor
and his orientation towards punishment (deterrence, retribution).
2) Situational pressures or constraints in handling cases which include plea bargaining strategy,
judge's reputation, and pressure from police.
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the facts of the case, the sufficiency and quality of the evidence, and any aggravating and mitigating circumstances that relate to the crime and the defendant.39 Not establishing objective guidelines and allowing such a wide range of

factors makes it possible for the prosecutor to discriminate based on his personal
motivations rather than analyzing possible charges in terms of the circumstances
of the crime.
Removing discrimination, regardless of its source, from capital punishment
was a primary consideration for the Furman Court. Although the per curiam
opinion held only that the imposition of the death penalty in that case constituted cruel and unusual punishment, 4° six justices noted that unbridled discretion in capital proceedings could have discriminatory effects. 4 1 Justice Stewart
objected to administering the death penalty in a "wanton" and "freakish" manner. 42 Referring to the cruel and unusual clause of the eighth amendment, Justice Douglas noted: "It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty

inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of
his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices." 4 3
To reduce the risk that the death penalty would be imposed in a discrimina-

tory or capricious manner, capital statutes were rewritten to provide procedural

safeguards at the sentencing phase of the trial. 44 The primary protection is the

requirement that juries find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
before imposing the death penalty. 4 5 The Supreme Court in Gregg approved the
changes made by the Georgia legislature in the Georgia capital punishment stat3) Social influences or pressures from community which include media coverage and public
opinion. Id. (excerpt from Table 2).
The general use of prosecutorial discretion is analyzed in Abrams, InternalPolicy: Guiding the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. RxV. 1 (1971). Abrams classified those
prosecutorial factors that are applicable to all offenses in varying degrees as "practical factors."
Practical factors "include the prosecutor's belief in the guilt of a suspect, the likelihood of a conviction, the possibility of obtaining the suspect's cooperation in other matters, the prosecutor's concern
about his record for obtaining convictions, the influence of the law enforcement agents involved, and
the general character of the offender." Id. at 11.
39. Bowers, supra note 24, at 1076.
40. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam) (opinion quoted supra note 4).
41. See supra note 10.
42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionalityof the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1690 (1974).
45. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (1977) complies with this
requirement:
(c) Findings in Support of Sentence of Death. When the jury recommends a sentence of
death, the foreman of the jury shall sign a writing on behalf of the jury which writing shall
show:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds
beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by the jury
are sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty; and
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.
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ute and held that the statute was constitutional. 4 6 The Georgia statute, however, did not restrict the prosecutor's discretion in deciding who would be
subject to the death penalty.
Addressing the issue of discretion in Gregg, the Court concluded that only
sentencing procedures were required to protect against arbitrary use of capital
punishment. 47 The Court distinguished prosecutorial discretion that could only
have a mercy-granting effect by removing a defendant from consideration for the
death penalty from unbridled jury discretion that could result in selective imposition of the death penalty on those already convicted of a capital offense. 48
Moreover, the Court felt that removing prosecutorial discretion would be
equivalent to creating a mandatory charging system that would require a capital
prosecution whenever evidence existed that a suspect had committed a capital
murder.4 9 Such a system, the Court noted, would force the prosecutor to distinguish between murderers solely on the basis of legislative classifications of
crimes, 50 a requirement very similar to the mandatory death penalty statutes
held unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina.5 1
Notwithstanding Gregg, unbridled prosecutorial discretion subsequently
has been challenged as allowing discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, relying on Gregg, rejected this challenge in
State v. Lawson.5 2 Gregg, however, provides weak support for unrestricted
prosecutorial discretion; it is stronger support for requiring prosecutorial discretion but restricting it solely to a consideration of legally relevant factors. First,
the contention that prosecutorial discretion can only grant mercy, 5 3 and thus
benefit a defendant, is suspect. Applied in the extreme, an offer to plea bargain
could be made to all capital defendants except a select few the prosecutor feels
46. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
Gregg established three essential components for a capital punishment statute:
1. The trial must have separate guilt and sentencing stages. "No longer can a Georgia jury do as
Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction,
decide whether he should live or die." Id. at 197.
2. The jury must weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime and "must find a
statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of death." Id.
3. The statute must provide for an automatic appeal of all death sentences. Id. at 198. See also
Survey of Developments in North CarolinaLaw, 55 N.C.L. REV. 895, 973-74 (summary of the Gregg
capital punishment statute requirements).
47. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 ("Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the
death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose
it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized
circumstances of the crime and the defendant.") (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 199 n.50.
50. Id. The Gregg Court suggested in a footnote that without prosecutorial discretion in charging death-penalty crimes, the procedure "in many respects would have the vices of the mandatory
death penalty statutes we hold unconstitutional today in Woodson v. North Carolinaand Roberts v.
Louisiana." Id. (citations omitted). The Court in Woodson objected to legislative classifications of
capital crimes which, if mandatory, would have unduly harsh results. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 293
(1975).
51. 428 U.S. 280 0976) (North Carolina capital punishment statute requiring the death penalty
in all cases of first-degree murder held unconstitutional).
52. 310 N.C. 632, 644, 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 (1984).
53. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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deserve the death penalty. Using discretion in this manner is a "wanton" and
"freakish" imposition of the death penalty.
Second, if prosecutorial discretion is constitutionally required to avoid the
Woodson-type mandatory prosecution,5 4 this result still can be achieved if the
prosecutor only considers legally relevant factors. Consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime would help avoid overly rigid
compliance with legislative crime classifications.
Last, the three-justice concurring opinion in Gregg55 indicated that the
Supreme Court was not considering the possibility of abuse by prosecutors. Justice White assumed prosecutors would use legally relevant factors; 56 he contended that defendants would escape the death penalty through prosecutorial
charging decisions only if the offense was not serious enough, or the proof was
not strong enough.5 7 The concurring opinion therefore shows that Gregg is not
support for a prosecutor's reliance on nonlegal considerations.
If Gregg allows the use of prosecutorial discretion but limits it to legally
relevant considerations, the scope of allowable factors should be defined. Under
Furman a decision to impose the death penalty should focus on the circumstances of the crime and the defendant.58 Justice White stated in Gregg that the
prosecutor should use the same criteria that the jury uses to decide whether to
impose the death penalty.5 9 Under capital punishment statutes consistent with
Gregg, the jury is limited to weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime. 60 Use of this standard in the decision to prosecute would
exclude nonlegal considerations such as the personal motivation of the prosecutor or the wishes of the victim's family.
Limiting prosecutorial discretion to the circumstances of the crime and the
defendant also is supported by Justice Douglas' remarks in Gregg that the death
penalty cannot be imposed under a procedure that "gives room for the play of
such prejudices" as race, religion, or social position. 61 Because a request for
capital prosecution by the victim's family could stem from long-harbored resentment towards a particular segment of the community, consulting the family permits these prejudices to surface. Conversely, consideration only of the
circumstances of the crime and the defendant would preclude such prejudices
62
from affecting the outcome of the case.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
55. 428 U.S. at 207 (White, J., concurring) (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist).
56. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's proposition is quoted supra text accompanying note 11. White noted: "Absent facts to the contrary," prosecutors are presumed to use
legally relevant criteria. Id. (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Perhaps Justice White suggested that facts indicating a prosecutor's use of nonlegal criteria would result in arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in violation of the eighth amendment.

57. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
58. See supra note 47.
59. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
60. See supra note 46.
61. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
62. Prejudicial and arbitrary prosecution can surface in many forms. Public or media pressure
stemming from a widely publicized murder may tilt a district attorney's decision in favor of capital
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Limiting the prosecutor's charging function to an analysis of the circumstances of the crime and the defendant also creates a procedural advantage. Any

indication of discriminatory prosecution is likely to result in an appeal. The
state appellate courts then must decide whether the prosecutor relied on proper

grounds in charging a capital offense. Appeals taken by capital defendants can

be as numerous as the reasons for a prosecutor to seek the death penalty. 6 3 Ap-

peals based on the prosecutor's use of nonlegal consideration, however, can be
avoided. Since the jury will find a defendant guilty of a capital offense only if

sufficient evidence of guilt exists and will impose the death penalty only if sufficient aggravating circumstances exist, the prosecutor can prevent these appeals

by basing his decision to seek capital punishment on only those considerations
available to the jury. Because legally relevant factors are available to the prosecutor, he need not resort to nonlegal considerations. Limiting the prosecutor to
a consideration of the circumstances of the crime and the defendant therefore
would reduce the grounds for procedural appeals.

Despite Furman's nondiscrimination objectives, unbridled prosecutorial
discretion permits arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.

Even in a nondiscriminatory context, procedural appeals will result when the
prosecutor unnecessarily strays from legally relevant considerations in deciding
whether to charge a capital offense. These problems can be resolved by a minor
change in North Carolina's capital punishment statute. The existing statute lists

the aggravating and mitigating circumstances the jury may use in imposing the
death penalty. 64 These circumstances focus on the crime and the defendant, and
prosecution. In this situation the defendant's charge would not be based on legally relevant considerations; rather, it would result from public demand for anticrime action. Restricting prosecutorial
discretion to the circumstances of the crime and the defendant would limit the prejudicial effects of a
defendant's notoriety.
63. See supra note 38 (nonlegal prosecutorial considerations).
64. The North Carolina statute states:
(e) Aggravating Circumstances.-Aggravating circumstances which may be considered

shall be limited to the following:
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony.
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, employee of
the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former judge or justice,
prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or former witness
against the defendant, while engaged in the performance of his official duties or because of
the exercise of his official duty.
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person
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determine the egregiousness of the murder. Additionally, the North Carolina
Constitution and General Statutes specify which crimes are capital; 65 the jury
considers evidence that proves whether a capital crime was committed by the
defendant. The general assembly and the courts have approved the jury's use of
these factors in deciding whether a defendant committed the crime and whether
a death sentence should be imposed. The prosecutor, like the jury, should be
limited to considering these legally relevant factors in deciding whom to prose-

cute for a death-punishable crime.
PETER

K.

DANIEL

by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person.
(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of
conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons.
(f) Mitigating Circumstances.-Mitigating circumstances which may be considered shall
include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed
by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truthfully on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony.
(9) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have
mitigating value.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)-(f) (1977).
65. N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (murder, arson, burglary, and rape punishable by death if the
general assembly shall so enact); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981) (murder in the first degree includes those murders committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or
sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a
deadly weapon; first degree murder punishable by death).

The Evolution of North Carolina's Comparative Proportionality
Review in Capital Cases
In Furman v. Georgia1 the United States Supreme Court held that the
eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit
state capital sentencing schemes that operate at the unfettered discretion of the
sentencing authority. 2 Death may be imposed only after the sentencing authority has followed specific guidelines designed to ensure fair, nonarbitrary sentencing. 3 Sentencing bodies, however, must be allowed to exercise limited discretion
to assure that the particular circumstances of the crime and the defendant in
each case are considered before deciding on an appropriate sentence. Thus, the
Court also has rejected mandatory capital sentencing as constitutionally impermissible. 4 Consistent with these dual goals of nondiscretionary and particularized sentencing, many states have enacted "guided discretion" capital sentencing
statutes. 5 Typically, in a guided discretion scheme the jury must consider evidence of both aggravating 6 and mitigating7 circumstances. Death may be im1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 239-40. Furman was a per curiam decision with nine separate opinions (five concurring, four dissenting). Justice Stewart argued that it was cruel and unusual punishment to impose

the death penalty on a "selected random handful" of defendants at the discretion of the jury.

Id. at

309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
3. Id. at 255-57. While the United States Supreme Court did not create guidelines for acceptable capital sentencing procedures in Furman, the Court has approved state capital sentencing

schemes in several subsequent cases. See, eg., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976) (plurality opinion). The Court also has invalidated some capital sentencing procedures. See,
e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976).
4. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
At issue in Woodson was North Carolina's capital sentencing statute, Act of April 8, 1973, ch.
1201, §1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 323 (formerly codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp.
1975)), which called for the automatic imposition of the death penalty upon conviction of first degree
murder. The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional on three grounds. First, the statute
failed to take into.consideration the "character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense." Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. Second, the statute failed to reflect
"contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the punishment of death." Id. at 301. Last,
the Court noted that juries might be unwilling to convict defendants charged with first degree murder in light of the mandatory death sentence such a conviction imposed. Id. at 302-03.
5. "In response to [Furman],roughly two-thirds of the States promptly redrafted their capital
sentencing statutes in an effort to limit jury discretion .... " Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 876
(1984). North Carolina's capital sentencing statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983), is fairly
typical. The statute provides for a bifurcated procedure in capital felony cases: the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial are conducted separately. Id. § 15A-2000(a). At the sentencing phase,
evidence may be presented to the jury relating to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id.
§ 15A-2000(a)(3). The jury decides whether to impose death or life imprisonment by weighing the
circumstances: if the aggravating circumstances are found to outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the defendant may be sentenced to death. Id. § 15A-2000(b)(1) to (3). The sentence recommendation must be unanimous; if the jury cannot agree on a sentence the trial judge must impose a
sentence of life imprisonment. Id. § 15A-2000(b). A jury recommending death must return in writing the statutory aggravating circumstances found. Id. § 15A-2000(c)(1). For a discussion of the
history and application of the North Carolina capital sentencing statute, see Comment, CapitalPunishment in North Carolina: The 1977 Death Penalty Statute and the North CarolinaSupreme Court,
59 N.C.L. REv. 911 (1981).
6. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1983).
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posed only upon a finding of one or more aggravating circumstances and only if
8
such circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances found.
9
As an added "safeguard against arbitrarily imposed death sentences,"
many states incorporate a proportionality review into their capital sentencing
1
Tradiprocedures. 10 There are two basic types of proportionality review.
tional proportionality review examines the "appropriateness of a sentence for a
particular crime."' 12 For example, a traditional proportionality review might ex13
amine whether the death penalty is too severe a punishment for kidnapping.

The second type of proportionality review-the subject of this Note-is
14
Comparative proportionality procedures
comparative proportionality review.
require the reviewing court to compare the case under review to "similar" cases
previously decided in the same jurisdiction. The court must decide "whether the
[death] penalty is .. .unacceptable .. . because [such penalty is] dispropor15
tionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime."'
Unless the case is found to be sufficiently similar to other cases in which the
death penalty has been imposed, the death penalty will be deemed disproportionate. Although comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally reCourt clearly approves of such review in
quired, 16 the United States Supreme
7
procedures.'
sentencing
capital
7. See, ag., id. § 15A-2000(f).
8. Id. § 15A-2000(c).
9. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 879 (1984).
10. Thirty-two states currently provide for proportionality review, either by statute or case law.
See Goodpaster, JudicialReview ofDeath Sentences, 74 J.CRaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 786, 793 n.61
(1983) (complete listing of proportionality statutes).
11. See Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 875-76 (1984).
12. Id. at 875.
13. The United States Supreme Court has invalidated statutes after applying traditional proportionality analysis in several cases. See, ag., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227 (1983) (life imprisonment
without possibility of parole disproportionate punishment for issuing a $100 bad check); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty disproportionate punishment for an accessory to robbery
convicted of murder under the felony murder rule); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death
penalty disproportionate punishment for the rape of an adult victim); see also D. PANNICK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1982) (discussing traditional proportionality principles).
14. This type of review has been described as "proportionality review," "comparative excessiveness," "comparative sentence review," and "comparative proportionality review." See Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, ComparativeReview of Death Sentencing: An Empirical Study of the Georgia
Experience, 741. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 663 n.1 (1983). Thirty-one states require comparative proportionality review. Special Project, Capital Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit
of Fairnessand Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1129, 1189 n.382 (1984).
15. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S.Ct. 871, 876 (1984).
16. The issue in Pulley was "whether the Eighth Amendment. .. requires a state appellate
court, before it affirms a death sentence, to compare the sentence in the case before it with the
penalties imposed in similar cases." Id. The Court unequivocally rejected the concept of constitutionally mandated comparative proportionality review, holding that "there is. . .no basis in our
cases for holding that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every
case." Id. at 879.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that comparative proportionality review is constitutionally
required. Brennan noted that while comparative proportionality review is no panacea to the
problems inherent in any capital sentencing scheme, "such review often serves to identify the most
extreme examples of disproportionality among similarly situated defendants. . .[and] to eliminate
some of the irrationality that currently surrounds imposition of a death sentence." Id. at 890 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. See eg., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 890 (1983) (the Court upheld a death sentence
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Two determinations are central to the effective functioning of a comparative
proportionality review scheme. First, the reviewing court must define the group
or "pool" of cases that are to be used in making similarity comparisons.1 8 Sec-

ond, the court must decide how to determine similarity: the court must identify
the factors that will be considered pertinent in comparing one case to another.1 9

This Note will examine how North Carolina has dealt with these issues in the
development and application of its comparative proportionality review
procedure.
The current North Carolina capital sentencing statute was enacted in
1977.20 Under the statute any case in which the jury imposes a sentence of
death is automatically appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court. 21 On

appeal the court reviews assignments of error from both the guilt and sentencing
phases of the trial. 22 If both phases are found to be error-free, 2 3 the court then

undertakes three additional inquiries. First, the court examines whether the record supports the "jury's findings of any aggravating circumstance or circumstances upon which the sentencing court based its sentence of death."'24 Second,
the court must determine that the sentence was not imposed "under the influunder Georgia's capital sentencing statute, stating that "[o]ur decision in this case depends in part on
the existence of an important procedural safeguard, the mandatory appellate review of each death
sentence. . . to avoid arbitrariness and to assure proportionality."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
198 (1976) ("[a]s an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice. . . [the Georgia Supreme Court] is required by statute. . . [to determine] whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases.").
Several theories have been advanced for the necessity of comparative proportionality review.
Such review "may be the best means of ensuring that a state's statutory capital sentencing scheme is
functioning within. . . eighth amendment guidelines. . . [because it] measures the consistency with
which sentencing authorities impose the death penalty-a crucial factor in discerning potentially
cruel and unusual punishment." Special Project, supra note 14, at 1189. Comparative proportionality review is "the only review technique which tests capital sentences against accumulated evidence
of contemporary mores, as required by Woodson." Goodpaster, supra note 10, at 814.
18. Possible pools include all the cases in which (1) the defendant was convicted of a capital
crime, (2) the defendant was convicted of a capital crime or pleaded guilty to a capital crime as a
part of a plea-bargaining arrangement, (3) the defendant was sentenced to death, (4) the defendant
was sentenced to death and the sentence was affirmed on appeal, (5) the defendant was sentenced to
death or life imprisonment and the sentence was affirmed on appeal.
19. The United States Supreme Court has held that to impose a death penalty the sentencing
authority must consider the particular circumstances of the crime and of the defendant and that
there must be a "principled way to distinguish [a] case, in which the death penalty was imposed,
from the many cases in which it was not." Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980). Beyond
these guidelines it is not clear what factors a court may or should consider controlling in assessing
similarity. In any fact situation there are many different possible comparison factors. For example,
if an intoxicated 18 year-old defendant is convicted of the first degree murder of two store clerks
during an armed robbery, the case could be compared on proportionality review to armed robbery
cases, youthful offender cases, multiple murder cases, felony murder cases, diminished capacity
cases, or some combination of these cases.
20. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407. North Carolina drew heavily on
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) in creating the current statute. State v.
Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 60, 257 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1979).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d) (1983). The current statute allows imposition of the death
penalty only upon a conviction of first degree murder. Id. § 14-17 (1981).
22. Id. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (1983).
23. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 45, 305 S.E.2d 703, 717 (1983) (proportionality review is
performed by the court only if both phases of the trial are error-free).
24. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983).

1985]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1149

ence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor." 25 Last, the court must
conduct a comparative proportionality review. The court must overturn the
death sentence and impose life imprisonment "upon a finding that the sentence
imposed in similar cases,
of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
26
considering both the crime and the defendant."
North Carolina's comparative proportionality scheme is intended to serve

"as a check against the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty" 27

and to assure that "individualized consideration [is] given to the defendant
before the death sentence can be upheld."'28 In carrying out its proportionality
of the Legislature,
review, the court must be "sensitive not only to the mandate
29
review."
[the]
of
dimensions
constitutional
the
to
also
but
For purposes of assessing similarity, the court recognizes the "pool" of
cases available for comparison purposes as
all cases arising since the effective date of our capital punishment statute, 1 June 1977, which have been tried as capital cases and reviewed
on direct appeal by this Court and in which the jury recommended
death or life imprisonment or in which the trial court imposed life ima sentencing recomprisonment after the jury's failure to agree upon
30
mendation within a reasonable period of time.
This pool is further limited to only those cases that have been affirmed on appeal
by the North Carolina Supreme Court. 3 1 The court also may "suspend consideration of death penalty cases until such time as the court determines it is pre32
pared to make the comparisons required under the provisions" of the statute.
In conducting the proportionality review, the court compares "the case at
bar with other cases in the pool which are roughly similar with regard to the
crime and the defendant."' 33 Significant factors in comparing cases are "the
manner in which the crime was committed and defendant's character, back25. Id.
26. Id.
27. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 46, 305 S.E.2d 703, 717 (1983).
28. State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 36, 301 S.E.2d 308, 329, cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983).
29. State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 236, 283 S.E.2d 732, 753 (1981) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 204-06 (1976), and Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258-59 (1976)), cert. denied, 455 U.S.

1038 (1982).

30. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
31. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 45, 305 S.E.2d 703, 717 (1983). As of January 30, 1985, the
proportionality pool consisted of 88 cases. See infra Appendix. For a compilation of additional
information on some of these cases, see Petersen, OutlineofLegal PrinciplesEstablishedby the North
CarolinaSupreme Courtfor CapitalCases Under G.S. § 154-2000, 1977-1983, in NORTH CAROLINA
CAPITAL DEFENSE TRIAL MANUAL 39-46 (1983). The North Carolina Supreme Court has made
clear that in conducting a comparative proportionality review, it will not "necessarily feel bound
to give a citation to every case in the pool of 'similar cases' used for comparison." State v.
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 81, 301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1983). The North Carolina Supreme Court never has
invoked this language. Presumably, this language would enable the court to defer review of a death
penalty case until such time as sufficiently similar cases become available for comparative review
purposes.
33. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984). Thus, the court need not
compare the case under review with every case in the pool, but only with those deemed roughly
similar.
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ground, and physical and mental condition." 3 4 For purposes of proportionality
review, if the trial court finds one or more mitigating circumstances 35 but does

not specify exactly what those mitigating circumstances are, the reviewing court
must assume that the jury found all the mitigating circumstances submitted for
consideration in the sentencing phase. 3 6 Other than the general guidelines mentioned above, the North Carolina Supreme Court has not established a frame37
work for consistently conducting a comparative proportionality review.
Although the provisions for comparative proportionality review were en-

acted in 1977,38 the North Carolina Supreme Court did not have occasion to
apply the scheme until 1979. In State v. Barfield39 the court applied the proportionality review for the first time. The court concluded that the death penalty

was not excessive or disproportionate considering "the manner in which death
was inflicted and the way in which [the] defendant conducted herself after she

administered the poison to [the victim.]"' 4 Clearly the court did not conduct a
true comparative proportionality review in Barfield. Instead of comparing

Barfield to similar cases in the proportionality pool, the court merely applied the
traditional proportionality test-general appropriateness of the punishment for
the crime at issue 4 1-and decided that the death penalty was not excessive or
inappropriate in Barfield's case. In a line of cases following Barfield the court

continued this conclusory review, simply stating that the death penalty was not
disproportionate without citing or analyzing specific similar or dissimilar
42
cases.
34. Id.
35. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f) (1983).
36. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984).
37. Highly structured quantitative schemes for assessing similarities between cases have been
suggested by some commentators. See, eg., Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, supra note 14 (advocating statistical analysis of similarity variables using a computer-based data management system); Dix,
Appellate Review ofthe Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. L.J. 97 (1979) (analyzing appellate review
of death penalty cases in Georgia, Florida, and Texas). The North Carolina Supreme Court rejects
such quantitative factor analyses on several grounds. First, the court has noted that the factors used
for comparative proportionality review "are not readily subject to complete enumeration and definition." State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 80, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
"[The relevant] factors will be as numerous and as varied as the cases coming before us on appeal."
Id. Second, the use of quantitative analysis in comparing cases would tend to "become the last word
on the subject of proportionality rather than serving as the initial point of inquiry." Id. at 80-81, 301
S.E.2d at 356. Third, the courts might tend to base their decisions on the scientific analyses rather
than the "experienced judgments of [their] own members." Id. at 81, 301 S.E.2d at 356. Last, the
court believes that sole reliance on scientific analysis would deny the defendant "the constitutional
right to 'individualized consideration.'" Id. Consistent with this goal of individualized consideration, the court has held that "although the cases in the pool offer guidance in determining whether a
sentence of death in a particular case is excessive or disproportionate, ultimately each case must rest
on its own unique facts." State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 519, 324 S.E.2d 250, 263 (1985).
38. See supra note 20.
39. 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980). In Barfield defendant was convicted of poisoning the victim to death for pecuniary gain. The evidence indicated that
defendant previously had poisoned four others, also for pecuniary gain. Id. at 310-16, 259 S.E.2d at
518-22.
40. Id. at 355, 259 S.E.2d at 544.
41. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
42. See, eg., State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 186, 293 S.E.2d 569, 591 ("mT1he record before us
reveals two of the most blood-thirsty and brutal crimes which have ever been reviewed by this Court
....
The bloody facts disclosed by the record before us leave this Court no choice but to conclude
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In State v. Hutchins4 3 the North Carolina Supreme Court for the first time
identified cases used for comparison purposes in conducting its proportionality
review.
The present case does not present the situation in which a victim
was brutally murdered in such a way that the episode could be characterized as being a torture slaying. Compare State v. Martin, [citation
omitted]; State v. McDowell, [citation omitted]. . . . However, the
record clearly establishes a course of conduct on the part of defendant
which amounts to a wanton disregard for the value of human life and
for the enforcement of the law by duly appointed authorities. These

factors lead us to conclude that the sentence of death is not disproportionate or excessive. 44

It is not clear from this language what factors in the cited cases the court
deemed sufficiently similar to support imposition of the death penalty against
45
Hutchins.
In State v. Pinch46 the court again identified cases used for comparison in
conducting its proportionality review. The court cited six previous cases in
which the death penalty had been affirmed, but did not discuss any particular
that the sentence of death imposed is not disproportionate or excessive."), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1080 (1982); State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 711, 292 S.E.2d 264, 276 (no cases cited) ("The sentence
of death for the intentional, deliberate and senseless murder of [the victim] was not excessive or
disproportionate."), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 292, 283
S.E.2d 761, 787 (1981) ("[Because] the murder of [the victim] was, simply put, a cold-blooded killing
of an innocent woman on her way to work, we see no reason to reverse the judgment of the jury.
The sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate."), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 (1983);
State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 236, 283 S.E.2d 732, 753 (1981) ("Defendant's sadistic and bloodthirsty crimes committed against this victim compel the conclusion that the sentence of death is not
disproportionate or excessive."), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246,
256, 278 S.E.2d 214, 220-21 ("The brutal manner in which death was inflicted, which followed
defendant's declaration approximately six months previously that he was going to kill [the victim],
leads us to conclude that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate."), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 294, 271 S.E.2d 286, 296 (1980) ("Considering the brutal manner in which... [the victims were murdered] and considering defendant's prior
history of violent criminal behavior, we conclude that the sentence of death is not excessive."), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981). The North Carolina Supreme Court's perfunctory review of death
penalty cases during this period led one commentator to note that the court "appears to be engaging
in cursory or rubber stamp review." Comment, Evolving Standardsof Decency: The Constitutionality of North Carolina's CapitalPunishment Statute, 16 WAKE FoRESr L. REv. 737, 759 (1980).
43. 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981). Hutchins was convicted of the first degree murder of
two police officers who responded to a call from Hutchins' daughter. The daughter claimed that
Hutchins was drunk, had beaten her, and had threatened other family members. Hutchins shot the
officers as they were getting out of their police car in the Hutchins' driveway. Id. at 327, 279 S.E.2d
at 793.
44. Id. at 357, 279 S.E.2d at 810. The two cases used for comparison by the court were State v.
Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981) and State v. McDowell, 301
N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981).
45. The court might have intended to imply that the stated "wanton disregard for the value of
human life" was a similar factor in the cited cases. It also is interesting to note that the court
specified the disregard of law enforcement as a ground for upholding the death penalty. Hutchins,
303 N.C. at 357, 279 S.E.2d at 810. See infra note 111.
46. 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982). In Pinch defendant was
convicted of two counts of first degree murder. Defendant had expressed a dislike for and intention
to kill the victims. He borrowed a shotgun, went to a club and shot both victims in the chest at close
range. The second victim pleaded for his life before being shot. One victim was killed instantly; the
other victim lay moaning on the ground until defendant shot him again. Id. at 4-6, 292 S.E.2d at
210-11.
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factors that made these six cases similar to Pinch.47 In affirming the death pen-

alty, the court concluded that "[a]ll things considered, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that this defendant is somehow less deserving of capital punishment
than the other occupants of death row."'48 Two justices noted that the majority
had failed to identify the relevant pool of cases for purposes of proportionality
review. 4 9 Justice Exum, in dissent, urged as a comparison pool all cases tried
under the 1977 death penalty statute in which the defendant had received the
death penalty or life imprisonment.50
In State v. Williams 5 1 the court adopted Justice Exum's proposed propor-

tionality pool. 52 In conducting the proportionality review the Williams court
cited no cases, but simply stated that they had made "a comparison of this case

to the cases in the pool of 'similar cases.' -53 The court concluded that the

murder was "so brutal and so utterly senseless as to lead us to conclude that the
sentence of death imposed in this case is not disproportionate." '5 4
For the first time in State v. McDougall,55 a companion case to Williams,
the court identified specific variables in the cases chosen for comparison upon

which its decision to uphold the death penalty was based. In McDougalldefendant was convicted of stabbing his victim to death while he was under the influ-

ence of cocaine.5 6 The jury found as mitigating circumstances defendant's

impaired capacity 57 and his mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the

murder.5 8 On review, the court noted that "[w]hile these findings are often per47. Id. at 35-36, 292 S.E.2d at 228. The six cases were State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 301, 283 S.E.2d
732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213 (1983); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981); State v.
Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214 (1981); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979),
cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
48. Pinch, 306 N.C. at 35, 292 S.E.2d at 228. The court also noted that the death penalty
"doles] not seem excessive or disproportionate considering the premeditated and callous manner in
which the defendant calmly shot and killed two people in cold blood, suddenly and without any
provocation by them, for reasons exhibiting a wanton disregard for human life." Id. at 37, 292
S.E.2d at 229. Thus, it appears the court upheld the death penalty in Pinch not as a result of comparison with similar cases, but simply on the facts of the case itself.
49. Id. at 62, 292 S.E.2d at 229-30 (Carlton, J., concurring); id. at 59, 292 S.E.2d at 242-43
(Exum, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 60-61, 292 S.E.2d at 243 (Exum, J., dissenting).
51. 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983). In Williams defendant was
convicted of sexually assaulting and beating to death a 100-year-old woman. Id. at 51-55, 301
S.E.2d at 339-41.
52. Id. at 79, 301 S.E.2d at 355; see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
53. Williams, 308 N.C. at 82, 301 S.E.2d at 357.
54. Id. The court continued this perfunctory review, citing affirmed death penalty cases without discussion, in a case following Williams. See State v. Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 464, 302 S.E.2d 740,
750-51 (no cases cited) ("We... have compared this case with all similar cases.. . [and] [w]c
believe that the imposition of the death penalty. . . is not disproportionate."), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 263 (1983).
55. 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983). In McDougall defendant
was convicted of stabbing the victim to death after he had tricked the victim and her roommate into
letting him into their home by pretending that he needed to use the phone to get medical assistance
for his wife. Id. at 5-7, 301 S.E.2d at 311-13.
56. Id. at 7, 301 S.E.2d at 313.
57. Id. at 16, 301 S.E.2d at 318.
58. Id.
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suasive on the jury in recommending life imprisonment, they are not conclusive."159 The court noted cases in which juries had sentenced the defendant to
death when the defendant had exhibited impaired capacity and emotional disturbance; the court noted similar cases in which the defendant was sentenced to life
imprisonment. 6° The court distinguished McDougall from the life imprisonment cases on the ground that the defendant in McDougall might have voluntarily injected the cocaine that resulted in impaired capacity and emotional
disturbance. 6 1 The court reasoned that the jury thus could have given the mitigating circumstances less weight than in the life imprisonment cases. 62 Based on
dissimilar from the
this conclusion, the court found McDougall to be sufficiently
63
penalty.
death
the
affirmed
and
cases
imprisonment
life
The court employed a more stringent analysis in conducting its compara64
tive proportionality review in several cases decided in 1984. In State v. Lawson
defendant was interrupted by the victim homeowner while burglarizing a house.
Defendant shot and killed the homeowner and also shot the homeowner's father
to eliminate witnesses to the burglary. 6 5 In conducting the proportionality review the court considered a number of factors. The Lawson jury found two
66
aggravating circumstances: murder for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest
and murder committed as a part of a course of conduct of violence against other
persons. 67 The court noted that the latter circumstance had been found by the
jury in seven of the fourteen cases in which the death penalty had been affirmed. 68 The court also compared mitigating circumstances, noting that in Williams as well as in Lawson the jury found as mitigating the defendant's lack of
prior convictions. 69 The court continued the proportionality review by comparing Lawson to cases in which a similar type of crime had been committed. The
court identified another case in which the victim surprised the defendant who
70
was in the act of burglarizing the victim's home and cited similar robbery71
Defendant's character, background, and physical and mental
murder cases.
72
After noting
condition also were cited as grounds for similarity comparisons.
59. Id. at 36, 301 S.E.2d at 329.
60. Id. at 36 nn.9-10, 301 S.E.2d at 329 nn.9-10.
61. Id. at 37, 301 S.E.2d at 329.
62. Id.
63. Id. In another 1983 case, State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983), the court
upheld the death penalty for a defendant convicted of murdering a witness during an armed robbery.
The court compared the case to State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1056 (1982), a robbery-murder case in which the death penalty was affirmed, and held the death
penalty not disproportionate. Central to the Oliver court's decision was the fact that the murder was
motivated chiefly by the desire to eliminate witnesses to the armed robbery. Oliver, 309 N.C. at 375,
307 S.E.2d at 335.
64. 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
65. Id. at 634-35, 314 S.E.2d at 495-96.
66. Id. at 637, 314 S.E.2d at 497.
67. Id. at 637-38, 314 S.E.2d at 497.
68. Id. at 648-49, 314 S.E.2d at 503-04.
69. Id. at 649, 314 S.E.2d at 504; Williams, 308 N.C. at 57, 301 S.E.2d at 342.
70. Lawson, 310 N.C. at 649, 314 S.E.2d at 504. The cited case was Williams.
71. Lawson, 310 N.C. at 649-51, 314 S.E.2d at 504-05.
72. Id. at 650-51, 314 S.E.2d at 504-05.
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the similarities and dissimilarities of the relevant cases, the court concluded that
the death penalty should be upheld because cases in which life imprisonment

had been imposed were "for the most part distinguishable on the basis of the
absence of an aggravating factor present in this case or the presence of mitigat' 73
ing factors absent in this case."
74
In the next death penalty case affirmed by the court, State v. Maynard,
the court returned to the pre-Lawson practice of dispensing with the proportion-

ality review; the court made a conclusory determination that the death penalty
was not disproportionate and supported this conclusion with case citations 75 but

without discussion or analysis. Central to the court's decision to uphold the
death penalty in Maynard, another witness elimination case, were "compelling

'76
policies which encourage witnesses to testify in criminal trials without fear."
Although the court then cited without discussion two cases in support of its
similarity comparisons, 77 it seems clear that the Maynardproportionality review
focused on a single facet of the crime-witness elimination-as a basis of comparison. The court did not analyze any other aggravating or mitigating circumstances or characteristics of the crime or defendant. The decision to affirm the
death penalty, based primarily on a single feature of the crime, is uncomfortably
similar to the mandatory death penalty sentencing schemes outlawed in Wood78

son v. North Carolina.

The North Carolina Supreme Court conducted a somewhat more detailed
proportionality review in two recent cases. Defendant in State v. Boyd 79 stabbed
his ex-lover to death in the presence of her mother and child. The court com-

pared Boyd to another murder case involving a domestic relationship in which
the death penalty had been upheld. 80 The court observed that in both cases the
murder was preceded by threats against the victim and that the victim was not

murdered "in a quick and efficient manner." 81 The court also noted that in both
cases the victim was murdered in the presence of her child and that both defend73. Id. at 651, 314 S.E.2d at 505.
74. 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197, cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984). In Maynard defendant beat,
stabbed, and shot the victim and then threw the victim into a river, to keep the victim from testifying
against defendant. Id. at 5-7, 316 S.E.2d at 200-01.
75. Id. at 36, 316 S.E.2d at 216.
76. Id.
77. Id. The court cited State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cert. denied, 448
U.S. 907 (1980), and State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983), noting that in both those
cases the motivation for the murders was to "avoid detection or arrest." Maynard, 311 N.C. at 36
n.3, 316 S.E.2d at 216 n.3.
78. 428 U.S. 280 (1976); see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
79. 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2052 (1985).
80. Id. at 435, 319 S.E.2d at 207. The court compared Boyd to State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246,
278 S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981), in which defendant shot his estranged wife to
death in front of their young child.
81. Boyd, 311 N.C. at 435, 319 S.E.2d at 207. The suffering experienced by the victim before
death is often noted as a consideration in the review of death penalty cases. See, eg., Boyd, 311 N.C.
408, 319 S.E.2d 189; State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056
(1982); State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State
v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. Barfield, 298
N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979), cerL denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
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ants "presented evidence of social and emotional problems."' 82 The court reviewed the estranged lover and estranged spouse murder cases in which the
83
defendant had received life imprisonment and found them to be dissimilar.
In another case involving a domestic relationship, State v. Noland,84 the
court focused on previous murder cases involving domestic relationships 85 as
well as previous cases that involved "death or serious injury to one or more
people other than the murder victim." '86 Because Noland was similar to these
previous cases the court affirmed the death penalty. A dissent 87 examined the
case with an emphasis on completely different factors. The dissent compared the
case with other mental disturbance cases, noting that the death penalty generally
had not been imposed when mental and emotional disturbance was found to be a
mitigating circumstance 88 and that the death penalty previously had been upheld in domestic murder cases only when the murder was particularly brutal and
the victim had been made to suffer needlessly.8 9 Thus, the supreme court's review of Noland illustrates that a case logically can be compared with previous
cases using completely different variables 90 and that the choice of different comparison variables may lead to an entirely different result.
In State v. Huffstetler,9 1 decided only one month after Noland, the court
inexplicably returned to cursory review. 92 In Huffstetler the court cited no cases
in support of its decision to uphold the death penalty, but simply stated that
the record before us reveals a senseless, unprovoked, exceptionally brutal, prolonged and murderous assault by an adult male upon a sixtyfive year old female.. . . Having compared the defendant and the
crime in this case to others in the pool of similar cases,93we conclude
that the sentence of death. . . is not disproportionate.
A strong dissent criticized the majority's failure to identify the cases on which
the proportionality review was based and alluded to possible constitutional
94
problems raised by such a perfunctory review.
82. Boyd, 311 N.C. at 435, 319 S.E.2d at 207.
83. Id. at 436, 319 S.E.2d at 207.
84. 312 N.C. 1, 320 S.E.2d 642 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1232 (1985). In Noland defendant's estranged wife moved to another state. Defendant threatened to kill his wife's family unless she
returned to North Carolina. When his wife refused to return, defendant carried out his threat,
killing her father and sister and severely injuring her mother. Id. at 4-6, 320 S.E.2d at 645-46.
85. Id. at 24-25, 320 S.E.2d at 656. The court cited Boyd and Martin as comparable domestic
relations murder cases. Id. The court also noted that in all three cases the defendant previously had
threatened the murder victims. Id.
86. Noland, 312 N.C. at 25, 320 S.E.2d at 656.
87. Id. at 25, 320 S.E.2d at 657 (Exum, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 33, 320 S.E.2d at 661 (Exum, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Exum, J., dissenting).
90. See supra note 19.
91. 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1877 (1985). In Huffstetler
defendant brutally beat his mother-in-law to death with a cast iron skillet. Id. at 95-98, 322 S.E.2d
at 113-15. See Note, State v. Huffstetler: Denying Mitigating Instructions in Capital Cases on
Grounds of Relevancy, 63 N.C.L. REv. 1122 (1985).
92. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
93. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. at 118, 322 S.E.2d at 126.
94. Id. at 123, 322 S.E.2d at 129 (Exum, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that:
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Since 1977, the North Carolina Supreme Court has vacated the death penalty in four cases based on a finding of disproportionality. In State v. Jackson95

defendant feigned car trouble and persuaded a passerby to give him a ride to a
local service station. The victim later was found in his car, robbed and murdered. 96 In holding the death sentence disproportionate, the court noted that in
Jackson, unlike the other robbery-murder cases in which the death penalty was
imposed, there was no evidence as to the exact circumstances of the victim's
death and thus no reason to conclude that the murder had been "especially hei-

nous."' 97 The court concluded that this murder did not "rise to the level of those
murders in which we have approved the death sentence upon proportionality
review."98
The court again vacated the death penalty in State v. Bondurant.99 Pivotal

in its decision that the case was not similar to other death penalty cases were
findings that defendant did not "coldly calculate" the commission of the crime,
that it was not a "torturous" murder, and that the murder did not occur while
defendant was perpetrating another felony. 100 The court also noted that in this
case defendant was highly intoxicated, that there apparently was no motive in
the shooting, that defendant and victim were friends, that defendant helped rush
the victim to the hospital immediately after the shooting, and that defendant was
The majority seems to treat the [proportionality] issue as being one exclusively within this
Court's unbridled discretion.
I think the question of proportionality... is more serious than this. It is not a
question for the unbridled discretion of this Court. We do not sit as a super jury on this
issue. Whether a death sentence in any case is disproportionate is a question of law.
Id. In another recent case, State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 324 S.E.2d 250 (1985), the court affirmed
the death penalty after citing previous cases in which the death penalty was affirmed, without a
discussion of relevant factors or relevant life imprisonment cases used in its comparison. In Vereen
defendant strangled, stabbed, and sexually assaulted his 72 year-old victim and sexually assaulted
and stabbed the victim's mentally retarded daughter. Id. at 502-04, 324 S.E.2d at 253-54. The court
concluded that "[c]onsidering both the crime and the defendant, the circumstances of this case fall
well within the class of first-degree murders in which we have previously upheld the penalty of
death." Id. at 518, 324 S.E.2d at 262.
95. 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
96. Id. at 30, 305 S.E.2d at 708.
97. Id. at 46, 305 S.E.2d at 717. Whether the crime is considered "heinous" has been significant in several cases in which the death penalty was imposed. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408,
319 S.E.2d 189 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Craig, 308
N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740, cerL denied, 104 S. Ct. 263 (1983); State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301
S.E.2d 335, cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 202 (1983); State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 197 (1983); State v. Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569, cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1080 (1982); State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); State v.
Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); State v. Rook, 304 N.C.
201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278
S.E.2d 214, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933 (1981); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979),
cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
98. Jackson, 309 N.C. at 46, 305 S.E.2d at 717.
99. 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983). In Bondurant defendant and several acquaintances
had been drinking and driving. The victim, in the back seat of the car, expressed a desire to go
home. Defendant, in the front seat, turned and pointed a gun at the victim's face. Although the
other passengers in the car pleaded with defendant to put down the gun, defendant told the victim,
"You don't believe I'll shoot you, do you?" and fatally shot him. Id. at 677, 309 S.E.2d at 173.
100. Id. at 693, 309 S.E.2d at 182.
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helpful to law enforcement officials. 10 1 The court noted that "[i]n no other capital case among those in our proportionality pool did the defendant express concern for the victim's life or remorse for his action by attempting to secure
immediate medical attention for the deceased." The court stressed, however,
that the expression of remorse was not controlling for purposes of the proportionality review.10 2 The court also noted that the totality of circumstances must
or absence of a
be considered on proportionality review and that the 10"presence
3
particular factor will not necessarily be controlling."
In State v. Hil 0 defendant was convicted of shooting a police officer to
death in the course of an eighty second encounter in which defendant ran from
the policeman, the policeman tackled defendant, and defendant got control of
the officer's gun and shot him. 105 The court found only two previous cases in
which the victim was a police officer and compared Hill to these. On roughly
similar facts one defendant had received the death penalty and the other had
received only life imprisonment. 10 6 Because of this irreconcilable disparity in
sentencing, the court did not find these cases helpful in assessing proportionality
and thus proceeded to compare Hill to the "entire pool of cases in which the
death penalty had been affirmed."' 0 7 Based on this comparison and on the0 cir8
cumstances surrounding the murder, the court vacated the death penalty.
The court employed an interesting method in Hill to conduct its proportionality review. First, the court compared the only two previous cases in which
the defendant had been convicted when an aggravating circumstance had been
10 9
the commission of a "capital felony. . . against a law enforcement officer."'
When this comparison proved fruitless, the court did not try to compare Hill
with cases in the pool based on other nonstatutory variables, such as the existence of a "struggle" in the case or the presence of alcohol. Instead, the court
proceeded to distinguish Hill from dissimilar death penalty cases. The court
grouped these dissimilar cases into five categories: "heinous" murder cases,
cases of torturous crimes, cases in which the crime was part of a violent course
of conduct, felony murder cases, and cases in which the crime had been coldly
101. Id. at 693-94, 309 S.E.2d at 182-83.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 693 n.1, 309 S.E.2d at 182 n.1.
104. 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984).
105. The police officer stopped to check Hill's parked car, which earlier had been observed circling the block. Apparently, Hill was trying to locate the house of an acquaintance. Id. at 467, 319
S.E.2d at 165. Hill did not testify, id. at 467, 319 S.E.2d at 166, so it is unclear why he fled from the

police officer.
106. Id. at 477, 319 S.E.2d at 171. The two other cases in the proportionality pool in which
policemen were the victims were State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983) (defendant
received life imprisonment for the shooting of a police officer during the course of an armed robbery)
and State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981) (death penalty affirmed for defendant
who shot and killed two officers who came to defendant's home to investigate a domestic
disturbance).
107. Hill, 311 N.C. at 477-78, 319 S.E.2d at 171 (The "great disparity of sentences in those two
cases renders any meaningful comparison inthis limited pool virtually impossible.").
108. Id. at 479-80, 319 S.E.2d at 172.
109. Id. at 477, 319 S.E.2d at 171 (construing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(8) (1983)).
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calculated. 110 The court did not explain why cases in these categories were considered sufficiently similar to be appropriate for use in comparative proportional-

ity. Thus, Hill implicitly approved a procedure in which proportionality review
can be conducted primarily by distinguishing dissimilar death penalty cases in

the absence of relevant similar cases with which to compare the case under
review.111
The North Carolina Supreme Court vacated a death sentence on proportionality grounds for the fourth time in State v. Young. 112 In conducting the
110. Id. at 478, 319 S.E.2d at 172.
111. Two strong dissents by Justices Meyer and Mitchell criticized the manner in which the
majority conducted the proportionality review. Justice Meyer argued that the court erred in comparing Hill only with brutal murder cases and cases in which the jury had found more than two
aggravating circumstances because these two types of cases were not sufficiently similar to Hill to
yield relevant comparison. He suggested instead that the court focus on the "targeted victim, the
motive for the killing, and important policy considerations" in the case under review. Id. at 484, 319
S.E.2d at 175 (Meyer, J., dissenting). The killing of a law enforcement officer should warrant the
death penalty "[i]n the absence of compelling circumstances which would militate against a sentence
of death" because "the effective administration ofjustice requires that some murders must indeed be
treated as different 'in kind and not merely in degree from other murders.'" Id. at 485, 319 S.E.2d
at 175 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Hill, 311 N.C. at 488, 319 S.E.2d at 177 (Mitchell, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
Justice Mitchell also argued that the majority's comparison was flawed. Mitchell would have
upheld the jury's death penalty in this case based on the lack of relevant similar cases for comparison
purposes and on public policy supporting effective law enforcement. He noted:
The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official
duties differs in kind and not merely in degree from other murders. When in the performance of his duties, a law enforcement officer is the representative of the public and a symbol
of the rule of law. The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of
his duties in the truest sense strikes a blow at the entire public-the body politic--and is a
direct attack upon the rule of law which must prevail if our society as we know it is to
survive.
A jury having found after solemn consideration that the defendant killed a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties and that this aggravating
circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances and called for the penalty of death,
I do not believe that we should hold the penalty disproportionate.
Id. at 488, 318 S.E.2d at 177 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
The dissents' arguments are erroneous for two reasons. First, the statute clearly requires that
the case under review be compared to similar cases. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
Any analysis that depends primarily on policy considerations instead of similar cases is inappropriate. To rely on policy considerations under these circumstances is to apply the wrong standard of
review: the statute does not require a finding that the death penalty is appropriate for a certain kind
of crime, such as murders of police officers, but instead requires a finding that the case is sufficiently
similar to other cases in the comparison pool to warrant imposition of the death penalty.
Second, the court may use its discretion to give the factors in a proportionality review different
weight, depending on the facts and circumstances in each case. An analysis that adopts a single
factor as controlling for comparison purposes, however, is erroneous under the Supreme Court's
prohibition against any "automatic" imposition of the death penalty without consideration of all the
facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304
(1976). In Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633 (1977) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court
held that a Louisiana statute imposing a mandatory death penalty for the murder of a police officer
was unconstitutional. The Court recognized the state's special interest in protecting public servants,
but insisted that other circumstances must be taken into consideration before the imposition of a
death sentence will be deemed constitutional. The Court did not require that these circumstances be
"compelling." Id. at 637; cf. Hill, 311 N.C. 485, 319 S.E.2d at 175 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
112. 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985). In Young defendant suggested that he and two accomplices go to the victim's house to rob and kill him. The three men gained entrance to the victim's house on a pretext, whereupon defendant stabbed the victim twice in the chest, and one
accomplice stabbed the victim several times in the back. Id. at 672, 325 S.E.2d at 184.
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proportionality review the court focused on the two statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury: murder committed for pecuniary gain, 1 13 and
murder committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of an armed
robbery. 114 The court cited twenty-three robbery-murder cases in which the
jury sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment and five robbery-murder cases
in which the defendant was sentenced to death. 1 15 The court wished to make it
"abundantly clear," however, that the mere difference in the number of cases in
which life imprisonment was imposed and the number of cases in which death
was imposed was not dispositive in determining proportionality.1 1 6 The court
found the death penalty to be disproportionate because "[tihe facts presented by
this appeal more closely resemble those cases in which the jury recommended
1 17
life imprisonment than those in which the defendant was sentenced to death."
The court then specifically compared Young with three cases: two in which life
imprisonment was imposed for robbery-murder and one in which the death penalty was vacated on proportionality grounds. 118 The court noted that in the two
life imprisonment cases, the juries had found four and six aggravating circumstances (including, in both cases, the two aggravating circumstances found in
Young) and still had declined to impose the death penalty. 119 The court also
compared Young to Jackson, in which the death penalty was vacated on proportionality grounds,' 2 0 and found the two cases similar. 121 Finally, the court examined a group of robbery-murder cases in which the defendant received the
death penalty and found the cases dissimilar. 122 This finding of dissimilarity
was based on the facts that the Young murder was not as "egregious" as the
murders in the comparison cases, that the defendant in Young had not been
engaged in a course of conduct which included the commission of violence
against another person, and that the murder in Young was "not especially hei123
nous, atrocious or cruel."'
The proportionality review conducted in Young clearly is superior to the
perfunctory review conducted by the court in many previous death penalty
cases. The court cited not only relevant cases in which the death penalty had
been affirmed but also relevant life imprisonment cases and a case in which the
death penalty had been vacated on proportionality grounds. In addition to citing these cases, the court discussed the factors in the cases that made them relevant for comparison purposes. This approach not only evidences a thorough
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 690, 325 S.E.2d at 192. See N.C. GEN.

STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (1983).
Young, 312 N.C. at 690, 325 S.E.2d at 192. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (1983).
Young, 312 N.C. at 687-88 n.1, 325 S.E.2d at 192 n.l.
Id. at 688, 325 S.E.2d at 193.

117. Id.
118. Id.at 689-90, 325 S.E.2d at 193-94. The court compared Young to State v. Jackson, 309
N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983) (death penalty vacated on proportionality grounds); State v. Whisenant, 308 N.C. 791, 303 S.E.2d 784 (1983) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment); and State v.
Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982) (defendant sentenced to life imprisonment).
119. Young, 312 N.C. at 689-90, 325 S.E.2d at 193-94.
120. State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).
121. Young, 312 N.C. at 690, 325 S.E.2d at 194.

122. Id.
123. Id.
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consideration by the court of the particular facts and circumstances of the case

under review in comparison to the facts and circumstances of prior cases, but
also gives the bar necessary guidance as to which factors are important in com-

parative proportionality review.
A clear conclusion emerges from an analysis of cases in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court has applied the comparative proportionality review to
uphold or vacate a death penalty. Although the court recognizes the importance

of a meaningful proportionality review, 124 its performance has been strikingly
inconsistent. The cases in which the court has conducted an in-depth analysis1 of
25
the similarities of both the relevant death penalty and life imprisonment cases

sharply contrast with the cases in which the court has applied a perfunctory

review as a mere formality in affirming a death sentence. 1 26 Although the court

has clearly indicated that it does not feel compelled to cite every relevant case
from the proportionality pool in conducting its review, 127 at least some guidance
is necessary in every decision. Without any analysis of, or citations to, the controlling cases, the bar can only speculate about the factors relevant to sentencing
decisions at the appellate level.128

In summary, the court has recognized that certain factors are important for
comparison purposes in proportionality review. These include the statutory aggravating 129 and mitigating'

30

circumstances, the general type of crime,131 the

132

number of victims involved, the defendant's character, background, physical
and emotional condition, 133 the manner in which the victim died, 134 and
whether the murder was especially heinous or bloodthirsty. 135 The court also

has held that special policy considerations may apply in witness elimination and
police murder cases. 1 36 Overall, the court has tended to compare cases under
124. "[A]ny imposition of the death penalty. . . should be searchingly reviewed. . . to insure
the absence of unfairness, arbitrariness or caprice in the result." State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 63,
257 S.E.2d 597, 610 (1979). "[W]e consider the responsibility placed on us by [N.C. GEN. STAT.]
§ 15A-2000(d)(2) as serious as any responsibility placed upon an appellate court." State v. Rook,
304 N.C. 201, 236, 283 S.E.2d 732, 753 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038 (1982).
125. See, e.g., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C.
632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
126. See, eg., State v. Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984).
127. State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 81, 301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 202 (1983).
128. See State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 61, 292 S.E.2d 203, 254 (Exum, J., dissenting) ("The bar is
entitled to know upon what basis we are conducting the proportionality review .... We should not
continue to keep the manner in which we perform this duty shrouded in mystery."), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1056 (1982).
129. See, eg., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465,
319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
130. See e.g., State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984); State v. McDougall, 308
N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 197 (1983).
131. See, e.g., State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984);
State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
132. See, e.g., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Noland, 312 N.C. 1,
320 S.E.2d 642 (1984), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 1232 (1985).
133. See, eg., State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
134. See, eg., State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984).
135. See, eg., State v. Young, 312 N.C. 699, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465,
319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984).
136. See, eg., State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Maynard, 311 N.C. 1,
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review with relevant death penalty cases more often than with relevant life imprisonment cases. The court, however, has not developed a framework for de-

ciding which variables should be controlling for comparison purposes or how
these variables should be chosen for any particular case. This lack of a consis-

tent approach to comparative proportionality review is arguably an unconstitutional exercise of "unbridled discretion" by the court in affirming sentencing

decisions in capital cases. On the other hand, the court must not go too far in
between cases becreating rigid guidelines by which to assess the similarities
137
cause such inflexibility also is constitutionally suspect.
There are two compelling reasons for the continued development and application of a meaningful comparative proportionality review. First, proportionality review provides a vital safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty by ensuring that the penalty will not be imposed

on a defendant when there "is no principled way to distinguish [the] case, in
which the death penalty [would be] imposed, from the many cases in which it
was not." 138 Second, because it requires analysis and comparison of both death
penalty and life imprisonment cases, proportionality review is the only effective

way for the reviewing court to be certain that its sentencing decisions reflect
contemporary attitudes about which crimes and which defendants warrant the

death penalty. 139 The North Carolina Supreme Court has made tremendous
progress in giving the statutorily mandated proportionality review depth and

substance. A clearly defined, consistent framework 1'4 for approaching the comparative analysis, however, still is needed as an additonal safeguard in the appli-

cation of the death penalty. 141 In developing such a framework the court should
emphasize the need to consider more life imprisonment cases as a part of the

comparative review. Case comparisons must be full, multifaceted examinations
301 S.E.2d 308, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 363 (1984); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183
(1981).
137. "IN]either unbridled, unguided discretion, nor the absence of all discretion in the imposition of the death penalty is constitutionally permissible." State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 58, 257
S.E.2d 597, 607 (1979).
138. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980).
139. See supra note 4.
140. Such a framework could emphasize the totality of circumstances approach articulated in
Bondurant, see text accompanying note 103, while setting forth a specific method of review. For
example, the court might first look to the proportionality pool for cases in which the aggravating and
mitigating factors are similar. Next, the court might examine cases in the pool of the same general
type as the case under review, such as similar domestic relations murder cases or similar struggle
cases. Third, the court could compare the case under review with other cases on any variables
deemed relevant in the particular case, such as intoxication or age of the defendant. Last, the court
could balance these comparisons in a totality of circumstances approach to decide whether the death
penalty should be affirmed.
141. Such a framework becomes more critical as the pool, already containing 88 cases, continues
to grow, making relevant comparisons absent any analytical framework extremely unwieldly. The
court has recognized that "[a]n analysis which involves. . . inquiry into the endless combinations,
variations, permutations, and nuances that an indepth review of every case in the pool would yield
would be a fruitless endeavor." State v. Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 519, 324 S.E.2d 250, 263 (1985).
Thus a framework is imperative to help narrow the pool of cases to be compared and to focus the
court's attention on the particular factors relevant to similarity comparisons in each case. Without
some method of limiting the number of cases to be compared in the proportionality review, the
burden imposed by the ever-growing pool of cases may encourage the court to return to the perfunctory comparative proportionality review that characterized the review of earlier death penalty cases.
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of the similarities and dissimilarities between relevant cases. Although there can
be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which case governmental authority
should be used to impose death," 142 the court must attempt to strike a balance
between unbridled discretion and inflexibility to ensure effective comparative
proportionality review.
CAROLYN SIEVERS REED

142. Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871, 881 (1984).

1985]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

1163

APPENDIX
These 88 cases comprise the proportionality pool, see supra notes 17-19 and
accompanying text. Included are all applicable cases tried under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000 (1983) from 1977 to January 30, 1985. Subsequent case histories are omitted in the interest of space.
This pool was compiled in part from records kept in the offices of the North
Carolina Supreme Court. The cases are divided into five categories for ease of
reference.
I.
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State
State

v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.
v.

DEATH SENTENCE AFFIRMED

Vereen, 312 N.C. 499, 324 S.E.2d 250 (1985)
Huffstetler, 312 N.C. 92, 322 S.E.2d 110 (1984)
Noland, 312 N.C. 1, 320 S.E.2d 642 (1984)
Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 319 S.E.2d 591 (1984)
Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 319 S.E.2d 189 (1984)
Maynard, 311 N.C. 1, 316 S.E.2d 197 (1984)
Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 314 S.E.2d 493 (1984)
Craig, 308 N.C. 446, 302 S.E.2d 740 (1983)
Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 301 S.E.2d 335 (1983)
McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 301 S.E.2d 308 (1983)
Brown, 306 N.C. 151, 293 S.E.2d 569 (1982)
Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 292 S.E.2d 203 (1982)
Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 292 S.E.2d 264 (1982)
Williams, 305 N.C. 656, 292 S.E.2d 243 (1982)
Taylor, 304 N.C. 249, 283 S.E.2d 761 (1981)
Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981)
Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981)
Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 278 S.E.2d 214 (1981)
Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981)
McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 271 S.E.2d 286 (1980)
Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979)

II.

DEATH SENTENCE VACATED ON PROPORTIONALITY GRouNDs

State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985)
State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984)
State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983)
State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983)

III.
State
State
State
State

v.
v.
v.
v.

DEATH SENTENCE VACATED FOR ERROR

Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 321 S.E.2d 837 (1984)
Beal, 311 N.C. 555, 319 S.E.2d 557 (1984)
Stanley, 310 N.C. 332, 312 S.E.2d 393 (1983)
Small, 301 N.C. 407, 272 S.E.2d 128 (1980)
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IV.

LIFE SENTENCE-JURY RECOMMENDATION

State v. Payne, 312 N.C. 647, 325 S.E.2d 205 (1985)
State v. Harold, 312 N.C. 787, 325 S.E.2d 219 (1985)
State v. McCray, 312 N.C. 519, 324 S.E.2d 606 (1985)
State v. Hannah, 312 N.C. 286, 322 S.E.2d 148 (1984)
State v. Withers, 311 N.C. 699, 319 S.E.2d 211 (1984)
State v. Wilson, 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46 (1984)
State v. Price, 310 N.C. 596, 313 S.E.2d 556 (1984)
State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984)
State v. Bauguss, 310 N.C. 259, 311 S.E.2d 248 (1984)
State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 311 S.E.2d 256 (1984)
State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 311 S.E.2d 540 (1984)
State v. Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 310 S.E.2d 587 (1983)
State v. Martin, 309 N.C. 465, 308 S.E.2d 277 (1983)
State v. Booker, 309 N.C. 446, 306 S.E.2d 771 (1983)
State v. Bare, 309 N.C. 122, 305 S.E.2d 513 (1983)
State v. Abdullah, 309 N.C. 63, 306 S.E.2d 100 (1983)
State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 305 S.E.2d 685 (1983)
State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983)
State v. Hill, 308 N.C. 382, 302 S.E.2d 202 (1983)
State v. Tysor, 307 N.C. 679, 300 S.E.2d 366 (1983)
State v. Barnett, 307 N.C. 608, 300 S.E.2d 340 (1983)
State v. Woods, 307 N.C. 213, 297 S.E.2d 574 (1982)
State v. Brock, 305 N.C. 532, 290 S.E.2d 566 (1982)
State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 290 S.E.2d 574 (1982)
State v. Fox, 305 N.C. 280, 287 S.E.2d 887 (1982)
State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982)
State v. Lake, 305 N.C. 143, 286 S.E.2d 541 (1982)
State v. Marshall, 304 N.C. 167, 282 S.E.2d 422 (1981)
State v. Adcox, 303 N.C. 133, 277 S.E.2d 398 (1981)
State v. Miller, 302 N.C. 572, 276 S.E.2d 417 (1981)
State v. Hawkins, 302 N.C. 364, 275 S.E.2d 172 (1981)
State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1, 273 S.E.2d 273 (1981)
State v. Smith, 301 N.C. 695, 272 S.E.2d 852 (1981)
State v. Moore, 301 N.C. 262, 271 S.E.2d 242 (1980)
State v. Clark, 301 N.C. 176, 270 S.E.2d 425 (1980)
State v. King, 301 N.C. 186, 270 S.E.2d 98 (1980)
State v. Crawford, 301 N.C. 212, 270 S.E.2d 102 (1980)
State v. Weimer, 300 N.C. 642, 268 S.E.2d 216 (1980)
State v. Clark, 300 N.C. 116, 265 S.E.2d 204 (1980)
State v. Franks, 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980)
State v. Horton, 299 N.C. 690, 263 S.E.2d 745 (1980)
State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 263 S.E.2d 768 (1980)
State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1980)
State v. Ferdinando, 298 N.C. 737, 260 S.E.2d 423 (1979)
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Atkinson, 298 N.C. 673, 259 S.E.2d 858 (1979)
Heavener, 298 N.C. 541, 259 S.E.2d 227 (1979)
Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 259 S.E.2d 502 (1979)
Crews, 296 N.C. 607, 252 S.E.2d 745 (1979)
LIFE SENTENCE-IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE BECAUSE
JURY UNABLE TO AGREE

State v. McDonald, 312 N.C. 264, 321 S.E.2d 849 (1984)
State v. Jenkins, 311 N.C. 194, 317 S.E.2d 345 (1984)
State v. Heptinstall, 309 N.C. 231, 306 S.E.2d 109 (1983)
State v. Whisenant, 308 N.C. 791, 303 S.E.2d 784 (1983)
State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 302 S.E.2d 164 (1983)
State v. Norwood, 303 N.C. 473, 279 S.E.2d 550 (1981)
State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235, 278 S.E.2d 200 (1981)
State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 277 S.E.2d 410 (1981)
State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 268 S.E.2d 800 (1980)
State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 261 S.E.2d 803 (1980)
State v. Carter, 296 N.C. 344, 250 S.E.2d 263 (1979)

Property Settlement or Separation Agreement: Perpetuating the
Confusion-Buffington v. Buffington
Domestic law in North Carolina has changed dramatically since 1867 when

the North Carolina Supreme Court recoiled at the idea of a "separation agreement," which "would virtually annul our marriage laws, and make the relation

of husband and wife a mere trade or bargain, dependent upon their caprice." 1
Over time, the courts and the legislature have come to accept as valid separation
agreements between spouses.? In 1981 North Carolina joined other commonlaw states by adopting a system for equitable distribution of property upon divorce.3 Equitable distribution statutes reflect the growing view that marriage is
a partnership, and that if a marriage ends, a fair and comprehensive system
4
should govern the economic division of property.

In Buffington v. Buffington 5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals tried to
continue North Carolina's progression from outdated common law to modem
policies governing marriage.6 The court interpreted North Carolina General

Statutes section 50-20(d) 7 of the equitable distribution statute to reject the former public policy rule that a property agreement between spouses was invalid
unless the parties were actually separated.8 In its brief opinion, the Buffington

court opened a Pandora's box of problems for drafters of marital agreements by
committing the common mistake of ignoring the distinction between "property

settlements" and "separation agreements." 9 In addition, the court failed to consider the potential conflict between its holding in Buffington and other recent
1. Collins v. Collins, 62 N.C. (Phil. Eq.) 153, 159 (1867).
2. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
3. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (1984)). Mississippi is the only common-law property state that has not yet adopted
an equitable distribution system. See Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A
Word of Caution on ContractualFreedom, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399, 1423 n.103 (1984). Eight states
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Washington) have community
property laws. See Family Law I: PropertyDivision upon Divorce, 1983 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 973,
973-74 n.3 (1984).
4. Sharp, supra note 3, at 1455; see also Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North
Carolina: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 61 N.C.L. REv. 247, 247 (1983) (Equitable distribution systems
reflect the concept of marriage as "a shared enterprise to which both spouses make valuable
contributions.").
5. 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97 (1984).
6. rd. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100. Applying rules of statutory construction, the court held that
the legislature had "manifested a clear intent to change the former [common-law] rule." Id.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1984) provides:
Before, during and after marriage the parties may by written agreement, duly executed and
acknowledged in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 52-10 and 52-10.1, or by a written
agreement valid in the jurisdiction where executed, provide for distribution of the marital
property in a manner deemed by the parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be
binding on the parties.
8. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100. The court used the term "property
settlement" in its discussion of the former common-law rule. For a criticism of this phrasing, see
infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina decisions. 10
The facts of Buffington were relatively simple. The Buffingtons were married on June 13, 1970.11 They subsequently experienced marital problems and
executed a separation agreement on November 12, 1981.12 After signing the
agreement, both spouses continued to reside in the marital home until November 30, 1981.13 Under the terms of the separation agreement, Mrs. Buffington
was to convey her rights in five real estate properties to Mr. Buffington in exchange for Mr. Buffington's payment of $60,000.14 On December 10, 1982, Mr.
Buffington filed suit for divorce and specific performance of the separation agreement. 15 Mrs. Buffington did not contest the divorce, but counterclaimed for
equitable distribution under section 50-20, alleging that the separation agreement was void. 16 After obtaining an absolute divorce, both parties moved for
The trial court found
summary judgment on defendant wife's counterclaims.
7
the agreement valid and denied defendant's motion.'
On appeal 18 defendant based her argument on long standing public policy
that voided a separation agreement unless the parties were separated at the time
they executed the agreement or planned to separate immediately after its execution. 19 Defendant argued that by referring to North Carolina General Statutes
sections 52-10 and 52-10.1, the requirements in section 50-20(d) implicitly affirmed existing public policy rules governing separation agreements. 20 Plaintiff
argued that the clear language of section 50-20(d) explicitly approved property
10. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
11. Record at 1.
12. Id. The parties captioned their contract of November 12, 1981, as a "Separation Agreement." Id. at 4.
13. In the original complaint, Mr. Buffington, plaintiff, alleged that he "allowed" defendant to
remain in the house until she made other arrangements. Id. at 1. Defendant described the 18-day
period between November 12 and November 30, 1981, quite differently. She mentioned common
displays of affection and one occasion of sleeping in the same bedroom. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14.
14. Record at 4-8. Defendant also waived any rights she might have had for alimony or support payments from plaintiff. Id. at 13.
15. In the alternative, plaintiff claimed damages for defendant's breach of the agreement. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 484, 317 S.E.2d at 98.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Before reaching the merits of the case, the court of appeals first addressed some procedural
issues. Id. at 485-86, 317 S.E.2d at 98-99. The court noted that the denial of summary judgment
was a proper order for appeal because it disposed of an issue that affected defendant's substantial
rights. The court also recognized that defendant had failed to compile her record for appeal in the
proper form. Because of "the importance of the issues presented," however, the court used its discretionary power to consider the appeal. Id.
19. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8-11. See 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 4, at 10 (rev. ed. 1983). Defendant also raised the question whether
the parties had actually separated before November 30, 1981. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 1114. This issue, however, was a question of fact and would not have been properly raised in defendant's summary judgment motion.
20. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14-19; see also Note, The North CarolinaAct for Equitable
Distribution of Marital Property, 18 WAKE FoREsr L. REv. 735, 738 (1982) (Under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(d), "the key to establishing a valid separation agreement is physical separation.").
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10 (1984) provides, in part, that "contracts between husband and wife not
inconsistent with public policy are valid." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1984) is a general authorization for married couples to execute separation agreements not inconsistent with public policy.
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settlements without requiring immediate separation of the spouses.2 1 Plaintiff
also argued that his interpretation of section 50-20(d) was consistent with existing law on property distribution. 2 2 The court of appeals accepted plaintiff's
basic interpretation of section 50-20(d) and held that "the public policy of our
state, as expressed by G.S. § 50-20(d), permits spouses to execute a property
settlement at any time, regardless of whether they separate immediately thereafter or not."'23 Based on this finding, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's
summary judgment motion and barred her from equitable distribution of the
marital property.24
The common-law fiction that a wife's identity merged with her husband's
and made the couple "one person" initially prevented judicial acceptance of any
contract between a husband and wife. 25 Although by the late nineteenth century courts generally allowed married parties to contract with each other, a large
degree of judicial hostility to separation agreements remained. 26 In the 1912
case of Archbell v. Archbell,27 the North Carolina Supreme Court finally held
28
that separation agreements between spouses were not void as a matter of law.
The court held, however, that separation agreements were valid only under certain conditions. The Archbell case established the rule that separation of the
parties must occur prior to or immediately after the agreement's execution for
the agreement to be valid. 2 9 This requirement reflected the widespread disapproval of agreements facilitating divorce and agreements contingent upon divorce. 30 This public policy, which voided any agreement made in contemplation
of divorce and without separation, prevailed in most states throughout most of
21. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 6-9. Plaintiff argued that the references in § 50-20(d) to
§§ 50-10 and 50-10.1 only incorporated technical requirements for properly executed agreements.
Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's argument consistently ignored the distinction
between separation agreements and property settlements. Id. at 9; see infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text
23. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
24. Id.
25. See 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 188, at 465 (4th ed. 1980); Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: SpousalSupport, PrivateAgreements, and the State, 59 N.C.L. REV.819,
827 (1981); see also Comment, An Analysis of the Enforceability of Marital Contracts, 47 N.C.L.
REv. 815, 816-17 (1969) (theory behind unity of married couple was fear that the husband was a
dominating influence on the wife).
26. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 828.
27. 158 N.C. 409, 74 S.E. 327 (1912).
28. Id. at 413, 74 S.E. at 329.
29. Id.; see 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 188, at 469-70. InSmith v. Smith, 225 N.C. 189, 194, 34
S.E.2d 148, 151 (1948), the court restated the Archbell requirements for a valid separation agreement:
(1) Existing separation or separation immediately following the execution of the deed,
(2) Some adequate reason for executing a separation agreement other than the parties' "mere volition,"
(3) Circumstances surrounding the execution which were fair and reasonable to the wife,
(4) Statutory formalities.
30. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 830-31; 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 823 (1983);
see also Matthews v. Matthews, 2 N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1968) ("mT1he law now
looks with disfavor upon an agreement which will encourage or bring about a destruction of the
home."). The requirement of immediate separation also meets the need for consideration in a valid
separation agreement. 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 19, § 4, at 6.
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the twentieth century. 3 1 Following a 1970 Florida case,3 2 courts in many jurisdictions began to apply the "contemplating divorce" standard more loosely to
antenuptial agreements and to agreements made during the marriage but without immediate separation. 3 3 In North Carolina, courts tended to invalidate only
the more outrageous contracts on the basis of contemplating divorce. 34 The
policy was not abandoned35 however, and the requirement of immediate separation for a valid separation agreement remained entrenched in North Carolina
law.36 Thus, although the law eventually favored separation agreements, 3 7 until
Buffington it still forbad separation agreements executed without immediate
38
separation.
Throughout the development of law defining and enforcing marital con-

tracts, courts and advocates have repeatedly confused the terms "separation
agreement" and "property settlement."'3 9 The distinctions between a true separation agreement and a true property settlement are simple. A separation agree-

ment is a contract between spouses providing for marital support rights and is
executed while the parties are separated or are planning to separate immedi-

ately.4 ' A property settlement provides for a division of real and personal property held by the spouses. 4 ' The parties may enter a property settlement at any
time, regardless of whether they contemplate separation or divorce. 42 The term
"postnuptial agreements" generally is used to describe property division con-

tracts or property transfers executed by spouses who have no intention of separating.43 North Carolina follows the practice of most states and treats

"separation agreements" and "property settlements" differently in various

31. See Klarman,MaritalAgreements in ContemplationofDivorce, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF.397,
397-98 (1977); Weitzman, Legal Regulation ofMarriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. Rlv.
1169, 1259 (1974).
32. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384-85 (Fla. 1970).
33. See 2 R. LEE, supranote 25, § 183.1, at 446-48; Klarman, supra note 31, at 399-402; Note,
supra note 20, at 737; 24 Am.JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 825 (1983).
34. Sharp, supra note 25, at 831-32; see also Howland v. Stitzer, 236 N.C. 230, 72 S.E.2d 583
(1952) (applying New York law, court held that agreement intended to smooth litigation process
would not be per se void for contemplating divorce).
35. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 147, 157, 319 S.E.2d 315, 321 (1984) ("It
is well established that a promise or contract looking to the future separation of a husband and wife
will not be sustained.").
36. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 188, at 470-71; 1 A. LnDEY, supra note 19, § 4, at 10-11;
Sharp, supra note 25, at 831-32; Merritt, ChangingMaritalRights and Duties By Contrac" Legal
Obstacles in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FoREsr L. REV. 85, 99 (1977).
37. Sharp, supra note 25, at 830.
38. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
39. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 826-27.
40. See id. at 826.
41. Id.; 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187.
42. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 463-64; Sharp, supra note 25, at 826; 24 AM. JUR. 2D,
Divorce and Separation § 817 (1983); see also Shoaf v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1977)
(lower courts misled by assuming that support payments and property settlement fell into same
category); Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117 S.E.2d 826 (1961) (noting clear distinction between
consideration of property settlement and alimony provisions).
43. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 186; 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 19, §§ 3-4. Antenuptial
agreements-agreements in which prospective spouses fix their respective rights in each other's
property prior to their marriage-fall under the same policy guidelines as postnuptial agreements.
See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, §§ 179, 186; Note, supra note 20, at 737.
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circumstances."4
Although the substance and analysis of a separation agreement and a prop-

erty settlement should be distinct, the provisions often are confused when contained in a single document.4 5 Usually the parties will refer to the entire
document as a "separation agreement," even though its provisions cover both
support rights and property rights. 46 Gradually, North Carolina courts have
developed rules distinguishing between the support provisions and the property

settlement provisions found in most separation agreements. These distinctions
have been particularly important with regard to issues of modification 47 and

reconciliation. 48 The North Carolina Supreme Court has recently addressed
both issues. 49

Prior to 1983 North Carolina courts had a settled approach to dealing with
the modifiability of provisions in a separation agreement.5 0 First, courts distinguished between court-approved agreements, which they treated as contracts,
and court-adopted agreements, which they treated as judgments.5 1 If a court44. See Shoafv. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972); Stanley v. Cox, 253 N.C. 620, 117
S.E.2d 826 (1961). The major technical distinctions between the effect of a separation agreement and
a property settlement are as follows: (1) Tax Consequences-support payments made pursuant to a
separation agreement are considered as alimony and are deductible for supporting spouse, but payments in property settlement are not; (2) Support payments in separation agreement normally will
not survive past the death of either spouse, but payments or conveyances in property settlement
usually will survive either party's death; (3) Alimony payments in a separation agreement will not
be discharged in bankruptcy but property settlement liabilities may be discharged; (4) Reconciliation and resumed cohabitation of parties will rescind executory provisions of a separation agreement
but will have no effect on property settlements. See 1 A. LINDEY, supra note 19, § 3, at 15-17;
Sharp, supra note 25, at 826 n.38; 24 Am.JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 817 (1983).
45. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 826-27; see also 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 461 (common practice upon marriage breakup for parties to make contract covering every subject upon which
they can agree).
46. 2 IL LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 462. The Buffingtons' agreement covered everything
from a waiver of alimony to property division to custody of their golden retriever. Record at 4-14,
Buffington.
47. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
49. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983) (modifiability ofseparation agreements); Murphy v. Murphy, 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1977) (effect of reconciliation on separation agreements).
50. See 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 462-63. But cf. Walters v. Walters, 307 N.C. 381,
386, 298 S.E.2d 338, 341-42 (1983) (recognizing "great confusion" in area of family law dealing with
separation agreements presented to the court). Until the Walters decision, a "consent judgment" in
North Carolina was "basically nothing more than a private contract between [spouses] that ha[d]
been entered upon the records of, and received the stamp of approval from a court." Sharp, supra
note 25, at 826.
51. Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 183, 287 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1982); White v. White, 296 N.C.
661, 665, 252 S.E.2d 698, 700-01 (1979); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 69-70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243
(1964); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 708, 245 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1978). In general, the relationship
between a separation agreement and the divorce decree of a court produces one of three results.
First, the agreement may survive the decree as a private contract. The parties can enforce the agreement as they would enforce any contract and can modify the terms of the agreement only if both
parties consent. Second, the parties can present their agreement to the court for approval. These
court-approved agreements also leave the parties with basic contract rights. The court cannot modify the agreement without consent of both parties, but court approval does have res judieata effect as
to the absence of fraud and the fairness of the agreement. Last, the agreement may be adopted by
the court so that the parties' contract rights are extinguished and the court replaces the contract
provisions with its own judgment. Merger or adoption are the common terms used to describe this
relationship. Support provisions that are merged or adopted by the court are subject to modification
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adopted agreement contained separable and independent provisions, a court
could not modify the property division terms, but could modify the alimony
provisions.5 2 If the support provisions and the property distribution provisions
constituted reciprocal consideration for each other, the court-adopted agreement
became "integrated." 5 3 No provision of an integrated agreement was subject to
modification without the parties' consent.5 4 Last, if a court could not determine
be integrated, the court would
whether the parties intended that their agreement
55
presume that the provisions were separable.
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently modified these well-settled
rules. In Walters v. Walters56 the supreme court turned settled law on its head
in an attempt to "simplify" the issues surrounding the modifiability of separation agreements.5 7 The decision in Walters established a new rule: Any separation agreement brought before a court loses its status as a private contract and
becomes a judgment of the court. 58 Thus, all provisions of court-approved and
court-adopted separation agreements are now subject to modification 5regardless
9
of whether the support and property division sections are reciprocal.
Another shift in the law governing marital agreements involved the effect of
reconciliation and the effect of cohabitation by separated spouses on the validity
of separation agreements. The well-established rule in North Carolina had been
that "where a husband and wife enter into a separation agreement and thereafter
become reconciled and renew their marital relations, the agreement is termiby the court without the consent of both parties. See W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESmC
RELATIONS 560 (3d ed. 1978); Sharp, supra note 25, at 848.
52. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 666, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979); Holsomback v. Holsomback, 273 N.C. 728, 732, 161 S.E.2d 99, 102-03 (1968); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C. 67, 70, 136
S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 708-09, 245 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1978); 2 R.
LEE, supra note 25, § 187, at 462-63; Sharp, supra note 25, at 863. See Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C.
177, 183-84, 287 S.E.2d 840, 844 (1982).
53. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 851-52.
54. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661,666-67, 252 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1979); Bunn v. Bunn, 262 N.C.
67, 70, 136 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1964); Britt v. Britt, 36 N.C. App. 705, 711, 245 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1978);
see Sharp, supra note 25, at 851-52, 863.
55. White v. White, 296 N.C. 661, 672, 252 S.E.2d 698, 704 (1979); see Rowe v. Rowe, 305
N.C. 177, 184, 287 S.E.2d 840, 845 (1982); Walters v. Walters, 54 N.C. App. 545, 550, 284 S.E.2d
151, 155 (1981), rev'd, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983); see also Sharp, supra note 25, at 863-64
(Although it is easy to indicate that provisions in a separation agreement are intended to be separable, "[u]nfortunately these distinctions are frequently not made.").
56. 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983).
57. Id. at 386, 298 S.E.2d at 342.
58. Id.
59. Id. The court explained that this was not a harsh rule because parties could protect the
contract status of their separation agreement by not bringing it before the court. Id. In a case
decided the same day as Walters, the supreme court made it clear that the enforceability of a separation agreement through the court's contempt power depended on its inclusion in a court-ordered
judgment. Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 407, 298 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1983). Even a separation agreement kept out of court initially could become part of a court order for specific performance
and could then be enforced by contempt proceedings. Id. at 407 n.1, 298 S.E.2d at 350 n.1; see also
Harris v. Harris, 307 N.C. 684, 300 S.E.2d 369 (1983) (court can hold person in contempt for past
violation of specific performance order); Moore v. Moore, 297 N.C. 14, 252 S.E.2d 735 (1979) (wife
given remedy of specific performance for husband's failure to make payments required by separation
agreement); Erhart v. Erhart, 67 N.C. App. 189, 312 S.E.2d 534 (1984) (court cannot alter terms of
private agreement between spouses but it can alter amount ordered in specific performance remedy).
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nated for every purpose insofar as it remains executory." 60 In practice, reconcil-

iation affects property settlement provisions differently from support provisions
in a separation agreement. Because the parties usually execute a property settle-

ment provision or a conveyance of property shortly after signing the separation
agreement, a subsequent reconciliation will not affect such "executed" provi-

sions.6 1 In a 1976 case, In re Estate ofAdamee,62 the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that "reconciliation" occurred when the couple resumed living to-

63
gether in their marital home and held themselves out as husband and wife.
Two years afterAdamee, in Murphy v. Murphy,64 the supreme court reaffirmed a

1932 case holding that sexual intercourse between separated spouses will have

the effect of a reconciliation "whether the resumption of sexual relations was
'casual', 'isolated', or otherwise." 65 The Murphy holding made North Carolina

the only state to define reconciliation in terms of either living together or engaging in sex.

66

While the North Carolina courts struggled to deal with the definition and
effects of separation agreement provisions, the North Carolina General Assembly made a major change in property division law by passing an equitable distribution act.67 Section (d) of the act allows parties to make their own property

distribution agreement "before, during and after marriage." 68 Such property
settlements bar application of the equitable distribution act so long as the parties
60. Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 261, 90 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1955); see Murphy v. Murphy, 295
N.C. 390, 394, 245 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1978); In re Estate of Adamee, 291 N.C. 386, 391, 230 S.E.2d
541, 545 (1976); Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C. 630, 634, 151 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1966); Joyner v. Joyner,
264 N.C. 27, 31, 140 S.E.2d 714, 717-18 (1965); Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409, 415, 74 S.E.
327, 330 (1912); Williamson v. Williamson, 66 N.C. App. 315, 317, 311 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1984);
Whitt v. Whitt, 32 N.C. App. 125, 129, 230 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1977); Potts v. Potts, 24 N.C. App.
673, 674, 211 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1975); 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 200; Sharp, supra note 25, at 839.
61. See Tilley v. Tilley, 268 N.C. 630, 634, 151 S.E.2d 592, 594 (1966); Joyner v. Joyner, 264
N.C. 27, 31, 140 S.E.2d 714, 718 (1965); Jones v. Lewis, 243 N.C. 259, 261, 90 S.E.2d 547, 549
(1952); Whitt v. Whitt, 32 N.C. App. 125, 129, 230 S.E.2d 793, 795-96 (1977); Potts v. Potts, 24
N.C. App. 673, 674,211 S.E.2d 815, 816 (1975); 2 R. LEE, supra note 25, § 200, at 518. The court of
appeals has held that a spouse cannot change an otherwise fully executed property provision into an
executory provision simply by avoiding compliance with the executed agreement. Whitt v. Whitt, 32
N.C. App. 125, 130, 230 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1977).
62. 291 N.C. 386, 230 S.E.2d 541 (1976).
63. Id. at 392-93, 230 S.E.2d at 546. The wife had returned to the home and lived there continuously from January through August 1974. Id.; see also Dudley v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d
489 (1945) (no separation occurred when spouses ceased sexual relations but continued to live together in the same house for two years).
64. 295 N.C. 390, 245 S.E.2d 693 (1978).
65. Id. at 397, 245 S.E.2d at 698. In support of its ruling, the court stated, "'otherwise, the
separation agreement would degenerate into a mere cloak or device by means of which the husband
would escape the responsibilities imposed by the marital status and yet be free to partake of such
privileges as he chose to enjoy.'" Id. at 396-97, 245 S.E.2d at 698 (quoting State v. Gossett, 203
N.C. 641, 644, 166 S.E. 754, 755 (1932)).
66. Sharp, supranote 25, at 842. Professor Sharp points out that the result of North Carolina's
unique "either/or" standard is to discourage attempted reconciliation and to raise suspicions that
such an attempt is a pretext for trying to terminate the agreement. Id. at 842 & n.129.
67. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
68. The original draft of this section read "[b]efore and during marriage." Act of July 3, 1981,
ch. 815, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184, 1185. The change may indicate the general assembly's
intent to protect property settlements made after separation or divorce.
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deem that the agreement is equitable. 69 Integrating this breakthrough in statutory law7" with the ever shifting case law on property settlements and separation

agreements was the task faced by the court of appeals in Buffington.
The most critical mistake made by the court in Buffington was perpetuating
the semantic confusion that has plagued domestic law for some time. 7 1 The
opinion repeatedly interchanged the terms "property settlement" and "separa-

tion agreement" without distinguishing between them. 72 Through its casual use
of language, the court misstated the common-law rule as requiring "actual separation of the parties to a marriage in order for a property settlement to be effective."' 73 The rule actually applies to separation agreements which may or may

not include property settlement provisions. 74 In addition, the court failed to
address how the equitable distribution statute, governing "property distribution" agreements, affected Buffington, which involved a "separation
' '75
agreement.
Assuming that the court of appeals meant to apply its holding only to pure

property settlements or to independent property settlement provisions within a
separation agreement, the Buffington decision makes sense. 76 By interpreting

section 50-20(d) as not requiring immediate separation for a property settlement
agreement to be valid, the court complied with several well-known common-law

principles. These principles-upholding postnuptial settlements without a separation, 77 upholding property division provisions in separation agreements as
nonmodifiable without the consent of both parties,78 and upholding executed
property division provisions after the parties have reconciled 79-reflect the more

modem policy in favor of allowing parties to determine their property rights
without court intervention. The court's interpretation also was consistent with
the basic purpose of equitable distribution-to recognize marriage as a partner-

ship.8 0 Absent any requirement of immediate separation, section 50-20(d) simply gives spouses the freedom to make property division contracts as equal
partners at any point in their relationship. Thus, under a generous reading, the

69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(d) (1984). The section made no allowance for judicial review of
the parties' agreement. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
70. Before the advent of equitable distribution statutes, common-law states simply divided
property based on which spouse held the title. This title system completely ignored contributions
made by the homemaker. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 870 (1983).
71. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
72. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 486-88, 317 S.E.2d at 99-100.
73. Id. at 455, 317 S.E.2d at 100 (emphasis added).
74. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
75. The court consistently referred to "property settlements" when discussing the statute or the
common law and to "separation agreement[s]" when discussing the facts of the case. Buffington, 69
N.C. App. at 486-88, 317 S.E.2d at 99-100.
76. In McArthur v. McArthur, 68 N.C. App. 484,487,315 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1984), the court of
appeals held that the equitable distribution act "did not purport to change the general validity of
separation agreements."
77. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
78. This was the understanding prior to 1983. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
But cf supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (Walters decision leaves all provisions in courtapproved separation agreement open to modification.).
79. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Buffington case holds that a separation agreement not followed by actual separa-

tion is valid only to the extent that its provisions qualify as a property
settlement. 81

Unfortunately, the Buffington decision was not clearly articulated. A literal
interpretation of the inaccurate language used by the court, combined with re-

cent North Carolina case law on separation agreements, only confuses this area
of domestic law. Major problems surface as possible consequences of a strict
reading of Buffington.
Given the court's loose terminology, one could interpret Buffington as removing the immediate separation requirement from both property settlements
and separation agreements. 8 2 The court refused to void a separation agreement
even though the parties had continued to live together for eighteen days. This

holding conflicts with the North Carolina definition of "reconciliation" and its
effect on separated parties.8 3 Under Buffington, a court would enforce a separa-

tion agreement despite the continued cohabitation of the parties. Under Murphy, however, a court would void a separation agreement if the parties lived

apart but engaged in occasional sexual relations,8 4 and under Adamee, a court
would strike a separation agreement if the parties held themselves out as married
even if they never engaged in sex.8 5 Such absurd results probably cut directly
against the parties' intentions.8 6 The Murphy decision has prompted criticism

for discouraging attempted reconciliations between separated parties.8 7 By following Buffington, an attorney might advise parties who actually intend to sepa-

rate and want an agreement enforceable if attempts at reconciliation fail to
continue living together for a few weeks after signing the agreement.8 8 The

Buffington opinion leaves unanswered the question of when North Carolina law
requires separation for a valid separation agreement.
The Buffington decision, combined with the Walters rule,8 9 encourages par-

ties to keep their property distribution agreements out of the court's reach. 90 As
81. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 817 (1983); see also Cator v. Cator, 70 N.C.
App. 719, 321 S.E.2d 36 (1984) (equitable distribution act will not modify binding separation
agreement).
82. Both parties raised the issue and argued against this result. Brief for Defendant-Appellant
at 18; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 9-10.
83. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. In Buffington, defendant argued that she and her husband did not intend to separate immediately and permanently, despite the language in the agreement. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at
11. In Murphy, plaintiff claimed that he never agreed to a resumption of marital relations although
he did have occasional sex with the defendant. Murphy, 295 N.C. at 393-94, 245 S.E.2d at 695-96.
87. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 842.
88. On the other hand, the same attorney would advise a separated client to stay away from his
or her spouse to avoid any encounter that might lead to an absolutely void separation agreement
under the Murphy rule. See supra note 66.
89. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
90. The Walters court stated that parties could keep a property settlement enforceable and
modifiable under traditional contract methods by not presenting it to a court for approval. Walters,
307 N.C. at 387, 298 S.E.2d at 342. Judge Copeland writing for the majority in Walters clearly
intended to encourage parties to contract outside the courtroom. See id. at 386-87, 298 S.E.2d at
342; see also Rowe v. Rowe, 305 N.C. 177, 190-92, 287 S.E.2d 840, 848-49 (1982) (Copeland, J.,
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a private contract, the terms of the property settlement would be modifiable only
by the parties 91 and enforceable by contract remedies, including specific performance. 92 So long as the parties agree that the property settlement is equita-

ble, North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20(d) will operate to bar

equitable distribution by the court. 93 This process, however, ignores the potential for overreaching and unfairness in marital contracts negotiated wholly
outside the courtroom. 94 Despite occasional references in cases to a fairness
standard for separation agreements, 95 North Carolina courts rarely have given
more than perfunctory review to marital agreements. 96 Walters, Buffington, and
North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20(d) all encourage freedom of contract between spouses for both property settlement and support provisions in a
separation agreement. Simultaneously, these decisions limit judicial review of

the agreement's ultimate fairness. At some point, North Carolina courts must
consider whether contract remedies alone provide sufficient protection for

type of judicial respouses negotiating a separation agreement or whether some
97
view is necessary to ensure fair terms for spousal support.

In its efforts to clarify North Carolina domestic law, the court of appeals
produced even more confusion with its Buffington decision. Confined to its specific holding that section 50-20(d) "permits spouses to execute a property settlement at any time, regardless of whether they separate immediately thereafter or
99
not,"' 98 the Buffington case advances the concept of marriage as a partnership
and retreats further from archaic rules against agreements contemplating divorce. 1o The ambiguous language used throughout the opinion, however, only
contributes to the list of unanswered questions presently facing the drafter of
separation agreements. For instance, when, if at all, are parties required to live
dissenting in part) (parties should be able to agree on final alimony settlement without interference
by court).
91. See Waiters, 307 N.C. at 387, 298 S.E.2d at 342.
92. See supra note 59.
93. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
94. See Sharp, supra note 3, at 1405-07. Professor Sharp argues that separation agreements are
fundamentally different from other contracts because they deal with issues of highest personal significance, such as child custody and support rights. Thus, conditions for negotiating separation agreements are highly stressful. Id.
95. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Eubanks, 273 N.C. 189, 195-96, 159 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1968) (separation agreement must be fair, reasonable, and just and must be untainted by fraud or undue influence); Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409, 415, 74 S.E. 2d 327, 330 (1912) (separation agreement
must be fair and reasonable to the wife in light of all circumstances of execution); Johnson v. Johnson, 67 N.C. App. 250, 255, 313 S.E.2d 162, 165 (1984) ("'R]elief will be granted if the [separation
agreement] is manifestly unfair to a spouse because of the other's overreaching.").
96. Sharp, supra note 3, at 1409. Until 1977, North Carolina required a private examination of
the wife to ensure the fairness of the separation agreement. These "privy exams," however, were
little more than rubber stamps of the parties' agreement. See Sharp, supra note 25, at 828-29, 83334.
97. "Husbands and wives are not strangers, and to subject them to contract principles governing negotiations between strangers undermines the very heart of the concept of marriage as a
sharing enterprise and ignores the psychological and economic realities of most spousal relationships." Sharp, supra note 3, at 1459.
98. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. at 488, 317 S.E.2d at 100.
99. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
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separate and apart for a court to consider their separation agreement valid?
When, if ever, will North Carolina courts recognize the danger of blindly moving toward total contractual freedom for spouses without some concern for the
ultimate fairness of the agreement? If nothing more, North Carolina courts
must explicitly distinguish between a "property settlement" and a "separation
agreement." Otherwise, the equitable distribution statute will become hopelessly entangled in the semantic web of domestic case law.
KATHERINE MARTIN ALLEN

Termination of Parental Rights: Putting Love in Its Place
Parentageis a very importantprofession; but no test offitness for it
is ever imposed in the interest of the children.
- George Bernard Shawi
Shaw may have been an uncommonly perceptive social critic, but in this
case he was only half right. Although men and women generally are not told
whether they are fit to have children, courts often decide whether they are fit to
keep them. 2 Statutes in almost every state permit courts to terminate the parental rights of individuals who abandon, abuse, or otherwise neglect their chil'
dren. 3 North Carolina district courts 4 may "completely and permanently

5

sever the parent-child relationship in such cases, 6 unless the judge specifically

finds that termination of parental rights would not be in "the best interests of the
1. G. SAW, EvERYBoDY's POLrICAL WHAT's WHAT 74 (1944).
2. Removal of children from a dangerous environment is justified by the doctrine ofparens
patriae (literally, parent of the country). Parenspatriae"traces back to the English Court of Chancery's recognition that the throne had a duty to protect every subject incapable of protecting himself,
including children." Note, Termination ofParentalRights: The Substantive Due Process Issue, 26
ST. Louis U.L.J. 915, 917 (1982) (citing Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 664 (Ch. 1722)); see
also Rendleman, ParensPatriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205 (1971)
(history of the parenspatriaedoctrine).
Shaw knew that courts sometimes take children away from their parents, but attributed the
practice to something other than pure benevolence: "In certain rare cases like those of the poet
Shelley and Annie Besant the State may take the children out of their parents' hands and make them
wards in Chancery lest they should be brought up as atheists." G. SHAw, supra note 1, at 74.
3. See Bell, Termination ofParentalRights: Recent Judicial and Legislative Trends, 30 EMoRY L.J. 1065, 1067 (1981).
4. "The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any
petition relating to termination of parental rights ....
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.23 (Cum.
Supp. 1983). The district courts'jurisdiction, however, is not in fact exclusive. Superior court clerks
may terminate parental rights during an adoption proceeding if the child has been abandoned. See
id. § 48-5 (1984). The North Carolina General Statutes Commission has proposed legislation that
would end this practice and give genuinely exclusive jurisdiction over termination cases to the district courts. Letter from Floyd M. Lewis, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable Abner
Alexander, Chief District Court Judge, 21st Judicial District (Jan. 11, 1985) (available at Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (Cui. Supp. 1983). "Following an order of termination,
the parent has no right to contact the child or to be notified of the child's location, welfare, or
adoption by a third party." Bell, supra note 3, at 1068. Courts frequently have remarked on the
severity of this action. See, eg., Davis v. Page, 618 F.2d 374, 379 (1980) ("[I]t is not unlikely that
many parents would choose to serve a prison sentence rather than to lose the companionship and
custody of their children."), aff'd in part, vacated and rev'd in part on reh'g, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1981) (en banc); In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 370, 383 A.2d 1228, 1252 (Manderino, J., dissenting)
(" T]he child is dead so far as that parent is concerned."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); In re
Gibson, 4 Wash. App. 372, 379, 483 P.2d 131, 135 (1971) (Termination cuts off rights "more precious to many people than the right to life itself.").
Neglected children may be-and usually are-temporarily removed from their parents' homes
before termination proceedings are initiated. During this period the children may be returned to the
parents if the situation improves. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39.
6. Grounds for termination in North Carolina are set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32
(1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983), which states in part:
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child."'7 Unfortunately, there may be considerable disagreement about what
constitutes neglect, 8 or what is in a child's best interests. 9 A recent North Caro-

lina Supreme Court decision, In re Montgomery,' 0 illustrates the difficulties inherent in using such ill- defined standards to justify breaking up a family.
David Maxwell and Geraldine Montgomery were the parents of four minor

children. 1 ' The couple was not married, 12 and both individuals were mentally
retarded. 13 Maxwell earned about $120 a week as a welder and handyman on a

farm in Harnett County, North Carolina. 14 The family's small house "was

sparsely furnished, having a single bed on which the parents slept and a mattress

on the floor on which the four children slept."' 5 In September 1980 the children
were adjudged neglected 16 and temporary custody was awarded to the Harnett

County Department of Social Services. 17 Maxwell later was ordered to pay
thirty dollars a week for the support of his children while they were in foster
The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more of the
following:
(2) The parent has abused or neglected the child....
(4) The child has been placed in the custody of a county department of social services,
a licensed child-placing agency, or a child-caring institution, and the parent, for a continuous period of six months next preceding the filing of the petition, has failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the child.
(7) That the parent is incapable as a result of mental retardation, mental illness, organic brain syndrome, or any other degenerative mental condition of providing for the
proper care and supervision of the child.. . and that there is a reasonable probability that
such incapability will continue throughout the minority of the child.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31(a) (1981); cf.id. § 7A-289.22(3) (1981) ("Action which is in
the best interests of the child should be taken in all cases where the interests of the child and those of
his parents or other persons are in conflict.").
8. See infra note 67. In North Carolina a child "who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parent" is said to be neglected. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1981).
The full text of this minimally helpful definition is reproduced infra at note 23.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55 and 95-99.
10. 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
11. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 102, 316 S.E.2d at 248. The children, three girls and a boy,
ranged in age from five to ten at the time of the termination hearing. Id. at 101-02, 316 S.E.2d at
246-48.
12. Id. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248. Maxwell testified that he and Montgomery had considered
marriage but felt that they got along better without it. See Transcript of Termination Hearing at 15.
The couple still lives together and they remain unmarried. Telephone interview with 0. Henry
Willis, attorney for Maxwell and Montgomery (Jan. 24, 1985).
13. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248. Maxwell scored 54 on the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Test, which places him in the moderately retarded category. Montgomery scored
55, which is considered mildly retarded. Petition for Termination of Parental Rights at 4 (D. Montgomery). In addition to being retarded, Montgomery frequently insisted that "someone was looking
in the windows of her house and also that someone was trying to get inside her mind. She continuously claimed, for a period of about 14 months, that she was pregnant, when in fact she had had a
hysterectomy." Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248.
14. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248.
15. Id. Other evidence of neglect included the older children's poor school attendance record
and a lack of food in the house. Id. at 103, 316 S.E.2d at 248-49.
16. Neglect proceedings typically precede-and are distinct from-actions for termination of
parental rights. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
17. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 104, 316 S.E.2d at 249.
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18
care, but during the next forty-five weeks only three payments were made.
The county Department of Social Services filed a petition for termination of
parental rights, and the district court entered an order against Maxwell and
Montgomery in January 1982,19 "citing as grounds neglect by the mother and
both neglect and a failure to pay a reasonable [portion of the] cost of care by the
father." 20
The North Carolina Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's termination order. 2 1 A three-judge panel22 in In re Montgomery held that the statutory
definition of child neglect 2 3 "is sufficiently broad to allow interpretation by the
courts and the engrafting of some requirement that due consideration be given to
non-economic or non-physical indicia.' '2 4 Therefore, the court concluded that
before terminating parental rights because of neglect, trial courts must "deter-

mine whether love, affection, and the other intangible qualities to be found in a
no such
family relationship actually exist .... *25 The district court had made
26

findings, and consequently its decision in Montgomery was vacated.
The North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals and substantially reinstated the judgment of the trial court.27 In a wideranging opinion by Justice Copeland, the supreme court held that "the Termination of Parental Rights statute as drafted provides an appropriate forum to address the 'intangible needs' issue, as well as protects a parent's interest in
preserving the family."' 28 Thus, it concluded that the court of appeals' requirement of "a separate and distinct finding regarding the adequate fulfillment of a
18. Id. Maxwell attributed his nonpayment to a failed hog farming venture. Transcript of
Termination Hearing at 18.
19. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 104, 316 S.E.2d at 249.
20. Id. at 102, 316 S.E.2d at 248; see also supra note 6 (grounds for terminating parental rights).
The trial court held N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(7) (1981), which permits termination based on a
parent's mental incapacity, to be unconstitutional. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 116, 316 S.E.2d at
256. This decision later was reversed by the North Carolina Supreme Court. See infra note 29.
21. In re Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. 343, 303 S.E.2d 324 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101, 316
S.E.2d 246 (1984).
22. The panel included Judge Hill, who wrote the opinion, and Judges Johnson and Phillips.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1981) defines a neglected juvenile as an individual
who does not receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from his parent, guardian,
custodian, or caretaker; or who has been abandoned; or who is not provided necessary
medical care or other remedial care recognized under State law, or who lives in an environment injurious to his welfare, or who has been placed for care or adoption in violation of
law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) was held constitutional in In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293 S.E.2d
127 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983).
24. In re Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. 343, 349, 303 S.E.2d 324, 327 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101,
316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
25. Id. at 353, 303 S.E.2d at 330. The court of appeals also held that the trial judge's findings
of fact did not support his conclusion that Maxwell had failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of caring for his children while they were in the custody of the Department of Social Services. Id. at
354-55, 303 S.E.2d at 330. This portion of the court of appeals' opinion, in addition to the portion
discussed in the text of this Note, was reversed by the supreme court. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at
113-14, 316 S.E.2d at 253-54; infra note 29.
26. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 355, 303 S.E.2d at 330.
27. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
28. Id. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
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child's intangible and non-economic needs... is not justified." '29 This Note
first examines the supreme court's treatment of the intangible needs issue, and
then suggests three ways in which North Carolina's procedures for termination
of parental rights should be clarified to better protect the interests of both children and their parents.

Child abuse and neglect are among the oldest and most intractable
problems facing our society. 30 Nationwide, more than half a million children
are wards of the state. 31 As of September 1984, North Carolina county depart-

ments of social services had custody of 6853 children, most of whom had been

abused, abandoned, or neglected by their parents or guardians. 32 During fiscal

year 1983-84 there were 6642 confirmed cases of child abuse and neglect in
33
North Carolina; another 9901 cases were reported but not confirmed.
Although relatively few of these cases end up in juvenile court, and fewer still

lead to termination of parental rights, 34 the magnitude of the problem is readily
apparent.

Given the severe consequences of an order terminating parental rights, 35
29. Id. Regarding Maxwell's failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of foster care for his
children, see supra note 25, the supreme court determined that,
A parent's ability topay is the controlling characteristic of what is a 'reasonable portion' of
[the] cost of foster care.... A parent is required to pay that portion of the cost of foster
care. . . . that is fair, just, and equitable based upon the parent'sability or means to pay.
Id. at 113, 316 S.E.2d at 254 (quoting In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 603-04, 28 S.E.2d 47, 55 (1981).
The court stated further that "[w]e believe there was ample evidence from which the trial court
could conclude that respondent Maxwell failed to pay a reasonable portion of the costs of care of the
children." Id. at 114, 316 S.E.2d at 254.
Although the trial court had declared N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(7) (1981)-which permits
termination of parental rights in cases of mental incapacity-to be unconstitutional, see supra note
20, the issue was not raised by either party in the court of appeals. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at
114, 316 S.E.2d at 254. It was raised in the supreme court, however, and the judgment of the trial
court was reversed. Id. at 114-16, 316 S.E.2d at 254-56. The court held that termination of parental
rights for reasons of long-term mental incapacity does not violate either the due process or the equal
protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Id. The supreme court thus followed the example of several other states. See, eg., In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 27 Ariz.
App. 420, 555 P.2d 679 (1976); In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1979); In re
J.C., 242 Ga. 737, 251 S.E.2d 299 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Crane v. Carroll County Dep't
of Family and Children Servs., 441 U.S. 929 (1979); People ex reL Nabstedt v. Barger, 3 Ill. 2d 511,
121 N.E.2d 781 (1954); In re Atkins, 112 Mich. App. 528, 316 N.W.2d 477 (1982); In re Sylvia M.,
82 A.D.2d 217, 443 N.Y.S.2d 214 (1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 636, 439 N.E.2d 870, 454 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1982); Department of Human Servs. v. Ogle, 617 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. 1980).
30. See Thomas, ChildAbuse andNeglect PartP: HistoricalOverview, Legal Matrix, and Social
Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293 (1972).
31. See Garrison, Why Terminate ParentalRights?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 423 (1983).
32. Memorandum from Sue Glasby, Head, Children's Services Branch, N.C. Division of Social
Services, to Permanent Families Task Force, Attachment A (Oct. 23, 1984) (available at Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. Of
the 6853 children in Department of Social Services custody, 822 had been abused, 129 had been
abandoned, and 3413 had been neglected. Id.
33. Id. at Attachment D. These figures break down to 11,181 reports of neglect (4980 confirmed) and 5362 reports of abuse (1662 confirmed). Id. The major contributing factors in confirmed abuse and neglect reports were the parents' lack of child development knowledge, mental
retardation and emotional disturbance, and alcohol abuse. Id.
34. Interview with Janet Mason, Institute of Government, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill (Feb. 18, 1985). Exact figures are unavailable. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text.
35. See supra note 5.
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the State typically begins action against parents in juvenile cases by petitioning
for an adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. 36 If the court finds the
complaint valid, it may award custody of the children involved to the State or to
some other foster care provider, 37 subject to periodic review. 38 Although an
award of custody in these cases permits the reunification of parents and children
if conditions in the home improve, 39 an initial judgment of neglect often results
in permanent separation. 4°
Because North Carolina only recently began keeping track of termination

petitions, 4 1 little is known about how often or how quickly the State cuts off
parental rights in cases of child abuse and neglect. 42 Termination procedures
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-561(b) (1981); 4 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW
§ 292 (1979) (quoting H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL § 20.7 (1977)).
37. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-647(2) (1981).
38. See id. § 7A-657 (1981). "ITihejudge shall conduct a review within six months of the date
the order was entered, and shall conduct subsequent reviews at least every year thereafter." Id.
39. See id.
40. As of September 1984, only about one-third of the 6853 children in the custody of the
North Carolina Division of Social Services placement authority were expected to return home. See
Memorandum, supra note 32, at Attachment A.
41. Telephone interview with Virginia Weisz, Administrator, Guardian Ad Litem Program,
N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts (Jan. 24, 1985). Record-keeping began in the summer of
1984 and should be reflected in the Administrative Office of the Courts' next annual report. Id.
42. Cases reaching the appellate level indicate that in many instances termination of parental
rights is not only justifiable, but arguably overdue. See, e.g., In re Adcock, 69 N.C. App. 222, 316
S.E.2d 347 (1984) (child beaten; parents failed to provide adequate food and clothing); In re Pierce,
67 N.C. App. 257, 312 S.E.2d 900 (1984) (child born with fetal alcohol syndrome; mother convicted
of heroin possession and prostitution); In re Apa, 59 N.C. App. 322, 296 S.E.2d 811 (1982) (father's
only contribution to child's support in 11 years was gift of bicycle); In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322,
293 S.E.2d 607 (1982) (children frequently dirty, unfed, and urine soaked; parents failed to provide
medical care); In re Smith, 56 N.C. App. 142, 287 S.E.2d 440 (mother with tuberculosis refused to
arrange separate living quarters for infant and later abandoned children), cert. denied, 306 N.C. 385,
294 S.E.2d 212 (1982); In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981) (mother had severe
drug and alcohol problems; home infested with pests due to debris and garbage). These extreme
examples of neglect and abuse make the evidence against the parents in Montgomery seem rather
weak by comparison. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
The hair-raising nature of so many published cases also seems to contribute to the failure of
most constitutionally based attacks on termination statutes. See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.4th 774
(1983) (compilation of cases discussing constitutionality of state termination statutes). Courts frequently have rejected claims that the provisions of termination statutes are impermissibly vague.
See, e-g., In re Ladewig, 34 Ill. App. 3d 393, 340 N.E.2d 150 (1975); In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293
S.E.2d 127 (1982), appeal dismissed sub nom. Moore v. Guilford County Dep't of Social Servs., 459
U.S. 1139 (1983); In re J.Z., 190 N.W.2d 27 (N.D. 1971); State v. McMaster, 259 Ore. 291, 486 P.2d
567 (1971); In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975); D-F- v. State, 525 S.W.2d 933
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975). Contra Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Alsager v. District
Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd in partper curiam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976);
Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 583 S.W.2d 37 (1979).
Some state courts have applied strict scrutiny when examining the constitutionality of termination statutes, see, e.g., In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 192-93, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63, 68-69 (1979),
although this does not appear to be the practice in North Carolina. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at
115, 316 S.E.2d at 255 (statute merely required to have "rational relation" to state interests). The
United States Supreme Court has recognized "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in
the care, custody, and management of their child," Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982),
but has gone only so far as to say that "[w]hen the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds,
it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures." Id. at 753-54; see also Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 106, 316 S.E.2d at 250 (asserting that Santosky holding confined to consideration of
procedural due process claims).
Courts often reject equal protection challenges to termination statutes. See In re Appeal in
Maricopa County Juvenile Action, 27 Ariz. App. 420, 555 P.2d 679 (1976); In re Adoption of Ah-

1182

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

begin when a qualified party, 43 frequently a county department of social serv-

ices, files a petition in district court alleging one or more of the grounds set forth
in North Carolina General Statutes section 7A-289.32. 44 A formal hearing is

conducted, 4 5 at which the petitioner must prove by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence" 46 that at least one of the alleged grounds for termination exists. 47
If the petitioner satisfies this burden, the court is required to issue an order
terminating parental rights unless it specifically finds that such action would not
48
be in the best interests of the child.

Termination of parental rights is the method by which the State frees children for adoption without the consent of their parents. 49 Thus, the termination
statute ostensibly furthers the State's policy of providing abused and neglected
children "a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible age." 50 The permanence and stability envisioned by the statute are largely illusory, however, be-

cause relatively few children removed from their parents ever get adopted.5 1
"[E]xisting evidence suggests that children removed by the state from the home

of their parents are often destined to remain in limbo until adulthood, wards of a
med,44 Cal. App. 3d 810, 118 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1975); Chandler v.Cochran, 247 Ga. 184, 275 S.E.2d
23, cerL denied, 454 U.S. 872 (1981); In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 643 P.2d 168
(1982); In re Atkins, 112 Mich. App. 528, 316 N.W.2d 477 (1982); Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 116,
316 S.E.2d at 255-56. Contra Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974); Helvey v. Rednour, 86
Ill. App. 3d 154, 408 N.E.2d 17 (1980); In re Miller, 105 Misc. 2d 41, 430 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Fam. Ct.
1980); In re Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
43. Termination petitions may be filed by either parent against the other, by a child's judicially
appointed guardian, by a county department of social services or licensed child placing agency that
has custody of the child, by anyone with whom the child has resided for the immediately preceding
two years, or by the child's guardian ad litem. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.24 (1981 & Cum.
Supp. 1983).
44. See id. §§ 7A-289.25(6), -. 32 (1981); see also supra note 6 (list of grounds for termination).
45. The hearing is conducted by a judge, sitting without a jury. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A289.30(a) (1981). Indigent parents have a right to state appointed counsel in termination proceedings. Id. § 7A-289.30(al) (1981). Butsee Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27
(1981) (no absolute right to counsel in termination cases).
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e) (1981); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769
(1982) (constitutional requirement of clear and convincing evidence to establish grounds for
termination).
47. Any one of the grounds stated in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (1981) is sufficient to support an order terminating parental rights. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252; In
re Adcock, 69 N.C. App. 222, 227, 316 S.E.2d 347, 349 (1984).
48. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 7A-289.31(a) (1981); see supra text accompanying note 7. The theoretically bifurcated nature of this proceeding-an adjudicatory hearing followed by a dispositional
phase-was crucial to the supreme court's decision in Montgomery. See infra text accompanying
notes 76-83. Bifurcation in theory, however, may not be bifurcation in fact. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
49. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 7A-289.33 (1981 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
50. Id. § 7A-289.22(2) (1981).
51. The North Carolina Division of Social Services found adoptive parents for 732 children in
fiscal year 1983-84. Memorandum, supra note 32. This was a considerable improvement over the
year before, when 460 were placed, id., but still represents only a small fraction of the total number
of children in Department of Social Services custody. The difficulty in placing children whose parents' rights have been terminated can be especially acute: "Almost all these children, by the time
you get around to terminating parental rights, are older or handicapped in some way. So many of
them have special problems that make them hard to place." Telephone interview with Sue Glasby,
Head, Children's Services Branch, N.C. Division of Social Services (Jan. 24, 1985) [hereinafter cited
as Telephone interview with Sue Glasby]; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765 n. 15
(1982) (termination of parental rights does not ensure adoption).
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largely indifferent state."' 52 Children in foster care tend to bounce from one
placement to another,5 3 a phenomenon known as "foster caredrift. ' '54 Termination of parental rights, in other words, is no panacea. If the only thing most
neglected children have to look forward to is a bureaucratic journey toward
emancipation, one might reasonably ask how often termination orders actually
55
are in the children's best interests.
The court of appeals may have had the inadequacies of the child welfare

system in mind when it made its unique56 and ultimately short-lived decision in
In re Montgomery.5 7 In addition, the panel was required to consider the due
process rights of the parents, 5 8 as well as the state's interest in its role as parens
patriae.5 9 The court began by acknowledging "the due process evolution that
has taken place in the area of parental rights." 6 According to Judge Hill, this
evolution began in 1972, when the United States Supreme Court recognized the
"essential" right to "conceive and raise one's children."' 61 It culminated in the
case of Santosky v. Kramer,62 in which the Court held that the due process

rights of parents required petitioners to prove grounds for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. 63 The court of appeals acknowledged that the Santosky holding had been limited to "matters of procedural due
process," 64 but nonetheless focused on the case's supposed "substantive
65
importance":
Santosky did not attempt to state specifically what must be shown and

what quantum of proof must exist to justify a termination of parental
52. Mnookin, Child-CustodyAdjudication: JudicialFunctionsin the Face of Indeterminacy, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 273 (Summer 1975). As of Dec. 31, 1984, children in the placement
authority of the Division of Social Services had been there an average of 3 years for white children,
4.1 years for black children, and 5 years for Indian children. Telephone interview with Sue Glasby,
supra note 51; see also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 833-38 (1977) (describing the "limbo" of the New York foster care system).
53. Telephone interview with Sue Glasby, supra note 51; see Wald, State Intervention on Behalf
of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 994 (1975).
54. See Garrison, supra note 31, at 426.
55. See In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 413-15, 293 S.E.2d 127, 138-39 (1982) (Carlton, J., dissenting). One might argue that termination of parental rights, which at least opens up the possibility of
adoption, is preferable to leaving children in the limbo of permanent foster care. See, e.g., In re
Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 343, 274 S.E.2d 236, 243 (1981). On the other hand, "[tiermination of
parental rights... should look.., to the likelihood that the child in question will find suitable
adoptive parents. Except in unusual circumstances, there is nothing to be gained by terminating
parental rights where no effective parental substitute can be provided by way of adoption." H.
KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL §20.7 (1977).

56. "The Court of Appeals ruling is believed to be the first to instruct judges specifically to
consider parental love." Charlotte Observer, Jun. 9, 1983, at 1B, col. 2. The holding caused "an
uproar" among North Carolina child welfare officials. Interview with Janet Mason, Institute of
Government, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Jan. 24, 1985).
57. 62 N.C. App. 343, 303 S.E.2d 324 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
58. See supra note 42.
59. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
60. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 347, 303 S.E.2d at 326.
61. Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972)).
62. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
63. Id. at 769.
64. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 348, 303 S.E.2d at 326.
65. Id. at 348, 303 S.E.2d at 327.
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rights. Nevertheless, the Court appeared to endorse an approach that

would take into account more than physical or economic factors; an
approach that would reflect some consideration by the trial judge of all
the circumstances of the parent-child relationship in each individual
case. The Court noted that termination proceedings "often required

the fact finder to.

.

. decide issues difficult to prove to a level of abso-

lute certainty, such as lack of parental motive, absence of affection between parent and child, and failure of parental foresight and
progress." 66

The words "absence of affection" must have hit a responsive chord in the
court's collective mind, because Judge Hill devoted a great deal of his opinion to

that subject. Taking advantage of the vague statutory definition of child neglect, 67 the court held that trial courts must consider noneconomic and

nonphysical indications of parental fitness in termination cases. 68 Before terminating parental rights on the basis of neglect, trial courts were required to supplement the statutorily mandated findings of fact 69 with evidence concerning the
70
parents' love and affection for their children.

The supreme court reversed, 71 stating that "the Court of Appeals, in contravention of our Legislature's intent, erroneously elevated the burden of proof
required in proceedings terminating parental rights."' 72 Due process, according
66. Id. (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769).
67. See supranotes 23-24 and accompanying text. Although the statutory defintition of neglect
has survived constitutional challenges based on vagueness, see In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 293
S.E.2d 127 (1982); In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607 (1982), phrases such as "proper
care, supervision, and discipline" are nonetheless subject to a wide range of interpretations. The
court of appeals has ruled that the terms used in the statutory definition "are given a precise and
understandable meaning by the normative standards imposed upon parents by our society," In re
Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 341, 274 S.E.2d 236, 241 (1981), but this kind of precision is not very
useful in a difficult case such as Montgomery. It has been argued, however, that the statutory definition of neglect must be rather vague if it is to protect the interests of children in a wide variety of
circumstances. See Biggers, 50 N.C. App. at 342, 274 S.E.2d at 242 ("This context requires flexibility in the weighing of each case's facts in order to give the child, as well as the parent, the highest
form of due process."), H. KRAUSE, supra note 55, § 20.3, at 236 ("Statutes need to be flexible to
provide the necessary broad discretion to the courts."); Note, Application of the Vagueness Doctrine
to Statutes Terminating ParentalRights, 1980 Dua L.J. 336, 355.
68. See Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 349, 303 S.E.2d at 327.
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(d) (1981).
70. See Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 353, 303 S.E.2d at 330.
71. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984).
72. Id. at 106, 316 S.E.2d at 250. The supreme court arguably misinterpreted the court of
appeals' opinion on this point. The lower court, according to Justice Copeland:
held that the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence standard of proof requires the party
seeking termination of parental rights for neglect to prove not only that the physical and
economic needs of the child are not adequately met, but also that the intangible non-economic needs of a child are not adequately met.
Id. at 104-05, 316 S.E.2d at 249. This is not quite what the court of appeals held. It merely required
the trial court in termination cases to make specific findings regarding love and affection, and to take
them into consideration. Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 353-54, 303 S.E.2d at 329-30. Judge Hill's
opinion clearly indicated that whatever the weight of nonphysical, noneconomic indicia, evidence of
physical and financial neglect could be controlling in a given case. Id. at 353, 303 S.E.2d at 329.
Even though the supreme court seems to have misinterpreted the court of appeals' ruling, the
ultimate holding can be justified as an exercise of judicial restraint. See infra text following note 99.
The lower court's opinion clearly engrafted an extra proceduralrequirement onto the termination
statute, see Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 349, 303 S.E.2d at 327, and therefore increased the burden
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to Justice Copeland, is satisfied when the petitioner has proved grounds for termination as they are set forth in the termination statute.7 3 Therefore, the court
held that the lower court had erred in requiring separate findings concerning the
74
fulfillment of a child's intangible, noneconomic needs.
Where the evidence shows that a parent has failed or is unable to adequately provide for his child's physical and economic needs. . and it
appears that the parent will not or is not able to correct those inadequate conditions within a reasonable time, the court may appropriately
conclude that the child is neglected. . . . [T]he fact that the parent
loves or is concerned about his child will not necessarily prevent
the
75
court from making a determination that the child is neglected.
The supreme court did not dispute the importance of love and affection in
family relationships. 76 Rather, it held that these intangible factors should be
taken into consideration at the dispositional stage of a termination proceeding-not during the adjudicatory phase.77 The purpose of the adjudicatory hearing78 is to determine whether grounds for termination exist under section 7A80
79
289.32, which says nothing about love or affection. The dispositional phase,
on the other hand, is relatively open-ended. Even if grounds for termination
have been established, "the [trial] court's decision to terminate parental rights is
discretionary." ' The trial judge may dismiss a petition for termination if, in his
opinion, termination of parental rights would not be in the best interests of the
child.8 2 Thus, intangibles such as love and affection not only are relevant at the
83
dispositional phase-they may be controlling.
The Montgomery holding, while seemingly straightforward, raises at least
three important questions. First, what exactly did the supreme court mean by
its bifurcated approach to termination hearings? The court of appeals seems to
have envisioned a unitary proceeding in which the adjudicatory and dispositional phases are merged for all practical purposes. 8 4 North Carolina's termination statute does not explicitly require separate hearings, 8 5 and common practice
on petitioners beyond what was intended by the legislature. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 106, 316
S.E.2d at 250. Moreover, the supreme court made room for consideration of the intangibles during
the dispositional phase of termination proceedings. See infra text accompanying notes 76-83.
73. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 108-09, 316 S.E.2d at 251; see also supra note 6 (text of
statute setting forth neglect grounds for termination).
74. See Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
75. Id. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 252. The supreme court, again overruling the court of appeals,
determined that there was substantial evidence supporting a determination of neglect on the part of
Maxwell and Montgomery. See id. at I11, 316 S.E.2d at 253. Therefore the judgment of the trial
court was reinstated.
76. Id. at 107, 316 S.E.2d at 250.
77. See id. at 107-08, 316 S.E.2d at 251; see also supra text accompanying notes 43-48 (synopsis
of termination procedure).
78. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30 (1981).
79. See supra note 6.
80. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (1981 & Supp. 1983).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 107, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
See id.
See Montgomery, 62 N.C. App. at 353-54, 303 S.E.2d at 329-30.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-289.30 to .31 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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seems to favor a unitary approach.8 6 The supreme court's opinion in Montgomery makes little sense, however, unless there is some clear distinction between
87
the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of a termination proceeding.
Second, what is the proper burden of proof in the dispositional phase, and
who should bear it? Although the petitioner must prove grounds for termination by "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,"'8 8 the statute is silent as to the
evidentiary standard governing disposition; nothing is said about which party

must prove what is in the child's best interests, or what the quantum of that
proof must be.89 Some have suggested that once grounds for termination have
been established, the parents should bear the burden of proving that termination
would not benefit the child. 90 The supreme court in Montgomery simply stated

that disposition is "discretionary," 91 and strongly implied that the trial judge at
this point is on his own. 92 Given that termination of parental rights often results
in no demonstrable benefit to the children involved, 9 3 the best practice in these
cases would be to make petitioners prove by at least a preponderance of the
94
evidence that termination would be in the best interests of the children.

Third, what besides love and affection should trial courts consider at the
86. Appellate records filed in Montgomery and other termination cases indicate that evidence
typically is taken at a single hearing, after which the judge issues an order that combines his findings
concerning grounds for termination and his disposition of the case. See Records on Appeal for In re
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984), In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607
(1982), and In re Biggers, 50 N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981).
87. Some states permit, but do not require, separate adjudicatory and dispositional hearings in
termination cases. See, eg., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-607 (1983); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.424
(West Supp. 1984). Separate hearings often are required, however, in an initial neglect proceeding,
when the petitioner seeks removal of a child from its parents' custody. See IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 232.96, -.99 (West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-404 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-639 to
-640 (1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.34.110 (Supp. 1985); Singleman, A Case of Neglect:
Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 1055, 1077
(1975); see also supra text accompanying notes 35-40 (describing typical pretermination actions
taken by state in cases of neglect).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.30(e) (1981); Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252.
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.31 (1981 & Supp. 1983). The statute, however, does state
that when grounds for termination have been proved, "the court shall issue an order terminating
. . . parental rights. . . unless the court shall further determine that the best interests of the child
require that. . . parental rights.., not be terminated." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, it can be
argued that the burden of proving that termination would not benefit the child is on the parents at
this point. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 91-92
(supreme court does not seem to accept this view).
90. This position was argued by the Montgomery appellants and their allies before the supreme
court. They contended that "at the dispositional stage of a termination case there is a presumption
or inference in favor of termination; and. . . the parent should bear the burden of establishing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the best interests of the child require that rights not be terminated." Brief for Amicus Curiae Mecklenburg County Department of Social Services at 5; see also
Brief for Appellants at 14-15 (making similar assertions).
91. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 110, 316 S.E.2d at 252.
92. See id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55.
94. In some states the court is required to find by clear and convincing evidence that termination would be in the child's best interests. See, eg., ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 4055(l)(B)(2)(a)
(Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-147(d) (1984). In addition to protecting children from
unwarranted state action, such a rule acknowledges the "fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; see supra
note 42.
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dispositional stage of a termination hearing? Both the statute and the Montgomery opinion state that termination decisions are controlled by the best interests of
the child. 95 Neither authority, however, spells out how those interests are defined. 96 A comprehensive list of relevant factors probably would be endless, but

the trial court should be required to enter at least some findings of fact in sup-

port of its disposition.97 For example, a child's adoptability surely is relevant to
whether termination of parental rights would be in his best interests;98 if a child
cannot be placed, termination of parental rights can do him little good. 9 9

The North Carolina legislature's definition of child neglect may be vague,
but that does not justify the court of appeals' attempt to increase the statutory
burden on petitioners in termination cases. Thus, the supreme court's reversal
in Montgomery was an appropriate exercise of judicial restraint. The court
should be commended, moreover, for recognizing the importance of love and
affection in termination cases and for putting such considerations in their proper
place. Nevertheless, questions and concerns about North Carolina's termination
procedures persist in the wake of Montgomery. The supreme court should clar-

ify the extent to which termination hearings must be bifurcated, so that proper
consideration can be given to the different issues at stake in the adjudicatory and
dispositional phases. The burden of proving that termination is in the best interests of the child should be placed squarely on the petitioner in order to protect
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.22(3) (1981 & Supp. 1983); Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 116, 316
S.E.2d at 256.
96. Wisconsin courts, by way of contrast, have been given explicit guidance by the legislature:
In considering the best interests of the child ... the court shall consider but not be limited
to the following:
(a) The likelihood of the child's adoption after termination.
(b) The age and health of the child, both at the time of the disposition and, if applicable, at the time the child was removed from the home.
(c) Whether the child has substantial relationships with the parent or other family
members, and whether it would be harmful to the child to sever these relationships.
(d) The wishes of the child.
(e) The duration of the separation of the parent from the child.
(f) Whether the child will be able to enter into a more stable and permanent family
relationship as a result of the termination, taking into account the conditions of the child's
current placement, the likelihood of future placements and the results of prior placements.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.426(3) (West Supp.1984).
97. Termination orders typically make a conclusory statement to the effect that termination of
parental rights is in the child's best interests. Findings of fact supporting grounds for termination
are included in the order, but there generally are no separate findings demonstrating why termination is in the best interests of the child. See Records on Appeal for In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101,
316 S.E.2d 246 (1984), In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607 (1982), and In re Biggers, 50
N.C. App. 332, 274 S.E.2d 236 (1981). Much of the evidence will support both conclusions, of
course, but there also may be situations in which the proof establishing grounds for termination is
not sufficient to prove that termination is in the best interests of the child. See Montgomery, 311 N.C.
at 107, 316 S.E.2d at 251.
98. See supra note 96.
99. See V. DEFRANcIS, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS 15 (1971); supra note 55. The
court of appeals has ruled that trial judges need not find that a child is highly adoptable before
terminating parental rights, In re Norris, 65 N.C. App. 269, 310 S.E.2d 25 (1983), cert. denied, 310
N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 703 (1984), but some district court judges reportedly consider adoptability to
be a key factor in their termination decisions: "Some judges think there should be a home waiting
before parental rights are terminated. Some [child care] professionals feel that way too." Telephone
interview with Sue Glasby, supra note 51.

1188

NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

the due process rights of both children and their parents. The factors to be
considered in determining a child's best interests should be elucidated. Courts
may be justified in deferring to the legislature on some of these matters, but
judicial restraint should not be an excuse for inaction when such vital relationships hang in the balance.
GARY R. GOVERT

Mayer v. Mayer: Estoppel and Foreign Divorce
A suitor persuades a married woman to obtain an invalid divorce from her
husband and actively helps her procure that decree so that they may marry.
When their marriage turns sour and the wife sues for divorce and alimony, can
the husband defend on the ground that they are not married because her former
divorce was invalid? In Mayer v. Mayer,1 the North Carolina Court of Appeals
held that "a husband, who actively participates in his wife's procurement of an

invalid divorce from her prior husband, is estopped from denying the validity of
that divorce."' 2 The court's decision was particularly significant because in es-

topping the husband from attacking the validity of his wife's divorce, the court
gave practical effect to a "quickie" foreign divorce, which3 the court considered
invalid on both jurisdictional and public policy grounds.
The Mayer decision is important for two reasons. First, the court addressed
"[flor the benefit of the bar ' 4 a question of first impression in North Carolinawhether recognition should be given to a divorce obtained in a foreign country
in which neither party was domiciled. Second, the court applied the equitable
doctrine of estoppel 6 to prevent a husband, not a party to his wife's prior di1. 66 N.C. App. 522, 311 S.E.2d 659, disc rev. denied, 311 N.C. 760, 321 S.E.2d 140 (1984).
2. Id. at 531, 311 S.E.2d at 666.
3. See id. at 527-30, 311 S.E.2d at 663-65. Although divorces granted in sister states often are
called foreign divorces, this Note reserves the term "foreign divorce" for divorces granted by a
foreign nation.
4. Id. at 530, 311 S.E.2d at 665. The court stressed the narrowness of its holding: "Much of
what we have said impels us to reject Doris Mayer's argument that her Dominican divorce was
valid. Our narrow holding, however, must be emphasized-considering the circumstances of this
case, Victor Mayer can neither assert the invalidity of Doris Mayer's Dominican divorce nor the
invalidity of his subsequent marriage to Doris Mayer." Id. at 536, 311 S.E.2d at 669. The finding
that the husband was estopped disposed of the case; it was not necessary to determine the validity of
the divorce.
5. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
6. The court explained that "[u]nder quasi-estoppel doctrine, one is not permitted to injure
another by taking a position inconsistent with prior conduct, regardless of whether the person had
actually relied upon that conduct." Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 532, 311 S.E.2d at 666. This doctrine is
to be distinguished from "true" or "technical" estoppel. "True estoppel results from representations
made or other conduct performed for the consumption of another who relies thereon to his damage
in ignorance of the truth." Weiss, A Flighton the FantasyofEstoppel in ForeignDivorce, 50 COLuM.
L. REV. 409, 414 (1950); see also Rosenberg, How Void is a Void Decree, or The Estoppel Effect of
Invalid Divorce Decrees, 8 FAM. L.Q. 207, 208 (1974) (quasi-estoppel broader than traditional estoppel theory because no need for reliance on factual representations by other party).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey discussed the type of estoppel under consideration in this
Note, stating that it is applied to prevent a person from "taking a position inconsistent with prior
conduct, if this would injure another, regardless of whether that person has actually relied thereon."
Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 94, 405 A.2d 360, 365 (1979). Professor Clark described this doctrine of
estoppel as the "principle, that one who obtains a judgment cannot later collaterally attack it upon
jurisdictional grounds." Clark, Estoppel Against JurisdictionalAttack on Decrees of Divorce, 70
YALE L.J. 45, 45 (1960). According to Professor Clark, it has long been applied to divorce decrees,
and recently has been "broadly extended." Id. at 45 & n.7. Professor Rosenberg has defined this
type of estoppel as follows: "When someone is barred from attacking a divorce decree of questionable validity because such an attack would produce an unfair result, the concept of equitable estoppel
has been applied." Rosenberg, supra, at 207. This form of estoppel has been referred to as the
"'equitable principle of estoppel,' 'so-called estoppel,' 'quasi-estoppel,' 'somewhat similar to estoppel,' [and] 'res judicata.'" 1 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMmY LAW § 98, at 446 (4th ed. 1979);
see Weiss, supra, at 414. The Mayer court referred to this doctrine as "quasi-estoppel," "estoppel,"
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vorce, from attacking the validity of that decree on the ground that the granting
court lacked jurisdiction. 7 Although North Carolina courts have estopped par-

ties to a divorce from attacking the decree on grounds of subject matter jurisdiction, 8 they had never similarly estopped a second spouse of one of the parties to
the original divorce. 9 This Note analyzes the Mayer decision and concludes that
the invocation of estoppel was justified and consistent with the policy considerations supporting the doctrine.
In the summer of 1980, Doris Crumpler and Victor Mayer decided to

marry,10 but they faced the obstacle of Mrs. Crumpler's marriage to Fred Crumpler. Under North Carolina law1 at the time, Doris Crumpler had a choice
between absolute divorce 12 based on a variety of fault grounds 13 or absolute

divorce based on one year's separation. 14 Victor Mayer insisted on a "quickie"
divorce 15 and promised Mrs. Crumpler that he would support her in a manner

better than that to which she was accustomed.' 6 As a result, on October 17,
1980, Doris Crumpler and Fred Crumpler executed a separation agreement, according to which she relinquished any right she might have had to alimony or
support.17

Subsequently, in February 1981, Doris Crumpler traveled to the Dominican
and "equitable estoppel." Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 523-25, 530-36, 311 S.E.2d at 661-62, 665-69.
This Note adopts the term "estoppel."
For an overview of the application of estoppel to divorce cases, see Clark, supra; Phillips, EquitablePreclusion ofJurisdictionalAttacks on Void Divorces, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (1969); Rosenberg, supra; Swisher, ForeignMigratory Divorces: A Reappraisal,21 J. FAM. L. 9, 37-48 (1982-83);
Weiss, supra.
7. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 530-36, 311 S.E.2d at 665-69.
8. See, eg., McIntyre v. McIntyre, 211 N.C. 698, 191 S.E.2d 507 (1937); Watson v. Watson,
49 N.C. App. 58, 270 S.E.2d 542 (1980). Unless otherwise indicated, the term "jurisdiction" will be
used throughout this Note to refer to subject matter jurisdiction rather than to personal jurisdiction.
9. See infra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
10. Record at 44.
11. Both the Crumplers were domiciled in North Carolina. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311
S.E.2d at 664.
12. In North Carolina there are two kinds of divorce, divorce from the bond of matrimony (a
vinculo matrimonii) or absolute divorce, and divorce from bed and board (mensa et thoro). 1 R.
LEE, supra note 6, § 33. The former completely dissolves the marriage, and the parties are free to
remarry. Id. at 168; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11(a) (1984). The latter does not end the marriage but
"merely suspends the effect of marriage as to cohabitation," I R. LEE, supra note 6, § 33, and
"effects an authorized separation of the husband and wife." Schlagel v. Schlagel, 253 N.C. 787, 790,
117 S.E.2d 790, 793 (1961).
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (1976) (adultery, impotence, pregnancy by another at time of marriage, criminal act and two years' separation, unnatural sex, incurable insanity), repealed by Act of
June 24, 1983, ch. 613, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 548; see I R. LEE, supra note 6, § 64. Under § 50-5
the application for divorce had to be made by the injured party. Id. at 310. Doris Crumpler may not
have been able to prove any of these fault grounds.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984); see 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 64, at 310.
15. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668; Record at 44-45. The court of appeals
referred to this proposition as a "fact" and stated that the record "suggest[ed]" that it was so.
Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668. The district court's findings of fact stated that
"defendant was aware of the arrangements for plaintiff to obtain a divorce from Mr. Crumpler in the
Dominican Republic." Record at 96.
16. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668; Record at 45.
17. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668; Record at 96.
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Republic,18 where she obtained a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. 19 Although the trial court found that Mr. Crumpler "acquiesced" in the
2
divorce, 20 he did not appear in the action either in person or through counsel. '

Rather, Mr. Crumpler expressed an intention to obtain a divorce in North Carocourt judgment Mr.
lina after one year's separation; at the time of the district
22

Crumpler had neither obtained a divorce nor remarried.

Victor Mayer accompanied Doris Crumpler to the Dominican Republic
23
and paid for all expenses except the filing fees of the divorce. After returning

to North Carolina, Doris Crumpler signed, at Mr. Mayer's request, 24 an antenuptial agreement limiting her right to alimony to $1,000 per month for every

month their marriage lasted. 25 Following the couple's marriage on March 6,

1981, they lived together in Doris Mayer's house until July 1981, when Mr.

Mayer, without provocation, left his new wife. 26 Significantly, the district court
found that during the period the Mayers lived together, they "held themselves
neither questioned the validity of their marriage
out as husband and wife, and
'27
separation."
the
after
until

After the separation, Doris Mayer filed a complaint seeking divorce from

29
bed and board, 2 8 permanent alimony, and alimony pendente lite. Defendant

Victor Mayer counterclaimed for an annulment and asserted as a defense the
invalidity of his wife's prior divorce and the resulting invalidity of his mar-

riage. 30 Plaintiff contended that since defendant had participated in obtaining
out as her husband, he was esthe Dominican divorce and had held himself
31
topped to deny the validity of that divorce.
The district court denied plaintiff's motions for alimony pendente lite and
18. Id. Doris Crumpler remained in the Dominican Republic for five days. Id.
19. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 526, 311 S.E.2d at 663; Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at 15. In 1971
the divorce law respecting foreigners in the Dominican Republic was liberalized to attract the migratory divorce trade. Note, CaribbeanDivorcefor Americans: Useful Alternative or ObsolescentInstitution?, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 116, 116 (1976); see 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DImRcToRY,
Dominican Republic Law Digest 3-4 (1985) (law of Dominican Republic permits nonresidents to
obtain mutual consent divorce if one spouse is present and the other is represented by an attorney).
20. Record at 96.
21. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at 664; see Record at 96. The court of appeals
noted that the district court had not found as a fact that Mr. Crumpler had made either an actual or
a constructive appearance in the Dominican proceeding. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at
664.
22. Record at 96.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 32-33, 48-49.
25. Id. at 96-97 (agreement signed March 4, 1981). For example, if the marriage lasted for 12
months, Doris Mayer would be entitled to alimony of $1,000 per month for a period of 12 months.
26. Id. at 97.
27. Id.
28. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-7 (1984) (grounds for divorce from bed and board); supra note
12 (discussion of divorce from bed and board).
29. Record at 5-6 (complaint filed October 15, 1981). See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-16.2, -16.3
(1984) (grounds for alimony and alimony pendente lite).
30. Record at 8; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51.3 (1984) ("All marriages between.. . persons
either of whom has a husband or wife living at the time of such marriage. . shall be void.").
31. Record at 16.
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attorney's fees. 32 Although the court determined that plaintiff would have satisfied the grounds for alimony and alimony pendente lite if the parties had been

married, 33 it concluded that plaintiff's Dominican divorce was invalid due to
lack of jurisdiction in the granting court, and that therefore her subsequent marriage was void. 34 Further, the court concluded that Victor Mayer was not estopped from asserting the invalidity of the divorce. 35 It found estoppel

a
inapplicable to a foreign divorce that the state deemed invalid, inapplicable to
36
person not a party to the divorce, and inapplicable to the facts of the case.

On appeal the court of appeals rejected Doris Mayer's contention that her

37
foreign divorce should be recognized in North Carolina. The court concluded
38
that comity should not be extended to the foreign divorce because there was

not an adequate basis for jurisdiction-either domicile or some other sufficient
relationship. 39 In addition, the Dominican decree was denied recognition be-

cause it was offensive to North Carolina's public policy against the "hasty dissolution of marriages."''4
41
The court of appeals reversed the district court on the estoppel issue. Balancing conflicting public policies, the court noted that estoppel allows circum-

vention of a state's divorce law by giving practical effect to invalid divorces
obtained elsewhere. 4 2 It observed, however, that it would be even more contrary

to public policy to allow Victor Mayer to avoid his marital obligations by denying the validity of the divorce. 43 The court concluded that application of estop-

pel is not necessarily precluded when the party to be estopped is a second spouse
rather than one of the parties to the original divorce. 44

Generally, a state has jurisdiction to grant a divorce when one of the

spouses is domiciled in that state. 45 As the Supreme Court stated in Williams v.

32. Id. at 100.
33. Id. at 98; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2(4) (1984) (grounds for alimony include supporting spouse's abandonment of dependent spouse).
34. Record at 98.
35. Id. at 99.
36. Id. at 99-100.
37. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 525-30, 311 S.E.2d at 662-65. The court of appeals first had to
dispose of a procedural issue. The court determined that an immediate appeal was possible despite
is interlocutory and not immediately
prior decisions holding that an order of alimony pendente lite
appealable. Id. at 525, 311 S.E.2d at 662.
38. Comity is the recognition granted by one nation to legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). For further discussion of comity, see
infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
39. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 527-28, 311 S.E.2d at 663-64.
40. Id. at 529-30, 311 S.E.2d at 664-65.
41. Id. at 536, 311 S.E.2d at 669.
42. Id. at 532, 311 S.E.2d at 666.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 534-36, 311 S.E.2d at 667-68.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71, at 218 (1971) provides: "A state
has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses one of whom is domiciled in the state." This rule is not absolute; jurisdiction sometimes is predicated on a different
requirement. See id. § 72, at 219 ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the
marriage of spouses, neither of whom is domiciled in the state, if either spouse has such a relationship to the state as would make it reasonable for the state to dissolve the marriage."). North Carolina generally has required domicile as a minimum requirement for jurisdiction to grant a divorce.
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North Carolina (Williams //),46 "Under our system of law, judicial power to
47
grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicil."
Domicile is the place where one is physically present or living with the intent of
making that place his home. 48 Because of the domicile requirement, the parties
to a divorce proceeding cannot confer jurisdiction on a court.49 The rationale
underlying this restriction on the parties' choice of forum is that the domiciliary
state is a third party to the marriage, and thus has an interest in the marital

relationship.50

Recognition of a divorce granted in a sister state is governed by the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.51 The Supreme Court
held in Williams v. North Carolina (Williams 1)52 that domicile of one of the

parties to a divorce is a sufficient jurisdictional basis to entitle the divorce decree

to full faith and credit in every other state. 53 The scope of this entitlement to
full faith and credit was narrowed somewhat by Williams 11, which held that the
recognizing state can deny full faith and credit to a divorce if the rendering sister

state lacked jurisdiction-that is, if neither party was domiciled in the rendering
state.54 This freedom of the recognizing state to inquire into domicile and juris-

diction was thereafter limited by Supreme Court decisions holding that if the res
judicata rules of the rendering state would bar collateral attack on the issue of

domicile and jurisdiction when both parties participated (bilateral divorce), the
full faith and credit clause bars attack on this ground in other states as well.55

Recognition of foreign divorces, however, is not governed by the full faith

57
and credit clause,5 6 but instead is dependent on the doctrine of comity. Com-

Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in North Carolina, 48 N.C.L. REV. 243, 293 (1970). In addition,
jurisdiction is dependent upon residence in the state for the length of time required by statute. 3 W.
NELSON, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 489 (2d ed. 1945). North Carolina has a durational residency requirement of six months. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (1984); see 1 R. LEE, supra
note 6, § 98, at 452.
46. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
47. Id. at 229.
48. State v. Williams, 224 N.C. 183, 191, 29 S.E.2d 744, 749-50 (1944), aff'd, 325 U.S. 226
(1945); H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 286 (1968).
49. See, eg., Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 370, 68 P.2d 928, 936 (1937); Weiss, supra note 6,
at 412.
50. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 230; Weiss, supra note 6, at 412. In Williams l1 the North Carolina Supreme Court stated: "The marriage relation is interwoven with public policy to such an extent
that it is dissolvable only by the law of the domicil." State v. Williams, 224 N.C. 183, 192, 29 S.E.2d
744, 750 (1944), aft'd, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See generally Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party:
Spousal Support,PrivateAgreements, andthe State, 59 N.C.L. REv. 819 (1981) (interests of state and
parties in separation agreements).
51. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 299-304 (1942); 3
W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 33.2, at 451.
52. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
53. Id. at 298-302.
54. Williams II, 325 U.S. at 229.
55. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378, 384 (1948);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 & comment b (1971). In other words, the
res judicata rules of the state rendering the divorce are entitled to full faith and credit in all other
states.
56. 3 W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 13.11, at 439; Annot., 13 A.L.R.3D 1419, 1423-24 (1967).
57. See, eg., Warrender v. Warrender, 79 N.J. Super. 114, 119, 190 A.2d 684, 687 (App. Div.
1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 287, 195 A.2d 16 (1964); Southern v. Southern, 43 N.C. App. 159, 161-62, 258
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ity has been described as being "neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows . . . [to decrees of another] having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens. . .. ,,58 Thus, the extension of comity to a foreign divorce is discretionary.5 9 It may be denied, for example, when the foreign court lacked jurisdiction or when the foreign divorce is contrary to the recognizing state's public
60
policy.
The overwhelming majority of states withhold comity from a foreign divorce in cases in which the foreign court lacked jurisdiction because neither
party was domiciled in the foreign nation. 61 A minority of states, however, has
extended comity to bilateral foreign divorces in which neither party was domi62
ciled in the foreign nation.
Prior to the Mayer decision, no North Carolina cases had dealt with the
recognition of a foreign divorce, nor had any cases dealt with the recognition of
a divorce granted in a foreign nation where neither party was domiciled. 63 The
trial judge remarked at the close of the Mayer trial that this issue was "new
ground in North Carolina."" Professor Lee had reasoned in 1979 that since
North Carolina would not recognize an exparte sister-state decree granted without domicile, it was unlikely that the State would recognize a similar foreign
65
divorce.
Some background on the doctrine of estoppel is necessary to an understanding of the Mayer decision. Estoppel may be applied to prevent attack on both
sister-state 66 and foreign divorces. 67 This doctrine-that one who obtains or
S.E.2d 422, 424 (1979); 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 487; 3 W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 33.11,
at 440; Annot., supra note 56, at 1423-24. See generally Swisher, supra note 6, at 14-17 (comity as
applied to foreign divorces).
58. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
59. Swisher, supra note 6, at 14.
60. 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 487; 3 W. NELSON, supra note 45, § 33.11, at 440-42
(comity denied if divorce granted for cause not available under local law). The jurisdictional standards ofthe United States are used, rather than those of the foreign country. Annot., supra note 56,
at 1424. Comity may be denied when the grounds upon which the divorce was granted are not
available in and are contrary to the public policy of the state. E.g., Everett v. Everett, 345 So. 2d
586, 588 (La. Ct. App. 1977); cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 (1895) (Comity is extended
voluntarily and only when extension of it is not contrary to a nation's policies).
61. 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 488; Swisher, supra note 6, at 25-26; Note, Extension of
Comity to Foreign-NationDivorce, 46 TENN. L. REv. 238, 242 (1978).
62. Swisher, supra note 6, at 34-37; see Perrin v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1969) (Virgin
Islands); Yoder v. Yoder, 31 Conn. Supp. 345, 330 A.2d 825 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974); Rosenstiel v.
Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 971
(1966); Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978); Weiss, supra note 6, at 426-27 (discussing
factors the New York courts consider when deciding whether to grant comity to a foreign divorce).
63. See 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 488. Southern v. Southern, 43 N.C. App. 159, 258
S.E.2d 422 (1979), dealt not with the extension of comity to a divorce decree but with the extension
of comity to an in personam judgment for alimony and child support. The judgment was rendered in
England, where the plaintiff was domiciled, but North Carolina's requirements for personal jurisdiction were not satisfied.
64. Record at 94.
65. 1 R. LEE, supra note 6, § 104, at 488-89.
66. E.g., In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 509-10 (Iowa), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
951 (1979). In cases involving a bilateral sister-state divorce, attack on the divorce may be prevented
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relies on a judgment may not later collaterally attack that judgment for lack of
jurisdiction 6 8 -is an exception to the general principle that a judgment rendered

without jurisdiction is void and subject to collateral attack. 69 Estoppel, however, is not applied in every case. 70 Whether estoppel will be applied depends

upon the facts of a particular case.7 1 Application of estoppel does not validate

an invalid divorce decree, but rather silences a collateral attack. 72 The practical
effect is to give the invalid divorce decree some legal force,7 3 and to allow parties
to confer jurisdiction for a divorce by their conduct. 74 The result may be to
75
allow an evasion of the recognizing domiciliary state's divorce laws.
To assess the Mayer court's application of estoppel, one must first consider
the general level of acceptance accorded the doctrine, the factors that govern its

application, and its use against third-party second spouses. Although some jurisdictions reject estoppel, 7 6 the doctrine has been accorded "broad acceptance"
by the courts. 7 7 Among the factors that militate in favor of estoppel are procurement of the divorce by the party to be estopped, participation of the defen-

dant in the invalid divorce, remarriage by either party, receipt of benefit such as
alimony as a result of the divorce, and knowledge of and acquiescence in the

questionable validity of the divorce. 78 Professor Clark has abstracted the basic
components of a factual situation suitable for application of estoppel: "(1) the
by application of full faith and credit and res judicata. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAws § 73 & comment (1971); see supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text. Although such a
bilateral sister-state divorce would be protected from attack under the rule of Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334
U.S. 343 (1948), courts sometimes discuss such cases in terms ofestoppel. Clark, supra note 6, at 48.
67. Annot., supra note 56, at 1452. See generally Swisher, supra note 6, at 37-45 (overview of
application of estoppel to prevent attack on foreign divorces).
68. Clark, supra note 6, at 45.
69. Id.
70. See Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 94, 405 A.2d 360, 365 (1979).
71. Id.; see Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 207-08. Estoppel "is an equity principle dependent
upon events which may have occurred after the divorce was granted or apart from the divorce
action. It is not a function of the decree but a personal disability of the party attacking the decree."
Clark, supra note 6, at 47.
72. Packer v. Packer, 6 A.D.2d 464, 468, 179 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1958); Clark, supra note 6, at
55.
73. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 207.
74. Phillips, supra note 6, at 364 & n.48.
75. Id. at 364.
76. See, eg., Everett v. Everett, 345 So. 2d 586 (La. CL App.), cert. denied, 349 So. 2d 329 (La.
1977); Weber v. Weber, 200 Neb. 659, 265 N.W.2d 436 (1978).
77. Clark, supra note 6, at 49; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74 &
comment b (1971). Rejection of estoppel has been termed the "traditional theory," Swisher, supra
note 6, at 40, while acceptance has been described as a sociological approach, since estoppel has been
viewed as consistent with sociological theories of divorce. See Clark, supra note 6, at 56. This
sociological approach was expressed succinctly by the court in Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 98, 405
A.2d 360, 367 (1979) ("There remains little, if any, interest in encouraging the resurrection of deceased marriages, even if pronounced dead by other tribunals whose processes are not completely
consistent with our own.").
78. E.g., Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 505, 261 P.2d 269, 273 (1953) (remarriage), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 938 (1954); In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505, 509 (Iowa) (acquiescence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979); Norris v. Norris, 342 Mich. 83, 87, 69 N.W.2d 208, 210
(alimony), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Rosen v. Sitner, 274 Pa. Super. 445, 451-52, 418 A.2d
490, 493 (1980) (benefit of marrying a party to invalid divorce); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 210-11,
220; Weiss, supra note 6, at 415-16; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74 comment b (1971).
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attack on the divorce is inconsistent with prior conduct of the attacking party;
(2) the party upholding the divorce has relied upon it, or has formed expectations based on it; (3) these relations or expectations will be upset if the divorce is

held invalid."'79 The broad scope of estoppel is illustrated by section 74 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: "A person may be precluded from

attacking the validity of a foreign divorce decree if, under the circumstances, it
would be inequitable for him to do so." 80

Courts historically have been more hesitant to apply estoppel to a third
party than to a party to an invalid divorce.81 The issue of estopping a third
party most often arises with respect to a second spouse, usually a second hus-

band, of a party to the invalid divorce.8 2 The second husband may be estopped
from attacking the validity of his wife's divorce if he married with knowledge of

the nature of her prior divorce, and thus received benefits from that divorce
through his marriage.8 3 He also may be estopped if he persuaded his future wife
to obtain the invalid divorce, financed or arranged the divorce,8 4 or promised
85
support.

Some courts and commentators have argued the equity of estopping a second spouse from attacking the validity of a divorce he has participated in procuring.8 6 Since such a person, although technically not a party, stands in the
same position as the plaintiff in the divorce proceeding, the same reasons for
applying estoppel to a party to the divorce also apply to him.8 7 Further, it has

been argued that application of estoppel to the parties to an invalid divorce but
not to a second spouse "creates the impossible situation of wife or husband 'at

will,' where the divorced party who remarried cannot avoid the obligation of his
remarriage, while his second spouse could at any time seek and obtain an
annulment."

88

79. Clark, supra note 6, at 56-57.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIrT OF LAws § 74 (1971). "Foreign" as used in the
Restatement means both sister-state and foreign country.
81. Rosen v. Sitner, 274 Pa. Super. 445, 451, 418 A.2d 490, 492-93 (1980). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 74 comment b (1971); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAWS
§ 112 (1934) ("nor is any opinion expressed as to whether... a third person may be precluded from
questioning the validity of a divorce decree").
82. Clark, supra note 6, at 66; see, eg., Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d 613
(1957); Poor v. Poor, 381 Mass. 392, 409 N.E.2d 758 (1980).
83. See, eg., Zirkalos v. Zirkalos, 326 Mich. 420, 427, 40 N.W.2d 313, 316 (1949); Rosen v.
Sitner, 274 Pa. Super. 445, 451-52, 418 A.2d 490, 493 (1980).
84. See, eg., Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945) (financed and arranged divorce); In re Marriage of Winegard, 278 N.W.2d 505 (Iowa) (acquiescence, encouragement
and financed divorce), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 951 (1979).
85. See, eg., Kazin v. Kazin, 81 N.J. 85, 88, 98, 405 A.2d 360, 362, 367 (1979) (promise of
support, knowledge, arranged and financed divorce, receipt of benefits).
86. Goodloe v. Hawk, 113 F.2d 753, 756 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ("Equity has regard for realities
....
[Tihe appellant is as responsible for the action of the Virginia court, in a real sense, as the
appellee."); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal. App. 2d 657, 661, 161 P.2d 490, 493 (1945) ("[the second
spouse is] as much as any other. . . responsible for. . . the suit"); Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 217;
Weiss, supra note 6, at 425.
87. Clark, supra note 6, at 66-67.
88. Note, Enforcement by Estoppel of Divorces Without Domicil: Toward a Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, 61 HARv. L. REv. 326, 333 (1948); see Weiss, supra note 6, at 425.
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Prior to Mayer, North Carolina courts had estopped attacks on divorce
decrees for lack of jurisdiction to prevent a person from asserting that the divorce to which he was a party was invalid.8 9 In McIntyre v. McIntyre90 the
North Carolina Supreme Court estopped defendant in a suit for alimony from
asserting as a defense the invalidity for lack of jurisdiction of a divorce decree he
had obtained in Nevada from his first wife. 9 1 The court concluded that "reason
and justice" required this result because defendant had invoked the jurisdiction
of the Nevada court, and thereby had been able to remarry. 92 The court also
stressed that his remarriage had created new expectations on the part of his
second wife. 93 In Watson v. Watson 94 defendant in the original divorce sought
to have a Florida divorce her husband had obtained declared void for lack of
jurisdiction because he was not domiciled there. The court applied estoppel to
defendant as one alternative ground of its decision. 95 Even if the divorce were
invalid, the wife would have been estopped because she had received benefits
from the divorce by entering into a settlement agreement and receiving "valua'96
ble consideration."
The husband in Redfern v. Redfern9 7 did not attack the validity of his divorce per se, but rather its validity at the date of his marriage to his second wife.
The fact setting thus differed from the typical estoppel situation. 98 Although the
court in Redfern found the divorce valid at the date of the second marriage, the
opinion also contained language suggesting a decision based on estoppel. In
Redfern, defendant had instituted the divorce proceeding and had continued to
live with his second wife after discovering that the divorce judgment was not
signed until after the date of the second marriage. He failed to tell his second
wife of this flaw; therefore, the court noted he "should be equitably estopped"
from asserting this defense to his second wife's action for alihmony. 9 9
Parties guilty of culpable conduct sometimes have not been allowed to inyoke the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel was denied in Donnell v. Howell,1' ° a
case upholding an Alabama divorce, in which the wife stipulated that she had
obtained the divorce by fraud as to domicile. The court did not discuss the case
in terms of "clean hands"-the principle that one seeking the protection of eq89. See McIntyre v. McIntyre, 211 N.C. 698, 191 S.E. 507 (1937); Redfern v. Redfern, 49 N.C.
App. 94, 270 S.E.2d 606 (1980) (estoppel not explicitly relied on); Watson v. Watson, 49 N.C. App.
58, 270 S.E.2d 542 (1980) (alternate ground).
90. 211 N.C. 698, 191 S.E. 507 (1937).
91. Id. at 699, 191 S.E. at 507.
92. Id. at 699, 191 S.E. at 508.

93. Id.
94. 49 N.C. App. 58, 61, 270 S.E.2d 542, 544 (1980).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 64, 270 S.E.2d at 546; see 1 I LE supra note 6, § 98, at 463 ("A person cannot
attack a divorce decree after using the benefits which it confers.").
97. 49 N.C. App. 94, 270 S.E.2d 606 (1980).
98. See Note, supra note 88, at 327 (divorce usually attacked for lack of "jurisdiction over the
subject matter or domicil").

99. Redfern, 49 N.C. App. at 95-97, 270 S.E.2d at 608-09.
100. 257 N.C. 175, 125 S.E.2d 448 (1962).
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uity must have a clear conscience' 0 1-but stated that estopping the husband
(who also had made the fraudulent allegations) would, due to the joint stipulation of fraud, be an "offense against public morals." 10 2
Thus, prior to Mayer North Carolina courts had estopped either the plaintiff or the defendant in the original divorce proceeding based on the following
factors: procurement of the divorce (invocation ofjurisdiction), remarriage, new
expectations upset by invalidating the divorce, receipt of benefit, and knowledge
of and acquiescence in the invalid divorce.
Two cases in which a third party was not estopped involved culpable conduct by the party seeking estoppel or lack of participation in the divorce by the
third party. In Cunningham v. Brigman10 3 a wife asserted estoppel against the
children of her second husband. She alleged that after her remarriage her second husband had learned that her divorce was of questionable validity, but
nonetheless continued to live with her. The court stated that estoppel is for the
protection of innocent persons. Because the wife had procured her divorce
based on a false affidavit, she could not invoke the doctrine of estoppel.' 0 4 In an
earlier case, Pridgen v. Pridgen,105 the court had allowed a second husband to
annul his marriage on the ground that his wife had been divorced by her first
husband in an invalid proceeding. The court did not discuss the possibility of
estopping the second husband based on benefit to him from marriage, his wife's
remarriage, or the expectations that would be upset by invalidating the divorce.10 6 On the facts in these cases-when the conduct of the wife claiming
estoppel was not innocent or when the second husband had not been involved in
the prior decree-North Carolina courts had declined to estop the third-party
10 7
second spouse.
The Mayer court was eager to reach questions concerning the recognition of
"quickie" foreign divorces in North Carolina.10 8 Although the court could have
avoided the issue altogether,10 9 it analyzed in some detail the jurisdictional and
public policy issues bearing on the recognition of the Dominican divorce. The
court also resolved the question of appealability so as to permit immediate appeal of the validity of the Dominican divorce, further evidence of its desire to
101. For a discussion of "clean hands" as applied in estoppel cases, see Rosenberg, supra note 6,
at 221.
102. Donnell, 257 N.C. at 185, 125 S.E.2d at 455.
103. 263 N.C. 208, 139 S.E.2d 353 (1964) (will contest).
104. Id. at 211, 139 S.E.2d at 355.
105. 203 N.C. 533, 166 S.E. 591 (1932).
106. A case peripherally related to the question at hand is Carpenter v. Carpenter, 244 N.C. 286,
93 S.E.2d 617 (1956), in which the court held the decree at most voidable, not void. Id. at 295, 93
S.E.2d at 626. The court did not allow collateral attack by a second husband on the ground for
divorce alleged in his wife's prior divorce. Id. at 289, 93 S.E.2d at 622. The court carefully limited
the question before it to collateral attack on the ground for divorce alleged rather than collateral
attack on jurisdiction.
107. Cunningham concerned refusal to estop those whose claim was derived from a third-party
second spouse. See generally Clark, supranote 6, at 67 (person whose claim is derived from one who
would have been estopped is also estopped).
108. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 523-24, 311 S.E.2d at 661-62.
109. Id. at 523, 311 S.E.2d at 661; see supra note 4.
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address the foreign divorce issue. 110 The court's refusal to extend comity to a
foreign divorce granted without domicile (or other sufficient relationship between the parties and the forum), and its refusal to extend comity to a foreign
divorce contrary to the state's public policy against hasty divorce, shut off the
"quickie" foreign divorce as a viable alternative for North Carolinians.
The court in Mayer preserved the legal distinction between sister-state and
foreign divorce decrees. Briefly stated, the court's reasoning regarding the jurisdictional prerequisites for recognition of the Dominican divorce was: since comity requires domicile and there was no domicile in this case,1 11 comity will not
be extended. 112 Doris Mayer had argued that the standards by which North
Carolina extends comity to foreign divorces should mirror those by which the
state recognizes sister state divorces. 113 Those standards include the rule that
full faith and credit must be granted to bilateral divorces when the rendering
state's rules of res judicata preclude collateral attack on the issues of domicile
and jurisdiction. 114 This rule has the effect of protecting divorces granted with115
The Mayer
out domicile from collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds.
court maintained the distinction between recognition of sister-state and foreign
divorces, thus recognizing that this particular loophole is not available for for116
eign divorces.
The court's holding in Mayer brings North Carolina in line with the majority of states that have considered the foreign divorce issue. The court observed
that the majority of American jurisdictions will not recognize a foreign divorce
117
Doris Mayer had
if the parties were not domiciled in the granting nation.
urged the court to join the "growing minority of jurisdictions" that have extended comity to bilateral foreign divorces without the domicile of either party
in the foreign nation. 118 The Tennessee Supreme Court recently joined this minority in Hyde v. Hyde.' 19 In Hyde the court upheld a divorce obtained in the
Dominican Republic by nondomiciliaries of that country, one of whom was
present in person and the other represented by an attorney. It has been noted
110. See Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 525, 311 S.E.2d at 662. The court reasoned that cases holding
that orders for alimony are interlocutory and not immediately appealable are based on a desire to
prevent delay in the execution of orders for alimony. Id.; see Fliehr v. Fliehr, 56 N.C. App. 465, 289
S.E.2d 105 (1982); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 55 N.C. App. 250, 285 S.E.2d 281 (1981). Such cases,
therefore, did not bar appeal in Mayer since the appeal was from a denial of alimony. Mayer, 66
N.C. App. at 525, 311 S.E.2d at 662.
Ill. Id. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at 664; see supra note 45.
112. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528-29, 311 S.E.2d at 664.
113. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 5-8.
114. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 73 comment d (1971).

116. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528-29, 311 S.E.2d at 664. The court reasoned that even if Doris
Mayer's divorce had been obtained in a sister state, the Sherrerholding would not apply since her
divorce was not bilateral. Under Williams 1I the court would be free to inquire into the jurisdiction
of a sister state. Thus, North Carolina also could inquire into the jurisdiction of the Dominican
court. If Doris Mayer's divorce had been bilateral, domicile still would have been required because
the divorce was foreign. Id.
117. Id. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 664; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
118. Record at 9-11; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
119. 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
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that the Hyde court's concern with possible prejudice to the parties rather than
to the State resulting from the foreign nation's failure to require domicile for
jurisdiction is unusual. 1 20 The Mayer court, on the other hand, sided with the
majority of jurisdictions.1 21 In effect, the court reasserted the validity of domicile as the basis for divorce jurisdiction, a requirement that flows from the state's
1 22
interest in the marital relationship.
On the question of public policy, the court concluded that the Dominican
Republic's immediate 12 3 no-fault divorce was contrary to North Carolina's policy against hasty divorce. 124 The court pointed out by reference to the State's
statutes that North Carolina has a public policy against "the hasty dissolution of
marriages."' 125 Until 1983 State law permitted immediate divorce, but only on
proof of fault. 126 At present the only ground for absolute divorce is separation
for one year.1 27 The court rejected an argument that the ground of irreconcilable differences, upon which the Dominican divorce had been granted, was "substantially equivalent" to one year's separation.' 28 The distinction relied on by
the court was that the Dominican divorce could be obtained at once-a clear
conflict with the State's asserted public policy against hasty divorce. The Mayer
court's holding on this point differs from the Tennessee court in Hyde v.
Hyde.129 The Hyde court considered the grounds for the Dominican divorce
comparable to grounds available in Tennessee, since both were no-fault
grounds.' 30 The Tennessee court so found despite the fact that the Tennessee
no-fault statute required a cooling-off period,13 which one commentator viewed
as evidence of a state public policy against hasty divorce. 132
120. Note, supra note 61, at 247 n.59.
121. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 664.
122. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text. It is significant that the court's discussion of
jurisdiction opened with, "[The Dominican Republic had no interest in the marriage of the two
North Carolinians." Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 528, 311 S.E.2d at 664.
123. The Dominican divorce for foreigners does not have a durational residence requirement.
See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREcrORY, Dominican Republic Law Digest 3-4 (1985);
Swisher, supra note 6, at 10 n.4. Dominican officials have announced that foreigners can have access
to the courts within 72 hours. Note, CaribbeanDivorcefor Americans: Useful Alternative or Obsoles.
cent Institution?, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 116, 124 (1976).
124. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529-30, 311 S.E.2d at 664-65.
125. Id. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 664-65.
126. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (1976) (various fault grounds), repealed by Act of June 24,
1983, ch. 613, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 42. For a discussion of no-fault and fault grounds for divorce
available in the United States, see Note, supra note 123, at 119-20.
127. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984). The court noted that efforts to shorten the one-year
period in § 50-6 to six months had failed. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 665. The act
repealing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 was entitled "An Act to Abolish All Grounds for Absolute Divorce Except Separation." Act of June 24, 1983, ch. 613, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 42.
128. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529-30, 311 S.E.2d at 665.
129. 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978).
130. Id. at 197.
131. Note, supra note 61, at 248-49; see TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(c) (1984). The Tennessee statute requires that bills for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences be on file for 60
(no minor child) or 90 (minor child) days before being heard. Id. This requirement is distinct from
the durational residency requirement. Id. § 36-4-104.
132. Note, supra note 61, at 249. The commentator further noted that in Hyde neither party
challenged the validity of the Dominican decree, and that the court might not have upheld the
divorce had there been such a challenge. Id. at 250.
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The court of appeals in Mayer concluded that the trial court had correctly
refused to recognize the Dominican decree. 133 The court thus rejected the "sociological" view, 134 urged by Doris Mayer, that every divorce decree should be
recognized since there is nothing to be gained by denying divorce when the marriage has in fact ended.1 35 The court appeared to endorse the realism of the
sociological view but was not prepared to recognize a divorce granted on
grounds that did not guarantee the marriage was ended, a fact that one year's
delay would tend to confirm.
The court's refusal to recognize the Dominican decree was intended to
force North Carolinians to submit their marital difficulties to the "legislature's
judgments on the question of divorce." 13 6 The effect of this refusal will be limited because the expense 137 of a foreign divorce would have prevented many
couples from even considering one. After Mayer, what will happen to North
Carolina couples who want absolute divorce but are unwilling to wait a year?
The couples' options include committing perjury in a North Carolina court as to
the duration of their separation. 138 Another option would be for one spouse to
transfer domicile to a sister state with shorter durational residency or cooling off
period requirements. 139 Alternatively, the couple may obtain a bilateral divorce
in a sister state so as to take advantage of the rule that full faith and credit bars
attack on the issue of domicile and jurisdiction when the res judicata rules of the
rendering sister state would bar such attack. 14° The Mayer decision thus has
undermined only one method of evading North Carolina's divorce law.
The Mayer decision demonstrates that even a foreign divorce decree that
lacks jurisdiction and is substantively contrary to public policy may be given
limited practical effect through the application of estoppel. 14 1 The court deter133. See Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 530, 311 S.E.2d at 665. The court limited the holding to the
issue of estoppel. Id.; see supra note 4.
134. See Clark, supra note 6, at 52-53; supra note 77.
135. See Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 15-16. These arguments were summarized by the Mayer
court. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 526, 311 S.E.2d at 663. The sociological view of divorce has been
described as seeing "divorce as a regrettable but necessary legal recognition of marital failure."
Clark, supra note 6, at 54. The court noted that passage of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984) (grounds
of one year's separation) represented a concession to or or partial acceptance of the sociological view
of divorce. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 529, 311 S.E.2d at 665.
136. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 530, 311 S.E.2d at 665.
137. When travel and lodging are taken into account, it has been estimated that the cost of a
Caribbean divorce generally exceeds that of an American divorce. Note, supra note 123, at 126.

138. Perjury has been said to be widespread in American divorce proceedings. M.

WHEELER,

No-FAULT DIVORCE 5 (1974).

139. Domicile of one of the parties to a divorce is a sufficient jurisdictional basis to entitle the
divorce decree to full faith and credit in every other state. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
298-302 (1942).
A durational residency requirement for divorce is a statutory requirement that a party to the
divorce have been a resident of the state for a certain length of time prior to the filing of the action
for divorce. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-8 (1984) requires residence of six months. Such a residence
requirement is a jurisdictional requirement, see Eudy v. Eudy, 24 N.C. App. 516, 211 S.E.2d 536,
aftd, 288 N.C. 71, 215 S.E.2d 782 (1975), but is distinct from the domicile requirement. Swisher,
supra note 6, at 22-23; see supra note 45.

140. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
141. For the practical effect that estoppel gives to an invalid divorce decree, see supra notes 7375 and accompanying text.
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mined that allowing an evasion of the State's divorce law was preferable to alof his wife's prior divorce, which he
lowing Victor Mayer to deny the validity
142
had actively participated in procuring.
The Mayer decision opens the door to further applications of estoppel to
prevent a second husband from attacking his wife's prior divorce on grounds of
jurisdiction. Two arguments adduced by the court 143 offer strong support for
the application of estoppel to third-party second spouses like Victor Mayer.
First, one who procures a divorce, though not technically a party to the action,
has invoked the jurisdiction of the court to the same extent as the plaintiff and is
equally responsible for the decision. 144 To apply estoppel to a divorce plaintiff
but not to the second spouse who actively induced the invalid divorce would be
to value form over substance. Second, failure to estop a third-party second
spouse would allow him to induce reliance on the second marriage and escape at
will any obligation of support. 145 Escape from a failed marriage is, of course,
sanctioned by the state in the form of divorce, but escape from support obligations is not permitted.
The Mayer court assembled a list of factors favoring application of estoppel
that will help guide lower courts in future cases involving possible estoppel of a
third-party second spouse. The factors present in Mayer were (1) persuasion to
obtain the divorce, (2) promise of support, (3) reliance on this promise (by signing away alimony rights from first husband), (4) escort to the site of the divorce,
(5) financing the divorce, (6) reliance on the divorce by marriage and remarriage, (7) receipt of benefits (by marriage, living in his wife's house, borrowing
146
money), and (8) acceptance of the marriage as valid until after separation.
Additional factors-such as the presence of a child from the second marriage or
a marriage that had been long in duration-would have strengthened the case
for estoppel. The case for estoppel may be further strengthened when the party
seeking estoppel has not taken the risk of a new marriage while aware of the
possible consequences.

147

North Carolina's public policy, as enunciated in Mayer, against hasty divorce is buttressed by the Mayer court's determination that domicile be the jurisdictional basis for foreign divorce. The court thus sought to prevent interference
by foreign nations in the marital status of the state's domiciliaries. The Mayer
case illustrates, however, that the state's control over the marriage of its domiciliaries, and its substantive public policy, sometimes may be overridden. The
142. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 531, 311 S.E.2d at 666.
143. The court also noted that estoppel previously had been applied by North Carolina courts.
It downplayed the factual distinctions between Mayer and the prior cases, since estoppel depends on
the facts of each case, rather than on general rules. Id. at 533-34, 311 S.E.2d at 667. The court also
noted the broad language of REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONFLiCr OF LAWS § 74 (1971) and the
expansion from earlier versions. Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 532 & n.4, 311 S.E.2d at 666 & n.4.
144. Id. at 534, 536, 311 S.E.2d at 666, 667-68; supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
145. See Mayer, 66 N.C. App. at 532, 534, 311 S.E.2d at 666, 667-68.
146. Id. at 535, 311 S.E.2d at 668.
147. Id. at 531-32, 311 S.E.2d at 666. The district court stated in its order that "plaintiff knew
or should have known that the Dominican Republic divorce might not be recognized in North Caro-

lina." Record at 100.
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court's will to effectuate state divorce policy was properly tempered in Mayer by
considerations of equity. The court's use of estoppel against a third-party second spouse expands the use of estoppel in North Carolina in a fashion consistent
with the basic doctrine.
LAURA GOLDBERG LAPE

Hinton v. Hinton: Equitable Distribution Without
Consideration Of Marital Fault
In 1981 North Carolina modernized its laws on the distribution of property
upon divorce. 1 The adoption of North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20
changed North Carolina law from the common-law approach, in which property
division focused primarily on legal title, 2 to an equitable distribution system, in

which marriage is viewed as an economic partnership. 3 This change brought

North Carolina in line with most other jurisdictions 4 and generally has been

seen as desirable, 5 but it also left unanswered questions. For example, if a husband beats his wife, or if a wife abandons her husband, should a court consider
such conduct in distributing the couple's property on divorce?
In Hinton v. Hinton6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed for

the first time whether marital fault should be a consideration in equitable distribution. The court concluded that marital fault is irrelevant in making an equitable distribution of property. 7 This Note examines the implications of the court's
decision and concludes that, although marital fault generally should not be a
consideration, other types of fault may be relevant in equitable distribution. If
confronted with this issue, the North Carolina Supreme Court should reach the
same holding as the Hinton court, but also should recognize those situations in

which fault may be relevant.
The parties in Hinton filed for equitable distribution of their property under
section 50-20. 8 The trial court awarded a greater share of the property to the
wife, partly because the husband had physically abused the wife throughout

their marriage. 9 Among other incidents of abuse, 10 the husband had struck his
wife, causing a detached retina and scarring the tissue of her eye.1 I At the time
1. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. SEss.
§ 50-20 (1984)).

LAWS

1184 (codified at N.C. GEN.

STAT.

2. Marschall, ProposedReforms in North CarolinaDivorce Law, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 35, 45
(1976); see infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
3. Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 61
N.C.L. REv. 247, 247 (1983); see infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
4. There are at least forty-one states with equitable distribution systems. Freed & Foster,
Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 17 FAM. L.Q. 365, 379 (1984).
5. See, e.g., Sharp, supranote 3; Survey ofDevelopments in North CarolinaLaw, 1981-Family
Law, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1379, 1396 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Survey].
6. 70 N.C. App. 665, 321 S.E.2d 161 (1984).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 666, 321 S.E.2d at 161-62.
9. Id. at 666, 321 S.E.2d at 162.
10. The evidence showed that the husband was argumentative, threatened his wife, repeatedly
physically abused her, chased her around the house with a loaded shotgun and told her he was going
to blow her head off, held a loaded shotgun to his wife's head for 30 minutes and told her to "say
your prayers because it will be the last time you see daylight," beat her with his shoe, ripped the
phone out of the wall and chased her with a butcher knife, beat one of their daughters, spanked his
wife over his knee, and contracted venereal disease and gave it to his wife. Id. at 670-71, 321 S.E.2d
at 164.
11. Id.
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of trial, these injuries still impaired her ability to work. 12 The trial court found
that an equal distribution of property would not be equitable, 13 citing as one
14
reason that "injuries from the beatings. . have affected her employability.',
On appeal, the court interpreted this finding to mean that "because it is the
husband's fault that his wife's future earning ability is limited, his share of the
marital property should be reduced."' 15 Although it is questionable whether the
trial court's distribution actually reflected fault considerations,' 6 the court of
appeals used Hinton as a vehicle to consider the relevance of fault under North
Carolina's equitable distribution statute.
In rejecting fault as a consideration, the court of appeals examined the approach taken in other states, particularly New York, 17 and focused on the policies and legislative intent behind North Carolina's statute. Other jurisdictions
take varying approaches to the issue of fault in equitable distribution. Some
states expressly include fault as a relevant consideration in their statutes; others
reject it.18 In states with statutes that do not expressly mention fault, courts
have reached different conclusions on whether to consider fault in the distribution of property. 19
In Hinton the court began its discussion by stating that the North Carolina
equitable distribution statute was enacted to recognize marriage as an economic
partnership. 20 The purpose of equitable distribution is to effect "a return to each
party of that which he or she contributed to the marriage." 2 ' The court discussed the difficulty in determining fault 22 and expressed its view that considera12. Id.
13. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
14. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 671, 321 S.E.2d at 164. The court also based its conclusion that an
equal distribution would not be equitable on the disparity in the parties' incomes, the duration of the
marriage, the disparity between their retirement rights, and the wife's indirect contribution to the
husband's career potential. Id.
15. Id. at 672, 321 S.E.2d at 165.
16. Judge Becton, in his dissent, contended that the trial court's decision was not based on
fault. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
17. The court's reliance on New York's approach was appropriate because North Carolina's
equitable distribution statute closely resembles and was modeled after the New York statute. See
Survey, supra note 5, at 1399; infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussion of similarities
between the two statutes). The court paid particular attention to a recent New York decision, Blickstein v. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1984). See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
18. See Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 667, 321 S.E.2d at 162. The court lists the following state
statutes as among those that expressly include fault: CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-81(c) (West
1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330.1(4) (Vernon
1984). The following statutes expressly exclude fault from consideration: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1513(a) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.40, § 503(d) (Smith-Hurd 1984); MIm. STAT. ANN. § 518.58
(West 1984). Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 667, 321 S.E.2d at 162. Fault is a factor to be considered at
the trial court's discretion in at least two states: ALA. CODE § 30-2-52 (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, §751 (Equity 1984). See also infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (discussion of different
states' approaches to consideration of fault).
19. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 667, 321 S.E.2d at 162; see also infra note 59 (list of representative
state decisions); infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text (diesussion of different states' approaches
to consideration of fault).
20. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 668, 321 S.E.2d at 163.
21. Id. at 669, 321 S.E.2d at 163.
22. Id.
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tion of fault serves only one purpose-punishment of the "guilty" spouse by the
courts. 23 The court asserted that the general assembly did not intend the statute
to fulfill this purpose. 24 Last, the court considered the relationship between the
equitable distribution statute and other North Carolina divorce statutes. The
general assembly has instituted "no fault" divorce. 25 Fault, however, is a relevant consideration in awarding alimony. 26 These facts led the court to conclude
that the general assembly intended fault to be considered in making alimony
awards, but not in equitable distribution. 27
The policies underlying North Carolina's equitable distribution statute and
the cases cited in Hinton support the conclusion that marital fault 28 is not an
appropriate consideration under the statute. Although equitable distribution
29
should not be based on marital fault, other types of fault should be considered.
An examination of the North Carolina statute and the approach taken in other
jurisdictions will illuminate this distinction.
The North Carolina equitable distribution statute 30 provides that on divorce, the court shall make an equitable distribution 31 of a couple's marital
property. 32 The court must make an equal division 33 of marital property unless
it determines that an equal distribution would not be equitable. 34 The court
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984) (provides for divorce based on one-year separation without
showing that plaintiff is injured party).
26. See infra note 31.
27. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 670, 321 S.E.2d at 164.
28. The term "fault" is used here to refer to conduct leading to the dissolution of the marriage.
Economic fault, usually consisting of dissipating joint assets, involves different considerations and is
discussed infra in notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984).
31. The distribution of property on divorce differs from the awarding of alimony. Property
distribution is a one-time division of marital assets between husband and wife; alimony involves
ongoing payments from one spouse to the other. In North Carolina, alimony is paid to a dependent
spouse by a supporting spouse, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1 (1984), and is awarded only if the supporting spouse has committed one of the wrongs listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1984). Two
of the grounds for alimony are particularly relevant to the Hinton case: "The supporting spouse by
cruel or barbarous treatment endangers the life of the dependent spouse [and] [t]he supporting
spouse offers such indignities to the person of the dependent spouse as to render his or her condition
intolerable and life burdensome." Id. § 50-16.2 (6), (7).
Misconduct by the dependent spouse prevents him or her from receiving alimony. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.5 (1984). Thus, in North Carolina alimony awards clearly are fault-based. See Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 188, 261 S.E.2d 849, 858 (1980) (general assembly intended that
fault be a factor in alimony awards).
32. Only marital property is subject to distribution-separate property is excluded. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (1984). The definition of marital property in North Carolina is relatively narrow;
thus, the reach of the statute is less extensive than that of other states' statutes. See Sharp, supra
note 3, at 253. For an example of the effect of this provision, see Crumbley v. Crumbley, 70 N.C.
App. 143, 318 S.E.2d 525 (1984) (lot held to be husband's separate property even though deeded to
husband and wife, because it was received by husband from his mother in exchange for a separately
owned lot conveyed earlier to his mother).
33. See Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 552, 315 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1985) (statute
creates presumption of equal division "in the absence of some reason(s) compelling a contrary result"); White v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 435, 308 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1983) (statute creates presumption
of equal division), aff'd as modified, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d 829 (1985).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984).
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must consider specific factors in determining what division is equitable. 35 The
final listed factor is a "catch-all" provision, 36 which permits consideration of
"[a]ny other factor which the court finds to be just and proper."'37 It is under
38
this factor that fault could be considered.
The significance of the court of appeals' decision not to consider fault is
apparent only when the decision is contrasted with the fault-ridden backdrop of
earlier divorce law.39 Before the adoption of section 50-20, North Carolina
courts distributed property on divorce under the common-law system. Under
this system, property followed legal title on divorce, unless a constructive trust
or gift could be established. 40 This approach produced inequitable results when
one spouse had performed housekeeping and child-rearing services, but property
was held in the name of the other spouse. 4 1 To remedy this inequity42 and to
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984) lists the following factors:
(1) The income, property, and liabilities of each party at the time the division of property
is to become effective;
(2) Any obligation for support arising out of a prior marriage;
(3) The duration of the marriage and the age and physical and mental health of both
parties;
(4) The need of a parent with custody of a child or children of the marriage to occupy or
own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects;
(5) Vested pension or retirement rights and the expectation of nonvested pension or retirement rights, which are separate property;
(6) Any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage earner
or homemaker;
(7) Any direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop the
career potential of the other spouse;
(8) Any direct contribution to an increase in value of separate property which occurs during the course of the marriage;
(9) The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;
(10) The difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest, intact
and free from any claim or interference by the other party;
(11) The tax consequences to each party; and
(12) Any other factor which the court finds to be just and proper.
36. See Survey, supra note 5, at 1399.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (1984).
38. See Survey, supra note 5, at 1403-07 (pre-Hinton discussion of whether North Carolina
courts would be likely to consider fault under catch-all factor).
39. For a discussion of the role of fault in North Carolina family law, see Marschall, supra note
2, at 38-39; Sharp, Divorce and the Third Party: Spousal Support, PrivateAgreements, and the State,
59 N.C.L. REv. 819, 822-25 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Divorce]. But cf. Sharp, FairnessStandards
andSeparationAgreements: A Word of Caution on ContractualFreedom, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1399,
1454-55 (1984) (suggesting that the role of fault in alimony awards and property distribution may
have been overestimated).
40. Marschall, supra note 2, at 45; Survey, supra note 5, at 1396 (property follows title on
divorce).
41. See Marschall, supra note 2, at 45; Sharp, supra note 3, at 247; Survey, supra note 5, at
1396; see also Weitzman, The Economics ofDivorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 23 UCLA L. Rv.1181, 1241-53 (1980-81) (demonstrating
empirically that men are financially better-off than women after divorce).
42. The North Carolina Court of Appeals stated in White v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 433, 308
S.E.2d 68, 69 (1983) that "[e]quitable distribution. . . gives recognition to the essential supportive
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recognize marriage as an economic partnership, 4 3 the general assembly enacted
section 50-20.44 Under this statute, marital property is distributed equitably
upon divorce based on factors enumerated in the statute,45 which do not include
marital fault. In contrast, fault is crucial in determining alimony awards; a deif the supporting spouse is "guilty"
pendent spouse is entitled to alimony only
'46
and the dependent spouse is "innocent."
The North Carolina General Assembly borrowed heavily from New York's
equitable distribution statute, 47 therefore, an examination of that state's statute
is helpful. 48 The New York statute was enacted in 1980 to reflect the "modem
view of marriage as a partnership of equals and of divorce as the dissolution of
such a partnership."' 49 The New York equitable distribution statute contains a
catch-all provision almost identical to North Carolina's, which allows consideration of "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.'"so In Blickstein v. Blickstein5 l , a recent New York case relied on by the
role played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as homemaker, wife and mother she should
clearly be entitled to a share of the assets accumulated during the marriage."
Furthermore, the North Carolina Supreme Court has described § 50-20 as part of "the ongoing
march of the law to place men and women generally and husbands and wives particularly on an
equal legal footing." Mims v. Mirns, 305 N.C. 41, 56, 286 S.E.2d 779, 789 (1982). But cf. Prager,
SharingPrinciplesand the Future of MaritalPropertyLaw, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1, 2 (1977-78) (suggesting that "the marital property policy debate has become distorted by the focus on equality" and
emphasizing the importance of "sharing behavior" in marriage).
43. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 668, 321 S.E.2d at 163; White v. White, 64 N.C. App. 432, 432,
308 S.E.2d 68, 69 (1983).
44. Since § 50-20 was enacted, the North Carolina courts have resolved many controversies in
connection with the statute in addition to the fault issue. The statute has survived a charge of
unconstitutional vagueness. Ellis v. Ellis, 68 N.C. App. 634, 315 S.E.2d 526 (1984). Also, the courts
have determined that the statute does not affect the validity of separation agreements, McArthur v.
McArthur, 68 N.C. App. 484, 315 S.E.2d 344 (1984), although it does permit parties to execute a
property settlement without a separation. Buffington v. Buffington, 69 N.C. App. 483, 317 S.E.2d 97
(1984). Furthermore, a valid property settlement precludes the parties from requesting equitable
distribution of their property. Id. In addition, the court of of appeals has determined that equitable
distribution must occur before alimony and child support are awarded. Capps v. Capps, 69 N.C.
App. 755, 318 S.E.2d 346 (1984).
It is clear that only marital property is subject to equitable distribution. The court must determine what the marital property is, ascertain its net value, and then proceed with the distribution.
Turner v. Turner, 64 N.C. App. 342, 307 S.E.2d 407 (1983). If the trial court concludes that an
equal distribution is not equitable, it is required to enter findings of fact to support its conclusion.
The trial court's order will not be disturbed on appeal unless it has resulted in "an obvious miscarriage of justice." Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 552, 315 S.E.2d 772, 776 (1984).
45. See supra note 35.
46. See supra note 31.
47. North Carolina was relatively late in enacting its equitable distribution statute. See Marschall, supra note 2, at 45 (at the time of enactment, only fourteen United States jurisdictions, including North Carolina, still adhered to common-law marital property systems). See also Freed &
Foster, supra note 4, at 379 (at least forty-one states have equitable distribution systems).
48. See supra note 17.
49. Recent Developments-EquitableDistribution in New York, 45 ALB. L. REV. 483, 488
(1980-81) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]; see also Forcucci v. Forcucci, 83 A.D.2d 169,
171, 443 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1015 (1981) (statute enacted as a result of realization that marriage is an
economic partnership).
50. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1985). This provision was
controversial. Opponents of the statute thought the catch-all factor gave the courts too much latitude. Recent Developments, supra note 49, at 504. The factor apparently was included, both in the
New York and North Carolina statutes, as a compromise between those who wanted fault to be
considered and those who did not. Survey, supra note 5, at 1403 n.191. See Recent Developments,
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court in Hinton, the New York Supreme Court determined that marital fault
generally is not a relevant factor under the statute.5 2 The court's holding was
based on its view of marriage as an economic partnership and on the idea that
upon dissolution of the partnership, property should be distributed according to
economic need.5 3 In addition, the court reasoned that fault may be difficult to
evaluate and that both parties actually may be responsible for the breakup of a
marriage.5 4 The court did note, however, that fault may be relevant in extraordinary situations-those in which marital misconduct "shocks the conscience."'5 5 The court also stated that economic fault-in most cases dissipation
56
of assets-is a relevant consideration.
Legislative and judicial resolutions of the fault issue in other jurisdictions
further illustrate the policy considerations in this area. The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act expressly precludes consideration of fault in distribution of
property.5 7 Some states have enacted statutes providing that fault may not be

considered, whereas others have statutes listing fault as a factor that must be
considered.5 8 Still other states' statutes do not mention fault; in these states the
supra note 49, at 506 n.116, for a discussion of the omission of fault from the New York statute
(commentary was written prior to any New York court decisions on the fault issue).
51. 99 A.D.2d 287, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1984).
52. Id. Before Blickstein, lower courts in New York had reached varying conclusions on
whether fault was a proper consideration in equitable distribution of marital property. In Giannola
v. Giannola, 109 Misc. 2d 985, 441 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 1981), the court held that marital fault,
consisting of alleged adultery, constructive abandonment, and cruel and inhuman treatment by the
husband, was relevant to equitable distribution. The court held, however, that marital fault would
not preclude an award of equitable distribution. Id. at 987, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
This approach was developed further in Kobylack v. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d 402, 442 N.Y.S.2d
392 (Sup. Ct. 1981), modified on other grounds, 96 A.D.2d 831, 465 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1983) (mem.),
rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 62 N.Y.2d 399, 477 N.Y.S.2d 109 (1984). The Kobylack court
agreed with the Giannola court that fault is a proper consideration, but found it not relevant in the
case before it because the assets could be equitably distributed without economic harm to either
party. Kobylack, 110 Misc. 2d at 408, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 395. The Kobylack court set forth the
general rule that "fault should not be used as a punishment but only as a consideration to tilt the
balance where there are insufficient assets to make the parties economically 'whole."' Id.
In a later decision, M.V.R. v. T.M.R., 115 Misc. 2d 674, 454 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. 1982),
another trial court concluded that fault (in this case the husband's alleged homosexuality) should not
be considered in equitable distribution of marital assets. The court based its holding on an analogy
to dissolution of a commercial partnership, in which fault is irrelevant, id. at 678, 454 N.Y.S.2d at
782, on the difficulty in determining marital fault, id. at 679, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 782, and on the
potential for discrimination by the courts (against homosexuals in this case and against women in
other cases). Id. at 680, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
53. Blickstein, 99 A.D.2d at 291, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
54. Id. at 292, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
55. Id. at 292, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 113-14; see infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
56. Id. at 293, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 114; see supra note 28; infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
57. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 201 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) § 307 (1974). This
section contains two alternatives. Alternative A provides that "the court, without regard to marital
misconduct, shall... equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to
either or both. . . ." Alternative B states that the court "shall divide community property, without
regard to marital misconduct, in just proportions.
Both alternatives list factors for the court
to consider in making the distribution. Id.
The New York statute was modeled on Alternative A. Recent Developments, supra note 49, at
492. The language regarding marital misconduct, however, was omitted. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
58. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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courts have decided whether fault should be considered.5 9 New Jersey's equitable distribution statute, for example, does not address the question of fault. 60 In
the landmark case of Chalmers v. Chalmers61 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that marital fault could not be considered in equitable distribution. 62 The

court based its decision on the difficulty of assessing fault, noting that "fault may
be merely a manifestation of a sick marriage." 63 In addition, the court found

the concept of fault irrelevant in equitable distribution "since all that is being
64
effected is the allocation to each party of what really belongs to him or her."
The Hinton court's holding appears to reflect properly the policies underly-

ing equitable distribution. If the purpose of equitable distribution is to effect the
dissolution of an economic partnership, marital fault is irrelevant. Misconduct
that leads to divorce may not be related to the economic contributions of the
65
parties or to their financial needs after divorce.

If the court does consider marital fault, it faces the difficult task of deter-

66
mining which spouse's conduct precipitated the collapse of the marriage.

Some courts have taken the position that fault is relevant, but when both spouses
are equally at fault, the parties' misconduct will be disregarded. 67 This position

affords a partial solution to the problem of assessing fault. On the other hand,
courts may not wish to inquire into marital fault at all to avoid the
melancholy history of feigned grounds, strident name-calling and finger-pointing and mutually destructive charges of crime and misconduct which have turned our courts all too often into battle grounds in

which reputations are destroyed along with marriages, and children
are made
spectators to mutual character-assassination by their
8
parents.

6

Refusal to consider fault on dissolution, however, may have drawbacks.
The court in Hinton pointed out that the trial court might reach the same result
59. Representative state decisions include: Cooper v. Cooper, 382 So. 2d 569 (Ala. Civ. App.
1980) (fault relevant despite availability of no-fault divorce); Peters v. Peters, 248 Ga. 490, 283
S.E.2d 454 (1981) (adultery relevant but will not preclude equitable distribution); In re Marriage of
Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972) (fault irrelevant under catch-all provision); LaRue v. LaRue,
216 Kan. 242, 531 P.2d 84 (1975) (fault relevant); Davey v. Davey, 106 Mich. App. 579, 308
N.W.2d 468 (1981) (fault relevant despite availability of no-fault divorce); Simmons v. Simmons, 275
S.C. 41, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980) (adultery relevant but will not preclude equitable distribution);
Thorpe v. Thorpe, 108 Wis. 2d 189, 321 N.W.2d 237 (1982) (fault not proper consideration under
catch-all factor of equitable distribution statute).
60. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1985).
61. 65 N.J. 186, 320 A.2d 478 (1974).
62. Id. at 193, 320 A.2d at 482.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 194, 320 A.2d at 483.
65. Sharp, Divorce supra note 39, at 825 n.30.
66. See supra notes 22, 54 & 63 and accompanying text.
67. See Nolen v. Nolen, 398 So. 2d 712, 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259
N.W.2d 41, 45 (N.D.), appeal after remand, 281 N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1977).
68. Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 46-47 (N.D.), appeal afterremand, 281 N.W.2d 569
(N.D. 1977) (Vogel, J., dissenting). Justice Vogel pointed out that the purpose of no-fault divorce
was to end this "melancholy history," but that the purpose is not achieved if fault enters as a consideration in property division. Id. at 47 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
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on remand, but must support it with nonfault-related findings. 69 Given that
their orders will not be easily disturbed on appeal, 70 trial courts may continue to
be influenced by fault without expressing it as a factor in their findings. This
risk probably will be short lived, however, because over time courts are likely to
move away from a fault-oriented approach. Courts historically have considered
fault in all aspects of divorce, 7 1 although recently the trend has been away from
fault considerations. 72 As courts confront more cases under the new laws and
become accustomed to making decisions without reference to fault, fault surely
will cease to be even an unconscious consideration. In addition, when alimony is
not an issue, fault-related evidence will be irrelevant and thus can be excluded
entirely.
A general rule against consideration of fault is consistent with the policies
behind equitable distribution. Such a rule allows courts to focus on the economic situations of the parties rather than on the marital dispute itself. There
are circumstances, however, under which it would be inequitable not to consider
certain types of fault. In particular, fault may be relevant when one spouse has
dissipated joint assets, when one spouse has engaged in misconduct that decreases the earning capacity of the other spouse, and when marital fault is especially egregious.
Although marital fault usually does not involve the economic contributions
of the parties, sometimes the fault of one spouse consists of dissipation of marital
assets. 73 Even if fault generally is not a relevant factor, economic fault should be
considered in equitable distribution. For example, in In re Marriageof Clark,74
the Washington Court of Appeals held that the husband's dissipation of much of
his earnings through drinking could be taken into account in distributing the
couple's property.
Misconduct by one spouse that affects the earning capacity of the other
spouse should be entitled to similar treatment. In Hinton the majority refused to
consider that the husband's abuse of his wife affected her ability to work, but
Judge Becton, in his dissent, found this fact relevant. 75 There clearly is a distinction between misconduct that leads to the dissolution of a marriage and mis69. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. at 672, 321 S.E.2d at 165.
70. Alexander v. Alexander, 68 N.C. App. 548, 315 S.E.2d 772 (1984).
71. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 1-5, 39-46 and accompanying text.
73. The Blickstein court stated that such economic fault is a relevant consideration. Blickstein,
99 A.D.2d at 293, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
74. 13 Wash. App. 805, 538 P.2d 145 (1975). See also Harrigan v. Harrigan, 135 Vt. 249, 251,
373 A.2d 550, 552 (1977) (relevant that husband dissipated wife's inheritance).
75. Fault may not have been the appropriate issue on which to resolve Hinton. The court of
appeals probably was anxious to resolve the issue of fault in the equitable distribution context and
thus saw fault as an issue in Hinton when it really was not. Mrs. Hinton suffered from a detached
retina and scarring of the tissue in her left eye, which affected her ability to work. Hinton, 70 N.C.
App. at 670-71, 321 S.E.2d at 164. Thus, Judge Becton in his dissent interpreted the trial court's
determination as based on the wife's impaired employability and not on fault. Id. at 673, 321 S.E.2d
at 166 (Becton, J., dissenting). Judge Becton agreed with the majority that fault should not be
considered in equitable distribution, but stated that the fact that one spouse has diminished the
career potential of the other is a relevant consideration. Id. He pointed out that the statute specifically directs courts to consider the parties' relative economic positions, their physical and mental
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conduct that leaves a spouse disabled and unemployable. For instance, in an
Oregon case, the court found the fact that the husband had fractured his wife's

ankle relevant to the issue of her employability, but found that she was able to
work.76 Misconduct causing a physical disability that affects one spouse's ability
to work should be a proper consideration in equitable distribution and should be

distinguished from misconduct causing only the deterioration of the marriage.
Finally, in some cases the fault of one spouse may be so egregious that to

ignore it would be inequitable. For example, in D'Arc v. D'Arc77 a husband had
offered someone $50,000 to kill his wife, a wealthy heiress. In this case the court

relaxed the New Jersey rule against consideration of fault in equitable distribution7 8 to permit consideration of the husband's fault. The court noted that this
was not the usual type of fault, but an attempt to commit a heinous crime and
stated, "[W]here a spouse has committed an act that is so evil and outrageous

that it must shock the conscience of everyone, it is inconceivable that this court
should not consider his conduct when distributing the marital assets
equitably."

79

The adoption of equitable distribution represented a significant change in
North Carolina family law. To implement the policies of the equitable distribution statute fully, marital fault clearly cannot be considered in dividing a
couple's property on divorce. Equitable distribution is based on a view of marriage as an economic partnership. The parties are entitled to recover what they
contributed to the marriage. In addition, the economic future of each spouse is
relevant. Fault, however, is not relevant to the dissolution of an economic partnership or to predicting the future needs of the parties. The decision of the
North Carolina Court of Appeals in Hinton not to consider fault under North
Carolina's equitable distribution statute thus is both appropriate and consistent
with the purpose of the statute.

If the North Carolina Supreme Court is confronted with this issue, it
should reach the same result as the court of appeals, but should provide excephealth, and any effort by one spouse to develop the career potential of the other spouse. Id. at 673,
321 S.E.2d at 165 (Becton, J., dissenting).
Any controversy over whether Hinton was the appropriate forum for deciding the role of fault
in equitable distribution has since been rendered moot. The court of appeals recently reaffirmed its
Hinton decision in a case presenting the issue more clearly. In Smith v. Smith, 71 N.C. App. 242,
322 S.E.2d 393 (1984), the wife had engaged in various forms of misconduct, including abandoning
her husband and children and drinking alcohol excessively. Id. at 245-46, 322 S.E.2d at 396. The
court reiterated its holding in Hinton: fault is not an appropriate consideration in determining an
equitable distribution of property. Id. at 249, 322 S.E.2d at 395; see also Dusenberry v. Dusenberry,
73 N.C. App. 177, 326 S.E.2d 65 (inappropriate to consider fault consisting of wife's adultery), disc.
rev. granted, 313 N.C. 598, 330 S.E.2d 608 (1985); Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E.2d 260
(evidence of misconduct properly excluded), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
76. In re Marriage of Koch, 58 Or. App. 252, 255, 648 P.2d 406, 408 (1982). But cf Myers v.
Myers, 586 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (fault is relevant, but husband's misconduct in
striking wife was too minor to affect property distribution).
77. 164 N.J. Super. 226, 395 A.2d 1270 (1978), modified on other grounds, 175 N.J. Super. 598,
421 A.2d 602 (1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981).
78. Id. at 241, 395 A.2d at 1278; see supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
79. D'Arc, 164 N.J. Super. at 241, 395 A.2d at 1278. The court in Blickstein used similar
language in stating that certain types of misconduct might be relevant. See supra text accompanying
note 55.
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tions to the general rule against consideration of fault in equitable distribution.
A spouse's misconduct that depletes the parties' joint assets should be considered. It would be inequitable to allow one spouse to waste the couple's assets
and then to share equally in the property on divorce. In addition, courts should
consider any physical disability affecting a spouse's earning capacity, regardless
of whether the disability was caused by the misconduct of the other spouse.
Finally, some types of misconduct are so egregious that a court would find it
difficult to ignore them, even if it were so inclined. Egregious fault thus should
be considered by courts making equitable distributions of marital property.
Although the court of appeals did not address these specific issues, the
broad policy expressed in Hinton is sound. The North Carolina Court of Appeals helped fulfill the purpose of equitable distribution in holding that fault
should not enter into the court's division of marital property under section 5020. The courts now will be free to implement the true purposes of the statuteequitable distribution of marital property based on the parties' contributions and
needs.
LEsLIE CALKINs O'TOOLE

State v. Thomas: When Is a Confession Coerced and
When Is It Voluntary?
The United States Constitution provides a criminal defendant with the right
to due process of law,1 the right to assistance of counsel, 2 and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 3 American courts have used all three of these constitutional provisions to refuse to admit into evidence certain confessions made by
criminal defendants. 4 No matter which premise is used to determine whether
confessions are admissible, the underlying theme is the same: confessions extracted by unacceptable means will not be used as substantive evidence against a
defendant.5 There are, however, varying interpretations concerning what are
unacceptable means. Some methods of extracting a confession have been found
to be clearly unacceptable. 6 Many questionable methods, however, have been
7
found acceptable.
In State v. Thomas 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the admissibility of a defendant's confession in light of two rules of evidence. 9 One
rule arose from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v. Arizona10 that once an accused invokes his fifth amendment right to counsel, there
can be no further police interrogation unless the accused initiates the dialogue. 1
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.01 (1980); J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 70 (1974).
5. Although not admitted for substantive purposes, in "some circumstances an improperly
obtained confession may be used for impeachment purposes." J. COOK, supra note 4, § 70. Also, in
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), the United States Supreme Court upheld the admission
into evidence of a confession that arguably resulted from the violation of the defendant's fifth and
sixth amendment rights because the admission was shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be harmless
error. Id. at 372-73. Commenting on the harmless error doctrine, Professor Whitebread observed:
"If the primary reason for Mirandais to deter coercive methods by the police, then the harmless
error doctrine should seldom, if ever, be applicable." C. WHITEBREAD, supranote 4, § 15.06, at 322.
6. See, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confession obtained during police custo.
dial interrogation from a suspect who was not warned of his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (confession obtained through long-term
interrogation of defendant who was deprived of sleep); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(confession obtained through the use of physical brutality).
7. See, eg., Leuschen v. State, 41 Md. App. 423, 397 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 933
(1979) (inculpatory statements made by defendant to an undercover officer during the course of
general conversation in defendant's cell were not obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda
rights); State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 687-89, 304 S.E.2d 579, 583-84 (1983) (defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel had not yet arisen while he was in custody on an unrelated charge but
before a warrant for his arrest concerning the crime at issue had been executed); State v. Pacheco,
481 A.2d 1009, 1022-27 (R.I. 1984) (police officer's promise to help defendant receive sentence to be
served at an out-of-state prison and to dismiss charges against defendant's companion did not make
defendant's confession involuntary).
8. 310 N.C. 369, 312 S.E.2d 458 (1984).
9. Id. at 377-79, 312 S.E.2d at 462-64.
10. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
11. Id. at 484-85. The Court in Edwards noted that Miranda "declared that an accused has a
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation." Id.
at 482. For a discussion of the Edwards holding, see infra text accompanying notes 53-59.

1985]

EVIDENCE

The other rule is a North Carolina requirement that a confession be voluntary to
be admissible. 12 This Note discusses the background of both rules and the reasoning used by the court in applying them. This Note also analyzes the ambiguities inherent in both rules but unaddressed by the court. It concludes that
although the Thomas decision is not a pronounced deviation from existing case
law involving either rule, 13 there are problems with the court's straightforward
approach, including the possibility that use of coercive confessions will be less
restricted in the future.
At approximately 5:30 a.m. on May 26, 1982, a ten year old boy was sexually assaulted while on his newspaper route in Winston-Salem. t4 The victim
described his assailant as a jogger.1 5 On August 6, 1982, the victim identified
the defendant as his assailant from a group of six photographs.' 6 Defendant had
been arrested on August 5, 1982, for a different assault, which occurred on August 4, 1982.17 At the time of his arrest defendant was informed of his Miranda
rights,' 8 and he apparently understood them. 19 The next day, defendant was
taken by two police officers from jail to the city hall, where he was again informed of his rights, both orally and in writing. 20 After defendant waived his
rights,2 ' the two officers began to question him "in very general terms."'22 When
they began to question him specifically about the assault of May 26, "defendant
'23
indicated that he did not want to talk further and that he wanted an attorney."
The officers then stopped questioning defendant and took him to the Office of
the Clerk of Superior Court, where one of the officers filled out an arrest
24
warrant.
While filling out the arrest warrant, one of the officers said to defendant:
"Be sure to tell your attorney that you had the opportunity to help yourself and
didn't."'25 Approximately five minutes after the officer made the comment, defendant asked the officer if he still wanted a statement. The officer responded
that it was up to defendant.2 6 Defendant was again taken to the city hall and
informed of his rights. Defendant then waived his rights and gave an incrimi12. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 378-79, 312 S.E.2d at 463-64. For a discussion of North Carolina's
voluntariness rule, see infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
13. See infra text following note 74.
14. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 370, 312 S.E.2d at 459.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
18. For a discussion of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), see infra notes
38-40 and accompanying text.
19. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
20. Id. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
21. Brief for Appellant at 72 app., Thomas.
22. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. During the voir dire hearing, see infra note 28, defendant gave his version of what took
place after he asked for an attorney:
I'm not sure if Mr. Weavil [one of the police officers) got up and left the room or not, but
Mr. Dalton [the second police officer] was there, and he was very polite and asked what
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nating statement to the officers. 27
At trial the court conducted a voir dire hearing to determine the admissibil-

ity of defendant's confession. 2 8 Finding that the confession was not the result of
any questioning or inducement by the officers and that the confession "was made
freely, voluntarily, and understandingly,"' 29 the trial court admitted the confession into evidence over defendant's objection. The jury found Thomas guilty
30
and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Thomas came before the North Carolina Supreme Court on an appeal of

right.31 Defendant assigned as error the admission of his confession, basing his
argument on two grounds. First, he claimed that the confession was obtained in
violation of the Edwards rule because the officer's suggestion that defendant tell
his attorney he had been given an opportunity to help himself was interrogation
32
Secinitiated by the officer after defendant had invoked his right to counsel.

ond, defendant claimed that his confession was involuntary because it was "induced by the suggestion of hope or fear implanted in his mind" by the officer's
comment.

33

The North Carolina Supreme Court's rejection of defendant's claims was
brief. First, the court held that the officer's comment was not interrogation and
therefore did not violate the Edwards rule. 34 Second, the court held that the
confession was not the product of coercion or fear and therefore was made by
religion I was. Said, "You're a reasonable person." And I said I was raised as a Southern
Baptist, and he said good morals, that sort of thing.
"You're a smart person. If you had a chance to help yourself, wouldn't you?" And I
said, "Yes, I would." And he said, "Well, a statement would help you very much." And I
said, "I have nothing further to say."
And then he sat up in his chair and shuffled his papers and he said, "Well, when you
do speak to your lawyer, tell him you had a chance to help yourself and you didn't."
Brief for Appellant at 61 app., Thomas.
27. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
28. Id. When a defendant objects to the admission of his confession into evidence, "the trial
judge should then excuse the jury and in the absence of the jury hear the evidence of both State and
the defendant upon the question of whether defendant, if he made an admission or confession, voluntarily and understandingly made the admission or confession." State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 291,
158 S.E.2d 511, 516 (1968).
29. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
30. Id. at 370, 312 S.E.2d at 459.
31. The appeal as a matter of right was in accordance with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (1981).
32. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 462-63. For a discussion of the holding in Edwards, see infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
33. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 463. Defendant assigned two other points as error.
First, defendant contended that the trial court had admitted evidence which tended to show that
defendant had committed a separate offense. The trial court had admitted the evidence on the
ground that defendant had put his identity and presence at the crime scene in issue. The court,
therefore, permitted the State to present evidence of a second crime by defendant which involved
facts sufficiently unusual that they indicated the commission of both crimes by the same person. The
North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the admission of this evidence. Id. at 371-74, 312 S.E.2d at
459-61.
Second, defendant assigned as error the trial court's denial of defense counsel's motion to withdraw himself from the case because of a potential conflict of interest. The supreme court stated that
motions to withdraw generally are left to the trial judge's discretion unless an abuse of discretion is
demonstrated. The court found no showing of abuse and therefore upheld the trial court's ruling on
the withdrawal motion. Id. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 461.
34. Id. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
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defendant voluntarily. 35 Judge Exum dissented from the affirmance of the trial
court's decision, considering the officer's remark to be an interrogation and believing the confession to be involuntary because it was the product of a promise
36
of leniency.
To thoroughly reanalyze defendant's claims, it is necessary to consider the
development of the two admissibility rules from which the claims arose. The
Edwards rule grew out of Miranda v. Arizona.37 The United States Supreme
Court in Mirandaheld that certain threshold procedures were necessary to pro-

tect a criminal defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 38 The Court held that a person subjected to custodial interrogation must
be warned in "clear and unequivocal terms" that he has the right to remain
silent; that anything he says may be used against him; that he has the right to
speak with an attorney; and that he has the right to have an attorney appointed
for him if he is indigent. 39 Although noting that a defendant could waive these

rights, the Court put a heavy burden on the government to show that any waiver
was made knowingly and intelligently. 4° Following Miranda, the United States

Supreme Court decided three fifth amendment cases relevant to the issues in
Thomas:41 Edwards,4 2 Rhode Island v. Innis, 4 3 and Oregon v. Bradshaw.44

In the first case in the trilogy, Innis, defendant had been arrested for murder and was being transported in a police wagon by two police officers.4 5 With
the defendant listening, the two officers engaged in conversation concerning the
location of the gun used in the murder. They expressed great concern over the
possibility that the gun might fall into the hands of one of the retarded children
35. Id. at 379, 312 S.E.2d at 464.
36. Id. at 381-84, 312 S.E.2d at 465-66 (Exum, J., dissenting).
37. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Edwardswas based on the statement in Mirandathat "the assertion of
the right to counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the accused, 'the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present.'" Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
474).
38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-79.
39. Id. The Court in Mirandastated that it intended to give "concrete constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow," id. at 441-42, guidelines aimed at ensuring that
an accused was given his fifth amendment privilege. Id. The Court was concerned with suspects'
compulsion to confess during custodial interrogation, even when, "in traditional terms," the suspects' statements were made voluntarily. Id. at 457. The Court created procedural."safeguards"
which must be observed unless the states devise "other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise" that right. Id. at 467.
40. Id. at 479.
41. Although the court in Thomas stated that there was "no violation of defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel," Thomas, 310 N.C. at 377, 312 S.E.2d at 463, defendant's assignment
of error and the court's analysis were based on the Edwardsrule, which protects the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the part of this Note concerning the interrogation
issue is a fifth amendment discussion. The United States Supreme Court noted that "[tihe definitions
of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term 'interrogation' is even
apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two constitutional protections are quite distinct." Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
42. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
43. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
44. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
45. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293-94.
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who attended a nearby school. 4 6 The conversation was between the two officers
only and did not include defendant. However, defendant spoke up from the
back seat and told the officers that he wanted to retrieve the
gun because of the
47
children around the school, thereby incriminating himself.
Defendant in Innis had been informed of his Miranda rights and had invoked his right to counsel before the officers' conversation about the gun took
place.48 The defendant was clearly in custody at the time he made the inculpatory statement; 4 9 therefore, the only question for the Court to decide under the
'50
Miranda standard was whether the officers' conversation was "interrogation."
Squarely addressing what constitutes interrogation, the Court stated:
[Tihe Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. ... [T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect rather
than the intent of the police. . . . [T]he Miranda safeguards were
designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without
regard to objective proof
51
of the underlying intent of the police.
The Supreme Court applied this definition to the officers' front seat conversation
52
and found that the conversation was not interrogation.
A year after Innis, the Court decided Edwards. In Edwards defendant, arrested for robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder, was informed of his Miranda rights. 53 He invoked his right to counsel, interrogation ceased, and he
was jailed.5 4 The next morning he was told that he had to talk with two detectives, although he had not yet seen an attorney. The conversation with the
detectives resulted in his confession. 55 The Supreme Court held that "when an
accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights."5 6 The Court further held that when an accused has "expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject
46. Id. at 294-95.
47. Id. at 295.
48. Id. at 294.

49. Id. at 298. The Court in Miranda established that "custody," for Miranda purposes means
that the defendant is either "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
50. Innis, 446 U.S. at 298.
51. Id. at 300-01.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 303.
Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478.
Id. at 479.
Id.

56. Id. at 484.

1985]

EVIDENCE

1219

to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges,
or conversations with the police."' 57 The police had interrogated defendant after
58
he invoked his right to counsel and defendant had not initiated the exchange.
Therefore, his confession was inadmissible.5 9
Edwards established an apparent per se rule which would operate to exclude a confession upon a showing that a defendant did not initiate the dialogue
that resulted in the confession. 6° Edwards' impact was somewhat lessened,
61
however, by the subsequent decision of the Court in Oregon v. Bradshaw. Just
as the Court defined "interrogation" in Innis, the court in Bradshaw refined
Edwards' reference to "initiation" of communication with the police by an accused. 62 In Bradshaw defendant was arrested for furnishing liquor to a minor
and was informed of his Miranda rights. When he requested an attorney, inter63
rogation ended and he was transported from the police station to jail. During
the trip, Bradshaw asked a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me
65
now?" 64 The subsequent discussion eventuated in defendant's confession.
The Court held that defendant's question "evinced a willingness and a desire for
a generalized discussion about the investigation" and that "[i]t could reasonably
66
have been interpreted by the officer as relating generally to the investigation."
Therefore, defendant's question satisfied the Edwards' "initiation"
67
requirement.
57. Id. at 484-85. The Court addressed how it would define defendant-initiated dialogue in
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-45 (1983). See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
58. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487.
59. Id.
60. Lower courts have interpreted Edwards in two different ways. One interpretation views
Edwards as presenting the initiation requirement as just one factor to be considered in a totality of
the circumstances test. The other view of Edwardsis that it mandates a two-step process in which it
is first determined whether defendant initiated the dialogue; then, if defendant did initiate it, a totality of circumstances test is used to determine whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights. This latter view is really a per se rule because of the requirement that defendant initiate
the dialogue before there is waiver. Comment, Oregon v. Bradshaw: Right to Counsel Under Miranda-The Waiver Standard, 19 Naw ENG. L. REV. 513, 519-20 (1984). Oregon v. Bradshaw
made it clear that the latter view is what the Edwards Court intended. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at
1044-45.
61. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
62. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46. For a discussion of the reference to initiation in Edwards,
see supra text accompanying note 57.
63. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1041-42.
64. Id. at 1042.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1045-46.
67. Id. The Court explained its holding:
While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements
around the word "initiate" in this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare
inquiry by either defendant or by a police officer should not be held to "initiate" any conversation or dialogue. There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a
request to use a telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a
desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly
or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquiries or statements, by either an accused or a
police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally
"initiate" a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards.
Id. at 1045.
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North Carolina, following the United States Supreme Court, adopted the
Edwards rule. 68 The definition of interrogation in Innis and of defendant-initiated dialogue in Bradshaw combine with the basic rule of Edwards-thatonce a

defendant requests counsel, interrogation by the police must cease unless the
defendant initiates dialogue with the police-to form the framework of analysis

for defendant's Edwards claim in Thomas.
Defendant's claim that his confession was inadmissible because it was involuntary has different origins. North Carolina's voluntariness standard has its origin in the belief that confessions induced by hope or fear are generally
unreliable. 69 Originally, the United States Supreme Court also used a voluntariness standard, but the basis for its use was the due process clause of the four-

teenth amendment. 70 As federal confession law developed, the due process
voluntariness test was superseded by modem confession law's emphasis on Miranda.71 North Carolina's confession law, while recognizing the Miranda requirements, still incorporates the test of voluntariness. 72 The North Carolina
Supreme Court recently stated that in testing the voluntariness of a confession,
"the court looks at the totality of the circumstances of the case." 73 Whenever a

confession is the product of a threat or a promise of leniency, the confession is
considered involuntary and inadmissible. 74
A survey of the background of both the Edwards and the voluntariness

claims asserted by defendant in Thomas reveals that the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision on both claims is consistent with prior law. The
troublesome aspect of Thomas is that the Edwards rule and the voluntariness
test are both surrounded by ambiguity in their application-ambiguity that necessarily permeates Thomas.

The ambiguity associated with the Edwards rule involves Miranda. Mirandaprovided clear-cut procedural protection against the potential for coerced
confessions by persons in police custody. 75 There was speculation after Miranda,however, that the Court was moving away from Miranda and its empha68. See, e.g., State v. Bauguss, 310 N.C. 259, 311 S.E.2d 248, cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 136 (1984)
(quoting the Edwards rule but finding it inapplicable because defendant never invoked his right to
counsel); State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 308 S.E.2d 317 (1983) (quoting the Edwards rule and determining that defendant initiated dialogue with the police but holding that there was prejudicial error
in the trial court's fact-finding effort to establish whether defendant made a "knowing, intelligent
and valid" waiver of his right); State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983) (quoting the
Edwards rule but finding it inapplicable because defendant never invoked his right to counsel).
69. See 2 H. BRamDIs, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE, SECOND REVISED EDITION OF STANSBuRY's NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 183 (1982).
70. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); C. WoTEBREAD, supra note 4, § 15.02; 2 H. BRADIS, supra note 69, § 183.
71. See C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 4, § 15.04.
72. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 69, § 183.
73. State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 581, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983).
74. See, eg., State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975); State v. Woodruff, 259 N.C.
333, 130 S.E.2d 641 (1963); State v. Livingston, 202 N.C. 809, 164 S.E. 337 (1932); State v. Whitfield, 70 N.C. 356 (1874); State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827).
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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sis on objective procedures. 76 Edwards, with its objective per se test, settled
77
speculation over whether the Court was in the process of abolishing Miranda.
A rule can be diminished without being abolished, however, and Edwards does
not preclude the possible diminution of Miranda.7S That Edwards itself is circumscribed by Innis and Bradshaw bears out this conclusion. Innis defined interrogation as "words or actions . . . the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" 79 and then applied
the term in a relatively conservative manner. 80 Bradshaw determined that a
statement from a suspect that "could reasonably have been interpreted by the
officer as relating generally to the investigation" is sufficient to meet the Edwards
provision that there may be further interrogation even after a suspect has requested an attorney if the suspect initiates dialogue with the police. 81 Therefore,
although the basic rule of Edwards is per se, it is restrained by tests of reasonableness. The questions inherent in a reasonableness approach are twofold: Has
the application of the reasonableness standard diminished Miranda'ssubstantive
goal of protecting suspects in police custody from the threat of coerced confeson Edwards diminish the Misions, and does the reasonableness test's influence
82
randa emphasis on objective procedural rules?
These questions apply to the holding in Thomas. In Thomas, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, with minimal discussion, applied the Edwards rule and
the test for voluntariness to defendant's confession. The court quoted the Edwards rule8 3 but then unequivocally stated that it was not violated because the
police officer's statement at issue was not interrogation. 84 The court based its
decision on the Innis definition of "interrogation," 85 concluding that it was not
true in this case that the officer "should have known that his 'off-hand' remark
likely to provoke defendant into making an incriminating
was reasonably
'8 6
statement."
The North Carolina Supreme Court's conservative application of the Innis
definition is in accord with the United States Supreme Court's application of it
in Innis. Although Innis supported Miranda by specifying that interrogation
76. See C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 4, § 15.08; Comment, Edwards v. Arizona: The Burger
Court Breathes New Life Into Miranda, 69 CALiF. L. R v. 1734, 1738-40 (1981).
77. Edwards has been called "the Burger Court's first clear-cut victory for Miranda." Sonenshein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 405, 447
(1982). No dissents were filed in Edwards.
78. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1748-51.
79. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. See alsosupra text accompanying note 51 (setting forth the Innis

Court's interpretation of "interrogation").

80. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
81. Bradshaw,462 U.S. at 1046.
82. See Fyfe, Enforcement Workshop: Oregon v. Bradshaw-What'sHappening Here?, 20
CRIM. L. BULL. 154, 158-60 (1984); Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 446; Comment, supra note 60, at
527-30.
83. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 377, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
84. Id. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
85. The court actually cited a North Carolina case that stated the Innis definition, noting that
"[w]e have recognized that 'interrogation is not limited to express questioning by the police.'" Id. at
377, 312 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 280, 302 S.E.2d 164, 170'(1983)).
86. Id. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
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under Miranda could include police activities other than questioning, 7 it also
refused to find that there was interrogation by the police officers during their
front seat conversation."8 The Innis holding-that police officers are not expected to know that a discussion about the danger of a school child finding a
missing gun might provoke an incriminating response from a defendant-was
reasonable. At least one commentator, however, has questioned whether this
application of the reasonableness test in Innis undermined Miranda by refusing
to classify police statements that directly resulted in defendant's incriminating
statements as interrogation.8 9 Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion in Innis,
described the majority's "reasonably likely to provoke".definition of interrogation as consistent with Miranda but considered the Court's holding on the facts
of Innis contradictory to that definition. 90
The North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Thomas is subject to the
same criticisms as those aimed at Innis. The Supreme Court's holding in Innis,
however, did not require the result reached by the Thomas court. First, Innis
and Thomas are factually distinct. Innis involved a conversation between two
officers in which neither one spoke to the accused at all. 9 1 Thomas, on the other
hand, dealt with a remark made directly to the accused by an officer. 92 Second,
Professor White has suggested that the Court's focus in Innis was on an objective standard rather than on the "actual intent" of the police. Professor White
has noted that the Court, in footnote seven of the majority opinion, "stated that
when 'a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response,' it is 'unlikely' that the 'reasonably likely' test will not be met."'93 Professor White therefore has proposed:
In order to preserve both the majority's objective approach and a
close correlation between the officer's purpose and the "reasonably
likely" standard, the best reading of the Innis test is that it turns upon
the objective purpose manifested by the police. Thus, an officer
"should know" that his speech or conduct will be "reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response" when he should realize that the
speech or conduct will probably be viewed by the suspect as designed
to achieve this purpose. To ensure that the inquiry is entirely objective, the proposed test could be framed as follows: if an objective observer (with the same knowledge of the suspect as the police officer)
would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks, infer that the
response, then the reremarks were designed to elicit an incriminating
'94
marks should constitute "interrogation."
Applying Professor White's interpretation of the Innis test to the officer's
87. See White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v.
Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1209, 1223 (1980).
88. See Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 446-47.
89. See id. at 446 (noting that Innis created a "potentially gaping hole in Miranda").
90. Innis, 446 U.S. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 294-95.
92. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
93. White, supra note 87, at 1231 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.7).
94. Id. at 1231-32 (emphasis omitted).
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remark in Thomas, it is possible to reach a different result than the court in
Thomas reached. An objective listener probably would infer that the officer told
defendant to tell his attorney about the opportunity defendant had been given to
help himself in an effort to elicit self-incrimination.
Because the North Carolina Supreme Court in Thomas construed the interrogation definition so narrowly, Edwards' application in the North Carolina
courts is excessively constricted. If the courts continue to follow such a conservative interpretation of the Innis definition of interrogation, police may skillfully use manipulative techniques that do not rise to the level of what the North
Carolina Supreme Court has perceived as "interrogation" and thus circumvent
the Miranda goal of minimizing the coercive element of custodial interrogation. 95 These methods would not violate Edwards because technically they
would not be interrogation, but they would violate the spirit96of Miranda by inducing confessions that are the result of subtle compulsion.
It is worth considering, therefore, whether the North Carolina Supreme
Court followed the best line of interpretation of Edwards in Thomas. The
United States Supreme Court has indicated that although it might not expand
Miranda in the future, it will support it. 9 7 Given the facts of Thomas, it would
be criticizing the North Carolina Supreme Court too harshly to say that the
court violated the meaning of Miranda in Thomas. Even if Professor White's
interpretation of the Innis rule is applied to Thomas, the fact situation in
Thomas is sufficiently ambiguous to allow support for the court's decision. The
real problem with Thomas is that it may encourage a much looser application of
both Miranda and Edwards in North Carolina courts.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Bradshaw leaves
open an issue which the Court may soon have to address-an issue of interest to
the North Carolina courts after Thomas. That issue concerns the relationship
between the threshold at which police comments and activity become interrogation and the threshold at which a suspect's comments are considered to be initiation of dialogue with the police. In Innis the officers' comments about the
95. This potential implication reflects Justice Marshall's complaint in his Bradshaw dissent concerning the Court's broad interpretation of what is an initiation of dialogue by a defendant. (Justice
Marshall was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens.) He stated that
"[to allow the authorities to recommence an interrogation based on such a question is to permit
them to capitalize on the custodial setting. Yet Miranda's procedural protections were adopted
precisely in order 'to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."' Bradshaw, 462
U.S. at 1056 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458).
96. See id. A similar fear has been voiced concerning the Bradshaw initiation rule:
By focusing on who initiates the dialogue, the Edwards-Bradshaw rule ignores certain
coercive aspects of the custodial environment. It would be possible for the police to manipulate the initiation step to their own advantage by subjecting the suspect to more subtle
forms of coercion. For example, the police could ignore the suspect until concern about his
status, and the coerciveness of the custodial environment generally, induce him to initiate a
conversation with the police.
Comment, supra note 60, at 527-28.
97. The substance of the Edwards decision itself indicates this. It is interesting to note what
Chief Justice Burger said in his concurring opinion in Innis: "The meaning of Miranda has become
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would never overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." Innis, 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, J.,
concurring).
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missing gun directly preceded the defendant's self-incrimination; yet, those com-

ments were not considered interrogation by the Court. 98 But in Bradshaw the
defendant's question as to what would happen to him next was considered to be
an initiation of the dialogue which resulted in a confession.9 9 The level of police

activity that is considered interrogation-and therefore a trigger of the Edwards
requirement that interrogation cease when defendant requests an attorney-is

much higher than that at which a defendant's comment or question is considered an initiation of dialogue and therefore sufficient to allow interrogation to
begin again. If that difference in thresholds is the rule, the ironic import of
Edwards is that, while the case purports to further Miranda'sgoal of protecting

a defendant in custody from self-incrimination, it actually diminishes Miranda.
The Court should consider setting thresholds at more comparable levels. 100
Thomas also raises questions concerning Miranda'sprocedural goals. One
of the primary goals of Miranda was to provide clear-cut rules of procedure to

help implement the constitutional protections. 10 1 Edwards has been greeted as

an effort by the Court to again provide a bright-line test. 102 Because the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Thomas provides little analysis to support its conclu-

sion that the remark at issue in the case was not interrogation, 10 3 Thomas offers
little in the way of guidelines for the police to follow in attempting to obey the
dictates of Edwards. If the Edwards tests for interrogation and initiation are

dependent upon a case-by-case analysis, law enforcement officials are left in the
position of having to guess in advance what a court will and will not admit into
evidence.1° 4 Lack of procedural guidelines also impedes one of the stated pur-

poses for the Edwards rule: "to protect an accused in police custody from being
badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards

was.'

05

If police are not fairly certain of what constitutes "badgering" and are

and error," the Edwards "prophylaconly able to find out by a process of "trial 10
6

tic rule" will not be consistently effective.
Just as the problems inherent in the Edwards rule affect the decision in
Thomas, the ambiguity inherent in the North Carolina test for voluntariness in
confessions also affects the Thomas decision. A pure application of the Edwards
98. See id. at 294-95, 303.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
100. See generally Fyfe, supra note 82, at 159-60 (concluding that "Bradshaw represents a serious erosion of Miranda and of the Edwards test").
101. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
102. See Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 447-51.
103. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
104. Justice Burger was troubled by this problem when he encountered it in theInnis definition.
According to the Chief Justice, "It may introduce new elements of uncertainty; under the Court's
test, a police officer, in the brief time available, apparently must evaluate the suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused." He noted that "[flew, if any, police officers are competent enough to have
concurring).
the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated." 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, J.,
105. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.
106. Professor Sonenshein has summed up the significance of guidelines in the Miranda area.
He concludes, "If there is a Miranda theme, it is that abuse of authority thrives on discretion. If
there is a legacy in Miranda,it is that the privilege against self-incrimination will only be honored in
the official interrogation setting when police and judges operate within clearly delineated guidelines."
Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 462.
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rule, after a finding that defendant initiated dialogue, would require the state to
prove that any confession resulting from the dialogue was made only after the
accused waived his rights. Such waiver must have been made knowingly and
intelligently in view of the totality of the circumstances. 10 7 The Edwards requirement that there be a valid waiver, however, apparently is not considered to
8
be the equivalent of the voluntariness requirement in North Carolina.10 The
requirement that a defendant's confession be voluntary in order to be admissible

must be satisfied even when the rules of both Miranda and Edwards have been
met.10 9 North Carolina's voluntariness test grows out of a long history of case

law, much of which is still cited frequently by North Carolina courts. 110

While the supreme court in Thomas did not specifically discuss waiver, it
did discuss the voluntariness of defendant's confession. The court applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether the confession in Thomas
was made voluntarily. 111 Applying the rule of State v. Corley,112 which indicated that involuntariness is not caused by a single factor, the court noted that

no attempt was made to frighten or threaten defendant or otherwise coerce him
into making a statement. 1 13 The court concluded that the officer's "off-hand"

confession involstatement was not a sufficient basis for considering defendant's
15
untary1 14 and admitted the confession into evidence.'
The court's "totality of the circumstances" test for voluntariness is some-

what puzzling in light of traditional North Carolina confession law. North Carolina cases repeatedly state that a confession produced by a promise of leniency

or by a threat-a confession that is the result of hope or fear induced by the
police in a defendant-is not a voluntary confession. 116 In Corley the court adamantly stated that this standard was not a per se rule,11 7 finding instead that the
totality of the circumstances had to indicate the confession was involuntary.

107. See supra note 60.
108. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "in determining whether a defendant's
confession was voluntarily and intelligently made... '[t]he North Carolina rule and the federal rule
for determining the admissibility of a confession is [sic] the same.'" State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40,
48, 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (quoting State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 581, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983)).
The court went on to add, however, that "this principle controls 'without regard to whether the
claim of inadmissibility rests upon constitutional grounds or rests solely upon our rule of evidence
requiring the exclusion of involuntary confessions.'" Id. at 48, 311 S.E.2d at 545 (quoting State v.
Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 108, 291 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982)) (emphasis added).
Within the Mirandacontext itself, a voluntary confession is not prohibited. The Supreme Court
said in Miranda that "[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence
is, of course, admissible in evidence." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
109. See State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 47, 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1984).
110. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983); State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C.
442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975); State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968); State v. Roberts, 12
N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827).
111. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 378-79, 312 S.E.2d at 463-64.
112. 310 N.C. 40, 47, 311 S.E.2d 540, 547 (1984).
113. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 379, 312 S.E.2d at 464.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
117. 310 N.C. at 48, 311 S.E.2d at 544.
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The court in Corley implied that it did not overrule prior law. 118
The juxtaposition of Corley and the existing case law creates confusion regarding the voluntariness test. That Thomas restated the totality of circumstances test, while applying it in a situation in which defendant's confession
could well have been a product of hope or fear, increases the existing uncertainty
surrounding the voluntariness rule.
In a dissent to Corley, Justice Exum expressed concern over the ambiguity
in the application of the voluntariness standard, stating that the totality of the
circumstances rule previously had been used to determine voluntariness only
"[i]n the absence of a promise or threat." 119 In his dissent in Thomas, Exum
stated, "When a confession follows a promise of leniency, the confession is inadmissible unless it can be shown that the influence of the promise had been ' en1 20
tirely dissipated so that the promise did not in fact induce the confession."
He then explained that "[w]here there is evidence in the case that the influence
of a promise of leniency has been dissipated, or 'entirely done away with,' before
the confession was made, then the question of whether the confession was a
product of the promise is resolved by considering the 'totality of circumstances.' "121 According to Exum, "[tihere is nothing in the record to indicate
that [defendant's confession] could have been the product of anything" other
than the officer's statement.122
The most troublesome aspect of the voluntariness issue in Thomas is not
whether the majority was justified in dismissing the comment as an "off-hand
statement of an officer, which is at best ambiguous," 123 but rather is the same
problem of uncertainty present in the court's decision concerning defendant's
Edwards claim. If the application of a totality of circumstances test requires a
case-by-case analysis of every confession the voluntariness of which is at issue,
the result is a situation in which police have few guidelines. 124 The same
problems, confusions, and abuses that exist in the Miranda context when its
guidelines are blurred are present in the totality of circumstances interpretation
of the voluntariness standard. 125 Justice Exum's perspective, which incorporates North Carolina's historical test for voluntariness, provides a great deal
more objectivity and certainty for the law of confessions than does the majority's
approach in Thomas.
The court's decision in Thomas made no definite changes in the law gov118. See id.
dissenting).
119. Id. at 56-58, 311 S.E.2d at 550 (Exum, J.,
dissenting).
120. 310 N.C. at 382, 312 S.E.2d at 465 (Exum, J.,
121. Id. at 382, 312 S.E.2d at 466 (Exum, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 382, 312 S.E.2d at 465 (Exum, ., dissenting).
123. Id. at 379, 312 S.E.2d at 464.
124. One commentator discussing the Bradshaw decision expressed concern over what he referred to as "attempts to individualize justice." He noted that these efforts may please arresting
officers, but they also "seriously damage the quality of justice in the great majority of cases." Furthermore, he stated that "[flew of us enjoy seeing the factually guilty escape conviction, but the
reality is that rules and principles that enhance justice in the general run of cases are certain to
enhance opportunities for injustice in some specific cases." Fyfe, supra note 82, at 154.
125. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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erning the admission of confessions into evidence and was not overtly inconsistent with United States Supreme Court decisions concerning confessions. The
decision, however, might have undercut Miranda and Edwards unnecessarily
and in so doing might have set a hazardous precedent for North Carolina courts
to follow. Thomas also might have hastened a course of uncertainty in the application of North Carolina's voluntariness standard. Both results of the case
might mean future abuse as both courts and law enforcement officials attempt to
function with diminishing or minimal guidelines.
SHEILA WHIrFIELD RAGLAND

South CarolinaInsurance Co. v. Smith: Employee Exclusion
Clauses in Automobile Liability Insurance Policies
North Carolina's Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act'
was enacted to help ensure that innocent victims of automobile accidents will be
able to recover compensation from the driver who caused their injuries. 2 Together with North Carolina's compulsory insurance law,3 the Financial Responsibility Act requires every owner of a motor vehicle to purchase liability
4
insurance covering the owner and all persons using the vehicle with permission.
The goal behind the Financial Responsibility Act, however, is not always
consistent with a vehicle owner's desire to limit his premiums by contracting for
exclusions from his automobile insurance coverage. One cost-saving provision
commonly included in automobile liability policies excludes the insurer from
liability for injuries to employees of the insured. An employee may be without
coverage under either workers' compensation or his employer's liability policy if
the employer's policy contains a clause excluding all employees rather than only
employees who are covered under the state's workers' compensation act. 5
In South CarolinaInsurance Co. v. Smith,6 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that an employee exclusion clause is valid only if workers' compensation is available to the employee. This Note examines the issues presented in
Smith and concludes that the court reached a sound middle ground between the
competing goals of compensating victims of highway negligence and maintaining reasonable insurance costs for drivers complying with North Carolina's
mandatory automobile insurance laws.
Marvin B. Smith was standing in the back of a truck belonging to his employer, who was at the wheel, 7 when a freezer in the truck fell on his foot. 8 He
brought suit against his employer, William B. Gore, alleging that Gore's negligence had caused the freezer to fall. 9 South Carolina Insurance Company,
which had issued Gore a liability policy covering the truck, brought a separate
action seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not liable for Smith's inju1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -.39 (1983).
2. See, eag.,Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 283 N.C. 87, 194 S.E.2d
834 (1973) (purpose of the Act is to compensate innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hale, 270 N.C. 195, 154 S.E.2d 79 (1967); Howell v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
237 N.C. 227, 74 S.E.2d 610 (1953).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1983).
4. For a discussion of the history of the two acts, see infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97 (1979 & Curn. Supp. 1983). Workers' compensation acts typically
do not include domestic servants, farm laborers, casual employees, and employees who work for an
employer with fewer than a statutory minimum number of workers (usually two to six employees).
See IC A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 50.10-52.34 (1982 & Supp.
1984). North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act does not apply to farm laborers, domestic
servants, employees in casual employment, and workers employed by an employer having fewer than
four employees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-13(b) (1979).
6. 67 N.C. App. 632, 313 S.E.2d 856 (1984).
7. Plaintiff's Complaint at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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ries. 10 The policy contained a clause providing: "We do not provide Liability
Coverage for any person: ... For bodily injury to an employee of that person
11
during the course of employment."
The insurance company argued that this exclusion relieved it from liability
12
for Smith's injuries. Smith, defendant in the declaratory judgment proceeding,
maintained that the exclusion clause did not relieve the company of liability
because the clause conflicted with the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act. Smith relied on section 20-279.21(e) of the Act, which provides that a "motor vehicle liability policy" issued in compliance with the Act
"need not insure against loss from any liability for which benefits are in whole or
in part either payable or required to be provided under any workmens' compensation law."' 13 The trial court granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment, but the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the exclusion was valid only if workers' compensation benefits were available to
Smith.'4
In an opinion by Chief Judge Vaughn,' 5 the court agreed that the exclusion
6
clause would be valid as written in the absence of a financial responsibility law.'

The court, however, accepted Smith's argument that a policy issued under
North Carolina's compulsory insurance laws must be construed in light of this
law. 17 The court held that section 20-279.21(e) of the Financial Responsibility
Act allows an exemption from coverage only insofar as there are benefits avail-

able to an employee pursuant to North Carolina's Workers' Compensation

Act.' 8 The Act thus did not invalidate the exclusion clause completely, but

rather made its validity contingent on a showing that the injured employee was
covered by workers' compensation.'

9

The court reasoned that this result was consistent with the rationale behind
the Financial Responsibility Act of compensating victims of "financially irresponsible" drivers: "Were we to accept plaintiff's argument, we would likewise
10. Smith, 67 N.C. App. at 632, 313 S.E.2d at 858.
11. Id. at 633, 313 S.E.2d at 858.
12. Smith's employer, Gore, was also a defendant in the declaratory judgment proceeding. See
id. at 632, 313 S.E.2d 858.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(e) (1983). For a discussion of the rest of the statute, see infra
notes 37-56 and accompanying text.
14. The case was remanded for determination of whether workers' compensation was available
to Smith. Smith, 67 N.C. App. at 640, 313 S.E.2d at 862. The appellate brief submitted by plaintiffinsurance company indicates that workers' compensation benefits were not available. The brief discussed a case in which an employee was not covered by workers' compensation because his employer
had fewer than the statutory minimum number of employees, adding that "[tjhis is similar to the
situation which is involved in this case." Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 5. Under the holding in Smith,
the insurance company will be liable for damages arising out of Smith's injuries if he in fact was not
covered by workers' compensation. See also supra note 5 (exclusions from North Carolina's Workers' Compensation Act).
15. Judges Braswell and Eagles concurred but did not write separate opinions. Smith, 67 N.C.
App. at 640, 313 S.E.2d at 862.
16. "The starting point of our analysis is that nothing else appearing, the exclusionary clause in
the policy before us would defeat coverage." Smith, 67 N.C. App. at 634, 313 S.E.2d at 859.
17. Id. at 635-36, 313 S.E.2d at 859.
18. Id. at 634, 313 S.E.2d at 859.
19. Id.
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be making possible situations wherein an injured employee may be left remediless. Such a result would contravene the established purpose of our Financial
Responsibility Act." 2" The court added that its holding was in accord with the
21
majority of decisions on this issue in other jurisdictions.
Smith was a case of first impression 22 on the validity of an employee exclusion clause in light of North Carolina's Financial Responsibility Act. In deciding the case, the court had to resolve the conflict between the employer's desire
to lower premiums by contracting for limits on automobile insurance coverage
and the state's policy of assuring compensation of automobile accident victims
through a mandatory financial responsibility statute.
As the name implies, financial responsibility acts were developed to address
the problem of negligent, uninsured motorists unable to compensate accident
victims. 23 Connecticut in 1925 passed a statute that revoked the registration of
drivers who committed traffic violations of a certain severity and required proof
24
of financial "responsibility" as a condition to reinstatement of the registration.
25
Similar acts were in widespread use by the 1930s.
These early financial responsibility laws required suspension of the driver's license, registration, or both
upon conviction for certain traffic violations. 26 To get his license or registration
restored, the driver had to offer proof of his ability to compensate future accident victims. This proof generally was in the form of a bond, securities, or, more
often, a liability insurance policy. 27 These acts were intended to encourage dangerous drivers to get liability insurance or, if they refused, to keep such drivers
28
off the road.
The early laws, however, had shortcomings. They applied only after a
driver had committed a serious offense or had an unsatisfied judgment against
him, and even then the acts required only proof of responsibility for future damages. Thus, they did nothing to compensate the victim of the driver's first acci20. Id. at 637, 313 S.E.2d at 860.
21. Id. at 639, 313 S.E.2d at 861-62. The court reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions at
length, concluding that the cases holding such a clause valid as written were fewer in number and
contained weaker reasoning. Id.

22. Id. at 634, 313 S.E.2d at 858.
23. See Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1962); 6B J. APPLE.MAN,

INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTicE § 4295, at 238 (Buckley ed. 1979); Grad, Recent Developments in
Auto Accident Compensation, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 300, 308 (1950); Murphy & Netherton, Public
Responsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 47 GEO. L.J. 700 (1959); Note, A Survey of Financial
ResponsibilityLaws and Compensationof Traffic Victims: A Proposalfor Reform, 21 VAND. L. REv.

1050, 1051-52 (1968).
24. Act of June 23, 1925, ch. 183, 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts 3956.
25. In 1936, 30 states had enacted some form of financial responsibility legislation. Brawn, The
FinancialResponsibility Law, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 505, 511 (1936). Most of these statutes
were based on one of two model acts: the Uniform Vehicle Code of the National Conference on
Street and Highway Safety or the American Automobile Association's Safety-Responsibility Bill.
Id. at 509. For a discussion of the differences between these model acts, see id.
26. See Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 159 (1962). Apparently the earliest law requiring liability insurance in connection with the operation of a motor vehicle was a 1915
San Francisco ordinance requiring such insurance for all buses. Id.
27. Murphy & Netherton, supra note 23, at 703-04.
28. Id. at 704.
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dent. 29 These early acts also did not reach many of the drivers who posed the
greatest threat to the public. When a driver was unable to compensate his victim, the victim often had little incentive to report the accident or seek a judg30
ment against the driver. Thus, the law often was never called into operation.
The inadequacies of the early "future proof" financial responsibility laws
led to the development of laws designed to provide compensation for all accident
victims, rather than merely those injured after a negligent driver had his first
reported accident. The first such law was enacted in New Hampshire in 193731
and provided that a driver involved in a serious accident had to deposit "security" with a state agency to be used to pay damages arising out of the past accident. 32 Security laws eventually replaced the "future proof' laws; by 1968 every
33
state except Massachusetts had a statute requiring the deposit of security.
Typically, security acts require drivers to file a report if involved in accidents causing personal injury or property damage over a certain amount. A
state official reviews the report and determines the amount of required security
based on the likelihood of damages arising from the accident. If a driver does
not provide the required security within a statutory period, his license and registration are revoked. The driver can recover his license and registration by depositing the security, by showing proof of a settlement agreement, or upon the
passage of a certain period-usually one year-in which no one files a lawsuit
arising from the accident. 34 Security laws have been successful in encouraging
many drivers to acquire automobile liability insurance, 35 but they are not without defects. Like the "future proof" laws, they operate only after an accident
has occurred. If, as is often the case, a financially irresponsible driver has caused
an accident, then, in the words of one commentator, "the best that the law can
do is to force him off the road while his unfortunate victim remains
''36
uncompensated.
North Carolina's first financial responsibility act, a "future proof" statute,
was enacted in 1931. 37 It provided for revocation of the license and registration
29. This aspect of the "future proof" financial responsibility laws made them vulnerable to the
criticism that they were "first bite" laws because they allowed bad drivers, like bad dogs, to get a
"first bite" free of consequences. See Murphy & Netherton, supra note 23, at 703-04; Note, supra
note 23, at 1052.
30. Murphy & Netherton, supra note 23, at 705; Note, supra note 23, at 1052.
31. Act of July 14, 1937, ch. 161, 1937 N.H. LAWS 296-97.
32. Kesler v. Dep't of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 163 (1962); Grad, supra note 23, at 705-06.
33. See, Note, supra note 23, at 1052. Massachusetts law currently provides that a plaintiff can
move for security against a nonresident. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 3G (Michie/Law. Co-op
1975 & Supp. 1985)
34. See Murphy & Netherton, supra note 23, at 706-07; Note, supra note 23, at 1052-54.
35. Murphy & Netherton, supra note 23, at 706-07.
36. Laufer, InsuranceAgainst Lack of Insurance? A Dissent From the UninsuredMotorist Endorsement, 1969 DUKE L.J. 227, 232 (1969). Financial responsibility acts have been upheld against
various constitutional challenges. 6B J. APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4295, at 247; 12A G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:722, at 362-63 (2d ed. 1971). North Carolina's statute was
held not to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment in Jones v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 370 N.C. 454, 155 S.E.2d 118 (1967).
37. Act of March 16, 1931, ch. 116, 1931 N.C. SaSS. LAWS 149 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-201 (1943)). See generally Note, Survey ofStatutory Changesin North Carolina,9 N.C.L. REv.
384 (1931) (discussing the operation of the new law).

1232

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

of any driver with a judgment of $100 or more outstanding against him. 38 The
license and registration would not be restored unless the driver paid the judg-

ment or furnished proof of financial responsibility for future liability. 39
In 1953 the general assembly modernized its financial responsibility law,

and North Carolina became the forty-second state4° to adopt a security statute.4 1 This law, titled the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility
Act of 1953, is still in force. It provides that every owner and operator of a
vehicle involved in an accident in which there is personal injury or property
damage exceeding $500 is required to deposit security with the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles.42 The Commissioner is directed to determine the required
43
If
amount of security based on the damages likely to arise out of the accident.
the owner or operator fails to post the security within a statutory period, the
44
Commissioner must suspend the license of that driver.
The security provision does not apply to several types of drivers, including
those who are covered by a motor vehicle liability policy that meets the statutory
limits, 4 5 those who were legally parked at the time of the accident, and those
involved in an accident in which the other party did not sustain personal injury
or property damage. 46 A license suspended under the Act may not be reinstated
unless the driver posts the required security, is adjudged to have no liability, or
enters a settlement agreement. 47 The license also may be reinstated if, after the
48
passage of one year, no litigation has been initiated as a result of the accident.
38. Act of March 16, 1931, ch. 116, 1931 N.C. SEss. LAWS 149, 149.
39. Interestingly, the 1931 statute went into effect four years before drivers' licenses became
mandatory in North Carolina. See Note, supra note 37, at 384-85.
40. See Note, Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina, 31 N.C.L. REV. 420, 421 n.20
(1953).

41. Act of April 30, 1953, ch. 1300, 1953 N.C. SEss. LAWS 1262 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-279.1 (1983)).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.4 to -.5 (1983). As originally enacted, the threshold amount
for requiring a deposit was $100. See supra note 41. The security may be in the form of a bond, a
cash deposit, or, for owners of more than 25 vehicles, proof of self-insurance. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 20-279.18, .33 (1983).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.5(a) (1983).
44. Id. § 20-279.5(b).
45. A driver offering proof of a statutory motor vehicle liability policy must submit a certificate
from his insurer that the policy is in effect and includes the coverage required by the statute. When
the Act was first enacted, a statutory policy had to provide coverage of $5,000 for bodily injury to or
death of one person; $10,000 for bodily injury to or death of two or more persons; and $1,000 for
property damage. Act of April 30, 1953, ch. 1300, 1953 N.C. SEss. LAws 1262, 1263. The statute
currently requires liability limits of $25,000 for bodily injury to or death of one person; $50,000 for
bodily injury to or death of one or more persons; and $10,000 for property damage. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (1983).
The Act also contains an "assigned risk plan" under which coverage of high risk drivers who
otherwise would be unable to obtain coverage is allocated among all insurance carriers licensed to
write automobile liability insurance in the state. Id. § 20-279.34. Participation in the assigned risk
plan is mandatory for insurance carriers who write automobile liability insurance in North Carolina.
See Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 454, 155 S.E.2d 118 (1967). Assigned risk
plans are a feature of many financial responsibility laws and help make insurance available to those
whom insurance companies would be reluctant to insure otherwise. See 6B J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 23, § 4295, at 253; Note, supra note 23, at 1066.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.6 (1983).
47. Id. § 20-279.7.
48. Id.
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The operation of these provisions is triggered by filing a mandatory accident
report. 49
The Act defines a "motor vehicle liability policy" in section 20-279.21.
That section requires that the policy insure "the person named therein and any
other persons, as insured, using any such motor vehicle.. . with the express or
implied permission of such named insured . . . against loss from the liability
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
such motor vehicle." 50 The section also specifies in detail the requirements a
policy must meet in order to exempt the insured from the security requirements
of the rest of the Act. The debate in Smith turned on the provision that a statutory motor vehicle liability policy "need not insure against loss from any liability
for which benefits are in whole or in part either payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law nor any liability for damage to
' 51
property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by the insured.
The state legislature in 1957 strengthened the 1953 Act with the enactment
of section 20-309.52 This Act, titled the Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of
1957, provides that no vehicle may be registered in North Carolina unless at the
time of registration the owner has proof of "financial responsibility." 53 Financial responsibility can be demonstrated by qualifying as a self-insurer or by offer54
ing proof of a motor vehicle liability policy or bond as defined in the 1953 Act.
The enactment of the 1957 Act made North Carolina one of only three
55
states to require liability coverage for every vehicle registered in the state. It
also obviated criticism that the financial responsibility legislation operated only
after an accident had occurred and thus after a victim may have been injured by
a financially irresponsible driver. Ideally, the mandatory registration provisions
of the 1957 Act deny financially irresponsible drivers a free "first bite" by deny56
ing them access to the road until they prove themselves financially responsible.
In decisions since enactment of the 1953 Financial Responsibility Act,
North Carolina courts have indicated their intention to interpret the Act expansively. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the statute "will be
broadly construed to carry out its beneficient purpose of providing compensation
49. Id. § 20-279.4.
50. Id. § 20-279.21(b)(2). The "omnibus clause" provision applying to all permissive users was
added by amendment in 1967. Act of July 6, 1967, ch. 1162, 1967 N.C. SESs. LAWS 1794, 1795.
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(e) (1983).
52. Act of June 12, 1957, c. 1393, 1957 N.C. SEss. LAWS 1586 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-309 (1983)).
53. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309(a) (1983).
54. Id. § 20-309(b). The 1953 and 1957 acts are complementary and are to be construed by the
courts so as to harmonize the acts and give each full effect. Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co.,
254 N.C. 47, 53, 118 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1961).
55. Massachusetts was the first state to adopt a compulsory insurance law. Act of May 1, 1925,
1925 Mass. Acts 426. It was followed in 1929 by New York. Vehicle and Traffic Law of 1929, ch.
655, § 2, 1929 N.Y. LAWS 1956. Today about half the states have a compulsory insurance system.
See 6B APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4299, at 300-01.
56. For a general discussion of the 1957 Act, see Montgomery, North Carolina'sNew Vehicle
FinancialResponsibility Act, 24 POPULAR Gov'T 12 (Dec. 1957).
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to those who have been injured by automobiles."'5 7 The court also has held that
the victim's right to recover against the insurer is not derived through the insured, as it is in cases of voluntary insurance, but rather is governed by the
58

statute.

The court's intention to interpret the Financial Responsibility Act expansively was tested in a 1964 case, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roberts.5 9
In that case Roberts and the victim had had a violent fight, after which Roberts
pursued the victim by car and drove into him, pinning him against a stone
wall.60 Roberts' insurance company sued for a declaratory judgment that it was
not liable for the injuries to the victim because Roberts' conduct was intentional.
The insurance policy had a clause stating that it covered "all sums which Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease. . . sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile. ' 6 1 The policy also
provided that "[a]ssault and battery shall be deemed an accident unless committed by or at the direction of the insured." 62
The court noted that such an exclusion was common in the insurance in63
dustry and would be valid if the insured had procured the policy voluntarily.
Roberts, however, had purchased the policy pursuant to the requirements of the
state's compulsory insurance laws, and the coverage did not exceed the minimum amounts required under the Financial Responsibility Act. 64 The court
recognized a conflict between the exclusion clause and the statutory goal of providing compensation for victims of traffic accidents. 65 The clause also conflicted
with the express requirement in section 20-279.21 that an automobile liability
policy insure against liability "arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use"
of the automobile.6 6 In such a situation, the court held, the statute must prevail
over the terms of the policy:
The primary purpose of compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is
to compensate innocent victims who have been injured by the negligence of financially irresponsible motorists. Its purpose is not, like
that of ordinary insurance, to save harmless the tortfeasor himself.
Therefore, there is no reason why the victim's right to recover should
depend upon whether the conduct of its insured was intentional or negligent. In order to accomplish the objective of the law, the perspective
here must be that of the victim and not that of the aggressor ....
[The victim's rights] are statutory and become absolute on the occur57. Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967).
58. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 283 N.C. 87, 194 S.E.2d 834

(1973).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
Id. at 286, 134 S.E.2d at 656.
Id. at 286-87, 134 S.E.2d at 656 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 290, 134 S.E.2d at 659.
Id. at 289, 134 S.E.2d at 658.
Id. at 290, 134 S.E.2d at 659.
Id.
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Twenty years later the court of appeals in Smith examined a conflict between another common policy exclusion and the state's financial responsibility
law. The challenged clause in Smith is known in the insurance industry as an

"employee exclusion clause" and typically provides that an insurer shall not be

liable for injury to or death of "employees of the insured" who are injured while
"engaged in the business of the insured."'6 8 The reasoning behind such an exclusion is to permit an employer to avoid the expense of covering his employees

under both the mandatory workers' compensation system and an automobile
liability policy. 6 9 Like the assault and battery clause of the policy in Roberts, an
70
employee exclusion clause is a common feature of automobile liability policies

and has been upheld as a valid means for the insurer to limit its liability and for
71
the insured to limit his expense.
Just as some employees could be doubly covered-by both workers' compensation and their employer's automobile liability policy-other employees
could be excluded from coverage under either kind of insurance. In many states,

workers' compensation does not apply to employers with fewer than a certain
minimum number of employees, or to farm or domestic laborers. 72 If an employee is not covered by the state's workers' compensation system and the employer's automobile liability policy contains an employee exclusion clause, the
employee potentially is without insurance protection if he is injured through the

use of one of his employer's vehicles. In this situation, courts have been called
upon to decide whether enforcement of the employee exclusion clause violates

the spirit, if not also the letter, of the state's financial responsibility law.
The decisions have not been uniform. 73 One line of cases, relied upon by

plaintiff-insurance company in Smith, holds that the employee exclusion is valid
regardless of whether the employee is eligible for workers' compensation. 74 In
some of these cases, the court simply decided the issue without mention of the
state's financial responsibility law. An example cited by the Smith court is Emt67. Id. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Webb, 10 N.C. App. 672, 179 S.E.2d 803 (1971) (policy excluded liability for assault and battery committed by insured; court, citing Roberts, held that the
public policy behind the financial responsibility law rendered the exclusion invalid).
68. Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 78, 79 (1956).
69. "It is well settled that the primary purpose of an (employee) exclusion clause in a public
liability policy. . . is to draw a sharp line between employees who are excluded, and members of the
general public." Travelers Corp. v. Boyer, 301 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (D. Md. 1969) (quoting Lumber
Mut. Casualty Co. v. Stukes, 164 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1947)); see also Annot., 45 A.L.R. 3d 288, 295
(1972) (discussing the rationale behind employee exclusion cases). A similar and perhaps more common exclusion clause is the "fellow employee" or "cross-employee" exclusion, which relieves the
insurer of liability for injuries to one employee arising out of actions by another employee. See id.
70. See 6B J. APPLEMAN, supra note 23, § 4297, at 280; 8 D. BLASHHELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 318.6, at 74-81 (3d ed. 1966); Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 13, 20 (1973).
71. See Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 13, 30 (1973); Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 288, 295 (1972).
72. See supra note 5.
73. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poole, 411 F. Supp. 429,433 (N.D. Miss. 1976) ("treatment
of the quoted employee exclusion clause has been far from uniform").
74. The court in Smith distinguished cases that discuss the financial responsibility law from
those that do not and held that the latter were not precedent for its decision. Smith, 67 N.C. App. at
639-40, 313 S.E.2d at 861-62.
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ployers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Owens. 75 In Owens, plaintiff was an employee of the insured and was injured while riding as a passenger in a truck
driven by his employer.76 The Florida Supreme Court upheld a clause in the
employer's policy excluding "bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any
employee of the Insured while engaged in the employment . .. of the In-

sured." 77 The majority found this clause to be unambiguous and held that
"[t]here are obvious reasons for differentiating between the public as a class and
one's own employees."' 78 A dissent argued that the majority had ignored the
Florida Financial Responsibility Law79 and that the exclusion clause was "re80
pugnant and contrary" to the requirements of that law.
In a subsequent case, the Florida Supreme Court8 l upheld a clause excluding liability for "1) domestic employment by the insured, if benefits therefor are
in whole or in part either payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law, or 2) other employment by the insured."8 2 The court
again did not discuss the financial responsibility law, resting its decision solely
on construction of the exclusion clause: "The [exclusion] clause under discussion makes specific reference to workmen's compensation relative to domestic
employment, but none whatever to nondomestic employment. The conclusion
seems inescapable that the intent was to exclude from the policy's coverage all
employees, other than domestic, whether or not of a category coming under
'83
workmen's compensation."
Other courts have reached the same result by holding that the financial
responsibility act did not compel invalidation of the clause. The Missouri Court
of Appeals 8 4 recently held that a fellow employee exclusion clause" was a "rational exclusion" even though its
enforcement "ultimately excludes the plaintiff
86
from any insurance coverage."
In contrast to the cases upholding employee exclusion clauses, a number of
decisions have held that the clause is not valid unless the employee is covered by
workers' compensation, and that this result is compelled by the state's financial
responsibility law. An early case adopting this view is Hindel v. State Farm
75. 78 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1955).
76. Id. at 104.
77. Id. at 105.
78. Id. at 106.
79. Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 324.011-.251 (West 1978 & Supp. 1984).
80. Owens, 78 So. 2d at 108 (Holt, J., dissenting).
81. Griffin v. Speidel, 179 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1965). But see Makris v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 267 So. 2d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (holding an employee exclusion clause to be in violation of the state's financial responsibility legislation).
82. Griffin v. Speidel, 179 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 1965).
83. Id. at 571.
84. Zink v. Allis, 650 S.W.2d 320 (Mo. App. 1983).
85. For a discussion of fellow employee exclusion clauses, see supra note 69.
86. Zink v. Allis, 650 S.W.2d 320, 323 (Mo. App. 1983); see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Gilliham,
659 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. App. 1983) (following Zink); Atkins v. Pacific Indem. Ins. Group, 125 Ariz. 46,
607 P.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1979) (fellow employee exclusion clause not inconsistent with state's financial
responsibility law).
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,8 7 a federal diversity case applying Indiana
law. In Hindel, plaintiff's decedent was killed while operating a vehicle in the
course of his employment. Decedent's employer's insurance company alleged
that the policy provided for no liability "to any employee of the insured while
engaged in the business of the Assured. . . or to any person to whom the Assured may be held liable under any Workmen's Compensation Law."'8 8 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the terms of the
policy "are merged in and must give way to" the state's financial responsibility
law.89 The court cited the Indiana Financial Responsibility Law's 90 requirement that a policy certified under the law be "for the benefit of all persons who
may suffer personal injuries or property damage due to any negligence of the
Assured" 91 and added that "[i]f it had been the intention of the lawmakers...
92
to exclude an employee, it could, without difficulty, have been so provided."
More recently, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that a policy clause excluding liability for injury caused by a fellow employee was valid, but only because the injured employee was covered by workers' compensation. 93 The court
wrote that "[tihere is a significant difference between excluding coverage for injuries to a person for whom another remedy has been provided, and an attempt
'94
to exclude certain persons as insureds under the policy."
With its decision in Smith, the North Carolina Court of Appeals aligned
itself with the courts that will not enforce an employee exclusion clause unless
workers' compensation is available to the injured employee. This decision has
the obvious advantage of avoiding a harsh result. The cases upholding an employee exclusion clause as written leave the injured employee with no coverage
under either workers' compensation or his employer's automobile liability policy. If the employer cannot satisfy a tort judgment, 95 the employee is without
recompense. This apparently would have been the result in Smith if the exclusion was enforced as written; the court noted that the record contained no evidence whether Smith was covered by workers' compensation, 96 but the
97
plaintiff's brief indicated that he was not.
The decision also is consistent with the wording of North Carolina's Financial Responsibility Act. Plaintiff argued that the statute did not conflict with the
87. 97 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1938).
88. Id. at 782.
89. Id.
90. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 9-2-1-1 to 9-2-1-45 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1983).
91. Hindel, 97 F.2d at 782.
92. Id.
93. Martinez v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 119 Ariz. 403, 581 P.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1978).
94. Id. at 404, 581 P.2d at 249. See United States v. Transport Indem. Co., 544 F.2d 393 (9th
Cir. 1976); Farmers Ins. Group v. Home Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 125, 493 P.2d 909 (1972); Paul
Masson Co. v. Colonial Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 265, 92 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1971).
95. If an employee's injury is within the scope of the workers' compensation law, but he is
denied recovery under the terms of the statute, the employee is precluded from seeking a tort remedy
against his employer. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 574 (5th ed. 1984).
96. Smith, 67 N.C. App. at 640, 313 S.E.2d at 862.
97. See supra note 14.
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exclusionary clause in the policy. 98 The court, however, disagreed and responded that "the plain language of G.S. 20-279.21(e) is alone sufficient to justify our holding." 99 An argument advanced by defendant but not discussed by
the court supports this conclusion. Defendant pointed out that section 20279.21(e) was amended in 1967100 and that before amendment the section read:
"Such motor vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability under any
Workmen's Compensation law nor liability on account of bodily injury to or
death of the insuredwhile engaged in the employment, other than domestic, of the
insured .

.

. ."101 While there is no legislative history on the amendment, the

deletion of the italicized part of the section 10 2 shows an intent to avoid the possibility that a policy qualifying under the statute would exclude coverage of an
employee "engaged in" his employer's business but not covered by workers'
compensation.

The Smith holding also finds support in the public policy behind the state's
financial responsibility legislation. Like other financial responsibility acts, section 20-279.1 was enacted to ensure compensation to victims of automobile accidents. Unlike many other states, North Carolina has strengthened its protection
for accident victims by requiring liability insurance that meets the specifications
of section 20-279.21 as a prerequisite for registration of any vehicle in the
state. 103 Thus, the state's compulsory insurance laws codify a policy of concern
for the plight of accident victims, a concern that should send a message to the
state's courts to rule accordingly. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Roberts, 104 the supreme court indicated its unwillingness to allow a policy exclusion
to defeat the purpose of the compulsory insurance laws.10 5 With its holding in
Smith, the court of appeals has taken a consistent stance.
The court of appeals also has succeeded in finding a middle ground between
the competing goals of a cost-conscious employer and the financial responsibility
law. The decision does not require that an employer's automobile liability policy
cover injury to employees who also are covered by workers' compensation. The
opinion makes it clear that an exclusion of liability for which workers' compensation benefits are available is valid and enforceable. 10 6 Thus, the employer does
not have to pay for double coverage of his employees, a point often overlooked
in the opinions upholding employee exclusion clauses.
Finally, the court's opinion sends a clear message to insurance companies
covering vehicles registered in North Carolina that a clause purporting to exclude liability for injuries to employees of the insured regardless of whether they
98. Plaintiff-Appeilee's Brief at 4.
99. Smith, 67 N.C. App. at 639, 313 S.E.2d at 861.
100. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 4-5. Section 20-279.21(e) was amended by Act of June 21,
1967, ch. 854, 1967 N.C. SEss. LAWS 1099.
101. Act of April 30, 1953, ch. 1300 § 21(e), 1953 N.C. SEss. LAws 1262, 1272 (emphasis

added).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See
See
261
See
See

supra text at note 51.
supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654 (1964).
supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
Smith, 67 N.C. App. at 634, 313 S.E.2d at 861.
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are covered by workers' compensation will be read as if it excluded only employees covered by workers' compensation. In light of the similarity between the
employee exclusion clause in Smith and a "cross-" or "fellow-employee" exclusion clause, 10 7 it is likely that the court would reach a similar conclusion in
construing a clause that purports to exclude liability for injuries to an employee
resulting from the actions of a fellow employee.
Although Smith provided a clear answer to one insurance problem, the decision raises doubts about the interpretation of other common policy exclusions.
For example, separate panels of the Michigan Court of Appeals have disagreed
over whether that state's financial responsibility law requires invalidation of a
policy clause excluding coverage for injuries to members of the insured's household.10 8 Future litigation in North Carolina could raise difficult questions about
whether a clause excluding coverage of injuries to the insured himself or to
members of his family is somehow less repugnant to the letter or spirit of North
Carolina's financial responsibility law than a clause excluding coverage for employees or members of the general public.
In conclusion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Smith demonstrated
its commitment to expansive interpretation of the state's compulsory insurance
law. The decision that an automobile liability policy cannot exclude an employee who is not covered by workers' compensation ultimately means that the
cost of compensating employees such as Smith will be borne by all the state's
residents who own motor vehicles and must purchase insurance. The court in
Smith reaffirmed the policy expressed with the enactment of the state's first financial responsibility act in 1931 that such cost-spreading is a more equitable
result than leaving the victims of highway negligence without compensation.
BRENDA JEAN

BOYKIN

107. Some of the cases cited by the court in Smith as authority for its position concerned fellow
employee exclusion clauses rather than the type of employee exclusion clause in Gore's policy. See,
e.g., Atkins v. Pacific Indem. Ins. Group, 125 Ariz. 46, 607 P.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1979); Dahm v.
Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 246 N.W.2d 131 (Wis. 1976). For a discussion of fellow employee
exclusion clauses, see supra note 69.
108. The debate centers around whether the statute requires coverage for injuries of the insured
and his household, or only for third parties who may be injured through the use of his vehicle.
Compare State Farm v. Peckham, 74 Mich. App. 551, 254 N.W.2d 575 (1977) (holding household
exclusion clause valid) with Gurwin v. Alcodray, 77 Mich. App. 97, 257 N.W.2d 665 (1977) (holding
household exclusion clause invalid). See also Schwab v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 27 Ariz.
App. 747, 558 P.2d 942 (1976) (holding that a policy clause excluding bodily injury to the insured is
not in conflict with the state's financial responsibility law).

Fortress Re, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Co.: Application
of the Tate Test to Notice Requirements in Reinsurance
Contracts
Provisions requiring the insured to give the insurer prompt notice of the
occurrence of an insured event are common in insurance contracts.1 Because

most insurance contracts also contain clauses requiring the insurer to defend
claims brought against the insured, 2 the purpose of notice provisions is to give
the insurer an opportunity to conduct a timely investigation so it may ade-

quately defend these claims. 3 Most jurisdictions traditionally have taken a strict
construction approach in breach of notice provision cases, absolving the insurer
of liability under the contract if the notice requirement was not met.4 In recent
years, however, some courts have abandoned the strict construction approach in

favor of the rule that for the insurer to escape its contractual obligations not
only does the insured have to breach the notice provision, but this breach also
must prejudice the insurer by actually frustrating its ability to adequately investigate and defend the claim. 5 This Note analyzes the recent decision of Fortress
Re, Inc. v. Central NationalInsurance Co. 6 in which the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina applied this new "prejudice
test" to a reinsurance contract. Also, this Note discusses the unsuitability of the
prejudice test in the reinsurance context and proposes a new standard to be used

in evaluating notice requirements in reinsurance contracts.
Until 1981 North Carolina courts followed the strict construction approach

in their treatment of notice requirements in insurance policies. 7 This approach
stemmed from the belief that because the terms of the insurance contract, including the notice requirements, were agreed upon by the parties, courts should

not interfere with these terms. 8 Thus the courts had only one duty in interpreting insurance contracts: to ascertain and uphold the intent of the parties, always
1. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4731, at 2 (1981); 13A G. COUCH,
COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 49:2, at 227 (2d ed. 1982); Note, GreatAmerican Insurance Co. v. C.G. Tate Construction Co.: Interpretationof Notice Provisionsin InsuranceContracts, 61
N.C.L. REv. 167, 167 (1982).
2. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supranote 1, § 4682, at 16; 14 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 51:35, at 438.
3. 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4681, at 2; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 49:2, at 227.
4. 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4732, at 10-13; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 49:50, at
278. The notice provision often is phrased in terms of a condition precedent: if notice is late, the
insurer is relieved of liability under the policy. Professors Appleman and Couch also note that even
if policies do not specify that notice is a condition precedent, courts often interpret policies as if they
did.
5. Comment, The Materiality ofPrejudiceto the Insureras a Result of the Insured'sFailure to
Give Timely Notice, 74 DICK. L. Rav. 260, 266-72 (1970); see, e.g., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d
193 (1977); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971).
6. 595 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
7. See, eg., Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964);
Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960); Peeler v. United States Casualty
Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929).
8. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d
518, 522 (1970).
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giving effect to the clear and unambiguous meaning of the terms of the con10
tract. 9 Therefore, if the contract called for notice to be given "immediately"'
12
or "as soon as practicable,"" any unreasonable delay abrogated the insurer's
liability under the policy, regardless of whether the insurer's ability to defend the
claim would have been aided by timely notice.
In 1981, however, the North Carolina Supreme Court in GreatAmerican
Insurance Co. v. C. G. Tate Construction Co. 13 overruled previous cases espousing the strict construction approach.14 The court adopted a three-part test for

determining whether the insurer should be relieved of its contractual obligations
because of the insured's failure to comply with notice requirements.'

5

First, a

16
court must determine whether notice was in fact given as soon as practicable.

Second, if notice was not given in a timely manner, the insured must show that
there was a good faith reason for the delay. Last, if the good faith standard is
met, the burden shifts to the insurer to show that its ability to investigate and
defend the claim was prejudiced by the delay. The court emphasized the prejudice component of the test, stating that the failure of an insured to give prompt

notice pursuant to an insurance contract provision does not relieve the insurer's
materially to prejudice the
liability under the contract "unless the delay operates
17
ability of the insurer to investigate and defend."'

The prejudice test adopted in Tate is consistent with the modem trend
away from strict construction of notice provisions in insurance contracts.'

8

The

basis for the test lies in the courts' perception of the relationship between the
parties to an insurance contract. Courts adopting this test have noted that an

insurance contract is not usually the result of an arm's length bargaining process, but is an adhesion contract 19 issued by an insurer on a take-it-or-leave-it
9. Id; see also Duke v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 286 N.C. 244, 247, 210 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1974)
("The intention of the parties is the controlling guide to [the] interpretation [of the insurance
contract].").
10. See, eg., Mewborn v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Co., 198 N.C. 156, 150 S.E. 887 (1929).
11. See, eg., Fleming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 303, 134 S.E.2d 614 (1964);
Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74, 116 S.E.2d 474 (1960); Peeler v. United States Casualty
Co., 197 N.C. 286, 148 S.E. 261 (1929).
12. North Carolina courts have never required that immediate notice be given; rather they have
construed notice provisions to require that notice be given in a reasonable time considering the facts
and circumstances of the particular situation. See Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 261 N.C.
499, 135 S.E.2d 209 (1964); Mewborn v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Co., 198 N.C. 156, 150 S.E. 887
(1929); see also Ball v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 206 N.C. 90, 172 S.E. 878 (1934) (delay in
giving notice due to inability to discern injury held excusable and not violative of notice requirement); Rhyne v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C 717, 147 S.E. 6 (1929) (delay in giving
notice due to insured's incapacitation held excusable).
13. 303 N.C. 387, 279 S.E.2d 769 (1981).
14. Tate, 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774 ("[W]e hereby overrule the Peeler-Muncie-Fleming line of cases .... ). See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776. For a thorough discussion of the Tate decision, see Note,
supra note 1, at 168-73.
16. This initial prong of the Tate test ends the inquiry for courts adhering to the strict construction approach. See Comment, supra note 5, at 264.
17. Tate, 303 N.C. at 396, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
18. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
19. An adhesion contract is a contract in which the terms are dictated largely by one party,
rather than resulting from negotiation. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
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basis. 20 Thus, the danger exists that insurers may take advantage of their supe-

rior bargaining position to include provisions that heavily favor themselves. Notice requirements are such provisions, inasmuch as failure to comply relieves the

insurer of liability and compliance with the provision affords no additional protection to the insured, but simply maintains the existing policy coverage.

In jurisdictions that have abandoned the strict construction approach, prejudice against the insurer determines whether insurers remain liable when notice
does not comply with the policy provisions. 21 Since the main purpose of a notice requirement is to afford the insurer the opportunity to adequately investigate
and defend the claim, the test is whether the late notice in any way prejudices

the insurer's ability to do so. If not, there is no reason for the insurer to escape
liability. In most jurisdictions that have abandoned the strict construction approach, including North Carolina under the test set forth in Tate, the burden of
22
proof is on the insurer to show that it was prejudiced by the delay.

Tate and all previous North Carolina cases involving insurance contract
notice provisions dealt with notice requirements in original insurance contracts.
Recently, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina applied the test adopted in Tate to a reinsurance contract. 23 In

Fortress Re, Inc. v. Central National Insurance Co.,24 the court held that the
insurer's excessive delay in notifying the reinsurer of the claim had prejudiced

the reinsurer. Therefore the reinsurer was relieved of its obligation to pay under

the contract. 25 Fortress Re, the first case to apply the Tate test, extended the

scope of Tate from original insurance contracts to reinsurance contracts. In so
ruling, the court departed from previous federal court decisions, applying pre-

Tate North Carolina law, that had applied the strict construction approach to
26

reinsurance contracts.

Reinsurance, as distinguished from original insurance, is a means of risk
distribution whereby one insurer (the reinsured) contracts with another insurer
(the reinsurer) for indemnity from all or a portion of the risk underwritten by
the reinsured. 27 Even though reinsurance has been characterized as a separate
20. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milam, 438 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.W.Va. 1977); Cooper
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins.
Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); see also Note, supra note 1, at 171 ("[A]lmost all of the
decisions [adopting a prejudice test] have been based on the adhesion contract rationale."). For a
general discussion of the rationale behind courts' adoption of the prejudice test, see Comment, supra
note 5, at 266-72.
21. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 4732, at 26-31; 13A G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 49:10,
at 234.
22. See Note, supra note 1, at 172-73.
23. For a discussion of the distinction between original insurance contracts and reinsurance
contracts, see infra notes § 27-30 and accompanying text.
24. 595 F. Supp. 334 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
25. Id. at 340.
26. See Fortress Re, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 465 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.C. 1978),
aff'd, 628 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980). "Generally the rules which govern the construction of contracts
and original policies of insurance are applicable to reinsurance contracts." Id. at 338 (quoting 13A
J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 7686, at 500).
27. Shulman, Reinsurance: A Primerfor the Practitioner,L.A. LAW, Oct. 1980 at 34; see also
13A J. APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 7681, at 480; 19 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 80:1, at 624,
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class of insurance, 28 contracts of reinsurance are governed by the same rules
applicable to other insurance contracts. 29 Thus, even though most cases concerning notice requirements have involved original insurance policies, the same
30
rules and terms are used in cases concerning reinsurance contracts.
The controversy in FortressRe arose out of a reinsurance contract executed
by the parties in 1975.31 In September 1978 the insurer was notified of a claim
filed against its insured, a swimming pool manufacturer, for injuries sustained by
an individual while diving into one of the insured's pools. 32 Because of the reinsurer's obligation under the contract to reimburse the insurer in the event of
liability under the insurer's policy, it appeared likely that the claim would involve the reinsurer. Shortly after receiving notification of the claim, the insurer
assigned the case to counsel. Upon investigation, counsel determined that "the
claim was a serious one and excess carriers should certainly be notified."' 33 In
34
April 1980 counsel again advised the insurer of the seriousness of the claim.
On at least two occasions the insurer's internal memoranda indicated that it was
aware of the need to notify the reinsurers. 35 Throughout this period, the insurer
36
sought to reach a settlement agreement with the accident victim.
The insurer finally notified the reinsurer, Fortress Re, of the suit on January
6, 1982, over three years after the claim arose. 37 Trial was set for January 12,
which was only three working days following the initial notice. The insurer
invited Fortress Re to attend a conference with the trial defense counsel on the
eve of the trial. 38 Fortress Re did not attend this meeting, at which the claim
was settled for $923,605. 39 Fortress Re then instituted a declaratory judgment
action to obtain a declaration of its rights and obligations under the contract,
alleging that the insurer had breached the notice requirement, 4° thereby absolv28. 19 G. COUCH, supra note 1, § 80:2, at 624.
29. 13A J.APPLEMAN, supra note 1, § 7686, at 500; 19 G. COUcH, supra note 1, § 80:1, at 623.
30. !Kg., Fortress Re, Inc. v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 465 F. Supp. 333 (E.D.N.C.
1978), aff'd, 628 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1980); Security Mut. Casualty Co. V. Century Casualty Co., 531
F.2d 974 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 860 (1976); Highlands Ins. Co. v. Employers Surplus
Lines Ins. Co., 497 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. La. 1980); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. United Public Ins. Co., 139
Ind. App. 533, 221 N.E.2d 358 (1966).
31. Under the contract, the reinsurer was to reinsure one-half of the insurer's liability over
$250,000 under a products liability insurance policy issued to a swimming pool manufacturer. The
upper limit of the liability policy was $1,000,000. FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at 336 & n.1.
32. Id. at 336.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Internal memoranda indicating an awareness of this need were dated November 1980 and
July 1981. The 1981 memorandum read, in part: "'They [the reinsurers] must be put on notice...
and get notice out to the facultative reinsurers.'" Id.
36. Id. at 337.
37. Id.
38. The correspondence extending the invitation read: "'Consider this your invitation to attend [the trial]. We will be meeting with defense counsel.. . in New Jersey on Sunday evening
[January 11].'" Id. at 337 (quoting Letter from Central National Insurance Co. to Fortress Re, Inc.
(Jan. 6, 1982)).
39. Id. at 337.
40. The notice provision in the reinsurance contract read:
Prompt notice shall be given to the Reinsurer by the Company of any occurrence or
accident which appears likely to involve this reinsurance and while the Reinsurer does not
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ing the reinsurer of liability under the reinsurance contract.
After noting that North Carolina law applied to the case, 4 1 the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina turned to the
substantive issue raised-whether the reinsurer was relieved of liability because
of the reinsured's violation of the notice requirement. The court assumed without discussion that Tate controlled the outcome of the case.42 FortressRe, how-

ever, is distinguishable from Tate, which dealt with a notice requirement in an
original insurance contract. The considerations that led the court in Tate to

adopt the prejudice test do not apply with equal force to a reinsurance contract.
Prior federal cases interpreting North Carolina law that dealt with notice requirements in reinsurance contracts had applied a rule of strict construction.
Even though courts in reinsurance cases generally apply rules applicable to insurance policies and other contracts, it is arguable that the Tate test should not
be applied in the reinsurance context. One of the principal bases for the court's
decision in Tate was the belief that the "terms of an insurance contract are not

bargained for in the traditional sense"; rather, they are "offered on a take-it-orleave-it basis" with the insured having little, if any, input. 43 This same belief

pervades decisions in other jurisdictions adopting a prejudice test. 44 In cases
arising out of original insurance contracts, some courts see a necessity to protect
insureds from potentially unfair insurance contracts since insureds have no control over the terms of their contracts. Reinsurance contracts, however, typically

are negotiated by the parties. 45 Thus, the need for protection of the insured does
not exist in a reinsurance context. The parties to the contract presumably are
aware of the law relating to insurance and reinsurance contracts, including the
importance of prompt notice. 46 Accordingly, it would be reasonable to apply a
to a reinsured than
stricter standard of compliance with the notice requirement
47
to an insured under an original insurance contract.
undertake to investigate or defend claims or suits it shall nevertheless have the right and be
given the opportunity to associate with the Company and its representatives at the Reinsurer's expense in the defense and control of any claim, suit or proceeding involving this
reinsurance, with the full cooperation of the Company.
Id. at 337 n.4.
41. Id. at 337.
42. Id. at 337-38.
43. Tate, 303 N.C. at 395, 279 S.E.2d at 774.
44. See, eg., Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 93, 237 A.2d 870, 873
(1968) ("[T]he terms of an insurance policy are not talked out or bargained for as in the case of
contracts generally."); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 72, 371 A.2d 193, 196 (1977)
("An insurance contract is not a negotiated agreement; rather its conditions are by and large dictated
by the insurance company to the insured."); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I.
143, 159, 282 A.2d 584, 593 (1971) ("An insurance contract is not the end result of the give-and-take
that goes on at a bargaining table."). The Tate court relied on all three of these cases. Tate, 303
N.C. at 394-95, 279 S.E.2d at 773-74.
45. See Shulman, supranote 27, at 35. For example, the contract in FortressRe was negotiated
between the parties. FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at 336.
46. Because both parties are insurance companies, it is reasonable to expect them to have
knowledge of the law surrounding the interpretation of insurance contracts, including reinsurance
contracts.
47. This idea has been applied in cases and endorsed by commentators. See, e.g., Stuyvesant
Ins. Co. v. United Public Ins. Co., 139 Ind. App. 533, 543, 221 N.E.2d 358, 360 (1966) (compared to
individual insureds, insurance company held to a stricter standard of reasonable time to notify rein-
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The court correctly decided under the first part of the test that the reinsured in fact had failed to give prompt notice of the claim to the reinsurer.48
Under the second prong of the Tate test, the court held that the reinsured failed
to meet its burden of proof that it had acted in good faith in giving notice at such
a late date. The reinsured contended that good faith may be shown by an "absence of motive or specific intent not to notify the insurer." 4 9 The court rejected

this contention, concluding that "[a] bad motive or specific intent is not required" for a showing of bad faith. 50 The court noted that even though the

reinsured was aware of the necessity for notifying the reinsurers, it failed to do
so until just before trial. The court also held that the delinquency of notice had
prejudiced the reinsurer in its "ability to participate in the defense and control of
the claim and its evaluation for settlement purposes." 51 The reinsured's conduct
was "so lacking in reasonableness and fair dealing that it amount[ed] to a lack of
good faith as a matter of law."'52 The court therefore granted the reinsurer's
53
motion for summary judgment.
The court was justified in reaching this conclusion. Under North Carolina

law each party to a contract is "required to act in good faith and to make reasonable efforts to perform his obligations under the agreement."' 54 This principle has been applied to contracts between business entities as well as to contracts

between individuals.5 5 It also has been held that good faith means more than an
honest intention to act fairly; it includes an absence of knowledge of any information that would cause the action to be unfair. 56 Thus, as the court in Fortress
Re concluded, "where two business entities deal at arms length, unreasonable or
57
unfair dealings can amount to a lack of good faith."
surer of claim of loss due to its superior knowledge); 19 G. CoucH, supra note 1, § 80:71, at 681
("Being an insurance company, the reinsured is held to a high degree of compliance with policy
provisions which require prompt notice to the reinsurer when a loss occurs which may potentially be
within policy coverage.").
48. The reinsured "waited for over three years before notifying the [reinsurer] and then [gave
notice] only on the eve of trial," even though it was aware shortly, after it received notice of the claim
that the reinsurance was likely to be involved. The reinsured also was advised by counsel to notify
the reinsurers well in advance of the time it actually gave notification. FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at
338. Internal memoranda reflected the reinsured's acknowledgement of its duty to give notification.
Id.; see also supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
49. FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at 338.
50. Id. The court noted that the court in Tate had cited lack of knowledge that a claim had
been filed as an example of good faith. Tate, 303 N.C. at 339, 279 S.E.2d at 776. Since in Fortress
Re the reinsurer was aware of the claim for over three years before it gave notice, the court in
FortressRe must have concluded from the Tate example that actual notice of a claim followed by a
delay in notifying the insurer/reinsurer amounted to a lack of good faith.
51. FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at 339.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 336.
54. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., Inc., 40 N.C. App. 743, 746, 253 S.E.2d
625, 627 (1979); see also United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985, 990 (4th Cir.
1981) ("North Carolina law does require that parties perform their contractual obligations in good
faith.").
55. See, eg., United Roasters, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D.N.C.
1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 985, 989-90 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., 40 N.C. App. 743, 746, 253 S.E.2d 625, 627-28 (1979).
56. See Jaudon v. Swink, 51 N.C. App. 433, 435, 276 S.E.2d 511, 513 (1981).
57. FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at 339.
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The principal issue raised by FortressRe is the application of the prejudice
component of the Tate test to a delayed notice situation involving a reinsurance
contract. Using the Tate test, the court in FortressRe found that the reinsured
acted in bad faith; and as a result, the reinsurer was relieved of its obligations
under the contract. There was, therefore, no need to discuss prejudice since
under the Tate test it is only when the good faith test is met that the issue of
prejudice even arises. 8 Nevertheless, the court in Fortress Re addressed the
prejudice issue. Noting the distinction between insurance and reinsurance, the
court looked to the purpose of the notice requirement in a reinsurance contract
to determine whether the reinsurer had been prejudiced by delayed notice. The
court decided that the underlying purpose of notice requirements in both insurance and reinsurance contracts is to protect the bargain of the parties. 5 9 It then
defined prejudice as "the irretrievable loss of the bargain." 6 Prejudice occurred
in FortressRe when the reinsured lost what it had bargained for-"the ability to
participate in the defense and control of the claim and its evaluation for settlement purposes." 6 1 Because the reinsurer was given notice only three working
days before trial, the purpose of the notice requirement was frustrated. Thus,
the court held as a matter of law that the reinsurer had been prejudiced by the
62
reinsured's tardy notice.
The Tate test places the burden to prove prejudice on the insurer. 63 The
Tate court apparently intended the prejudice issue to be a question of fact, decided on a case-by-case basis. 64 Thus, it is curious that the court in FortressRe
held that the reinsurer was prejudiced as a matter of law. The court candidly
recognized the lack of case law in North Carolina interpreting the prejudice
requirement.65 Without case law to develop a standard of prejudice, it seems
anomalous that a court would find prejudice as a matter of law in any situation.
The facts in FortressRe justify the court's holding; the reinsured substantially delayed giving notice to the reinsurer. If, however, a case with a less compelling fact situation arises, the application of the Tate test could thwart the
intention of the parties, who are aware of their duties and who often have negotiated their contract. Therefore, a modified version of the Tate test should be
applied in reinsurance cases. Courts should hold the reinsured to a high standard of good faith and require only a low degree of prejudice to the reinsurer.
58. Tate, 303 N.C. at 399, 279 S.E.2d at 776.

59. Although it noted that the Tate court discussed prejudice in terms of the insurer's ability to
defend the lawsuit, the FortressRe court nevertheless declared that prejudice as defined in Tate did
not apply in the reinsurance context. The Tate approach was intended "to protect the bargain of the
parties." FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at 339. The court reasoned that the reinsurer had bargained for
the opportunity to participate in the case and the notice requirement was designed to protect that
bargain. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 340.
63. Tate, 303 N.C. at 397-99, 279 S.E.2d at 775-76.
64. "Circumstances which may cause prejudice to an insurer are as varied and as numerous as
the circumstances surrounding automobile accidents. A more complete discussion of prejudicial
factors will have to await a case-by-case development." Id. at 399, 279 S.E.2d 776.
65. FortressRe, 595 F. Supp. at 339.
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Such a test would emphasize the obligation of the reinsured to perform its duty
of prompt notice under a bargained-for reinsurance contract, while retaining the
notion of prejudice in the event that the reinsured shows a legitimate justification
for the delayed notice. Good faith under this test should be limited to situations
in which the reinsured lacks actual knowledge of a claim and lacks any information that should give rise to knowledge of the claim and to situations in which
delay is caused by factors beyond the reinsured's control. Even if the good faith
test is met, however, the burden on the reinsurer of showing prejudice should be
light. A reasonable showing that timely notice might have made a difference in
the ultimate liability of the reinsurer should be enough to show prejudice.
The court in Fortress Re followed a recent innovation in North Carolina
original insurance law and applied it in a different context-reinsurance law.
The reinsurer in FortressRe was relieved of liability because of a bad faith delay
in notice to the reinsurer and the prejudice that resulted. The application of the
Tate test to the facts of FortressRe resulted in a correct decision that upheld the
intention of the parties. It remains to be seen whether this same test can continue to uphold the intention of parties in future reinsurance actions. Since no
North Carolina cases have addressed the issue of notice requirements in reinsurance contracts, it is not possible to determine whether North Carolina courts
will follow the rationale of the federal district court in FortressRe. North Carolina courts should not strictly apply the Tate test to notice provisions of reinsurance contracts. Instead, they should adopt a modified version of the Tate test, as
described in this Note. Such a test would protect the reasonable expectations of
both parties to a reinsurance contract.
CARLTON A. SHANNON, JR.

The Souring of Sweet Acidophilus Milk: Speck v. North
CarolinaDairy Foundation and the Rights of
University Faculty to Their Inventive Ideas
Although universities and university faculty have litigated many cases concerning patent rights,1 cases deciding the respective rights of the faculty inventor

and the university are few. 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Speck v. North CarolinaDairyFoundation.3 The court held that university faculty employed as "teachers and researchers" 4 fall within the category of
persons "hired to invent" and thus have no right to or interest in inventions

arising from university research. 5
This Note analyzes the development of the common-law rights of employees to their inventive ideas and the Speck court's failure to delineate the rights of

university employees within this established framework. The Note concludes
that the court's classification of university faculty as persons hired to invent is
contrary to the premises upon which higher education is based.
Traditionally, in the absence of an express contract, the rights of employees
to their inventions have depended upon the nature of the employment. If the
employee was hired to invent, the employer was entitled to full property rights
1. See Mead Corp. v. United States, 652 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (Dr. Richard
Sweet, a research scientist at Stanford University, developed an ink-jet device pursuant to a contract
between the university and the Department of Defense. Sweet then conveyed all his rights to A.B.
Dick Co. as allowed by his contract with Stanford. Mead Corp. was unsuccessful in its attempts to
force the government to recognize that the Department of Defense had acquired all interests in the
patent.); Burns v. Massachusetts Inst. of Technology, 394 F.2d 416 (1st Cir. 1968) (Burns informed
the university of certain secret ideas so that the university could access those ideas and furnish an
opinion as to their usefulness to an agency of the United States. Burns alleged that the university
presented an unfavorable report but proceeded to develop those ideas. The court held the statute of
limitations for torts governed and dismissed the action.); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir.) (Dr. Steenbock of the University of Wisconsin
had developed a process for the production of Vitamin D from lipoid contained in milk and other
food products. The court held that plaintiff's failure to authorize the use of this process by the
margarine industry was against the public interest. An infringement action against defendant therefore was dismissed. Dr. Steenbock had received $760,000 in royalties at the time of the action.), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945); Dinwiddie v. St. Louis & O'Fallon Coal Co., 64 F.2d 303 (4th Cir.
1933) (Dr. Harrison Bashioum, head of the Chemical Engineering Department of the University of
Pittsburgh, and others were denied all rights to patents pertaining to coal products that had been
developed under the employment of defendant.); Powell Mfg. Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 319 F. Supp. 24
(E.D.N.C. 1970) (Dr. Francis Hassler, a professor at North Carolina State College, obtained patents
relating to the bulk-curing of tobacco. These patents were assigned to Powell Manufacturing. In an
infringement suit, the court held that Hassler's connection to the college did not create a dedication
to the public.); Simmons v. California Inst. of Technology, 34 Cal. 2d 264, 209 P.2d 581 (1949) (en
bane) (Edward Simmons, a student at the California Institute of Technology, developed a strain
sensitive element that was used in research conducted by a faculty member. The court allowed
Simmons to rescind a contract to convey an interest in the device because of fraud.); Blackwell,
Avoiding Litigation over Faculty Patents, 1950-51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS OF COLLEGES AND
UNivERsmas 21 (Dr. Albert Schatz, assistant professor at Brooklyn College, claimed he was codiscoverer of streptomycin along with Dr. Selman Waksman of Rutgers University. The Superior
Court of New Jersey accepted a settlement between the two.)
2. T. BLACKWELL, COLLEGE LAW: A GUIDE FOR ADMINISTRATORS 175 (1961).
3. 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
4. Id. at 686, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
5. Id.
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in the invention. If the invention was created during hours of employment with
the employer's materials, the employee retained the right to the inventive idea,
subject to the employer's shop right-a nonexclusive right to use the invention
in the employer's business. If the employee was not hired to invent and the
invention was developed without the aid of the employer's resources, the em6
ployee retained full title to the invention.
In 1970 Dr. Marvin Speck, a professor at North Carolina State University
(NCSU), began working on the development of a pleasant-tasting milk containing lactobacillus acidophilus. 7 Lactobacillus acidophilus is a bacteria that facilitates proper digestion by neutralizing various undesirable microorganisms in the
human intestines. 8 While an employee of NCSU, Speck, with the assistance of

Dr. Stanley Gilliland, developed an improved medium for growing lactobacillus
acidophilus. 9
Speck informed his department chairman, Dr. William Roberts, of this discovery and noted that it would make possible the mass marketing of milk containing such bacteria.10 In September 1972 Speck sent a memo to the
department head stating that "there would appear to be nothing sufficiently
novel to warrant the filing of a patent application on this product. . . ." 11 In-

stead, Speck suggested that NCSU pursue registration of a trademark and proceed to market milk containing lactobacillus acidophilus. Speck then submitted

a proposal to the University's Patent Committee' 2 that the North Carolina
Dairy Foundation,

13

a nonprofit organization closely tied to NCSU, pursue li-

14
censing of a trademark.

6. See infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text.
7. Speck, 311 N.C. at 680, 319 S.E.2d at 140.
8. Plaintiff-Appellees' New Brief at 1, Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 311 N.C. 679,
319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
9. Defendant-Appellants' New Brief (Board of Governors, et al.) at 2, Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
10. Speck, 311 N.C. at 681-82, 319 S.E.2d at 141.
11. Defendant-Appellants' New Brief (Board of Governors, et al.) at 2, Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
12. North Carolina State University (NCSU) is one of 16 constituent universities that comprise
the University of North Carolina (UNC) system; this system is administered by the Board of Governors. N.C. GEN. STAT §§ 116-4, -11 (1983 & Supp. 1984). The UNC Board of Governors adopted a
patent policy that provides for the establishment of a patent committee at each constituent university. Such committees are responsible for reviewing "all patent disclosures made by the faculty and
staff.. . [and resolving] questions of invention ownership that may arise between the institution and
its faculty. . . ." University of North Carolina Patent Policy 10 (Nov. 16, 1973) (available from
the University of North Carolina General Administration Office).
13. The Dairy Foundation is a nonprofit organization that promotes University research
on dairy products. It has its office on the University campus and one of its officers is a dean
at the University. Dr. Speck and University officials helped the Dairy Foundation negotiate a contract for commercial production of acidophilus. The Dairy Foundation's Acidophilus Committee minutes of 9 January 1973 stated that University officials "would be
kept informed of all pending actions and would be given the opportunity to review all
agreements and contracts prior to execution." The Patent Committee and ranking University officials consistently maintained their desire to "work through" the Dairy Foundation
to make Sweet Acidophilus milk a commercially viable product.
Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 64 N.C. App. 419, 421, 307 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1983), rev'd,
311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
14. University of North Carolina Patent Policy, supra note 12, provides that the inventor shall
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In 1975 Speck wrote to Roberts to inform him that the royalty rights of
Speck and Gilliland had been overlooked in the Dairy Foundation's marketing

of Sweet Acidophilus milk. 15 A legal advisor to NCSU responded, asserting
that Speck had no claim to any such royalties. 16 Although the Chairman of the

University's Patent Committee previously had recommended that the University
make a one-time payment of fifteen percent of the royalties to plaintiffs to avoid
"hard feelings" within the Department, 17 Speck and Gilliland had received no

compensation, other than salaries, for this development. In 1981 Speck and Gilliland sued NCSU and the North Carolina Dairy Foundation. 18

The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground
that the three-year statute of limitations for implied contracts barred any action
for recovery of royalties. 19 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that if a special confidence existed between plaintiffs and NCSU, a

breach of this fiduciary relationship would result in a constructive trust that
triggered the ten-year statute of limitations. The court also rejected the North

Carolina Dairy Foundation's contention that the action should be barred on a

waiver and abandonment theory. 20 Whether a fiduciary relationship existed and

whether plaintiffs' actions should be barred by waiver and abandonment were

21
deemed issues for the jury.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that to prove a constructive trust
plaintiffs would have to prove a property interest in the secret process: "If the

plaintiffs never had any interest in the process which they developed while employed by the University, the defendants did not stand in a fiduciary relationship
receive not less than 15% of the gross royalties from licensing a patent. As noted by the North
Carolina Supreme Court: "The written Patent Policy adopted on November 16, 1973 by the defendant, The Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, simply was silent as to trademarks
and trade secrets." Speck, 311 N.C. at 687, 319 S.E.2d at 144. The North Carolina Court of Appeals had stated, "the Patent Committee revised the policy in 1976 to expressly cover trademarks
and trade secret agreements." Speck, 64 N.C. App. at 421, 307 S.E.2d at 787, rev'd, 311 N.C. 679,
319 S.E.2d 139 (1984). The supreme court rebutted this statement: "There is no indication in the
record on appeal that the defendant Board of Governors has ever authorized or approved an amendment to its written Patent Policy in any way to cover trademarks and trade secrets." Speck, 311
N.C. at 687, 319 S.E.2d at 144. The UNC Patent and Copyright policies as adopted by the Board of
Governors in June 1983 specifically state that the issuance of a trademark in the name of the University shall not result in royalties to the individual developing the trademark. University of North
Carolina Patent and Copyright Policies 14-15 (June 1983) (available from the University of North
Carolina General Administration Office). The policy denounces trade secret agreements as being
inconsistent with the goals of the University. Id. at 15.
15. Speck, 311 N.C. at 684, 319 S.E.2d at 142.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 684-85, 319 S.E.2d at 142-43.
18. Id. at 685, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
19. Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 64 N.C. App. 419,422, 307 S.E.2d 785, 788 (1983),
rev'd, 311 N.C. 679, 319 S.E.2d 139 (1984).
20. The North Carolina Dairy Foundation argued: "[An employee is not entitled to compensation. . . for the use of his invention, where in express terms the employee has given his employer
the free use of his invention or by his conduct or actions has manifested his acquiesence in its use
without payment therefor." Defendant-Appellee's Brief (N.C. Dairy Foundation, Inc.) at 15, Speck
v. North Carolina Dairy Found., 64 N.C. App. 419, 307 S.E.2d 785 (1983), rev'd, 311 N.C. 679, 319
S.E.2d 139 (1984).
21. Speck, 64 N.C. App. at 431, 307 S.E.2d at 793.
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to the plaintiffs with regard to the process."'2 2 The court, after analyzing the
rights of employees to their inventions, categorized Speck and Gilliland as "persons hired to invent" who therefore had no right to inventions arising from their

research.
The North Carolina Supreme Court embarked upon this path on its own
initiative. Of the ten cases cited in the majority opinion, only three were cited in
the parties' briefs. None of the numerous cases cited by the court of appeals was
even mentioned by the supreme court. Because of the nature of the summary
judgment motion, only limited facts had been presented at trial concerning
Speck's status as a person hired to invent. It was therefore unusual for the
supreme court to allow the case to turn on the rights of the employed inventor.
If the issue had been presented properly at the trial level and before the court of
appeals, not only would additional facts concerning the context and nature of
Speck and Gilliland's employment have come to light, but in all likelihood the
court would have been presented with a more developed discussion of the issue
whether faculty members should be classified as persons hired to invent.
An employee's claim for compensation for an inventive idea usually is
based upon the unjust enrichment of the employer and therefore is a question of
state contract law. Although patent infringement is governed by federal statute, 23 state law governs whether the employee has impliedly or explicitly assigned an inventive idea to the employer. 24 Trade secret protection, however, is
entirely a product of state common law. 25 In Speck the court failed to distin22. Speck, 311 N.C. at 685, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
23. The Patent Act provides for the inventor's exclusive right to market and use any product or
process that is appropriately filed with the patent office. This right is limited to a maximum of 17
years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." Id. § 101. The Patent Act
also establishes a civil action for damages as the inventor's remedy against infringement. Id. §§ 271,
281.
Trademark and copyright infringement also are governed by federal statute. A trademark is a
mark of authenticity used to distinguish a manufacturer's products from those of another. Elgin
Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901) ("The term has been in use
from a very early date, and, generally speaking, means a distinctive mark of authenticity, through
which the products of particular manufacturers. . . may be distinguished from those of others.");
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (5th ed. 1979). Federal statutes provide for injunctions, recovery
of damages, and destruction of infringing goods when the original trademark is properly registered
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1116-18 (1982).
Copyright protection is extended to literary material and the like, with civil and criminal actions available for infringement. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 501-509 (1982).
24. Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 390-91 (1929); Standard Brands, Inc.
v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161, 176 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
25. Engelhard Indus., Inc. v. Research Instrumental Corp., 324 F.2d 347, 352-53 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 923 (1964); Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).
A trade secret is based upon a confidential relationship. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co.
v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917). As defined by the American Law Institute, a trade secret is
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business,
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it. . . . An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors to
be considered in determining whether given information is one's trade secret are: (1) the
extent to which the information is known outside of his business; (2) the extent to which it
is known by employees and others involved in his business; (3) the extent of measures taken
by him to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to him and
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guish plaintiffs' claim for compensation for use of a trademark from a claim for
use of a patent. Although the opinion refers to the improved medium for grow-

ing lactobacillus acidophilus as a "secret process" (implying similarity to both
trade secrets and patents), the court applied both patent and trade secret law by

27
analogy. The hired-to-invent doctrine is common to patent, 26 trade secret,

copyright, 28 and other similar claims. 29 The North Carolina Supreme Court in

Speck properly recognized, however, as does the greater weight of authority,
that an employee's right to compensation for use of an invention should be de30

termined without regard to the patentability of the invention.
The United States Supreme Court in Solomons v. United States3 1 recog-

nized that an employee hired to invent has no property rights in his own inventive ideas: "If one is employed to devise or perfect an instrument . . . , he
cannot, after successfully accomplishing the work for which he was employed,

plead title thereto as against his employer. That which he has been employed
and paid to accomplish becomes.

dard PartsCo.

v. Peck, 33

. .

the property of the employer."' 32 In Stan-

the Court held that an employee under a general em-

ployment contract who is later assigned to pursue a project of developing a

particular process or machinery has no property rights to inventions related to
that project or process. 34 This point was further clarified by the United States
his competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in developing the
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). Due to the development of the fields of unfair
competition and trade regulation during the 40 years after the formulation of the first Restatement of
Torts, the provisions pertaining to trade secrets were eliminated from the second Restatement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 708-761 introductory note (1977). For examples of modem
courts citing the first Restatement, see Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 62324 (7th Cir. 1971); Demit of Venezuela, C.A. v. Electronic Water Sys., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 850, 852
(S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd mem., 740 F.2d 977 (1lth Cir. 1984) (quoting Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C &
P Plastics, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 55, 74 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 506 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1975) (citing
Restatement)); International Election Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp 684, 705-06 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
aff'd mem, 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979).
26. See Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426,435 (1896); McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1893); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890).
27. Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 626, 629-30, 419 A.2d 1115, 1117 (1980).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
29. Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 270 Cal. App. 2d 886, 890, 76 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108
(1969) (alluding to doctrine in discussion of "cutting" and "editing" rights in motion pictures).
30. "Nearly all of the cases agree that relief in respect of a defendant's use or disclosure of a
secret invention, discovery, etc., is to be granted, or withheld, without regard to questions of patentability." Annot., 170 A.L.R. 481 (1947) (citing cases); see also Wilson v. Barton & Ludwig, Inc., 163
Ga. App. 721, 296 S.E.2d 74 (1982) (The court recognized that an employee could recover compensation for an employer's use of an unpatentable idea or product based on implied contract. The
court, however, concluded the employee's idea was not sufficiently novel so as to constitute a protectable interest.); Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(claim for compensation analyzed under shop-right doctrine despite failure to file for patent; invention referred to as "novel idea"); Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 626, 419 A.2d 1115 (1980) (In
employer's suit seeking to enjoin employee from working for competitor, court applied shop-right
and hired-to-invent doctrine to unpatented device created by employee that was similar to trade

secret.).
31.
32.
33.
34.

137 U.S. 342 (1890).
Id. at 346.
264 U.S. 52 (1924).
Id. at 58-60.
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Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Houghton v. United States. 35 "The
right of the employer to the invention or discovery of the employee depends, not
upon the terms of the original contract of hiring, but upon the nature of the
service in which the employee is engaged at the time he makes the discovery or
invention ....
-36 The hired-to-invent doctrine is firmly established, 37 but
courts have differed in the application of the doctrine. Generally, an employee is
classified as one hired to invent only when there exists clear evidence of such a
situation. "Courts. . . are reluctant to find a specifically-inventive employment
agreement. They distinguish between employees hired to invent and those hired
38
merely to improve the embodiment of an idea."
An employer acquires an implied license to use the employee's inventive
ideas-a shop right-when the employee uses his work time or the employer's
materials to reduce his idea to practice. 39 The rationale for granting a shop
right was articulated in United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.4
Since the servant uses his master's time, facilities and materials to attain a concrete result, the latter is in equity entitled to use that which
embodies his own property and to duplicate it as often as he may find
occasion to employ similar appliances in his business. But the employer in such a case has no equity to demand a conveyance of the
invention, which is the original conception of the employee alone
41

An employer's shop right is personal to the employer and cannot be assigned to
35. 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928).
36. Id. at 390.
37. See Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 435 (1896); McAleer v. United States, 150 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1893); Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342, 346 (1890); Houghton v. United States, 23
F.2d 386, 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928); Bandag, Inc. v. Morenings, 259 Iowa 998,
1005, 146 N.W.2d 916, 921 (1966); National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 247, 55 N.E.2d 783,
787 (1944); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 162-63, 131
N.E. 307, 308 (1921); Steranko v. Inforex, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 253, 269-70, 362 N.E.2d 222, 23334 (1977); International Pulverizing Corp. v. Kidwel, 7 N.J. Super. 345, 347, 71 A.2d 151, 151 (Ch.
Div. 1950).
38. Note, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights To His Employee's Invention, 58 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 863, 867 (1983). For an example of a court's reluctance to classify an employee as a
person hired to invent, see Logus Mfg. Corp. v. Nelson, 195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 566, 568 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) (court held that vice-president hired to direct development of microwave products not hired to

invent).
39. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933); Kinkade v. New York
Shipbuilding Corp., 21 N.J. 362, 371, 122 A.2d 360, 365 (1956); Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 298,
157 N.E.2d 505, 509, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348, 353-55 (1959); see also Aero Bolt & Screw Co. v. Iaia, 180
Cal. App. 2d 728, 736-39, 5 Cal. Rptr. 53, 58-60 (1960) (shop right not granted for invention that
was created on employee's own time at his own expense); Brown v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration
Co., 374 A.2d 842, 847 (Del. Ch. 1977) (court recognized shop-right doctrine, but concluded doctrine was not applicable because of existence of express contract), rev'd on other grounds, 403 A.2d
1114 (Del. 1979); Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643, 648 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977)
(shop right not granted because use of employer's materials was de minimis); Annot., 61 A.L.R.2D
374-76 (1958) (collecting cases).
40. 289 U.S. 178 (1933). Dubilieris the seminal case delineating the rights of employees to
inventions created during employment. The United States Supreme Court held that two employees
of the United States Bureau of Standards who had conducted research in the use of radio remote
control would be required to grant a shop right in a radio receiving set they had invented. Id. at 18586, 193.
41. Id. at 188-89.
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43
a third person, 42 except to a successor corporation.
When the employee is under a general contract of employment-a person
not hired to invent-and the invention is not developed with the use of the employer's resources, the employee retains full rights to the invention. 44 The employee retains these rights even if the invention is related to the employer's
45
product line.
These classifications of employees were summarized by the United States
Supreme Court in Dubilier.
One employed to make an invention, who succeeds, during his term of
service, in accomplishing that task, is bound to assign to his employer
any patent obtained. The reason is that he has only produced that
which he was hired to invent.. . . On the other hand, if the employment be general, albeit it cover a field of labor and effort in the performance of which the employee conceived the invention for which he
obtained a patent, the contract is not so broadly construed as to require an assignment of the patent.

[W]here a servant, during his hours of employment, working
with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an
accord his master a
invention for which he obtains a patent, he must
46
nonexclusive right to practice the invention.
The Florida Supreme Court has examined two cases involving the rights of
employees to inventive ideas associated with institutional research. In State
Board of Education v. Bourne4 7 the court upheld an employee's right to his
inventions. Bourne was employed as a member of the research staff of the Everglades Experiment Station on a project attempting to develop new strains of
sugar cane. 48 At trial the chancellor determined that Bourne was hired as a
plant pathologist and physiologist, but not as a geneticist. 49 The chancellor held
that the nature of Bourne's employment did not contemplate invention of these
strains; thus, Bourne was not hired to invent. The Supreme Court of Florida
upheld the chancellor's determination because the employment contract "by express terms or unequivocal inference" did not show that Bourne was hired to
invent.50 Lacking such evidence, the employment was deemed to be of a general
nature. 51 Although Bourne was part of a project researching new plant varieties, unless his individual inventive capacities were employed specifically for the
42. Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52, 54 (1924); Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233
(1886); Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 1983); PPG Indus. V.
Guardian Indus., 597 F.2d 1090, 1093-94 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930 (1979).
43. Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793, 796 (W.D. Pa. 1931).

44. Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co., 149 U.S. 315, 320 (1893).
45. Mainland Indus. v. Timberland Machines & Eng'g Corp., 58 Or. App. 585, 589, 649 P.2d
613, 616, appeal denied, 293 Or. 801, 653 P.2d 999 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
46. Dubilier,289 U.S. at 187-88.
47. 150 Fla. 323, 7 So. 2d 838 (1942).
48. Id. at 324, 7 So. 2d at 839.
49. Id. at 325, 7 So. 2d at 839.
50. Id. at 328, 7 So. 2d at 840.
51. Id.
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purpose of deriving such strains he would not be considered a person hired to
invent. The court recognized that an individual employed for the purpose of
conducting research does not lose the rights to his inventive ideas unless he is
assigned to a specific project from which the employer expects to derive a patent
52
or trade secret.
In State v. Neal 53 the Supreme Court of Florida heard the appeal of another employee of the Experiment Station who claimed rights to his research. In
Neal the court found additional facts supporting a finding that the employee was
hired to invent. The rationale of Bourne, however, was left intact with only
slight modification. Dr. Wayne Neal, an assistant in animal nutrition at the
Experiment Station, was assigned to a project that was to examine the digestibility of dried citrus waste among livestock.5 4 The project later was modified to
include the development of dried citrus waste as a dairy feed. 55 Neal, as director
of the project, applied for a patent for such a dairy feed in the name of the
Experiment Station. 56 Upon being informed that a patent could be issued only
57
in the name of an individual, Neal applied for the patent in his own name.
Neal later assigned the patent, which resulted in litigation between the State and
the assignee. 58 In determining that there was an "unequivocal inference" that
Neal was hired to invent, the court pointed to his responsibility for directing the
project, the payment of patent expenses by the Station, and Neal's intention of
obtaining the patent in the name of his employer.5 9 The only modification of the
Bourne ruling appears to be that an "unequivocal inference" that an employee
was hired to invent need not arise from the express wording of the employment
contract, but may arise from subsequent conditions. That Neal cites Bourne
with approval supports this conclusion. 60
In Kaplan v. Johnson6 1 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois was faced with the question whether the government had
acquired all interests in a whole-body imaging system developed by the Chief of
the Nuclear Medicine Services at a Veterans Administration hospital. Plaintiff
acknowledged that during the development of this invention he had made use of
62
his employer's facilities and equipment and the services of other employees.
The court addressed the ownership of inventions created in connection with an
employer's research:
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
contract

Id. at 329, 7 So. 2d at 840.
152 Fla. 582, 12 So. 2d 590, cerL denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).
Id. at 583-84, 12 So. 2d at 590.
Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590.
Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590-91.
Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590.
Id. at 584, 12 So. 2d at 590-91.
Id. at 585-86, 12 So. 2d at 591.
Id. at 587, 12 So. 2d at 592 ("Mhe invention in question was the product of Dr. Neal's
of employment and. . . under the rule announced in State Board of Education v. Bourne,

. . . it enured to his employer.").

61. 409 F. Supp. 190 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd sub nom. Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir.
1976).
62. Id. at 193.
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The government .. argues that the invention related to [Kaplan's]
official duties. This argument is based upon [a] letter ... indicating
that plaintiff was expected to engage in research. . . In Dubilier,the
Court did not consider either the performance or the supervision of
research to be an absolutely critical factor. . .. It is readily apparent
that the Court desired to draw a distinction between employment calling for general research work and employment with the specific objective of invention. The Court held that even if an employee receives a
general research assignment and ultimately invents a patented process
or machine, he will not be required to assign his rights to the patent
absent an express agreement or assignment to invent. The Court held
covers a field of
this to be true even if the contract of employment
63
endeavor to which the invention relates.

The district court also considered the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 10096, which directs that any government employee who creates an invention during worlk hours or with government contribution of facilities, material,
or funds must assign all rights to the government. 64 After finding the order
unconstitutional, the court found in favor of plaintiff, granting only a shop right
to the government. 65 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cirorder constitutional, and granted the govcuit reversed, holding the executive
66
ernment full rights to the patent.
The ownership of literary property developed by a university professor has
been considered by the California Court of Appeals. In Williams v. Weisser67 a
college professor was awarded damages based on property rights in lectures delivered at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). Defendant
Weisser had paid graduate students to audit Williams' class and prepare summaries of his lectures. These notes then were sold to students. Defendant asserted
that any rights to the lectures were held by the university, which was not a party
to the suit. The court noted that UCLA was incapable of prescribing Williams' "way of expressing the ideas he puts before his students." 68 This lack of
control refuted defendant's contention that Williams was hired to produce these
specific lectures. The court also noted that if Williams did not hold property
rights to his lectures, the university could enjoin him from teaching similar
courses at other schools in the future. The university, however, had not
purchased Williams' every thought by virtue of the employment contract.
Despite the holdings in other jurisdictions that an employee assigned to
perform general institutional research is not a person hired to invent, the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Speck categorized faculty researchers as persons
hired to invent. The strongest reasoning supporting this classification was ex69
pressed in Houghton v. United States.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 203-06.
Id. at 206.
Kaplan v. Corcoran, 545 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1976).
273 Cal. App. 2d 726, 78 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1969).
Id. at 734, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir), cert denied, 277 U.S. 592 (1928).
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Let a case be supposed of a charitable foundation, which employs
chemists and physicians to study diseases, with a view of discovering a
cure for them, one of whose employees, in the course of experiments
conducted for it, discovers a remedy which it is seeking, and for the
discovery of which the experiments are conducted, and procures a patent on it. Should such employee be allowed to withhold the patent
from the foundation for his own profit, merely because the foundation
does not desire to monopolize the remedy but to give the benefit of the
70
discovery to mankind?
Preserving the interests of an employer that has expended resources in developing a particular inventive idea is the foundation of the hired-to-invent doctrine.
"[W]hen an employee merely does what he is hired to do, his successes, as well
as failures, belong to his employer."'7 1 When an employee pursues a particular
discovery on behalf of the employer, there is no reason to distinguish the products of an employee's inventive skills and the products of his mechanical skills;
73
72
The Restatement (Second) of Agency
both are property of the employer.
finds this rationale particularly appropriate when applied to persons assigned to
experimental work. The Restatement would create an inference of ownership in
the employer when a person is hired to conduct "experimental work for inventive purposes." 74 Finally, a court cannot but notice the vast amounts spent by
universities on research. A court determining ownership rights to university research naturally would be inclined to find that the university has acquired all
rights to the knowledge it has paid to attain.
Although the common law has recognized a shop right when the inventive
idea is reduced to practice with the employer's resources or during hours of
employment, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Speck did not use these factors to determine the existence of a shop right. Instead, these factors were cited
as support for the determination whether the employee was hired to invent. After noting that the secret process was developed during hours of employment
and with university resources, the court stated: "Under these facts, the secret
process developed through research of the plaintiffs belonged to the University
absent a written contract by the University to assign."'75 Although other courts
have shown reluctance in classifying persons as hired to invent because of the
risk of implying too much within the employment contract, 76 the North Carolina Supreme Court has categorically found that university faculty conducting
research are persons hired to invent.
In Speck, the court also noted the nature of NCSU as an institution pro70. Id. at 390.
71. Id.
72. Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 436 (1896).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 397 (1957).
74. Id. comment a.
75. Speck, 311 N.C. at 686, 319 S.E.2d at 143.
76. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. This is particularly true in the area of trade
secrets. Legal scholars have emphasized that courts should deny protection of a trade secret if the
job skills of the employee are such that "he will have difficulty in obtaining a new position if he
cannot take [the trade secret] with him." Note, Competitive Torts, 77 HARv.L. RIV.888, 949
(1964).
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moting research for the common good. 77 The court's holding in favor of NCSU,
however, does not necessarily promote the public good. The United States Constitution created the patent system upon the theory that placing limited exclusive rights in the inventor would create incentives to pursue inventive ideas and
enhance the development of technology. 78 Courts have refrained from frustrating this policy. As the Supreme Court noted in Dubilier, "[T]he courts are incompetent to answer the difficult question whether the patentee is to be...
compelled to dedicate his invention to the public. .

.

. [A]ny such declaration

of policy must come from Congress. .... ,,79
Academic research is fundamentally different from research conducted by
private industry. Although private industry pursues research and development
to attain practical applications capable of generating revenue, universities pursue
research to attain intellectual enlightenment. For this reason, university research is more adequately characterized as "general research" than as "employment with the specific objective of invention." Teaching is the primary
responsibility of professors; their research is conducted to enhance the university's position as an institution designed to convey knowledge. Professors, therefore, are allowed to research whatever problems their minds move them to
pursue. One avenue of research may be abandoned at will and another begun,
without reflection upon economic consequences and without any consultation
with university officials. The United States Supreme Court consistently has recognized the necessity of pursuing scholarship in a free and open environment.
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident. .

.

. To impose any strait jacket upon the intel-

lectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future
of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended
by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. . .

Teachers and

students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity80and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.
In contrast to the free pursuit of knowledge stands the Speck court's assumption that university professors are hired to pursue specific research from
which they are expected to produce patentable inventions. Although university
faculty may be encouraged to research or publish, the goal of the university is
not to achieve marketable inventions. "[U]niversity personnel, as compared
with those in a commercial organization, are employed and promoted on a basis
which gives no recognition to the [economic] value of the inventions they
make." 8 1 One court has held that when an employer is disinterested in whether
an employee produces an invention, that employee is not a person hired to
invent.82
77.
78.
79.
80.

Speck, 311 N.C. at 688, 319 S.E.2d at 145.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Dubilier,289 U.S. at 208-09.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).

81.

Caruso, UNIvERsrTY PATENT POLICIEs, 3 C. Couns. 64, 65-66 (1968).

82. Bowers v. Woodman, 59 F.2d 797 (D. Mass. 1932). In Bowers, the court held that an
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The common-law rights of ownership with regard to employed inventors
have developed from common expectations concerning employment. The common expectations concerning university employment are not the same as the
expectations concerning employees within private industry. University faculty
are not hired to produce commercially successful inventions; they are hired as
teachers and educators. Unlike the typical hired-to-invent situation in which the
acorn of an inventive idea is planted by the employer, patentable inventions arising from university research are results of the individual work of faculty who
chose to pursue such research. That professors are encouraged to pursue knowledge by means of research should not be a basis for claiming that a professor
who engages in such research is hired to invent.
It is regrettable that the North Carolina Supreme Court classified university
employees as persons hired to invent without the issue being properly before the
court. Because plaintiffs used university resources, NCSU should have been afforded a shop right. Speck and Gilliland, however, should not have been deprived of all interests in the process they developed. If NCSU had considered
Speck's work to be of such importance in improving public health as to require
full ownership by the university, it should have taken measures to establish that
interest. The university should have the responsibility and obligation to delineate, by means of the employment contract, the rights of employees to patents
derived from educational research.
CHRISTOPHER GRAFFLIN BROWNING, JR.

employee's assignment to study operations at various plants and to suggest improvements did not
anticipate that the employee would be required to invent. "If he had never invented anything, he
[T]here is, in this
could not have been charged with a failure in the performance of his duties ....
case, no contract to invent." Id. at 802. This same disinterest characterizes universities' attitudes
toward faculty inventions. "mhe research of university faculty members is not directed by others
into channels where its purpose is a solution of specific technological problems. Rather, it is pure or
basic research which is undirected in the sense that areas of natural phenomena are explored primarily for the purpose of adding to the store of knowledge." Caruso, supra note 81, at 64.

Competitive Annexation Among Municipalities: North Carolina
Adopts the Prior Jurisdiction Rule
Annexation, the process by which a municipality extends its boundaries to
include outlying areas,' is usually an attractive prospect to both the annexing
municipality and the territory being annexed. The main benefit to citizens in the

annexed area is that after annexation they receive city services and access to city
facilities. 2 Through annexation, the city forces persons in fringe areas who often
use municipal services to share the tax burden of those services. 3 Furthermore,

annexation ensures that the development of fringe areas is not inconsistent with
4
city planning objectives.

Annexation has been a major factor in the growth of North Carolina cities.5
From 1917 to 1947, there were 225 special legislative acts extending municipal
corporate boundaries in North Carolina. 6 In the seven year period from 1970 to

1977, annexations by cities with populations over 2500 accounted for 1480 corporate boundary extensions. 7 Annually, about one-half of North Carolina's cit1. Note, Annexation-North Carolina'sReferendum Procedure-Texi Industries, Inc. v. City
of Fayetteville, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 765, 767-68 (1981).
2. NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS & NORTH CAROLINA
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, REPORT OF THE JOINT ANNEXATION STUDY COMMISSION OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AND THE NORTH CAROLINA

LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES 21 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS]; NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

VI-11 to -12 (1959) (quoting MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY
REPORT OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION 5 (1959)).
3. DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIES NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, ADJUSTING MUNICI-

PAL BOUNDARIES 1-2 (1966), reprintedin SELECTED MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 7879 (W. Wicker ed. 1980). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.10 (1982) provides that an annexed area is
subject to immediate taxation by the annexing authority.
4. According to a 1958 study, problems may arise in uncontrolled fringe areas:
We have viewed with alarm the experience in other states where failure of cities to expand
their boundaries periodically has resulted in what is called the "metropolitan problem."
We have analyzed what can happen if a city is surrounded by heavily populated fringe
areas that cannot for a variety of reasons be annexed by the city. We have noted fringe
areas that are, in every sense of the word, slums. We have noted fringe areas whose
problems of sanitation and traffic and law enforcement are so great that cities are discouraged from attempting annexation. We have noted fringe areas so poorly developed that the
city finds it impossible to extend water and sewer facilities through these areas to serve
presently undeveloped land that could accommodate sound development.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY

COMMISSION 19 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 41 (W.
Wicker ed. 1980). See also A. COATES, INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA,
21-22 (tracing the history of municipal growth in North Carolina and observing that when fringe
areas came to be "sufficiently near to affect the health of the inhabitants of the town," the town's
limits were inevitably extended); ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

63 (1962), reprinted in SELECTED MATERIALS ON MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 72 (W. Wicker ed.
1980) ("[i]f uncontrolled, [fringe] areas can be a source of trouble and cost for the entire area-the
residents of the fringe area as well as the annexing city").
5. NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, supra note 2, at 11.
6. Id. at 12. Until 1947 the only way to annex territory to a municipality was by special act of
the general assembly. Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 73, 277 S.E.2d 820, 823, cert.
denied, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981).
7. NORTH CAROLINA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, supra note 2, at 17.
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ies make three annexations each. 8 In this flurry of annexation activity the
boundaries of North Carolina's cities move closer to one another, increasing the
likelihood that two or more municipalities will want to annex the same fringe

area. Under North Carolina statutes more than one municipality may have authority to annex the same territory; 9 thus, a conflict might ensue if two or more
municipalities take action at once.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has resolved two such conflicts. In

Town of Hudson v. City of Lenoir10 and in City of Burlington v. Town of Elon
College," the court had to determine which of two competing annexation attempts would prevail. The Hudson court considered the nature of the competing proceedings and chose a "voluntary" proceeding over an "involuntary"

one. 12 In 1984 the court in Burlington explicitly overruled the Hudson decision,
holding that the "winner" of the race for annexation is the first municipality

officially to begin its proceedings, regardless of the type of proceedings involved. 13 The Burlington court thus adopted the prior jurisdiction rule, which
of disputes between municihad been long recognized elsewhere as dispositive
14
palities over annexation of the same territory.
In the Hudson case the town of Hudson sought to extend its boundaries
under statutes permitting unilateral, involuntary annexation,15 a type of annexation that does not require the consent of residents in the area to be annexed. The

city of Lenoir, responding to a petition from residents of the area to be annexed,
sought to annex the same territory pursuant to the voluntary procedure prescribed by section 160A-31 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 16 The court
temporarily restrained both municipalities from pursuing their proceedings. Af-

ter the restraining order was lifted, both municipalities simultaneously began
8. Id. at 16.
9. For a discussion of statutory annexation methods in North Carolina and jurisdictional requisites for annexation, which may be satisfied by more than one municipality, see infra notes 25-42
and accompanying text.
10. 279 N.C. 156, 181 S.E.2d 443 (1971).
11. 310 N.C. 723, 314 S.E.2d 534 (1984).
12. "Voluntary" proceedings are those initiated by the residents of an area proposed for annexation. "Involuntary" annexations proceed regardless of the desire or consent of those residents. See
infra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
13. Burlington, 310 N.C. at 730, 314 S.E.2d at 538.
14. See, eg., Borghi v. Board of Supervisors, 133 Cal. App. 2d 463, 284 P.2d 537 (1955); City
of Daytona Beach v. City of Port Orange, 165 So. 2d 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); City of Muscatine v. Waters, 251 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1977); Pfeiffer v. City of Louisville, 240 S.W.2d 560 (Ky.
1951); State ex rel. Orono v. Village of Long Lake, 274 Minn. 264, 77 N.W.2d 46 (1956); Sugar
Creek v. City of Independence, 466 S.W.2d 100 (Mo. CL App. 1971); City of West Fargo v. City of
Fargo, 251 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1977); State ex rel. Winn v. City of San Antonio, 259 S.W.2d 248
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Town of Greenfield v. City of Milwaukee, 259 Wis. 77, 47 N.W.2d 292
(1951). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1037(a) (1981) (Virginia statutes do not follow the prior
jurisdiction rule and instead provide that if there is an annexation dispute, "the court in which the
original proceedings are pending... shall consolidate the cases and hear them together, and shall
make such decision as is just taking into consideration the interest of all parties to each case.").
15. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33 to -56 (1982 & Supp. 1983) provide for involuntary annexation; §§ 160A-33 to -44 govern involuntary annexations by cities of fewer than 5000 persons; and
§§ 160A-45 to -56 govern involuntary annexations by cities of 5000 or more. Because it was populated by fewer than 5000 persons, the Town of Hudson used §§ 160A-33 to -44 in its attempted
involuntary annexation.
16. Id. § 160A-31 (1982).
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new annexations; thus, neither proceeding was commenced before the other.
Searching for a basis on which to declare that one of the proceedings would
prevail, the court examined the nature of the two proceedings and noted that
statutes for voluntary annexation allow for quicker completion of proceedings
than do statutes for involuntary annexation. 17 The court concluded that the
general assembly preferred an annexation that had the blessing of the landowners and ruled that the voluntary annexation prevailed over the simultaneously
begun involuntary one. 18 Because the two annexation attempts had been initiated simultaneously, the Hudson court could not give priority based on a first-tostart rule. The court, however, did not limit its holding to simultaneously begun
annexations; instead, the court suggested that voluntary proceedings would always be given priority. 19
In Burlington20 the North Carolina Supreme Court faced another contest
between an involuntary and a voluntary proceeding. Unlike Hudson, in which
neither of two competing proceedings clearly had been begun first, the town of
Burlington had initiated its involuntary proceedings for annexing a territory
before the town of Elon College ever received a petition from the territory's
residents to begin voluntary proceedings. Nonetheless, Elon College completed
its proceedings first. Burlington brought suit alleging that it had prior jurisdiction over the territory and, therefore, that Elon College's activities were null and
void. The North Carolina Supreme Court accepted Burlington's reasoning, rejected the Hudson court's holding that voluntary annexation proceedings are
"more equal" than involuntary ones, and adopted instead the rule of prior
21
jurisdiction.
Under the prior jurisdiction rule, when "separate equivalent proceedings
relat[e] to the same subject matter, that one which is prior in time is prior in
jurisdiction to the exclusion of those subsequently instituted."'22 A proceeding is
"prior in time" if it is initiated before another; the proceeding is initiated when
17. Hudson, 279 N.C. at 161, 181 S.E.2d at 447.
18. See id. at 161-62, 181 S.E.2d at 447.
19. See id. The Hudson court cited no cases for support and one case to the contrary. The
contrary case, which the court cited with the signal "but see," was Town of Clive v. Colby, 255 Iowa
483, 123 N.W.2d 331 (1963) (supplemental opinion).
20. City of Burlington v. Town of Elon College, 310 N.C. 723, 314 S.E.2d 534 (1984).
21. Id. at 728-30, 314 S.E.2d at 537-39. Had the Hudson court restricted its holding to cases in
which an involuntary and voluntary proceeding began simultaneously, the Burlington court could
have limited Hudson to the facts of the case. Because the Hudson holding went beyond the facts of
the case, however, the Burlington court had to overrule Hudson to adopt the prior jurisdiction doctrine. To the extent that Hudson is still good law, it applies only when multiple annexation attempts
are simultaneously begun.
22. 2 E. McQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS § 7.22(a), at 377 (3d rev. ed.
1979). The prior jurisdiction rule
applies, generally speaking, to and among proceedings for the municipal incorporation,
annexation, or consolidation of a particular territory, i.e., in proceedings of this character,
while the [proceeding] first commenced is pending, jurisdiction to consider and determine
others concerning the same territory is excluded. Thus, where two or more bodies or tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction over a subject matter, the one first acquiring jurisdiction
may proceed, and subsequent purported assumptions of jurisdiction in the premises are a

nullity.
Id. at 377-78.
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the "first mandatory public procedural step" is taken. 2 3 Applying the prior jurisdiction rule to the Burlington facts, the supreme court found that Burlington
took the first mandatory public procedural step by following the first directive of

the statute pursuant to which it annexed-adopting a resolution of intent to
annex. 24 Because adoption of this resolution occurred before Elon College made
any annexation efforts, Elon College had no jurisdiction to annex, even though it
completed its proceedings first.
Before examining potential implications of the prior jurisdiction rule, it is

useful to consider the various methods by which annexation may be accomplished in North Carolina. 25 Although the general assembly has the authority
to extend municipal boundaries by special act,2 6 it has also enacted statutes allowing municipalities to extend their boundaries independent of the general assembly. In recent years these more local forms of annexation have become
27

increasingly common.
One method by which municipalities may annex without reference to the
general assembly or to the desires of citizens living in an area to be annexed is

the involuntary method prescribed by sections 160A-33 to -56 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 28 If the annexing body has at least 5000 citizens, it proceeds under sections 160A-33 to -44,29 the statutes under which Burlington
proceeded, and if it has fewer than 5000, it proceeds under sections 160A-45 to 23. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
24. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-49(a) (1982) (current version at Id. § 160A-49(a) (Supp.
1983)). For a discussion of how the amended version of § 160A-49 might change the Burlington
court's determination that the resolution of intent is the first step, see infra text accompanying note
59.
25. N.C. CONsT. art. VII, § 1 gives the general assembly the power to create and control the
boundaries of cities and towns. The general assembly has delegated much of this power to the
municipalities, providing statutory means by which municipalities may effect annexation without
legislative action. When the general assembly has so delegated its authority, annexation is invalid
unless the municipalities comply with the statutory directives. Eg., In re Ordinance of Annexation
No. 1977-4, 296 N.C. 1, 16-17, 249 S.E.2d 698, 707 (1978) (quoting Huntley v. Potter, 255 N.C.
619, 627, 122 S.E.2d 681, 686 (1961)). "Substantial compliance" with the statutes, however, is probably sufficient. For a discussion of substantial compliance, see infra notes 67-83 and accompanying

text.
Despite the delegation of its annexation powers, the general assembly has retained the right to
annex by special legislative act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (1982), formerly the only means by
which annexation could be accomplished, Abbott v. Town of Highlands, 52 N.C. App. 69, 73, 277
S.E.2d 820, 823, disc rev. denied, 303 N.C. 710, 283 S.E.2d 136 (1981). Consideration of this
method of annexation is beyond the scope of this Note.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (1982).
27. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33 to -56 (1982 & Supp. 1983). The U.S. Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations has cited these statutes as model statutes. See NORTH CAROLINA
AssocIATION OF CouNTY CoMMIssIoNERs, supra note 2, at 2.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-34 (1982) specifically limits the application of §§ 160A-33 to -44
to annexing cities of fewer than 5000 persons. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-33(4) (1982) notes that
because
urban development in and around municipalities having a population of less than 5000
persons tends to be concentrated close to the municipal boundary rather than being scattered and dispersed as in the vicinity of larger municipalities... the legislative standards
governing annexation by smaller municipalities can be simpler than those for larger municipalities and still attain the objectives set forth in this section.

1264

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

56, the statutes under which Hudson proceeded. 30 To undertake this involuntary annexation, a municipality must be contiguous to at least one-eighth of the
proposed annexed area's boundaries, 31 the area proposed for annexation must
not already be part of another municipality,3 2 and the annexed area must be
developed for urban purposes. 33 Furthermore, a municipal governing board
34
must pass a resolution identifying an area under consideration for annexation
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-46 (1982) specifically limits the application of§§ 160A-45 to -56
to annexing cities of 5000 or more persons. Section 160A-45(4) notes that
new urban development in and around municipalities having a population of 5000 or more
persons is more scattered than in and around smaller municipalities, and that such larger
municipalities have greater difficulty in expanding municipal utility systems and other service facilities to serve such scattered development, so that the legislative standards governing annexation by larger municipalities must take these facts into account if the
objectives set forth in this section are to be attained.
31. Id. §§ 160A-36Qo)(2), -48(b)(2). The definition of "contiguous" for involuntary annexation,
set forth in §§ 160A-41(l) and 160A-53(1) is, with a few semantic changes, the same as the definition of "contiguous" for voluntary annexation under § 160A-31(f), infra note 39.
32. Id. §§ 16oA-36(b)(3), -48(b)(3).
33. Section 160A-36(c) sets forth the "urban purposes" requirement for annexation by cities of
fewer than 5000 persons:
An area developed for urban purposes is defined as any area which is so developed that at
least sixty percent (60%) of the total number of lots and tracts in the area at the time of
annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, or governmental
purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty percent (60%) of the
total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of annexation for commercial,
industrial, governmental, or institutional purposes, consists of lots and tracts five acres or
less in size.
Id. § 160A-36(c). Section 160A-48(c) defines an area developed for "urban purposes" when annexation is sought by a city of 5000 or more persons. Id. § 160A-48(c) (Supp. 1983). Such an area:
(1) Has a total resident population equal to at least two persons for each acre of land
included in its boundaries; or
(2) Has a total resident population equal to at least one person for each acre of land
included within its boundaries, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at least sixty
percent (60%) of the total acreage consists of lots and tracts five acres or less in size and
such that at least sixty-five percent (65%) of the total number of lots and tracts are one
acre or less in size; or
(3) Is so developed that at least sixty percent (60%) of the total number of lots and
tracts in the area at the time of annexation are used for residential, commercial, industrial,
institutional, or governmental purposes, and is subdivided into lots and tracts such that at
least sixty percent (60%) of the total acreage, not counting the acreage used at the time of
annexation for commercial, industrial, governmental or institutional purposes, consists of
lots and tracts five acres or less in size.
Id. Cities of 5000 or more persons may also annex an area that does not meet the requirements of
§ 160A-48(c) but:
(1) Lies between the municipal boundary and an area developed for urban purposes so
that the area developed for urban purposes is either not adjacent to the municipal boundary or cannot be served by the municipality without extending services and/or water and/
or sewer lines through such sparsely developed area; or
(2) Is adjacent, on at least sixty percent (60%) of its external boundary, to any combination of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an area or areas developed for
urban purposes as defined in subsection (c).

Id. § 160A-48(d) (1982).
Huntley v. Potter, 255 N.C. 619, 629, 122 S.E.2d 681, 688 (1961) remanded for specification an
ordinance which stated in conclusory terms that the area being annexed was developed for urban
purposes.
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-37(i)-("), -49(i)-() (Supp. 1983). The requirement for adoption
of an identifying resolution appears in an amended version of the statute not in effect when Burlington annexed under the involuntary procedures. For a discussion of the effect the amendment might
have on the operation of the prior jurisdiction doctrine, see infra text accompanying note 59.
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and a resolution of intent to annex. 35 The local board must prepare a report
setting forth proposed boundary changes and proposed plans for extending municipal services to the area to be annexed. 36 Finally, a notice of public hearing
and a public hearing are required before the local board may enact an annexa37
tion ordinance.
"Voluntary" proceedings are another means by which North Carolina municipalities may annex without legislative action. 38 Unlike involuntary proceedings, residents of the area to be annexed must initiate and consent to voluntary
proceedings. Voluntary proceedings may accomplish the annexation of both
contiguous 39 and satellite 4° areas. If the area to be annexed meets either the
definition of "contiguous" or the definition of "satellite," annexation may be
41
initiated by a petition signed by all residents of the proposed annexation area.
The voluntary procedures further require public notice and a hearing prior to
enactment of an annexation ordinance by the local board.4 2
Because two or more North Carolina municipalities could satisfy the statutory prerequisites for annexation and could attempt annexation at the same
time, a rule to govern which proceeding would prevail in those circumstances is
necessary. Such a rule should ensure that annexation proceedings are predictable and orderly and that the better conceived plan, which furthers the interests
of the greatest number of persons in an urban area, prevails. The recently
adopted prior jurisdiction rule seems suited to address most of these concerns
because it embodies certain of the policy objectives of annexation. Alternatives
to the prior jurisdiction rule, however, also could address these concerns.
Perhaps the most significant attribute of the prior jurisdiction rule is that it
enhances the predictability and order of annexation proceedings. A rule declaring as the winner the first municipality to complete its proceedings would only
encourage North Carolina municipalities to rush annexation proceedings in order to thwart the success of other proceedings begun earlier. In North Carolina
each annexation method takes a different amount of time to complete, and thus
it is possible, as in Burlington, that the second annexation to begin will be the
first completed. Because the prior jurisdiction rule looks to the time of coin35. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-37(a), -49(a) (Supp. 1983).
36. Id. §§ 160A-35, -47 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
37. Id. §§ 160A-37(b) to (e), -49(b) to (e).

38. Id. § 160A-31 (1982).
39. Section 160A-31 defines an area as "contiguous" if

such area either abuts directly on the municipal boundary or is separated from the municipality by a street or a street right-of-way, a creek or a river, or the right-of-way of a
railroad or other public service corporation, lands owned by the municipality or some
other political subdivision, or lands owned by the state of North Carolina.
Id. § 160A-31(f).

40. Id. § 160A-58 to -58.6. This statute defines "satellite corporate limits" as "the corporate
limits of a noncontiguous area annexed pursuant to this Part or a local act authorizing or effecting
noncontiguous annexations." Id. § 160A-58(3). For further discussion of limitations on annexation
of a satellite, see infra note 81.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-31(a), -58.1(a) (1982).
42. Id. §§ 160A-31(c)-(d), -58.2.
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mencement rather than to the time of completion of proceedings, 43 it guarantees
that the first annexation proceedings begun will not be undermined by subsequently initiated plans. Thus, the rule ensures predictability and eliminates the
incentive for a rush to the finish line.
Because both the Hudson rule and the first-completed rule favor voluntary
procedures, 44 which are undertaken with the blessing of residents in an area to
be annexed, either rule arguably is preferable to the prior jurisdiction rule, which
is blind to the nature of the competing proceedings and thus ignores the desires
of residents. Furthermore, the voluntary procedures may have been preferred
by the general assembly, for, as noted by the Hudson court,4 5 they are quicker
than the involuntary procedures. Considerable commentary, however, suggests
that individual desires should not be paramount in annexation. Elaborating on
the necessity of subordinating individual desires to effectuate sound urban development, a government study commission in 1958 declared:
[W]e believe in the essential rights of every person, but we believe that
the rights and privileges of residents of urban fringe areas must be interpreted in the context of the rights and privileges of every person in
the urban area. We do not believe that an individual who chooses to
buy a lot and build a home in the vicinity of a city thereby acquiresthe
right to stand in the way of action which is deemed necessary for the
good of the entire urban area. By his very choice to build and live in
the vicinity of a city, he has chosen to identify himself with an urban
population, to assume the responsibilities of urban living, and to reap
the benefits of such location. Therefore, sooner or later his property
must become subject to the regulations and services that have been
found necessary and indispensable to the health, welfare, safety, con46
venience, and general prosperity of the entire urban area.
Although this policy appears to deprive property owners of their liberty, it
is consistent with the maxim that an individual's property rights are only those
that the law chooses to acknowledge. The policy also recognizes than an organized society is more far-sighted than are self-interested individuals. Individuals
are more likely to resist annexation because of personal grievances or fears about
a neighboring municipality and to seek annexation by one municipality solely to
prevent annexation by another, precisely the scenario that led to the Hudson and
Burlington cases.47 In doing so individuals probably will not consider either the
likely impact of annexation on an entire urban area or whether one municipality
43. 2 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 22, § 7.22(a), at 378.
44. A rule that would declare as the winner the first to the finish line almost always would favor
the voluntarily annexing municipality because the voluntary procedures require less time to complete than do the involuntary procedures. The disparity in the time required to complete the various
proceedings was noted in Hudson, 279 N.C. at 161, 181 S.E.2d at 447. The voluntary proceeding
would win consistently if the Hudson rule governed annexation disputes because that rule favors
voluntary proceedings.
45. Id.
46. MuNIcIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY CoMMIssION, supra note 4, at 19-21 (quoted in Burlington, 310 N.C. at 729-30, 314 S.E.2d at 538).
47. See Burlington, 310 N.C. at 724-25, 314 S.E.2d at 535; Hudson, 279 N.C. at 157-58, 181

S.E.2d at 444.
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is better equipped than another to extend municipal service to an annexed area.
Moreover, residents of a territory under consideration for annexation might seek
incorporation as a means of thwarting a neighboring municipality's annexation
efforts. Such rushed incorporation might lead to unnecessary fragmentation of
municipal services and leave North Carolina a conglomerate of tiny municipal
the
corporations, none of which would be large enough to provide its inhabitants
48
diversity and quality of services more easily afforded by a larger entity. That
courts have so readily adopted the prior jurisdiction rule rather than one favoring the preferences of local residents demonstrates that the policy underlying
annexation subordinates individual desires to the orderly growth of cities and
49
the convenience, health, and safety of entire urban areas.
Certainly not all initial, involuntary annexation attempts are entirely no50
ble for municipalities might be as greedy and short-sighted as individuals. The
first municipality to begin proceedings may well seek to annex merely as a political expediency. 51 The first municipality to initiate proceedings might also see
"an area, which will certainly be vital to [its] development in the foreseeable
future, threatened by the possibility of a rival annexation or incorporation, [and]
force. . . a premature annexation of the territory in order to protect its interests."' 52 Thus, a subsequently begun annexation attempt, whether voluntary or
involuntary, does not always present the worse alternative; the second municipality is not necessarily less deserving of or less able to serve a new area than is
the first municipality to begin its proceedings.
Although none of the alternatives-the first-completed rule, the Hudson
rule, or the prior jurisdiction rule-is without drawbacks, the policy statements
and the universal acceptance of the prior jurisdiction rule suggest widespread
agreement that proceedings first begun are more likely to be well conceived than
those subsequently begun. Both Hudson and Burlington support this conclusion; in each the subsequently begun proceeding was voluntary and little more
than a response to an earlier-begun proceeding. Moreover, although none of the
rules can guarantee that the best annexation plan will win, the prior jurisdiction
rule does ensure greater predictability than the alternatives. Measuring priority
from the date of commencement determines the outcome from the beginning,
48. The 1958 Study Commission observed
urban areas where the fringe is not unincorporated but a tangled thicket of small, financially weak and competing towns and special districts. In these areas it is impossible to
find any one governmental unit which has the jurisdiction or financial ability to provide
those services and facilities which are essential to the development of the entire urban area.
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMIssION, supra note 4, at 19-21.
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33(l), -45(1) (1982 & Supp. 1983) (setting forth as the policy behind involuntary annexation "tihat sound urban development is essential to the continued
economic development of North Carolina").
50. "Some annexations have been attempted for less noble reasons. So-called land grabs for
additional tax revenues, for increasing the area or population of the city as an end in itself, and
competitive annexation to thwart anticipated annexation by another jurisdiction, have usually
proved to be unwise actions." DEPARTMENT OF URBAN STUDIEs NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CrrIEs,
supra note 3, at 2.
51. Yeager, City and Town Boundaries-Incorporation,Consolidation, Annexation, and Severance Under the Iowa Statutes, 19 DRAKE L. REv. 1, 29 (1969).
52. Id. at 29-30.
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whereas a rule looking to the date of completion would lead to uncertainty
throughout the annexation process. A rule favoring voluntary proceedings
would make an involuntary proceeding even more uncertain since the involuntary proceeding could be thwarted at any time by a voluntary one. Therefore,
given the alternatives, the prior jurisdiction rule seems a practical choice.
North Carolina, having only recently adopted the prior jurisdiction rule,
has yet to refine the doctrine to specify the limits of its application. One necessary refinement is the determination of what marks commencement of proceedings for purposes of acquiring prior jurisdiction. Another is a determination of
how defective a proceeding must be before it will lose the benefits of prior jurisdiction. North Carolina courts also have yet to determine how quickly an annexing municipality must complete proceedings in order to retain prior
jurisdiction.
Typically, proceedings are commenced for prior jurisdiction purposes when
53
the "first mandatory public procedural step" in the statutory process is taken.
In North Carolina there is more than one statutory means of annexation, 5 4 so
the first step will not be the same for all proceedings. The city of Burlington
pursued annexation under the involuntary procedures permitting a city of 5000
or more persons to annex unilaterally;5 5 the involuntary procedures for smaller
cities are functionally identical. 5 6 Under these statutes at the time Burlington
annexed, the first directive was that an annexing municipality adopt a resolution
of intent, 5 7 and it was the adoption of such a resolution that marked the "first
mandatory public procedural step" in that case.5 8
A 1983 amendment to section 160A-49 of the North Carolina General Statutes, however, might have created a new first step in this particular statutory
process.5 9 The amendment, effective for resolutions of intent adopted on or after
July 1, 1984, requires that at least one year prior to adopting the resolution of
intent, a municipal governing board adopt a resolution identifying an area under
consideration for annexation. A muncipality may annex without the identifying
53. 2 E. McQuILLAN, supra note 22, § 7.22(a), at 378.
54. The statutory methods of annexation discussed in this Note are those that the municipalities may pursue without a specific act of the general assembly because these are the methods in
which municipalities will more likely conflict with one another. Another means of annexation, annexation by special act of the general assembly, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (1982), will not be
discussed in this Note in view of the intricacies of relations between the State and local bodies.
55. Id. §§ 16OA-45 to -56 (1982 & Supp. 1983).

56. Id. §§ 160A-33 to -44. Given the statutory similarity, the "first mandatory public procedural step" in the involuntary process should be the same for both small and large municipalities.
57. Id. § 160A-49(a). An amendment to this statute, effective in 1984, prescribes another step
before the adoption of the resolution of intent, namely adoption of a resolution identifying an area
under consideration for annexation. Id. § 160A-49(i)-j) (Supp. 1983). The statutes governing involuntary annexation by a smaller municipality were similarly amended. Id. § 160A-37(i)-(j). For
a discussion of this amendment, see infra text accompanying note 59.
58. Burlington, 310 N.C. at 728, 314 S.E.2d at 537. A North Carolina decision prior to Burlington had determined that adoption of the resolution of intent "mark[s] the formal beginning of the
municipality's actions." Kritzer v. Town of Southern Pines, 33 N.C. App. 152, 155, 234 S.E.2d 648,
651 (1977). Interestingly, in City of Muscatine v. Waters, 251 N.E.2d 544 (Iowa 1977), similar
annexation proceedings were not officially begun for prior jurisdiction purposes until there was publication of notice of a public hearing on the proposed annexation.
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-48(i)-(j) (Supp. 1983).

19851

MUNICIPAL LAW

1269

resolution, but in that event the ordinance annexing the particular area will not
be effective until one year after the date of its adoption. Because there is an
alternative to adoption of the identifying resolution, that resolution might not be
deemed the "first mandatory public procedural step" for prior jurisdiction purposes. Since the identifying resolution is directed by the statute, however, it
should be considered official and public enough to be the "first mandatory public procedural step." In fact, if the identifying resolution is not deemed to mark
the first step, no municipality concerned about protection from competing annexation will adopt it; there will be a one-year wait whether a municipality
adopts an identifying resolution or a resolution of intent, and it would be safer
for a municipality to adopt a resolution of intent so that it could be assured the
protection of the prior jurisdiction rule. If the new amendment is to have vitality, courts need to interpret it as giving jurisdictional priority to municipalities
that choose the identifying resolution alternative.
6°
The voluntary procedures for annexation of both a contiguous area under
6
section 160A-31 and a satellite area ' under section 160A-58 require a petition
62
The receipt of
signed by all owners of real property in the area to be annexed.
this petition probably marks the "first mandatory public procedural step" of
these processes. The Hudson case, which involved an involuntary and a voluntary proceeding, is unclear on whether the receipt of the petition by the local
governing board or the investigation and certification of the petition's accuracy
marks the beginning of voluntary proceedings. In reciting the facts, the court
indicated that the voluntary procedure was initiated when investigation and certification of the petition were complete. 63 In the text of the opinion, however,
the court detailed the steps taken to commence the proceedings and included the
presentation of the petition to the governing board. 64 Under the precedent of
other jurisdictions, presentation and receipt65of the petition is sufficiently "public" to mark the beginning of proceedings.
Other jurisdictions have determined that the advantages of prior jurisdiction do not accrue to a municipality not complying with applicable statutes, even
66
though that municipality commenced its proceedings first. North Carolina
has yet to decide how rigidly a municipality must comply with the letter of the
statutes in order to obtain and retain prior jurisdiction. Because "substantial
60. For a definition of contiguous, see supra note 39.
61. For a general definition of satellite, see supra note 40.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-31(a), -58.1(a) (1982).
63. Hudson, 279 N.C. at 158, 181 S.E.2d at 445.
64. Id. at 162, 181 S.E.2d at 447.
65. See Comment, Municipal Corporations:PriorJurisdictionRule, 7 WAKE FOREsT L. REV.
77-83 (1970-71). In jurisdictions in which the statutory procedure for annexation requires publication of notice prior to circulation of a petition, courts have held that the first public step for purposes
of prior jurisdiction is the posting of this notice. Village of Brown Deer v. City of Milwaukee, 274
Wis. 50, 58, 79 N.W.2d 340, 345 (1956); Town of Greenfield v. City of Milwaukee, 259 Wis. 77, 83,
47 N.W.2d 292, 296 (1951). In other jurisdictions which, like North Carolina, require a petition but
no posting of notice that a petition will be circulated, however, the first public step is the filing of the
petition with the local governing board. Greenfield, 259 Wis. at 83, 47 N.W.2d at 296.
66. 2 E. McQuILLAN, supra note 22, § 7.22(a), at 378. See also Town of Clive v. Colby, 455
Iowa 483, 496-97, 123 N.W.2d 331, 333 (1963) (supplemental opinion); State ex rel. Village of
Orono v. Village of Long Lake, 274 Minn.264, 273-74, 77 N.W.2d 46, 52 (1956).
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compliance with the statutes," 67 as opposed to absolute compliance, has been

68
sufficient when a single North Carolina municipality has attempted to annex,

less than meticulous compliance with the details of the statutes probably should

not cause one municipality competing with another to lose its jurisdictional priority. Even when there have been "procedural irregularities [in an annexation

proceeding which were] found to have materially prejudiced the substantive
rights of. .. petitioners" 69 and the annexation ordinance has been remanded to
the local governing board for amendment as directed by the statute, the amend70
ments have not always been serious enough to require a second public hearing.

The cases in which deficiencies requiring remand have not been serious enough
to require a second public hearing might be good precedent for what deficiencies

will allow a municipality to retain prior jurisdiction. On the other hand, when
there is a capable, competing municipality waiting in the wings, a judge may not
be predisposed to wink at statutory deficiencies. A stricter application of the
statutes for purposes of prior jurisdiction could well ensure greater obedience to
the statutes by municipalities concerned about a potential competing annexation. In turn, the quality of annexation proceedings generally would improve.

Although complete, literal compliance with every requirement of the involuntary annexation statute should not be necessary for a municipality to claim
exclusive jurisdiction over an area, the physical conditions required-that at
least one-eighth of the proposed annexed area's boundaries coincide with the
annexing municipality's primary limits, 71 that the proposed annexation area not
be a part of another municipality, 72 and that the proposed annexation area be
developed for urban purposes73-should be followed strictly. 74 These conditions are jurisdictional requirements, and "if they do not exist, any attempts to
67. Eg., Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Town of Wake Forest, 58 N.C. App. 15, 23, 293 S.E.2d 240, 246
(1982).
68. Eg., City of Conover v. City of Newton, 297 N.C. 506, 521-22, 256 S.E.2d 216, 226 (1979)
(failure of a resolution of intent to detail correctly the metes and bounds description of an area to be
annexed was not fatal to validity of involuntary proceeding because maps available for public inspection correctly depicted the area); Dunn v. City of Charlotte, 284 N.C. 542, 201 S.E.2d 873 (1974)
(failure to include in annexation report a proposed timetable for extension of municipal services to
annexed area, though required by statute, did not preclude substantial compliance and did not affect
the complainant's substantive rights); In re Annexation Ordinance Adopted by New Bern, 278 N.C.
641, 180 S.E.2d 851 (1971) (failure to have city official explain at public hearing plans for extension
of city services to an area proposed for annexation, though required by statute, did not materially
affect the substantial rights of complaining parties because the report itself was clear and understandable); Adams-Millis Corp. v. Town of Kernersville, 6 N.C. App. 78, 169 S.E.2d 496 (1969)
(failure to extend the period for public inspection of annexation plans after amending the plans did
not harm petitioner).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-38(g), -50(g) (1982).
70. See Gregory v. Town of Plymouth, 60 N.C. App. 431, 299 S.E.2d 232 (1983) (no required
rehearing regarding amended report for extension of municipal services when report merely clarified
the specifics of what services would be extended and how those services would be financed).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-36(b)(2), -48(b)(2) (1982); Hawks v. Town of Valdese, 299 N.C.
1, 261 S.E.2d 90 (1980) (requirement of contiguousness not satisfied when boundaries of the annexed
area coincide with an annexing city's satellite limits but not with its "primary" limits).

72. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-36(b)(3), -48(b)(3) (1982).
73. Id. §§ 160A-48(c)-(d), -36(c) (1982 & Supp. 1983). For discussion of the meaning of "urban purposes," see supra note 33.
74. See Town of Clive v. Colby, 255 Iowa 483, 123 N.W.2d 331 (1963) (supplemental opinion);
State ex rel. Village of Orono, 247 Minn. 264, 77 N.W.2d 46 (1956).
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annex are of no legal consequence." '75 Moreover, the annexing city must conform to the requirement that it have the ability to extend municipal services to
the area it seeks to annex. 76 Because these requirements directly affect the need
for a particular "urban" area to be annexed and the ability of an annexing city to
accommodate additional territory, the policy behind annexation dictates that
they be followed strictly. Otherwise, the purpose behind allowing involuntary
annexation-that sound urban development be effected by extension of municipal services into areas where population, industry, and other activity are concentrated 77-is not operative.
Having satisfied the prerequisites for involuntary annexation, an annexing
municipality probably will have to take the major procedural steps to be able to
take advantage of the prior jurisdiction rule. In addition to adopting resolutions
of identification and intent, 78 these steps include issuing a report setting forth
proposed boundary changes and plans for extending municipal services to the
area to be annexed, 79 publishing notice of a public hearing and conducting a
public hearing prior to officially enacting an annexation ordinance.8 0 Citizens
are given early notice that annexation is being considered through the public
adoption of resolutions, are informed of the nature and potential effects of this
boundary extension by the report, and are given a voice in the proposed change
by the notice and public hearing. Because these steps inform citizens about the
annexation and give them a chance to express their opinions, they should not be
omitted. If these general steps are taken, however, specific irregularities within
the hearing or the report should not be deemed to preclude "substantial compliance" so long as the citizens' rights to be informed and heard are not
undermined.
The same conclusions that apply to involuntary proceedings should apply
to voluntary ones. First, the annexing municipality must make sure that all
physical conditions for jurisdiction to annex are strictly met. 8 1 Second, a peti75. Yeager, supra note 51, at 17. As a practical matter, these jurisdictional prerequisites will be
met completely or not at all because they are primarily all-or-nothing type requirements; thus, there
will not be "substantial compliance" with them.
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-35, -47 (1982 & Supp. 1983). See Town of Clive v. Colby, 255
Iowa 483, 123 N.W.2d 331 (1963) (supplemental opinion) (no jurisdiction to annex because of failure
to show capability to extend municipal services to proposed annexation area); In re Annexation
Ordinance Adopted by Jacksonville, 255 N.C. 633, 646-47, 122 S.E.2d 690, 700 (1961) (plans for
extension of services condition precedent to annexation); Gregory v. Town of Plymouth, 60 N.C.
App. 431, 433, 299 S.E.2d 232, 234 (original ordinance remanded to local board to add details of
extension of municipal services to annexed area), cert denied, 308 N.C. 544, 304 S.E.2d 237 (1983).
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-33, -45 (1982).
78. For discussion of the resolutions of identification and of intent, see supra notes 57-59 and
accompanying text.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-35, -47 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
80. Id. §§ 160A-37, -49.
81. Section 160A-31 requires that a contiguous area, to be annexed as such, meet the statutory
definition of "contiguous." Id. § 160A-31 (1982). For that statutory definition, see supra note 39.
Conditions for annexation of satellites are more rigorous. See N.C GEN. STAT. § 160A58.1(b)(1982). A city may not annex a satellite area that is not within three miles of the annexing
city's primary limits, id. § 160A-58.1(b)(1), or that is closer to the primary limits of another city
than to the annexing city. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(2). Any subdivision in the satellite area must be
wholly included in the annexation. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(4). The annexing city also must be capable of
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tion requesting annexation signed by all residents of the area to be annexed must
be received and certified by the local governing board.82 Last, there must be
notice and a public hearing about the proposed annexation. 83 As with the involuntary proceedings, something short of strict compliance with the details of
these steps should suffice to maintain prior jurisdiction, but the steps themselves
should be substantially taken.
Finally, North Carolina must determine how long an acquired jurisdictional priority lasts. The general law is that "the right of priority in order of
time may be lost if proceedings, once instituted, are not completed within a reasonable time."' 84 As with all invocations of the word "reasonable," what is a
reasonable amount of time depends on the circumstances of each case. 85 Key
factors will be whether annexation is pursued actively and whether there is a
projected date for completion of the proceedings. 86 Beyond these general considerations, North Carolina courts will have to define more specifically what
amount of time is reasonable.
That the only two North Carolina cases involving competition for annexation are Hudson and Burlington suggests that adoption of a rule to govern such
competition is a relatively insignificant event. The increasing population of
North Carolina's cities, however, and their need to expand and accommodate
that population probably mean that disputes of the Burlington variety will multiply in the future.8 7 The mere existence of the prior jurisdiction rule might have
the beneficial effect of discouraging residents of an area targeted for involuntary
annexation by a neighboring municipality from seeking voluntary annexation by
a different municipality. Because the prior jurisdiction rule does not countenance such efforts, annexation will be well considered rather than purely reactive. Even though the rule will prevent some annexation conflicts from arising,
other fights over priority to annex are inevitable. These fights will result from
the increased need for annexation and from the variety of annexation procedures
available in North Carolina, procedures that do not require that annexation of a
particular area be by a particular municipality. The rule of prior jurisdiction
providing municipal services to the satellite area equivalent to the services already provided citizens
of the annexing city. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(3). Finally, the annexation of the new satellite area, when
added to all other satellites of the annexing city, must not result in the city having more than 10% of
its area within satellite boundaries. Id. § 160A-58.1(b)(5).

82. Id. §§ 160A-31(a), -58.1(a). The court in City of Conover v. City of Newton, 297 N.C.
506, 256 S.E.2d 216 (1979), stated that withdrawal of six required signatures from the petition prior

to completion of proceedings invalidates a voluntary annexation attempt.
83. N.C. GEN.STAT. §§ 160A-31(c) to -31(d), -58.2 (1982).
84. 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supranote 22, § 7.22(a), at 378-79. See also Town of Clive v. Colby, 255

Iowa 483, 492, 121 N.W.2d 115, 120 (1963) ("proceedings should be conducted with reasonable

dispatch and completed within a reasonable time"); Yeager, supra note 51, at 16-17 (reciting the
facts of Clive); Comment, supra note 65, at 84 (annexation and incorporation proceedings must be
completed within a reasonable time or else exclusive jurisdiction is lost).
85. See City of Muscatine v. Waters, 251 N.W.2d 544 (Iowa 1977) (more than one year to

complete annexation is not unreasonable given the circumstances); In re Incorporation of Brown

Deer, 267 Wis. 481, 484-85, 66 N.W.2d 333, 335-36 (1954) (although annexing city acted in good
faith, it lost its prior jurisdiction because annexation efforts were moving slowly and completion of
proceedings was not expected for two years); Yeager, supra note 51, at 16-17.
86. Comment, supra note 65, at 84.

87. See idat 79-80.

1985]

MUNICIPAL LAW

1273

should provide a fair and practical method for settling these disputes and should
be even more useful when the problems discussed by this Note-when the prior
jurisdiction rule is invoked, when annexation is too defective to merit the rewards of the prior jurisdiction rule, and when an annexation proceeding must be
completed in order to retain the benefits of the rule-are resolved.
JONI WALSER CRICHLOW

The Prodigal Father: Intestate Succession of Illegitimate
Children in North Carolina Under Section 29-19
Section 29-19 of the North Carolina General Statutes establishes procedures for a father's legal recognition of his illegitimate child for the purpose of
intestate succession. 1 In In re Estate of Stern v. Stern,2 a case of first impression,3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that section 29-19 can prevent
the lineal and collateral kindred of an illegitimate child's father from inheriting
from the child's intestate estate if the father failed to acknowledge his paternity
by the statutorily prescribed method.4 In its holding, the court relied on prece-

dent from the United States Supreme Court and on North Carolina courts' interpretation of the statute's language and purpose.

A dissent, however,

contended that, based on the facts presented, the court's failure to recognize the
father's constructive compliance with section 29-19 rendered the statute violative of the equal protection clause. 5 Whichever view is technically correct, the
outcome of Stern raises doubts about the fairness of the legislative scheme and
its interpretation by the courts. This Note examines the Stern decision and its
implications, proposes changes in section 29-19, and suggests a change in the

judiciary's construction of the statute to ensure that the legislation will better
serve its stated purpose of equalizing the inheritance rights of legitimate and
illegitimate children.
1. The statute provides:
(a) For purposes of intestate succession, an illegitimate child shall be treated as if he
were the legitimate child of his mother, so that he and his lineal descendants are entitled to
take by, through and from his mother and his other maternal kindred, both descendants
and collaterals, and they are entitled to take from him.
(b) For purposes of intestate succession, an illegitimate child shall be entitled to take
by, through and from:
(1) Any person who has been finally adjudged to be the father of such child pursuant
to the provisions of G.S. 49-1 through 49-9 or the provisions of G.S. 49-14 through 49-16;
(2) Any person who has acknowledged himself during his own lifetime and the child's
lifetime to be the father of such child in a written instrument executed or acknowledged
before a certifying officer named in G.S. 52-10(b) and filed during his own lifetime and the
child's lifetime in the office of the clerk of superior court of the county where either he or
the child resides.
Notwithstanding the above provisions, no person shall be entitled to take hereunder unless
he has given written notice of the basis of his claim to the personal representative of the
putative father within six months after the date of the first publication or posting of the
general notice to creditors.
(c) Any person described under subdivision (b)(1) or (2) above and his lineal and
collateral kin shall be entitled to inherit by, through and from the illegitimate child.
(d) Any person who acknowledges himself to be the father of an illegitimate child in
his duly probated last will shall be deemed to have intended that such child be treated as
expressly provided for in said will or, in the absence of any express provision, the same as a
legitimate child.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1984).
2. 66 N.C. App. 507, 311 S.E.2d 909, aff'dper curiam, 312 N.C. 486, 322 S.E.2d 771 (1984).
3. Id. at 515, 311 S.E.2d at 914 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 512, 311 S.E.2d at 912.
5. Id. at 521-22, 311 S.E.2d at 917 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The equal protection clause
states: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Prior to the passage of section 29-19, illegitimate children had few inheri-

tance rights. Originally, illegitimate children were seen asfilius nullius-unable
to inherit either intestate or through a will. 6 The North Carolina courts later
recognized an illegitimate child as an heir of the mother, entitled to the same
inheritance rights as her legitimate children. 7 The 1935 Intestate Succession Act

went further and provided that collateral heirs of a mother could inherit from
her illegitimate child. 8 When the Act was modified in 1959, however, the North

Carolina General Assembly rejected a proposal that would have permitted intestate inheritance by an illegitimate child from the father if paternity was established in a court action for nonsupport.9
The current version of section 29-19 is a remedial statute intended to "mitigate the hardships" of the common law on inheritance by illegitimates1° and
achieve "insofar as practical" equal inheritance between legitimate and illegitimate children. 11 Statutory provisions requiring that the father legally recognize
his illegitimate child before the child can inherit are intended to strike a balance
between this remedial goal and the state's dual interests in orderly disposition of
estates and prevention of fraudulent claims against the estates of putative fathers.1 2 While a mother's illegitimate children are treated as legitimate for intes-

tate succession purposes, 13 section 29-19(b) provides that they can "take by,
through and from" 14 their father only if paternity is established in a criminal
6. See Note, JudicialImpairment of the Illegitimate'sPaternalInheritance Rights in North
Carolina-Mitchellv. Freuler, 16 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 205, 205 (1980). See, eg., Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 768 (1977).
7. Paul v. Willoughby, 204 N.C. 796, 798, 169 S.E. 226, 228 (1933). The limited nature of this
modification of the common law is illustrated in Brown v. Holland, 221 N.C. 135, 136, 19 S.E.2d
255, 256 (1942), where the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the term "issue" in a mother's
will only included her legitimate children. The modification also did not allow collateral heirs of the
mother to inherit from the mother's illegitimate child. Carter v. Smith, 209 N.C. 788, 185 S.E. 15
(1936); Board of Educ. v. Johnston, 224 N.C. 86, 29 S.E.2d 126 (1944). In addition, an illegitimate
child could not inherit any property from her mother which the mother had received from the father
of the legitimate children. McCall, North Carolina'sNew IntestateSuccession Act, 39 N.C.L. REv.
1, 13 (1960). See also Battle v. Shore, 197 N.C. 449, 449, 149 S.E. 590, 590 (1929) (mother's illegitimate children inherit as her heirs but father's do not).
8. Board of Educ. v. Johnston, 224 N.C. 86, 88, 29 S.E.2d 126, 127 (1944).
9. McCall, supra note 7, at 14. The general assembly provided full inheritance rights for legitimated and adopted children in 1955. Greenlee v. Quinn, 255 N.C. 601, 606, 122 S.E.2d 409, 413
(1961). See also Comment, Illegitimacy in North Carolina, 46 N.C.L. REv. 813, 825 (1968) (adoption laws intended to alleviate stigma of illegitimacy, but only through nonreference to child's parental status).
10. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 216, 254 S.E.2d 762, 768 (1979); Stern, 66 N.C. App. at
511, 311 S.E.2d at 912 (quoting Mitchell).
11. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 216, 254 S.E.2d 762, 768 (1979); Stern, 66 N.C. App. at
511, 311 S.E.2d at 912 (quoting Mitchell).
12. Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 216, 254 S.E.2d 762, 768 (1979); Stern, 66 N.C. App. at
511-12, 311 S.E.2d at 912. See also Note, supra note 6, at 205 (In dealing with unequal treatment of
illegitimate persons, state legislatures must consider countervailing factors such as efficiency in administering estates and the policy of discouraging "spurious assertions of paternity."); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479, 511 (1974) ("The state is properly concerned
with minimizing administrative expense and inconvenience, as well as with preventing the successful
assertion of fraudulent claims.").
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(a) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1. See also McCall,
supra note 7, at 13-14 (discussion of "by, through and from" language).
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action for nonsupport,' 5 in a civil proceeding for support, i6 or by the father's
ackowledgement of paternity "before a certifying officer ... during his own
lifetime and the child's lifetime."' 17 The statute also provides that a duly adjudged or acknowledged father and his heirs may inherit from the illegitimate
child's estate18 and that a father's ackowledgement of his illegitimate child in a
will may be treated as intent to have the illegitimate child inherit as though she
were legitimate. 19
The Stern case arose in this statutory context. Decedent Gordon Stern was
born to Hilda Weiss and Edward D. Stern in Saskatchewan, Canada, where laws
forbidding intermarriage between Jews and Catholics prevented the couple from
marrying. Decedent lived with his parents from birth and continued to live with
his father after his mother's death. He adopted his father's surname to facilitate
inheritance under his father's will and subsequently inherited $500,000 at his
father's death. Although decedent's father had never sought judicial or other
official recognition of his paternity, he had recognized decedent as a son in his
will. Upon decedent's death intestate one year after his father's death, the heirs
of decedent's father sued to share in the decedent's estate. The trial court ruled
20
that only the mother's heirs were entitled to inherit and plaintiffs appealed.
Stern presented the court of appeals with the novel issue of when the heirs
of an illegitimate child's father are entitled to inherit from the illegitimate child

by intestate succession. Plaintiffs first contended that Edward Stern had com15. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (b)(1) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1. The criminal
nonsupport provisions are found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-1 to -9 (1984). Nonsupport of a child is
a misdemeanor. Id. § 49-2. The trial court has the power to compel both defendant and child to
submit to blood tests. Id. § 49-7. If defendant is convicted, the judge must fix a child support
arrangement. Id.
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(1) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note I. The civil
proceeding is a paternity action for support under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-14 to -16 (1984). See
Mitchell v. Freuler, 297 N.C. 206, 221 n.2, 254 S.E.2d 762, 763 n.2. The action must be completed
before the putative father's death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(b) (1984).
In addition to blood tests, a broad range of evidence is allowed to prove or disprove paternity in
a civil proceeding. See Wright v. Gann, 27 N.C. App. 45, 217 S.E.2d 761 (1975); Note, The Use of
Blood Tests in Actions to Determine Paternity, 16 WAKE FOREsr L. REv. 591 (1980). A mother's
testimony about the period between sexual intercourse with defendant and the child's birth is admissible. County of Lenoir ex rel. Dudley v. Dawson, 60 N.C. App. 122, 298 S.E.2d 418 (1982); State v.
Snyder, 3 N.C. App. 114, 164 S.E.2d 42 (1968). The child can be exhibited to show resemblance to
the defendant. State v. Green, 55 N.C. App. 255, 284 S.E.2d 688 (1981). Defendant's out of court
admission of paternity is relevant. State v. Bowman, 231 N.C. 51, 55 S.E.2d 789 (1949). Defendant's payments to child's mother are admissible evidence. State v. Garner, 34 N.C. App. 498, 238
S.E.2d 653 (1977). Evidence of a mother's sexual relations with other men near the time of conception can be offered. State v. Farmer, 63 N.C. App. 384, 304 S.E.2d 765 (1983). For a discussion of
evidence used to prove paternity in intestate proceedings in other states, see infra notes 58-59, 61-63
and 68-70 and accompanying text.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. §29-19(b)(2) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1. The father
may voluntarily acknowledge paternity before a certifying officer listed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5210(b) (1984). The certifying officer "shall be a notary public, or a justice, judge, magistrate, clerk,
assistant clerk or deputy clerk of the General Court of Justice, or the equivalent or corresponding
officers of the state, territory or foreign country where the acknowledgment is made." Id.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(c) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(d) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note I.
20. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 507-10, 311 S.E.2d at 909-11. At his death, decedent was a resident
of North Carolina. His parents, however, had never resided in the state. Id. at 508, 311 S.E.2d at
910.
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plied with the paternal acknowledgment requirements of section 29-19 when he
recognized Gordon Stem as his son in his will, thus allowing the son, under

section 29-19(d), to be treated as a legitimate child under the will. 2 1 Section 2919(c) explicitly provides that the heirs of an illegitimate child's father are entitled to intestate inheritance from the child under the same circumstances that
the child can inherit from the father-specifically, when the father has recog-

nized the child under section 29-19(b). 22 Plaintiffs in Stern did not argue that
Edward Stem had complied directly with section 29-19(b) in acknowledging

Gordon Stem as his illegitimate son. 23 Instead, they contended that Edward
Stem's statement of paternity in his will in compliance with section 29-19(d)
constructively satisfied the requirements of section 29-19(b). 2 4 Under plaintiffs'

interpretation, Edward Stem's indirect compliance with subsection (b) enabled
them to recover under subsection (c). The Stern court rejected this construction,
holding that section 29-19(d) only enables the illegitimate child to take under the

will from the putative father; it does not allow the father's heirs to inherit from
the child under intestacy.2 5 The court found that Edward Stem had failed to
his heirs were not entitled to inherit from
comply with section 29-19(b) and that26

Gordon Stem under section 29-19(c).

Plaintiffs also contended that failure to grant them inheritance rights would

deny equal protection of the law to fathers of illegitimate children and heirs of
such fathers. 27 The court in Stern relied on the denial of equal protection claims

in prior cases to dispose of this argument even though the equal protection problem in Stern is distinguishable from earlier suits. In one case relied on by the

court, Mitchell v. Freuler,28 the class distinction complained of was between le-

gitimate and illegitimate children. In contrast, plaintiffs in Stern alleged dis-

crimination against the father's heirs in favor of the mother's. 29 The court of
appeals, however, employed the same equal protection analysis in Stern as had

21. Id. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(d). For text of statute, see
supra note 1.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(c) (1984). For text of statute, see supra note 1.
23. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911.
24. Id. In his dissent Judge Johnson contended that the presence of a provision for inheritance
under a will in the intestate succession statute rendered its meaning ambiguous in relation to the
other provisions of § 29-19. Therefore, to further the remedial purposes of the statute, Judge Johnson stated that compliance with § 29-19(d) should be interpreted to fulfill the paternal acknowledgement provisions of § 29-19(b). Id. at 519, 311 S.E.2d at 916 (Johnson, J., dissenting). See infra note
46 and accompanying text.
25. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911. According to the majority, "G.S. 29-19(c)
clearly and unambiguously provides that a putative father and his kindred are only entitled to inherit
from an illegitimate child if paternity has been established by one of the methods prescribed in G.S.
29-19(b)." Id.
26. Id.
27. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 511, 311 S.E.2d at 911.
28. 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979). In Mitchell an illegitimate child argued that § 2919(b) violates the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment by placing the burden of showing
paternal recognition on illegitimate children but not on legitimate children. Id. at 207, 254 S.E.2d at
763. See also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763 (1977) (illegitimate children as plaintiffs); Lalli
v. Lai, 439 U.S. 259, 262 (1978) (illegitimate children as plaintiffs).
29. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510, 311 S.E.2d at 911. In Stern, plaintiffs contended that section
29-19(b) violates the equal protection rights of the illegitimate child's father and paternal heirs by
requiring that paternity be acknowledged in the manner required by the statute before they can
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been used in Mitchell because it found that the statute's purpose-to balance
inheritance rights against the state's interests in preventing fraudulent claims
upon estates-protected it against equal protection challenges whether the chal30
lenges were brought by a father's heirs or by an illegitimate child.

Once the court of appeals determined that Stern presented the same equal
protection problem as prior cases, United States Supreme Court and North Car-

olina Supreme Court precedent foreclosed plaintiff's contention that section 2919(b) on its face violated equal protection. In Trimble v. Gordon31 and LaI v.
Lalli 32 the United States Supreme Court established a framework for review of
statutes affecting intestate succession by illegitimate children. The Court ap-

plied the intermediate scrutiny equal protection test and suggested that statutes
which classify illegitimate children's inheritance rights differently from those of

legitimate children may be unconstitutional even if they "'bear some rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose.' ,,33 Thus, a statute that imposes a
substantially greater burden on illegitimate children cannot be written broadly
to deprive illegitimate children of inheritance rights in situations that do not
promote permissible state interests. 34 In Trimble the Court held that the state

of Illinois' interest in preventing fraudulent claims against estates did not justify
depriving all illegitimate children of the right to intestate succession.3 5 In Lall,
inherit from the child without placing the same burden on the illegitimate child's mother and maternal heirs. Id.
30. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 511-12, 311 S.E.2d at 911-12. In fact the court questioned whether
a statute classifying the parents of an illegitimate should not be subject to a less stringent equal
protection review. Id. at 511, 311 S.E.2d at 911.
31. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
32. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
33. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 766-67 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164,
172 (1972)). Statutes affecting illegitimate children are given an intermediate equal protection review. See Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 511, 311 S.E. 2d at 911; Note, supra note 6, at 207; Note, Trimble
v. Gordon: Expanding the Illegitimate'sRight to Inherit, 32 ARK. L. Rnv. 120, 121-22 (1979). A
court may require a more careful balancing between the rights of a class entitled to intermediate
review, such as illegitimate children, and permissible state interests than is required under the normal rational basis standard. Id. at 125-26; see infra note 34 and accompanying text. The Court in
Trimble rejected the argument that illegitimate children are a suspect class entitled to the highest
level of equal protection review. 430 U.S. at 767. See Developments in the Law-EqualProtection,
82 HARv. L. Rav. 1065, 1101-03, 1121-22 (1969).
The equal protection review for illegitimate children is not limited to intestate succession rights.
See, eg., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (discussing eligibility of illegitimate children to receive deceased parent's workers' compensation benefits).
34. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772. The Court stated:
We think. . . that the Illinois Supreme Court gave inadequate consideration to the relation between [the statute] and the state's proper objective of assuring accuracy and effi.
ciency in the disposition of property at death. The Court failed to consider the possibility
of a middle ground between the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity.
Id. at 770-71. Both Trimble and Lalli quoted with approval the Court's statement in Matthew v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976), that the statute must not "'broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates without more, [and must be] carefully tuned to alternative considerations.'"
Trimble, 430 U.S. at 772; Lalli, 439 U.S. at 266. Professor Loewy suggests that in order to sustain a
statute affecting illegitimates, a state must show a "legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose sufficient to
render it probable that the discrimination was merely an incidental adjunct to a legitimate purpose."
Loewy, A Different and More Viable Theory of Equal Protection, 57 N.C.L. REv. 1, 22 (1978).
35. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 771-72. An illegitimate child in Illinois could only inherit if she was
subsequently legitimated by the marriage of her parents. Id. The Court noted that the state interest
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however, a New York statute allowing inheritance by illegitimate children from

their fathers only after a judicial declaration of paternity was obtained was held
to be sufficiently related to the state's proper interest in avoiding spurious claims
36
against estates.
In Mitchell v. Frueler37 the North Carolina Supreme Court, relying on
Trimble and Lalli, held that section 29-19 passed equal protection scrutiny. 38
Specifically, the court found section 29-19 constitutional because it had a legitichild to establish pamate purpose and provided more ways for an illegitimate
39
ternity than the New York statute upheld in Lalli.
The dissent did not quarrel with the majority's characterization of section
29-19 as constitutional on its face. 4° Instead, Judge Johnson noted the United
States Supreme Court's partial reliance on the New York courts' liberal judicial

construction of the New York statute in holding the statute constitutional. 4 1 He
contrasted this treatment with the North Carolina Supreme Court's strict con-

struction of section 29-19 in Stern42 and suggested that section 29-19(b) be

interpreted broadly to allow substantial compliance with its provisions. He concluded that the court's failure to do so violated the equal protection rights of
Edward Stem's heirs. 43
Judge Johnson argued further that even if the statute did not violate the
equal protection clause, plaintiffs should have been allowed recovery based on

decedent's father's constructive compliance with section 29-19.4 4 He pointed to
in legitimate family relations is not served by totally depriving illegitimate children of their inheritance rights because their parents failed to marry. Id. at 770. See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1975).
36. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 275. According to one commentator, Trimble
reflects the philosophy that a limited amount of discrimination against illegitimates is allowable in the formulation of state laws regarding the orderly disposition of property upon
death, but laws which make it virtually impossible for an illegitimate child to be made
legitimate, and thereby eligible to inherit from his biological father, are an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection: of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.
Note, Davis v. Jones: A Casefor EquitableLegitimation, 23 S. TEx. L.J. 250, 252-53 (1982).
37. 297 N.C. 206, 254 S.E.2d 762 (1979).
38. Mitchell, 297 N.C. at 216, 254 S.E.2d at 762. See 3 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW § 252, at 361 (4th ed. 1981).
39. Mitchell, 297 N.C. at 216, 254 S.E.2d at762.
40. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 512, 311 S.E.2d at 911-12 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 520-21, 311 S.E.2d at 916-17 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The New York court's liberal
construction of the statute advanced the statute's remedial goal of equalizing inheritance rights for
illegitimate children. Id.
42. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 521-22, 311 S.E.2d at 917 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
44. The doctrine of constructive compliance allows a party who acts consistently with the purposes of a statute, but fails to comply with a technical requirement, to benefit from the protection of
the statute. See Note, supra note 6, at 216. The North Carolina courts have accepted the rule that
statutes serving a remedial purpose are to be construed liberally to achieve their objectives. See
Joyner v. Lucas, 42 N.C. App. 541, 546, 257 S.E.2d 105, 108 (1979) (civil paternity action under
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14). In contrast to other states, see, e.g., Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d
892, 894-95 (Minn. 1978), North Carolina courts have not applied this principle to § 29-19. See
Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 510-11, 311 S.E.2d at 911 (§ 29-19 language is unambiguous).
In the absence of legislative history, one can only wonder whether the general assembly expected the requirements of § 29-19 to be strictly construed. The statute's provision for voluntary
acknowledgement of paternity, however, see supra note 17 and accompanying text, suggests that the
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the trial court's findings of fact to show that there was little chance that the
Stern plaintiffs' claim was spurious. First, Edward Stem was clearly the biological father. Second, the decedent and-his father lived together for the first eighteen years of decedent's life and always treated each other as father and son.
Third, decedent adopted his father's surname and was closer to his father's relatives than to his mother's. Last, most of the disputed estate was inherited by the
45
decedent from his father's estate one year before the lawsuit was commenced.
Judge Johnson stated that the majority should have addressed
the issue of statutory construction . . . whether a father's acknowledgement of paternity in his duly probated last will is the substantial
equivalent of an inter vivos acknowledgement of paternity in a written
instrument
executed or acknowledged [in compliance with section 2919(b)(2)]. 46
Although the outcome advocated by Judge Johnson is appealing, his equal
protection reasoning is not entirely sound. Consideration of New York's "liberal" statutory construction in Laii4 7 does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that section 29-19(b) as applied in Stern is insufficiently related to the state
interest of preventing fraud upon estates so as to deny equal protection to the
paternal heirs of an illegitimate child.4 8 The father's recognition of his child in
his duly probated last will is more remote from statutory requirements than the
exceptions made by the New York courts for technical noncompliance with New
York's statutory provisions. 49 For example, a New York trial court recognized
as proof of paternity a judicial support order that did not specifically mention
paternity5 0 and allowed a paternity proceeding that was commenced, but not
terminated, before the father's death to constitute compliance with the statute's
requirement that paternity be established during the father's lifetime.5 1 Further,
the Court in Lalli was aware that statutory procedures intended to promote the
state's interest in disposition of estates would cause some inequitable results:
We do not question that there will be some illegitimate children
who would be able to establish their relationship to their deceased father without serious disruption of the administration of estates and
that, as applied to such individuals [the statute] appears to operate unfairly.. .. Our inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not
focus on the abstract "fairness" of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state interest it is intended to promote is so tenugeneral assembly expected the standard to cover even the estates of putative fathers who appeared to
have lived with or supported their children. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 513, 311 S.E.2d at 912 (Johnson,
J., dissenting).
45. Stem, 66 N.C. App. at 513-14, 311 S.E.2d at 912-13 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 515, 311 S.E.2d at 913-14 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Although a will does not technically meet the requirements of subsection (b) as a written, signed, and acknowledged recognition of

paternity, it certainly falls within the spirit of subsection (b). See supra note 1.
47. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 33.
49. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 273-74.
50. Id. at 274. See In re Kennedy, 89 Misc. 2d 551, 392 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1977).
51. Laffl, 439 U.S. at 274. See In re Niles, 53 A.D.2d 983, 385 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1976), appeal
denied sub nom. Niles v. Beninati, 40 N.Y.2d 809, 360 N.E.2d 1109, 392 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1977).
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the rationality contemplated by the fourteenth
ous that it 5 lacks
2
amendment.
Thus, it appears that even without the liberal construction of Judge Johnson
section 29-19(b) as construed by the majority does not run afoul of the equal
protection clause.
Judge Johnson's second contention, that constructive compliance with section 29-19(b) was present in Stern, is a more promising argument for plaintiffs.
The court of appeals held in Herndon v. Robinson 53 that an illegitimate child's
proof that his father had paid for his birth, had taken out insurance policies on
him, and had listed him as a son on an employment application did not "rise to
the dignity of constructive compliance" with section 29-19(b).5 4 That constructive compliance was even recognized, however, suggests that the doctrine would
be accepted under the right facts. 55 The Herndon court's conclusion that the
father's acknowledgment of paternity did not show intent to allow the child to
inherit was crucial to its analysis.
The formalities [of section 29-19(b)]. . . assure that the decedent intended the illegitimate child to share in the estate, much in the same
way a father intentionally excludes legitimate children as beneficiaries
under his will. But, just as the father must act to exclude a legitimate
in his estate, he must also act to include an illegitichild from sharing
56
mate child.
In Stern, however, Edward Stern had acted to include his son in the will. Plaintiffs had both the father's acknowledgment of paternity in the will and a direct
bequest of his entire estate to his son. Thus, a finding of constructive compliance
on the facts in Stern would have been consistent with the purpose of section 2919(b) as expressed in Herndon.
Judge Johnson suggested that the North Carolina courts recognize inheritance rights under section 29-19 whenever achievement of the remedial purposes of the statute could be enhanced without undermining the state's interest
in preventing fraudulent claims. 57 While this solution would erode the predictability of the statute, it would lead to fairer results. The harsh result in Stern
and, more disturbingly, in cases such as Herndon in which an illegitimate child
is deprived of his share in his father's estate suggests that section 29-19 as currently interpreted fails to achieve its egalitarian goals. An approach to intestate
succession that balances the interests of illegitimate children and the state would
reduce the instances in which illegitimate children are unjustly deprived of their
inheritance and would not unduly burden estates with fraudulent claims.
52. LaIli, 439 U.S. at 272-73.
53. 57 N.C. App. 318, 291 S.E.2d 305, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 557, 294 S.E.2d 223 (1982).
54. Id. at 321, 291 S.E.2d at 307.
55. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 514, 311 S.E.2d at 914-15 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
56. Herndon, 57 N.C. App. at 320-21, 291 S.E.2d at 307. The weakness in this reasoning is
obvious. A decedent cannot exclude any of his legal heirs when he dies intestate. Thus, the question
is not whether decedent intended for his illegitimate child to inherit, but whether the child is recognized as a legal heir. See, Note, Survey ofDevelopments in North CarolinaLaw: Property, 61 N.C.L.
REV. 1171, 1212 (1983).
57. Stern, 66 N.C. App. at 516, 311 S.E.2d at 914 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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Many state legislatures have recognized that statutes, which are constitutional under Trimble and Lalli do not adequately protect the inheritance rights
of illegitimate children and thus have enacted more flexible statutes. Some of
the most protective statutes allow an illegitimate child to take by intestate succession if her father "openly and notoriously" recognized her5 8 or if a "mutually
acknowledged relationship of parent and child" was present. 59 Under these statutes, the state's interest in the orderly disposition of estates is subordinated to
provide inheritance to "the informally acknowledged child." 6° In New Mexico 61 and Massachusetts 62 paternity may be established in an intestate succession proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence. Under this approach, a
father's acknowledgement of his child is strong evidence of paternity, but is not
required for inheritance. 63 This inheritance scheme reaches both informally acknowledged children and illegitimate children who would have been able to establish paternity only in an adversary proceeding during their father's lifetime.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted its statute" to allow a paternity
58. See IOWA CODE ANN.§ 633.222 (West 1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1976) (notorious recognition sufficient to establish paternity for intestate succession); see also Hawk's Estate v.
Lain, 329 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1983) (in the absence of blood tests, testimony of mother and photographs of father and child together were sufficient to find paternity by a preponderance of the evidence); In re Wolf's Estate, 242 Iowa 1012, 48 N.W.2d 890 (1951) (testimony that it was common
knowledge that decedent was the father and that decedent had admitted he was father supported a
finding of paternity); Kuhn v. Hicks, 229 Kan. 536, 626 P.2d 794 (1981) (clearly identified voluntary
child support constitutes recognition).
59. See MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 700.111(4)(c) (West 1982). In In re Vellenga, 120 Mich.
App. 699, 702, 327 N.W.2d 340, 342 (1982), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that because an
unborn child could not acknowledge her father she was unable to take intestate from him when he
died before her birth. For an annotation critical of this result, see In re Vellenga: An HeirApparently Not, 1984 DET.L. Rnv. 829 (1984).
60. The failure of the revised Louisiana statute to provide for the "informally acknowledged
child" is discussed at length in Note, A Survey of Recent Changes in Intestate Succession Law Affecting Illegitimate Children-The Informally Acknowledged Child Is the Ultimate Loser, 29 Loy. L.
REV.323 (1983).
As Justice Brennan pointed out in Lalli, the child who is recognized and supported by his father
is unlikely to have filed a paternity suit and thus will be unable to inherit under any statute that, like
North Carolina's, requires recognition in a criminal or civil proceeding or entry with a clerk of
court. See Lai, 439 U.S. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This creates the bizarre result that a
father who recognizes and even lives with his illegitimate child will have none of his estate go to the
child, while a father who is compelled by the courts to support his child will have his estate shared
by the child. One commentator is particularly concerned about the offspring of the growing number
of cohabitation relationships who become victims of society's preference for legitimate relationslips,
even though they were never denied the father's presence or support during his life. See Note, supra
note 6, at 216-17. Thus, the state's permissible interest in preventing fraud upon estates causes the
impermissible result of punishing children for their parents' choice not to marry. See supra note 35.
61.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109(B)(3) (1978).

62. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 7 (West 1981).
63. Despite testimony of "lack of communication between decedent and [son] over a period of
36 years," the New Mexico trial court found paternity established. In re Estate of Padilla, 97 N.M.
508, 512, 641 P.2d 539, 543 (1982). Decedent's acknowledgement to mother, pediatrician, and
friend; and grandmother's testimony that decedent visited child, met the "stricter" standard for
illegitimate child's inheritance from father. Higgins v. Ripley, 16 Mass, App. 928, 928, 450 N.E.2d
186, 186 (1983).
64. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 525.172 (West 1975) provides:
An illegitimate child shall inherit from his mother the same as if born in lawful wedlock,
and also from the person who... shall have declared himself to be his father... or from
the person who has been determined to be the father of such child in a paternity proceeding
before a court of competent jurisdiction ....
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proceeding for intestate succession after a father's death. The court found these
proceedings necessary for full protection of illegitimate children despite the

state's interest in facilitating disposition of estates:
[W]e recognize the legitimate concern that has been expressed in some

of the cases from other jurisdictions about the risk of fraudulent claims
against the putative father's estate. However, this risk is not signifi-

cantly greater in paternity actions brought after the putative father's
death than in many other types of actions, including an action by a
party seeking to prove that he is the legitimate child of a decedent.
Most importantly, we believe that the risk is outweighed by the injus-

tice which is done to the innocent child by denying it an adjudication
65
of paternity simply because its putative father happened to die.

The Illinois legislature has made statutes allowing an adjudication of paternity
after the father's death more acceptable to states concerned about fraud by giv66
ing plaintiffs a burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.

Despite the advantages of such legislative reform in improving the fairness
of inheritance laws, however, the North Carolina General Assembly is unlikely

to adopt an approach that balances the equation strongly in favor of the inheritance rights of illegitimate children. 67 It is worthwhile, therefore, to propose
those changes most vital to the needs of illegitimate children which might reasonably be expected to be added to the paternal acknowledgement provisions of

section 29-19(b) in the near future.
The rights of illegitimate minors who are entitled to their fathers' support

must be afforded greater protection. Children under eighteen should be granted
a one year grace period from the date of their father's death to establish pater-

nity.68 This amendment would benefit both informally acknowledged children
and those who had not been supported by their father. In addition, an illegitiThe statute does not specify whether the proceeding must take place before the father's death. Id.;
see Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 894-95 (Minn. 1978). The North Carolina statute is not
open to judicial interpretation on this point because it refers specifically to paternity proceedings
which must take place during the father's lifetime. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19(b)(1) (1984). See supra
notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
65. Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978). The North Carolina General
Assembly was apparently concerned about preventing claims that would slow the disposition of
estates, a point not addressed by the Minnesota court, and about fraud.
66. Act of June 11, 1975, § 2-2(h), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110112, § 2-2(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984). See also Cody v. Johnson, 92 Ml. App. 3d 208, 415 N.E.2d 1131 (1980) (rejecting argument
that decedent's heirs were deprived of equal protection because they could not introduce blood test
to disprove paternity after the putative father's death).
Justice Brennan's dissent in Lalli suggests that a state's interest in preventing fraud would be
served by a statute requiring "formal public acknowledgements of paternity," or by statutes requiring proof of paternity by "clear and convincing evidence, or even beyond a reasonable doubt." La!I,
439 U.S. at 278-9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
North Carolina requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for support actions during the father's
lifetime. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14(b) (1984). Furthermore, it makes no special provisions for informally acknowledged children, thus carefully safeguarding estates from fraudulent claims. See notes
15-17 and accompanying text.
67. The historical treatment by North Carolina of illegitimate children's inheritance rights suggests this conclusion. For a discussion of the developments of North Carolina law on inheritance for
illegitimate children, see supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text and note 44.
68. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209 (West Supp. 1984).
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mate minor will benefit from a rebuttable presumption .of paternity if he can
show that the alleged father was known to have lived with the mother at the
time of conception 69 or that the minor lived with the father immediately after
birth.70 Although these changes would reduce the certainty of the disposition of
estates, they are warranted because of the compelling needs of dependent children. Further, the inheritance rights of the heirs of a father who acknowledges
and provides for his illegitimate child in his duly probated will should be granted
as they pose no danger of fraudulent claims on the illegitimate child's estate.
Several commentators in addition to Judge Johnson have proposed that the
North Carolina Supreme Court protect further the inheritance rights of illegitimate children by expounding a doctrine of constructive compliance with section
29-19(b). 7 1 A broad theory of constructive compliance would allow intestate
inheritance whenever the child could establish proof of paternity by convincing
evidence. 72 The objective would be to protect illegitimate children whose fathers voluntarily acknowledged their paternity and provided support, but failed
to certify their paternity in strict compliance with section 29-19(b). The effect of
this practice would be to transform the formal requirements of section 29-19(b)
73
into a looser standard equivalent to "open and notorious recognition.
An alternative standard for constructive compliance with section 29-19,
more consistent with legislative intent 74 but less protective of illegitimate children, would be to grant inheritance rights if the illegitimate child's convincing
proof of paternity includes at least one written document tending to establish
acknowledgement of paternal obligation. Unfortunately, this standard would be
more useful to the heirs of the child's father as in Stern, who could rely on a
probated will, than it would be to illegitimate children. The doctrine could be
extended, however, to a child who could show a consistent pattern of support
documented by checks signed by the father to the child's mother or guardian or
by checks for payment of expenses for the household in which the father and
child were living as part of the proof of paternal acknowledgement.
69. Cf. Id., comment (b) ("[p]roof of filiation may include, but is not limited to: 'Informal'
acknowledgement; scientific test results; acknowledgement in a testament; and proof that the alleged
parents lived in a state of concubinage at the time of conception").
70. Note that while this change would help plaintiffs in Stern, it would not affect the result in
Herndon in which the child began living with his father at age nine, but the parents never lived
together. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. These presumptions follow from the assumption of the public generally that the man living with the mother or supporting the infant is its father.
71. See Note, supra note 56, at 1211 (1983); Note, supra note 6, at 211-12.
72. Such an approach would have compelled the North Carolina Court of Appeals to rule
differently in both Stern and Herndon. In both Stern and Herndon the father openly acknowledged
his paternity and had the child live with him and take his name. See supra notes 20 & 54 and
accompanying text. On these facts the court would have found constructive compliance. If the
North Carolina Supreme Court had been presented with this argument in Mitchell v. Freuler, 297
N.C. 206, 207, 254 S.E.2d 762, 762 (1979), it would have been required to recognize constructive
compliance because decedent lived with his son for the final seven years of the decedent's life, took
out insurance policies in his son's name, and openly acknowledged his paterpity. In each of these
cases, the danger of fraud was not present.
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
74. One student commentator has suggested that equitable legitimation, and not constructive
compliance, should be recognized, allowing all possible avenues of proof, such as photographs, letters and testimony, to prove paternal acknowledgement. See Note, supra note 36, at 254-55.

1985]

PROPERTY LAW

1285

Though the holding in the Stern case was rather narrow, its implications
are significant. Stern establishes for North Carolina the modest proposition that
the same equal protection and statutory analysis is applicable under section 2919(b) whether the plaintiff is an illegitimate child or the heir of an illegitimate
child's father. It also upholds a standard of strict statutory construction of section 29-19. The decision's harsh result, however, should alert the North Carolina General Assembly that its concern for prevention of fraudulent claims upon
estates has severely restricted the statute's ability to equalize inheritance rights
between legitimate and illegitimate children and that statutory reform, therefore,
is needed. In particular, the statute should be amended to address the problems
of illegitimate minors not formally recognized by their fathers. Finally, the
North Carolina Supreme Court should recognize the doctrine of constructive
compliance with section 29-19(b) and establish a more flexible and equitable
standard for the lower courts to follow.
DAVID

E. WEBB

Medford v. Lynch: North Carolina's Shift to the Minority
Rule Regarding Inheritance Taxation and Will
Compromise Agreements
In Medford v. Lynch1 the North Carolina Court of Appeals recognized the
North Carolina General Assembly's decision to impose inheritance taxes in accordance with the transfers under a compromise agreement when such an agreement is incorporated into a consent judgment in a caveat proceeding. 2 The
majority view-previously followed by North Carolina-imposes inheritance
taxes in accordance with the will provisions. 3 Medford was the first opportunity
for a North Carolina appellate court to interpret North Carolina General Statutes section 105-2(1) 4 since its amendment in 1974- to provide that inheritance
taxes shall be imposed upon a transfer "when the transfer is made pursuant to a
final judgment entered in a proceeding to caveat a will." 6 The Medford court

found that a consent judgment qualified as a final judgment 7 and therefore held
that inheritance taxes should be imposed in accordance with the transfers under
a compromise agreement when the agreement is incorporated into a consent
judgment. 8 This Note will explain the majority and minority views on imposing
inheritance taxes; analyze the Medford decision under section 105-2(1); review
the history of inheritance taxes in North Carolina concerning will compromise
agreements; discuss the policy arguments behind both the minority and majority
1. 67 N.C. App. 543, 313 S.E.2d 593 (1984).
2. Id. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595. This places North Carolina in the minority of states. See 42
Am. JUR. 2D Inheritance,Estate, And Gift Taxes § 76 (1969) (discussing the majority and minority
views on effect of compromise of will contest). A "caveat proceeding" is a proceeding undertaken in
the proper courts to prevent (temporarily or provisionally) the proving of a will. . . ." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1979).
3. See Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C. 636, 639-40, 97 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1957) (citing Annot., 36
A.L.R. 2D 917 (1954)). See generally 42 AM. JUR. 2D, supranote 2, §§ 71, 76 (1969) (discussing the
majority and minority views on taxation effect of compromise of will contest). The majority view
also holds that transfers should be taxed according to intestate succession, rather than according to a
compromise agreement, when decedent died intestate. Id. § 71. All further references in this Note
to the majority tax according to the will view also apply to taxation according to intestacy.
4. The section reads:
A tax shall be and is hereby imposed upon the transfer of any property, real or personal, or
of any interest therein or income therefrom, in trust or otherwise, to persons or corporations, in the following cases:
(1) When the transfer is by will or by the intestate laws of this State from any person
dying seized or possessed of the property while a resident of the State, or when the transfer
is made pursuant to a final judgment entered in a proceeding to caveat a will executed by
any person dying seized of the property while a resident of this State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
5. Act of April 1, 1974, ch. 1287, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984)).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984). The section quoted was added by a 1974
amendment cited at note 5.
7. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545-46, 313 S.E.2d at 594-95.
8. Id. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595. The language of § 105-2(1) implies that a compromise agreement which is not incorporated into a final consent judgment will not qualify for taxation according
to the compromise, but must be taxed according to the transfers specified by the will or by intestacy.
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views; and briefly explain why the minority view, adopted by North Carolina, is
the better view.
Two views exist regarding the correct method of taxing transfers from an
estate when the will or intestate distribution has been contested and a compromise agreement between the heirs or devisees and the contestants has been consummated. 9 The majority view holds that the tax should be imposed on
transfers as provided in the will even though the compromise agreement may
provide for a different distribution.10 Under this view a devisee would pay inheritance taxes on his total bequest under the will, even though he may not
receive the entire bequest because of the compromise agreement. A contestant
not named in the will would not pay any tax on the property he receives."1 The
minority view holds that the inheritance tax should be imposed on transfers
made in accordance with the compromise agreement, thereby taxing a devisee,
heir, or contestant only on the property he actually receives. 12 Because of these
two views, the difference in inheritance taxes paid by each party to a will contest
3
can vary substantially.'
In Medford plaintiff Bobby Lee Medford was executor and sole beneficiary
of the estate of Mary Clemens under a 1978 will. 14 After Medford probated this
will, Robert McLendon instituted a caveat proceeding to probate a 1977 will,
supposedly executed by Clemens, that made McLendon a devisee.15 Patrick
Span and Claudia Span Johns, representing all of Clemens' heirs at law, intervened in the caveat proceeding.' 6 During the trial all parties executed a compromise agreement which provided that the 1978 will would be probated, but
that the estate would be distributed in accordance with the terms of the agreement. 17 The jury determined that the 1978 will was Clemens' last will and testament, and the trial court entered a consent judgment to that effect. The court
ordered that the estate be distributed in accordance with the terms of the com8
promise agreement.'
As executor of the Clemens estate, Medford filed a North Carolina Inheri9. See generally42 AM. JUR. 2D, supranote 2, § 76 (discussing both the majority and minority
views on effect of compromise of will contest).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Cochran's Ex'r & Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 661, 44 S.W.2d 603,
605 (1931).
12. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903-04 (1919); 42
AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 2, § 76.
13. An heir or devisee would have to pay inheritance tax on his total bequest under the majority view; he would only pay inheritance tax on the part of the bequest he actually received under the
minority view. Also, tax rates and exemption amounts for beneficiaries vary according to the closeness in kinship of the beneficiary and the decedent. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 105-4,-S (1979 & Supp.
1984). The majority, taxation according to the will view, can deny the advantages of such provisions
to a contestant-beneficiary under a compromise agreement if he is closer in kin to the decedent than

was the devisee.
14. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 543, 313 S.E.2d at 593.
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id. The compromise agreement provided for a distribution as follows: fifty percent to Medford, twenty-eight percent to McLendon, and eleven percent each to Span and Johns. Id.
18. Id. at 543-44, 313 S.E.2d at 593.
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tance Tax Return, computing the tax due based on the transfers under the consent judgment. 19 Defendant Department of Revenue ignored the consent order,
computing the estate's inheritance tax liability in accordance with the terms of
the will and assessing Medford $4,845.92 in additional taxes, penalties, and interest. 20 Medford paid the assessment, was denied a refund, and sued to recover
the amount paid. 21 In the resulting nonjury trial, the presiding judge ruled in
favor of the Department of Revenue and concluded, as a matter of law, that
Medford was required by section 105-2(1) to determine the inheritance tax in
22
accordance with the terms of the will.
A unanimous court of appeals reversed, ruling that section 105-2(1) required Medford to compute the inheritance tax in accordance with the compromise agreement distributions contained in the consent judgment.2 3 The
Department of Revenue had contended that the 1957 case of Pulliam v.
Thrash24 was controlling. 25 In Pulliam the North Carolina Supreme Court had
held that "the succession tax is computable in accordance with the terms of the
will, unaffected by the compromise agreement" which had been incorporated
into a consent judgment. 2 6 The Medford court, however, noted that Pulliam
was decided prior to the amendment of section 105-2(1),27 which added that a
transfer is to be taxed "when the transfer is made pursuant to a final judgment
entered in a proceeding to caveat a will." 28 The court found that the legislature,
through this amendment, intended to change the Pulliam result and held that
section 105-2(1) as amended clearly required that the inheritance tax be computed on transfers in accordance with the final judgment in a caveat
29
proceeding.
The Department of Revenue also argued that the consent judgment was
only a contract between the parties and did not constitute a "final judgment" as
intended by section 105-2(1).30 The court disagreed, 3 1 noting that the North
Carolina Supreme Court had held that:
Once the court adopts the agreement of the parties and sets it
forth as a judgment of the court. . . the contractual character of the
agreement is subsumed into the court ordered judgment. At that point
the court and the parties are no longer dealing with a mere contract
19. Id. at 544, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957).
25. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
26. Pulliam, 245 N.C. at 639, 97 S.E.2d at 256 (quoting Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2D 918 (1954)).
"Succession tax" is merely a synonym for inheritance tax.
27. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984).
29. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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32

between the parties.
Therefore, the court held "that a consent judgment entered in a caveat proceeding is, absent any evidence of collusion, a final judgment for purposes of section
105-2(1)."

33

Accordingly, the court correctly held that the inheritance tax

should have been computed according to the compromise agreement transfers
34
instead of according to the will provisions.
Until 1937 North Carolina followed the majority rule of computing inheritance taxes according to the distributions made under the will or by intestate
succession. 35 The inheritance tax statute was then amended to provide expressly
that when an estate was distributed in accordance with a compromise agree36
ment, inheritance taxes should be computed according to that agreement.
This change, however, did not last long. In 1941 the legislature again amended
the inheritance tax statute, deleting the provision dealing with compromise
agreements and realigning North Carolina with the majority view of taxation
according to the will. 37 When the statute was amended to its present form in

1974, North Carolina rejoined the minority view of taxation according to the
38
compromise agreement.
Although the North Carolina statute governing inheritance taxes has
shifted between the majority and minority views, all pre-Medford cases concerning inheritance taxation in North Carolina were decided under the statute when
it reflected the majority view. These cases, therefore, supported taxation accord39
ing to the will.
32. Id. at 545-46, 313 S.E.2d at 594-95 (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 40708, 298 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1983)).
33. Id. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595.
34. Id.
35. See, eg., Act of May 9, 1935, ch. 371, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 429,429; Act of March 10,
1925, ch. 101, § 6, 1925 N.C. Sess. Laws 116, 119; Act of March 9, 1915, ch. 285, § 6, 1915 N.C.
Sess. Laws 355, 357; Act of March 15, 1901, ch. 9, § 12, 1901 N.C. Sess. Laws 116, 123. Until 1939
North Carolina's revenue act had to be renewed every two years. The statutes cited are examples of
the inheritance tax statute during this period.
36. Act of March 13, 1937, ch. 127, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 170. This change reflected the
minority view. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
37. Act of Feb. 28, 1941, ch. 50, 1941 N.C. Sess. Laws 66.
38. Act of Apr. 11, 1974, ch. 1287, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 557 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-2(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984)).
39. See, eg., Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C. 636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957); Bailey v. McLain, 215
N.C. 150, 1 S.E.2d 372 (1939); Greene v. Lynch, 51 N.C. App. 665, 277 S.E.2d 454 (1981); In re
McCoy, 39 N.C. App. 52, 249 S.E.2d 473 (1978), disc. rev. denied, 296 N.C. 585, 254 S.E.2d 36
(1979). In McCoy, which was decided four years after § 105-2(1) was amended, the court had to
apply the statute as it appeared in 1973, the year of the decedent's death. Its holding therefore
follows the majority view.
Pulliam was the first case in which the North Carolina Supreme Court explicitly recognized the
majority view. The Pulliam court held that an executor must compute inheritance taxes according
to the distributions in the will, basing its decision on the 1957 version of § 105-2(1). Pulliam, 245
N.C. at 639, 97 S.E.2d at 255-56. Section 105-2 did not then include a provision regarding caveat
proceedings or compromise agreements. The court stated that:
Our statutes impose inheritance taxes upon transfers of property by will, by intestate
laws or in contemplation of death. . . . No provision [in section 105-2] is made for the
assessment of inheritance taxes on a different basis, because, pursuant to a contract made
by the devisees after testator's death, the ultimate disposition differs in whole or in part
from that prescribed by the will.
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North Carolina's recognition of the majority view, however, was expressly
rejected in Medford.4° The Medford court found that the North Carolina legis-

lature, through its 1974 amendment of section 105-2(1), had adopted the minority view-taxation according to the compromise agreement. 41 The court of

appeals' interpretation of this statute is consistent with the statutory language
and, therefore, is correct.
The power to levy an inheritance tax and to specify how the tax should be
computed is entirely within the province of the general assembly. 42 The North
Carolina General Assembly, by amending section 105-2(1) in 1974, has provided

that North Carolina should follow the minority rule and tax transfers according
to their distribution in a compromise agreement if the agreement is incorporated
into a final judgment in a caveat proceeding. 43 Although it is clear that the
legislature has amended section 105-2(1) to adopt the minority rule, the reasons

for the legislature's reversal are unclear. Because no legislative history exists in
North Carolina to identify the supporting arguments behind the amendment, an
examination of the public policies supporting both the majority and minority
views clarifies the North Carolina General Assembly's change in position. 44
Four major rationales support the majority, taxation according to the will
view. First, some jurisdictions reason that the transfer to be taxed occurs on the
date of the decedent's death, and the tax is fixed as of that time. 45 Any subseId.
40. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 546, 313 S.E.2d at 595.
41. Id. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
42. See In re Morris' Estate, 138 N.C. 259, 262-63, 50 S.E. 682, 683 (1905). The Morris court
stated that:
[Tihe right to take property by devise or descent is not one of the natural rights of man, but
is the creature of the law . . . . The authority which confers such rights may impose
conditions upon them, or take them away entirely. Accordingly, it is held that the states
may tax the privilege, grant exemptions, discriminate between relatives and between these
and strangers, and are not precluded from the exercise of this power by constitutional
provisions requiring uniformity and equality of taxation. Neither is it necessary to the
validity of the tax that the state Constitution should contain a specific delegation of power
authorizing the Legislature to impose such taxation. The power of the Legislature over the
subject of taxation is absolute unless restricted by the Constitution of the state or nation.
Id.
43. Medford, 67 N.C. App. at 545, 313 S.E.2d at 594.
44. Although each state's statute governing inheritance taxes is different, the public policy reasoning behind these statutes, examined in existing case law, should be applicable and persuasive
irrespective of the differences in the statutes' wording. Also, whether the majority or minority view
will benefit the state or the taxpayer depends upon the facts peculiar to each situation; neither view
consistently benefits one party more than the other.
The federal government's taxation on transfers at death is an estate tax based on a decedent's
total estate, not an inheritance tax upon particular inheritances. Therefore, the federal government's
attitude towards the majority and minority view will not be examined in detail. The vast majority of
cases dealing with the federal estate tax and compromise agreements deal with charity-legatees who
agree to pay a portion of the bequest to decedent's heirs at law in return for the heir's withdrawal of
a will contest suit. The general rule in these cases favors the minority view and taxes the amount
received by the heirs, while the charity's share is nontaxable. Annot., 36 A.L.R. 2D 917, 920-21
(1954). Two earlier cases, however, did involve a federal inheritance tax and taxed the distributions
made in accordance with the compromise agreements. See Page v. Rives, 18 F. Cas. 990 (C.C.W.D.
Va. 1877) (No. 10,666); McCoy v. Gill, 156 F. 985 (C.C.D. Mass. 1907).
45. See MacKenzie v. Wright, 31 Ariz. 272, 252 P. 521 (1927); People v. Upson, 338 Ill. 145,
170 N.E. 276 (1930); Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div. v. Kitchin, 119 Ind.
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quent compromise agreement is merely a contract by which an heir or devisee
assigns a part of his interest in the decedent's estate to the contestant. 46 Second,
since the will is an essential link in the chain of title47 and transfers in the will
take effect at the testator's death, seisin immediately vests in the devisee upon
testator's death. If the taxable transfer was made pursuant to a later compromise agreement, the seisin would not be vested in anyone from the time of testator's death until the compromise agreement became effective, violating the
45
doctrine that someone must always possess the seisin.
The third rationale supporting the taxation according to the will view is
that it, unlike the minority view, offers no opportunity for tax avoidance. 49 The
minority view would allow a contestant and an heir or devisee to arrange collusively the property distribution so as to take advantage of favorable tax rates and
exemptions. 50 This manipulation of taxes would, according to the majority posi51
tion, wrongfully deprive the state of inheritance taxes.
A fourth rationale in favor of the majority view is that statutory provisions
allowing taxation according to the compromise agreement are unnecessary because the same result can be reached between the compromising parties by ap52
portioning the total inheritance tax to be paid in the compromise agreement.
The parties can specify in a tax apportionment clause that each will pay a certain
percentage of the tax due, or apportion the taxes consistently with the property
each receives from the estate. 53 Thus, the majority view can provide an equitable allocation of taxes according to the property actually received by a beneficiary while still complying with the doctrinal requirement that inheritance taxes
App. 422, 86 N.E.2d 96 (1949) (en bane); Cochran's Ex'r and Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky.
656, 44 S.W.2d 603 (1931); Baxter v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 459, 95 N.E. 854 (1911); In re Cook's
Estate, 187 N.Y. 253, 79 N.E. 991 (1907).
46. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, Inheritance Tax Div. v. Kitchin, 119 Ind. App. 422, 424,
86 N.E.2d 96, 97 (1949)(en banc); Cochran's Ex'r and Trustee v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 656, 659,
44 S.W.2d 603, 604 (1931).
47. Borish v. Zink, 2 N.J. Super. 42, 44, 64 A.2d 461, 461 (1949).
48. This argument concerning seisin seems less significant today because of the reduced emphasis on seisin in modem property law.
49. See Note, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinain 1941, 19 N.C.L. REv. 435,
527 (1941).
50. See People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Il. 168, 99 N.E. 377 (1912); Hart v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1942); In re Gartside's Estate, 357 Mo. 181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947);
In re Kierstead's Estate, 122 Neb. 694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); In re Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28
A. 353 (1894). Many states following the minority view, however, require that the compromise
agreement be entered into in good faith and for purposes other than tax avoidance. These states
guard against tax avoidance compromises through the use of fraud statutes and by requiring that
compromise agreements be incorporated into a court judgment or decree, thereby providing judicial
review of the agreement. See Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 222, 23 A.2d 682, 684
(1942); State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80-81, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 703, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932).
51. Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 222, 23 A.2d 682, 684 (1932).
52. See Brown v. McLoughlin, 287 Mass. 15, 190 N.E. 795 (1934); Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C.
636, 97 S.E.2d 253 (1957).
53. Cohn v. Cohn, 20 Cal. 2d 65, 68, 123 P.2d 833, 835 (1942); Pulliam v. Thrash, 245 N.C.
636, 640, 97 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1957); In re Estate of Rendsland, 92 Wash. 2d 185, 190, 594 P.2d 1346,
1349 (1979). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R. 3D 691, 717 (1954) (discussing tax apportionment
provisions in will compromise agreements).
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54
tax transfers at decedent's death.
The minority, taxation according to the compromise agreement view also
possesses significant public policy support. Five rationales have been advanced
in support of the minority view. First, taxation according to the compromise
provides a more equitable tax allocation.55 Under the minority view, only the
property actually received by a beneficiary under the compromise agreement is
taxed. 56 If a compromise agreement significantly alters the transfers mentioned
in a will, basing the inheritance tax due on the will provisions would impose an
57
inequitable tax burden on the devisees.

Second, taxation according to the compromise agreement more closely follows the legislative intent implicit in inheritance taxes-to tax the transfer of the
decedent's property.5 8 Inheritance taxes do not tax a decedent's estate, but
rather tax the receipt of property from that estate. 59 A third rationale supporting the minority view is based on the relationship between a testator and the
contestant of his will. 60 To have standing to contest, a party must have an interest that would be adversely affected by probate of the contested will. 61 Thus, an
62
interested party could include heirs at law and beneficiaries under a prior will.
Because of this interest requirement many courts have held that any property
transferred to a contestant as a result of a compromise agreement should be
treated as having passed under the laws concerning descent and distribution to
an heir of the same relationship as the contestant was to the testator and taxed
accordingly. 63 This result seemingly would create a part-will part-intestacy dis54. Under the majority view, however, the tax would be assessed against the beneficiaries under
the will. See In re Cook's Estate, 187 N.Y. 253, 259-60, 79 N.E. 991, 993 (1907). Therefore, the
majority view would ignore any favorable tax rates or exemptions a contestant close in kin to the
decedent might possess that the minority view would allow. See infra note 63 and accompanying
text.
55. See In re Estate of Thorson, 150 Minn. 464, 185 N.W. 508 (1921); State ex rel. Hilton v.
Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919); In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 207
S.W.2d 273 (1947); In re Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); In re Pepper's
Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 28 A. 353 (1894).
56. See State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903 (1919).
57. See In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 185, 207 S.W.2d 273, 275 (1947); Pepper's
Estate, 159 Pa. 508, 510, 28 A. 353, 353 (1894).
58. See Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1942); In re Estate of Thorson, 150 Minn. 464, 185 N.W. 508 (1921); State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172
N.W. 902 (1919); In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947).
59. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903 (1919); In re
Morris' Estate, 138 N.C. 259, 262, 50 S.E. 682, 683 (1905). Although transfers from an estate
theoretically are taxed as of the time of decedent's death and compromise agreements are entered
into after a decedent's death, the legislative intent of inheritance tax law overrides this discrepancy
and demands that the tax be computed on the property as it actually is distributed to the beneficiaries. See State ex rel Hilton, 143 Minn. at 80, 172 N.W. at 903.
60. See People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Rice, 40 Colo. 508, 91 P. 33 (1907); Taylor v. State, 40
Ga. App. 295, 149 S.E. 321 (1929); Hart v. Mercantile Trust Co., 180 Md. 218, 23 A.2d 682 (1942);
In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 207 S.W.2d 273 (1947); In re Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb.
694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); In re Hastings' Estate, 183 Misc. 517, 49 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1944).
61. In re Will of Calhoun, 47 N.C. App. 472, 267 S.E.2d 385, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 90, 273
S.E.2d 311 (1980).
62. In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 184, 207 S.W.2d 273, 275 (1947); In re Will of
Belvin, 261 N.C. 275, 276, 134 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1964).
63. Taylor v. State, 40 Ga. App. 295, 295, 149 S.E. 321, 321 (1929); Hart v. Mercantile Trust
Co., 180 Md. 218, 222, 23 A.2d 682, 684 (1942); In re Estate of Gartside, 357 Mo. 181, 184, 207
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tribution and would allow the transfers to be taxed according to the compromise
agreement while still meeting the doctrinal requirement that transfers be taxed
at the testator's death. 64 The theory of partial renunciation also supports the
minority view. 65 Under this theory, when a beneficiary renounces a bequest or
legacy he is not taxed on the attempted transfer; the property passes through
intestacy and is taxed to the receiving heirs.6 6 Likewise, a devisee under a will
should not be taxed on his whole bequest if, as a result of a compromise agreement, he does not receive the whole bequest; the amount passing under the compromise agreement should be treated as a partial renunciation by the devisee and
67
should be taxed to the recipients as if it were passing through intestacy.
The fourth public policy rationale in favor of the minority view is that taxation according to the compromise agreement encourages the settlement of willcontest litigation. 68 Because under the minority view a devisee or legatee must
pay inheritance taxes only on the amount received and not on the total bequest
or intestate share, a devisee or legatee should be more willing to compromise and
69
settle a will-contest suit.

The fifth rationale favoring the minority view deals with the requirement,
imposed by several states, that the compromise agreement be incorporated into a
court decree or judgment for the minority rule to apply. 70 The possibility of an
invalid will may create uncertainty as to who is entitled to property passing
through a testator's estate. 7 1 Therefore, the logical result in will-contest suits
would be to hold that no actual transfer of the estate assets occurs until a court
S.W.2d 273, 275 (1947). Treating the transfers under a compromise agreement as having passed
under the laws of descent and distribution would also meet the majority view's requirement that the
transfer to be taxed occur at the decedent's death.
64. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
65. See State ex reL Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81-82, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919);
In re Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932).
66. State ex rel.Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81-82, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932).
67. State ex rel.Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81-82, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932). Of course, under partial renunciation the property renounced would pass through intestacy to the heirs at law as a class, not to a
specific "heir" as it would under a compromise agreement.
68. See State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919); In re
Estate of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 704, 241 N.W. 274, 278 (1932); Note, Taxation-Effect of North
Carolina Inheritance Tax on a Will Compromise Agreement, 36 N.C.L. REV. 236, 238 (1958). A

danger exists, however, that by encouraging settlements the minority view may also encourage a
devisee and contestant to avoid inheritance taxes by apportioning the property in such a manner as
to maximize the effect of favorable tax rates and exemptions available to parties close in kin to
decedent. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. By encouraging settlements, the minority
view also may tempt a devisee and contestant to withhold evidence concerning the invalidity of a will
in order to facilitate an agreement between themselves, possibly excluding rightful heirs. See Bailey
v. McLain, 215 N.C. 150, 158-59, 1 S.E.2d 372, 377 (1939) (Clarkson, J., dissenting). Both of these
dangers, however, can be minimized by requiring that the compromise agreement be incorporated
into a judgment, thus subjecting it to judicial review. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
69. State ex reL. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 81, 172 N.W. 902, 904 (1919).
70. See State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 172 N.W. 902 (1919); In re Estate
of Kierstead, 122 Neb. 694, 241 N.W. 274 (1932); Medford v. Lynch, 67 N.C. App. 543, 313 S.E.2d
593 (1984).
71. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902, 903-04 (1919).
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enters a final decree or judgment providing for a valid distribution. 72 Any such
decree or judgment would be treated as having occurred at decedent's death and

would be binding on all, unless a compromise agreement had been entered into
collusively. 73 The requirement that a compromise agreement be incorporated
into a final decree or judgment provides the court an opportunity to evaluate
whether the agreement was made collusively or solely to avoid taxes, rather than
to settle a bona fide controversy. 74 Therefore, to require incorporation of a com-

promise agreement into a judgment or decree refutes criticism that the minority
view allows taxation of transfers made after the decedent's death and encourages
75
tax avoidance.
The minority view is the better of the two approaches. By taxing a benefici-

ary only on property he actually receives, the minority view provides a more
equitable result. 76 Under this view, a devisee would not suffer any dispropor-

tionate inheritance tax hardship when he surrenders a portion of his bequest to a
will contestant in a compromise agreement. The majority view would force the

devisee to pay the inheritance tax on his total bequest under the will.
The minority view fulfills the legislative intent underlying inheritance
taxes-to tax the beneficiary of a transfer of estate property only on the amount
he actually receives. 7 7 Since the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that
"[a] law imposing an inheritance tax is to be liberally construed to effectuate the

intention of the Legislature,"'78 this result should be of primary importance.
Therefore, the Medford court was correct in its interpretation of section 105-2(1)
and its recognition of the minority view in North Carolina. The minority view
also best implements the testator's intent. A testator would not wish for an
intended devisee to pay inheritance taxes on property the devisee did not receive

while an intentionally omitted contestant to the will pays no taxes on property
received pursuant to a compromise agreement.
The criticisms of the minority view are unfounded. The principle criticism

is that the minority rule does not comply with the theoretical requirement that
72. Id. The court in State ex rel Hilton v. Probate Court, 143 Minn. 77, 80, 172 N.W. 902,
903-04 (1919) stated:
Where a decedent has attempted to transfer his estate by a purported will, there is
frequently an uncertainty as to the persons who eventually will participate in the estate,
and the amount or value of the portion to be received; and there is also a possibility that
the transfer may after all be in virtue of the intestate law, and not through the will. The
will may turn out not properly executed, or invalid because of lack of testamentary capacity or the exertion of undue influence. Therefore, in case of a contest between the beneficiaries named in the will, or where the instrument is attacked by one claiming under the
intestate law, the practical proposition is that there is no actual transfer of any portion of
the estate until the final decree of distribution is made, or until a court of competent juris.
diction construes or determines the issue between the claimants. The decree so finally
entered relates back, and, of course, makes the transfer effectual as of the date of death.
73. Id.
74. Id.; Appellant's Brief at 7, Medford.
75. For a discussion of the majority view's criticism of these points, see supra notes 45-46 and
49-51 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
78. Watkins v. Shaw, 234 N.C. 96, 98, 65 S.E.2d 881, 883 (1951).
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inheritance taxes be levied on transfers at the time of testator's death. 79 The
minority view, however, counters this criticism by implying that the property
the contestant received passes under the statutes of descent and distribution and
relates back to the date of the testator's death under the compromise agreement. 80 This construction is supported by the close relationship that usually
exists between the contestant and the testator. 81 Therefore, the minority view
satisfies the requirement that transfers be taxed at the date of testator's death.
By interpreting section 105-2(1) to tax inheritances according to the distributions in a compromise agreement when that agreement is incorporated into a
final judgment in a caveat proceeding, the Medford court has given judicial recognition to the minority view of taxation according to the compromise agreement in North Carolina. This decision provides North Carolina with an
equitable inheritance tax law that best effectuates both the legislative intent of
the inheritance tax statute and the decedent's intent.
BRUCE ARCHER DENNING

79. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
81. See cases cited supra note 60.

North Carolina's Theft of Cable Television Service Statute:
Prospects of a Brighter Future for the Cable Television Industry
The past few decades have witnessed what appropriately may be termed a

revolution in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The advent
of new technologies and changes in the tastes of the consuming public have re-

sulted in an unprecedented demand for the wares of the telecommunications
industry. Epitomizing this phenomenon is the cable television industry,1 which

has blossomed from a status of virtual nonexistence in the early 1950s to a multibillion dollar contemporary enterprise whose services are used by a rapidly

increasing portion of the United States citizenry.2
Cable television's commercial success story has been tainted, however, by
an increase in the theft of cable services without payment of a fee to the cable
companies. 3 The incidence of cable service theft transcends the basic problem of
individual homeowners surreptitiously attaching their television sets to the

cables; rather, an entire industry has sprouted that produces and markets devices designed to enable a viewer to receive all of the premium programming of a

cable company without paying for it. 4 Cable companies, unlike traditional

broadcasters, 5 are supported primarily by the fees paid by subscribing customers

in return for cable services. 6 It has been estimated, however, that "pirates" are
"stealing.

.

.900 million dollars a year from cable and pay-TV providers."' 7

1. For a description of the cable television industry, see infra notes 15-20 and accompanying
text.
2. See, eg., Wheeler, Cable Television: Where It's
Been, Where It's
Headed, 56 FLA. B.J. 228,
228-29 (1982) ("Today, approximately 4,600 [cable] systems serve 23 million TV homes, and the
number of cable subscribers is growing at a rate of more than 250,000 per month. It is expected that
by 1985 the cable industry will have wired more than 40 percent of American homes."); Comment,
Pay Television Legal ProtectionsAgainst Interception: Backyard Earth StationsAmplify CurrentImperfections, 87 DICK. L. REv. 95, 99 n.22 (1982) (citing figures indicating that in 1980 44% of all
American television households had access to cable and of that 44%, 50% of the homes subscribed
to cable).
3. See, e-g., 2 C. FERIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAw 26.04 (1984);
Comment, Decoding Section 605 of the FederalCommunications Act: A Cause of Action for Unauthorized Reception ofSubscription Television, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 362, 362 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Decoding Section 605]; Comment, Pay Television Piracy: Does Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 Prohibit Signal Piracy-And Should It?, 10 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 531, 531 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pay Television Piracy].
4. See, e-g., Comment, Pay Television and Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934: A
Need for CongressionalAction, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1249, 1249-50 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Pay Television and Section 605]; Comment, Pay Television Piracy,supra note 3, at 531.
Without a decoder, only basic cable service can be received. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
5. See Comment, Pay Television and Section 605, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
6. See, eg., Comment, Decoding Section 605, supra note 3, at 362; Comment, Pay Television
and Section 605, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
7. 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3,

26.04.

Considering the long-term effects on the willingness of currently paying customers to continue
paying, the problem of cable piracy is even greater than the magnitude of immediate revenue losses
indicates. Knowledge that many of their friends and relatives are successfully receiving services and
avoiding payment for them will engender apathy and an incentive not to pay in those who ordinarily
would pay the cable fees.
Also, theft of cable service indirectly results in a loss of revenues to state and local governments
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The North Carolina General Assembly responded to the behests of the cable
industry and in 1978 enacted a statute devoted solely to combatting cable service
theft. 8 The 1978 statute was completely rewritten by the general assembly in
1984. 9 The new statute strengthens the criminal penalties against those who
obtain cable services illegally and those who sell or distribute devices designed to
assist purchasers in such illegal activity.10 In addition, cable companies now are
permitted to instigate civil actions for injunctive and monetary relief against persons who previously were subject only to criminal prosecution under the
statute. 11
This Note analyzes North Carolina's new theft of cable service statute by
comparing and contrasting it with its predecessor and with similar statutes in

other states, by addressing its potential constitutional infirmities, by assessing
some of its limitations and inadequacies, and by exploring the possibility of over-

lapping federal causes of action. The Note also discusses whether federal statutes concerning theft of cable television service preempt North Carolina's

statute.
It is imperative for analytical purposes to understand the primary distinctions between the cable television industry and other similar industries that are
plagued by many of the same problems. Currently, four basic methods exist for
distributing pay television. 12 Three of the systems use the airwaves to deliver

their signals to the home. With two of the over-the-air systems, multipoint distribution service (MDS) and direct broadcast satellites (DBS), the coded signal
is received by an antenna and unscrambled by a decoding device located between
the antenna and the television.1 3 The other over-the-air pay TV system, sub-

scription television (STV), transmits its scrambled signals using the facilities of
because state and local taxes and fees levied against cable companies generally are based on the gross
receipts of the cable companies. These revenues are reduced to the extent that thieves would become
paying customers if they were prevented from stealing cable service. See Ciminelli v. Cablevision,
583 F. Supp. 144, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
8. See Act of June 16, 1978, ch. 1185, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 86 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-118.5 (1981)). The 1978 statute superseded, for purposes of cable television, a theft of service
statute applicable to a variety of telecommunications services. See Act of May 22, 1973, ch. 648,
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 962 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (Supp. 1977)). Mr. John Jerose, a
representative of the cable television industry, testified before a House committee regarding the impending threat to the industry posed by service thieves and the inadequacy of the 1983 Act in dealing
with the problem. See Minutes, North Carolina House Committee on Judiciary II, at 1 (June 8,
1978).
A number of states have passed legislation during the past few years in an effort to deter the
activity of cable service thieves. See, eg., Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 158 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (providing citations for state theft of cable service statutes); 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T.
CAsEY, supra note 3, 26.031l] (noting that approximately 25 states have cable theft statutes).
9. See Act of July 5, 1984, ch. 1088, 1984 N.C. Sess. Laws 264 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-118.5 (Supp. 1984)).
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984); infra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text.
11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984); infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
12. See Comment, supra note 2, at 98. The four pay television systems are multipoint distribution service (MDS), direct broadcast satellites (DBS), subscription television (STY), and cable television. Id.
13. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CAsEY, supra note 3, 1 19.02, 20.02; Comment, supra
note 2, at 101; Comment, Subscription Television Decoders: Can CaliforniaProhibitTheir Manufac-
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commercial television stations, and thus only a special decoder is required for
interception. 1 4 The final pay television delivery system, cable television, 15 is

transmitted to the home through wires or coaxial cables. 1 6 The primary subject

ture andSale?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 839, 843 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Subscription Television].
MDS signals are sent from the MDS operator to a satellite which transmits the signals to a
distributor. A microwave transmitter at the distributor's facilities sends the signals to the homes of
individual subscribers. The MDS signal is generally only intelligible on a conventional television set
if the viewer has a special "directive" antenna to intercept the signal and a decoder to decipher and
transform it. See Comment, supra note 2, at 100; Comment, Subscription Television, supra, at 843
(special antenna required because MDS signals travel outside the spectrum of the standard television
broadcast signal).
The FCC recently approved a multiple channel capacity for MDS systems, but MDS systems
are still much more limited than cable television systems in channel capacity. See 2 C. FERRIs, F.
LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 5 19.01, 19.09. As a result of its multiple channel capacity,
comparable reception costs, and lower capital investment requirements, MDS should compete well
with the other pay television delivery systems. See id. 119.09.
DBS is the newest and least developed pay television system. See Comment, supra note 2, at
101; Comment, Subscription Television, supra, at 843. The DBS system is predicated on a satellite
network concept. "mhe [DBS] system will transmit from four orbitting satellites, one serving each
time zone.. . . The satellite signal will be picked up by a dish-shaped antenna.. .[that] must be
properly aligned and focused in the direction of a particular satellite." Id. One of the small antennas must be located at each subscriber's home. See Comment, supra note 2, at 101. It has been
estimated that the DBS antenna will be mass-produced and sold for approximately $200, putting it
within the financial reach of private homeowners. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra
note 3, $ 20.02 n.4.
The prospects for commercial success for DBS are good. DBS has multichannel capacity, see 2
C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 20.02, and it is superior to the other pay television
technologies because of its more concentrated signal, which results in clearer reception. See Comment, supra note 2, at 101.
14. See 2 C. FERRIs, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 18.02.
STV is the only pay TV service that operates in the "standard broadcast frequency spectrum."
Comment, Subscription Television, supra note 13, at 839. "The [STV] signals are receivable on
standard television sets equipped for ultra high frequencies (UHF), but are encoded so that only
subscribers whose televisions are equipped with decoding devices receive a comprehensible
message." Comment, Decoding Section 605, supra note 3, at 362. The STV companies rent the
decoder devices to paying customers. See Comment, supra note 2, at 101. STV systems do not use
satellites. Id.
STV is at a competitive disadvantage because it is limited to a single channel capacity of pay
programming, and consequently STV's commercial success has begun to wane in recent years when
contrasted with the other pay TV technologies. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note
3, 1 18.05 (decline of STV attributed primarily to multichannel capabilities of competitors).
15. See Comment, Subscription Television, supra note 13, at 841-44.
16. Every cable television system has one or more antennas located on high ground to pick up
signals to be sent to the "head-end" for processing. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 229. One antenna
is used "to receive local over the air broadcast signals. Other antennas pick up distant television
station or specialized cable network signals transmitted from microwave relay stations or communications satellites." 1 C. FEsRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 5.02. The "head-end" is a
processing center that receives the signals from the antenna, amplifies them for "maximum strength
and clarity," and then converts them into cable television frequencies for transmission over the cable
system. See, eg., id.; Donaldson, Minnesota's Approach to the Regulation of Cable Television, 10
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 413, 414 n.4 (1984).
A network of cables connects each receiver to the "head-end" or source of the signal. A
"trunk" line conducts the signals from the head-end through major streets or thoroughfares. Those signals then travel through smaller "feeder" lines into individual homes. Ultimately, each subscriber has a separate line to the cable.
Stem, The Evolution of Cable Television Regulation: A Proposalfor the Future, 21 URB. L. ANN.
179, 181-83 (1981); see also 1 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, II 5.02-5.03 (providing an excellent description of the cable television system and a synopsis of the historical development of cable television); Donaldson, supra, at 414 n.4 (discussing the components of a cable
television system).
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of this Note is cable television. 17
All cable television subscribers pay a minimum periodic fee which entitles

them to receive basic service. 18 In addition, most cable television operators offer
optional channels and premium services for an additional fee; in return for pay-

ment of the fee, subscribers receive one or more mechanical devices that enable

service may be
reception of the additional broadcasts.1 9 Theft of cable television
20

theft of basic service, theft of premium service, or both.

While the terminology and designations employed above are the ones most
commonly used in discussing the pay television industry, some commentators
use the phrase "cable television" generically to refer collectively to all the pay
television technologies. 2 1 For purposes of analyzing the North Carolina statute,
it is important to ascertain the meaning attributed to "cable television system"
by the general assembly. Although the 1984 theft of cable service statute does

not expressly define "cable television system," a complete definition is found in
North Carolina General Statutes section 160A-319.

"[C]able television system" means any system or facility that, by
means of a master antenna and wires or cables, or by wires or cables
alone, receives, amplifies, modifies, transmits, or distributes any televi-

sion, radio, or electronic signal, audio or video or both, to subscribing
17. In its early years, cable television was referred to as community antenna television (CATV)
because of its initial development to provide television service to small communities that were unable
to receive ordinary broadcast signals. See, eg., Comment, Pay Television: The Pendulum Swings
Toward Deregulation, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 86, 86 n.1 (1978).
18. See Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
"[C]able companies offer, as a minimum level of service, what is referred to as basic service.
While the content of basic service varies from one cable company to another, it generally consists of
local broadcast television signals, and local government and public access programming." Id.
19. See id.; Comment, supra note 2, at 99-100; Comment, supra note 17, at 86 n.l.
To receive the premium cable services, viewers usually must connect a converter and a decoder
to their television sets. A converter increases the channel capacity of the television set, and a decoder unscrambles the premium service signals so that they will be intelligible. Cable companies
provide these devices to paying subscribers. See Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 148
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376, 378 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
Comment, supra note 17, at 86 n.l. "These pay services offer programs and features not otherwise
available to television viewers, such as first-run movies, special entertainment programs, boxing and
other programs." Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
20. North Carolina's theft of cable service statute is broad enough to encompass both types of
theft. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984).
Theft of basic service occurs when a homeowner attaches a cable from his home to the system's
trunk line or to the feeder line of a neighbor or when a homeowner who at some time in the past has
received cable service and has a cable attached to his home that was installed by the cable company
reconnects his television set to the cable television wire. Premium service is stolen by procuring
"black-market" converters and decoders to attach to the cable wire inside the home. For a discussion of the various methods of stealing cable television service, see H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 83 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4655, 4720; 2 C. FERRIS, F.
LLOYD & T. CAEY, supra note 3, 26.01; Comment, Electronic Piracy: Can the Cable Television
Industry Prevent Unauthorized Interception?, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J 587, 592 (1982).
21. See Comment, supra note 20, at 587 n.1. ("[C]able television is any television service that
is provided for a fee and interception of that service without compensation deprives the originator of
a source of income."). One commentator referred to STV as "cable television" but acknowledged
that this usage of the term was "actually a misnomer because STV is devoid of cable in its carriage of
the television signal." Note, National Subscription Television v. S & H TV: The Problem of Unauthorized Interception of Subscription Television-Are the Legal Airwaves Unscrambled?, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 641, 641 n. (1981).
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compensation. 22

The statutory requirement that "wires or cables" be an integral part of the sys-

tem automatically excludes the three over-the-air methods2 3 for distributing pay
television signals. There being no indication in the theft of cable service statute
that a different definition is to apply, this Note will presume that the narrow,

traditional definition of "cable television" expresses the intent of the general assembly and, therefore, that the theft statute does not apply to any over-the-air

pay television signals.24 This analysis is implicitly supported by a provision in
the new statute that states: "The receipt, decoding or converting of a signal

from the air by the use of a satellite dish or antenna shall not constitute a viola25

tion of this section."
North Carolina's 1984 amendment of its theft of cable service law is a total
redraft of the prior statute. 26 In addition to strengthening the criminal sanctions
against violators, it creates a civil cause of action against cable service thieves.
The statute, codified as section 14-118.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes,
defines and prohibits two general categories of conduct that contribute to the
theft of cable service. First, the statute prohibits unauthorized connections to
the cables or other equipment of a cable television system for the purpose of
receiving cable service. 27 This basic provision is in all statutes that specifically
prohibit cable service theft because the conduct prohibited is the actual gaining
of unauthorized access to cable service. A second and extremely important pro22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-319 (1982). Section 160A-319 grants authority to municipalities
to award franchises to cable companies for operation within the city.
Even though the definition of cable television system given in § 160A-319 is preceded by the
language "[flor the purposes of this section," because no definition was provided in either the original or the amended version of the theft of cable service statute, it is reasonable to infer that the
general assembly intended for the definition in § 160A-319 to apply.
23. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
24. This definition is compatible with the preceding textual discussion of cable television. See
supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether North Carolina's theft of
cable service statute should be extended to cover other types of pay television systems, see infra notes
80-84 & 128-37 and accompanying text.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(f) (Supp. 1984). Cable companies frequently purchase premium viewing materials that are conveyed to the cable company "head-ends" in the form of overthe-air transmissions for processing to be sent to the cable television subscribers over the cable system. See, eg., Cablevision v. Annasonic Elec. Supply, No. 83-5159 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984) (relevant part included as appendix in Ciminelli v. Cablevision (Ciminelli II), 583 F. Supp. 158, 163
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376, 378-79 (N.D. Ohio
1983); Comment, supra note 2, at 99-100. Given this common purchasing arrangement, § 14118.5(f) apparently was included to indicate unambiguously that the new statute does not cover all
signal transmissions of proprietary interest to cable companies but rather only actual cable
transmissions.
26. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5 (1981) (earlier statute) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14118.5 (Supp. 1984) (amendment).
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a) (Supp. 1984). The statute states:
Any person . . . who . . . knowingly and willfully attaches or maintains an electronic, mechanical or other connection to any cable, wire, decoder, converter, device or
equipment of a cable television system or removes, tampers with, modifies or alters any
cable, wire, decoder, converter, device or equipment of a cable television system for the
purpose of intercepting or receiving any programming or service transmitted by such cable
television system which person . . . is not authorized by the cable television system to
receive, is guilty of [violating this statute].
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hibition in section 14-118.5 makes illegal the act of "knowingly and willfully,

without the authorization of a cable television system, distribut[ing], sell[ing],
attempt[ing] to sell or possess[ing] for sale in North Carolina any converter,
decoder, device, or kit, that is designed to decode or descramble any encoded or
scrambled signal transmitted by [a] cable television system....,"28 This type
of provision is in many state theft of cable service statutes.29
The 1984 amendment to section 14-118.5 provides for somewhat harsher
criminal sanctions than did the earlier version. 30 A person convicted of violating the 1978 statute was guilty of a misdemeanor and could be compelled to pay
a fine of up to $300, to serve a jail sentence of up to sixty days, or both. 31 The
amended version of the statute provides different penalties for the two different
violations. 32 If a person illegally attaches to or tampers with the cable or equip-

ment of a cable company, then that person has committed a misdemeanor and
may be fined up to $500, placed in jail for up to thirty days, or both. 33 On the

other hand, if the defendant is convicted of selling or possessing for sale any of
34
the enumerated devices, the maximum imprisonment increases to six months.

Even though the criminal penalties permitted by the 1984 amendment
strengthen the prior law, North Carolina's criminal penalties are still relatively
35
mild compared to those allowed in some other states.
The new statute, when contrasted with its predecessor, is unabashedly sym-

pathetic to the plight of North Carolina cable companies in their battle against
those who receive cable service without paying for it. 36 The inclusion of a provision against the sale of decoding devices is quite significant for purposes of enforcing the policy behind the statute because as a practical matter it is much
simpler to detect the public marketing of devices than it is to detect their illegal
use in the home.37 Also, proscribing the activity of the sellers of such devices
28. Id. § 14-118.5(b). For a brief discussion regarding the importance of such devices, see
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(b) (West Supp. 1984); GA. 'CODE ANN. § 46-5-3
(1981); Act of Sept. 26, 1980, art. 1, § 23, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-10(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-85); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(A)(4) (West Supp. 1984-85); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-3524 (1981).

30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984).
31. See id. § 14-118.5(d) (1981).
32. See id. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984).
33. Id. § 14-118.5(a).
34. Id. § 14-118.5(b). See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for the likely rationale
behind imposing harsher sanctions on this type of conduct.
35. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d (West Supp. 1984) ($1,000 or 90 days in jail or both for
unauthorized interception, and $10,000 or jail term or both for selling devices); OKLA.STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1737(A) (West Supp. 1984-85) ($1,000 or six months in jail or both).
36. As one would expect, the indications are that the cable industry has lobbied for protection
from service thieves. See supra note 8.
37. See State v. Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 6, 455 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (1983). Commenting on the
sufficiency of the evidence against the private homeowner defendant, the court said:
mhe evidence ... tended to prove mere possession of the [converter] device, not actual
acquisition by the appellant of the cable television service. The evidence of possession
consisted of ... observations of the converter unit on the appellant's television set and
appellant's admission of possession and that the unit was connected to his television set
.... [N]o evidence [was] presented from which a jury could reasonably infer that appellant actually acquired the cable television service.

1302

NOR TH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

an action against a single seller attacks the problem earfacilitates enforcement;
38
lier and at its root.
Regardless of how extreme the threatened punishment, however, without
aggressive enforcement by law enforcement officials, the punishment factor becomes illusory and the deterrent effect is diluted. It has been suggested that

theft of cable services is considered a low priority crime by law enforcement
authorities. 39 Considering the vast number of urgent, life-threatening crimes
that occur, the limited resources of most law enforcement agencies, and the diffi-

culty of detecting basic cable service theft, 4° this conclusion is not surprising.
Unquestionably, therefore, the most significant feature of the amended stat-

Id.; see also infra note 40 (discussing detection methods); 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra
note 3, %26.04 (discussing methods employed by cable companies to discover unauthorized recipients of cable services).
Some of the electronic surveillance techniques now used by pay TV distributors to detect unauthorized interception devices in homes raise intriguing invasion of privacy questions. In Movie Sys.,
Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983), an MDS distributor used electronic surveillance to
discover that an individual was using a microwave antenna and a special converter to intercept MDS
signals illegally. When sued by the MDS company, Heller counterclaimed, arguing that plaintiff's
use of electronic surveillance was a violation of Heller's fourth and fourteenth amendment privacy
rights. In rejecting defendant's privacy argument, the court said, "Heller's constitutional claim is
without merit because the constitutional prohibitions of the fourth and fourteenth amendments do
not apply to actions by private persons. . . [and] Heller has alleged no facts nor does the record
reveal any facts which would support a finding of state action." Id. at 496. The court also rejected a
state invasion of privacy claim on grounds that the state did not recognize a privacy cause of action.

Id.
Such a claim could not, of course, be dismissed as not involving state action in cases in which a
criminal defendant claimed a fourth amendment violation by police using electronic surveillance of
cable theft. Use of electronic surveillance in the past has been found to violate the fourth amendment. See, eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (holding that plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights were infringed by the enforcement agent's use of an electronic device to listen to
plaintiff's conversation in public telephone booth); see also 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY,
supra note 3, 26.04 (briefly mentioning possible invasion of privacy problems arising from electronic detection methods).
38. In effect, these statutory provisions prohibit activity (i.e., marketing of devices) that ultimately enables the actual theft of premium services to occur.
39. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(4) commentary on 1983 amendment (McKinney Supp.
1984-85) ("The problem is not that the statute needed explication and tightening but that the public
and law enforcement agencies are not particularly distressed about the problems facing the cable
television entrepreneurs. Avoiding cable television charges is widely viewed in the same light as
creative income tax calculation.").
A very plausible explanation for the lax enforcement of criminal sanctions against individual
homeowners who illegally receive cable services is the difficulty in detecting offenses and the danger
of a fourth amendment privacy violation by a law enforcement official. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. This reasoning is particularly strong in the case of a homeowner who subscribes to
basic service, see supra notes 18 & 20 and accompanying text, but purchases a converter/decoder
and illegally connects it so that he can receive premium service, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text, without paying the subscription fee. In this situation the only evidence of the criminal
activity is inside the home.
There is no similarly persuasive argument to justify the lack of enforcement against those who
illegally manufacture and sell cable converter/decoder devices. The detection problems are not
nearly as acute in this context.
40. In spite of the difficulty of detecting unauthorized receipt of cable television services, "cable
. . . companies are developing ways to detect unauthorized receivers. Detections are made through
electronic surveillance, through spot, rooftop inspections for illegal antennas and earth stations, and
through in-house inspection with the homeowner's permission, the latter usually made in conjunction with a 'service call."' 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 26.04.
The use of electronic surveillance to detect unauthorized receipt of cable services raises fourth
amendment and state invasion of privacy issues. See supra note 37.
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ute is its provision allowing cable companies to instigate civil suits against service thieves and those who aid them. 4 1 This concept is relatively novel and is

found in only a few state statutes. 42 Under section 14-118.5(c), cable companies

are authorized to bring civil suits to enjoin 43 violations of substantive prohibi-

tions of the statute44 and to recover damages. 45 The statute mandates that a
cable company that establishes a violation be awarded the greater of "actual
damages" 46 trebled 47 or a fixed default amount, which is dependent upon the
type of violation. 48 Furthermore, section 14-118.5(d) clarifies the damage provi-

sion by stating, "It is not a necessary prerequisite to a civil action instituted
pursuant to this section that the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer actual dam-

ages."' 49 Thus, even if the cable company is unable to prove any real loss or legal
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984). Authorization of the civil suit should
compensate for many of the deficiencies in criminal sanctions and criminal enforcement. See supra
notes 35 & 39 and accompanying text. Although the detection problems, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text, are still present, the remedies available in the civil action should provide an
incentive for cable companies to devote substantial funds and manpower to the task of discovering
cable service theft. An assessment of the ultimate impact in North Carolina of the newly created
civil action is of course speculative, but the statute's patent slant in favor of cable companies, see
supranotes 8 & 36 and accompanying text; infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text, would lead one
to conclude that cable entrepreneurs will pursue legal remedies aggressively. Evaluating the reaction
of cable companies to the theft of service problem, one commentator said:
[P]ay and cable companies, supported by state theft-of-cable service statutes, are waging a
war on piracy. The battles are being fought through the media (public awareness programs, television commercials, and newspaper advertisements informing the public that
use of unauthorized intercepting devices violates the law); through amnesty programs for
consumers who turn in their unauthorized devices; and through prosecution.
2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CAsEY, supra note 3, q 26.04.
42. See 2 C. FERRIs, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 26.0311] ("With the exception of a
few states. . . the applicable state theft of [cable] service laws only provide for criminal liability.").
Civil action provisions, however, are becoming more common in cable service theft statutes.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(c)-(e) (West Supp. 1984); Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 16-13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(C) (West Supp.
1984-85).
North Carolina's new statute, although certainly a product of this trend, is in many respects
more progressive from the viewpoint of cable companies than most of its counterparts in other
jurisdictions.
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984).
44. See id. § 14-118.5(a), (b).
45. Id. § 14-118.5(c)(1)-(2).
46. The statute does not define "actual damages." The term has, however, been defined by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. "Actual damages means 'compensation for injuries and losses
' " Godwin v. Vinson, 254 N.C. 582,
which are the direct and proximate result of the [wrong] ....
587, 119 S.E.2d 616, 620 (1961). "[Aictual damages refer to compensation for injury and losses
which are the proximate and direct result of a wrong. . . . Thus, loss of profits may be recovered if
plaintiff introduces evidence from which the amount of such loss can be ascertained by the jury with
reasonable certainty." 5 N.C. INDEX 3D Damages § 2 (1977).
47. Treble damages are the maximum civil damages allowed in any state theft of cable service
statute. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CAsEY, supra note 3, 26.03[1].
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1984). When the culpable conduct is the
actual theft of cable services, see id. § 14-118.5(a), then the default damage amount is $300; if the
defendant's conduct involves the manufacturing or selling of cable interception devices, see id. § 14118.5(b), then the default damage amount is $1000. Id. § 14-118.5(c)(1)-(2).
49. Id. § 14-118.5(d). For a discussion of the meaning of "actual damages," see supra note 46.
Other treble damages theft of cable service statutes similarly state that a recovery by the plaintiff is
not dependent upon proof of "actual damages." See, ag., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(e) (West Supp.
1984); Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-13(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85);
OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(E) (West Supp. 1984-85).
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injury as a result of defendant's activity, 50 it shall nevertheless be granted the

statutory default damage amount.-" Absent, however, from the North Carolina
theft of cable service statute is a provision, found in the statutes of some other

states, expressly providing for the recovery of attorney's fees and costs by a cable
company in a successful civil action.5 2 Considering the comprehensive nature of
the new statute, it seems doubtful that this absence was merely an oversight by
53
the general assembly.

Even though the new North Carolina statute makes liable only those who
knowingly and willfully violate its terms, there is a statutory presumption of
knowledge on the part of the defendant once basic proof of a violation is intro-

duced.5 4 This prima facie presumption represents the general assembly's recognition of the extreme difficulty in many cases of proving that the defendant

actually played a role in illegally gaining access to the cable system.55 Cases in
other jurisdictions, however, have raised serious questions about the constitu50. See supra note 46.
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984).
52. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(c)(2) (West Supp. 1984) (reasonable attorney's fees);
Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-13(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (all costs
plus reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-10-2 (1978) (costs
plus attorney's fees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(C)(2) (West Supp. 1984-85) (attorney's fees).
53. There is a well-established rule in North Carolina that "a successful litigant may not recover attorneys' fees, whether as costs or as an item of damages, unless such a recovery is expressly
authorized by statute." Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 289, 266 S.E.2d
812, 814 (1980). Therefore, it is unlikely that a trial judge would exercise discretion to award attorney's fees to a plaintiff who prevails in an action under North Carolina's theft of cable service statute.
54. The statute states:
Proof that any equipment, cable, wire, decoder, converter or device of a cable television system was modified, removed, altered, tampered with or connected without the consent of such cable system in violation of this section shall be prima facie evidence that such
action was taken knowingly and willfully by the person or persons in whose name the cable
system's equipment, cable, wire, decoder, converter or device is installed or the person or
persons regularly receiving the benefits of cable services resulting from such unauthorized
modification, removal, alteration, tampering or connection.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(e) (Supp. 1984). An analogous presumption provision has been a part
of North Carolina statutory law prohibiting the theft of electric, gas, and water services since 1977.
See Id. § 14-151.1(b) (1981) (proof of tampering with meter is prima facie evidence of violation).
The theft of cable service statutes of some other states contain presumptions very much like the
one found in North Carolina's new statute. See, eg., Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 16-11(d), -12(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1984-85); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(B) (West Supp. 1983-84); VA. CODE § 18.2-165.1
(1982).
55. In a New Jersey case involving a theft of utility services statute that contained a presumption very similar to North Carolina's, the court said, "It is apparent that. . . the presumption was
adopted by the Legislature because of the practical impossibility of proving by direct evidence the
actual participation of the consumer in the illegal activity." State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 240,
372 A.2d 612, 615 (Crim. Ct. 1977). In State v. Robinson, 97 Misc. 2d 47, 56, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793,
799 (Crim. Ct. 1978), the court, discussing this presumption in its theft of utility services statute,
stated:
This presumption was reinstated when the Legislature recognized the difficulty of obtaining proof of actual tampering. "Such proof can be produced only in the rare instance
where one is caught red-handed altering the electrical circuit to by-pass a meter." . ..
[citations omitted] If tampering was to be effectively deterred then the presumption was
. . . essential.

Id. (quoting State v. Mendez, 94 Misc. 2d 447, 449, 404 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (Crim. Ct. 1978)). For a
description of the practical effect upon plaintiff's case of not having the presumption, see State v.
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tionality of such a statutory presumption. 56 Similar presumptions have been
challenged primarily on the ground that they deny defendants their fourteenth
57
amendment due process rights.

In State v. Scott 58 the Ohio Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitu-

tional a provision in Ohio's theft of cable service statute5 9 that provided for a
prima facie presumption of intent.6 0 The Ohio court distinguished between
mandatory and permissive presumptions 61 and held that the language of the
62
Ohio statute unambiguously revealed that the presumption was mandatory.

After noting that mere proof of the unauthorized possession of a device for receiving cable services compelled the fact-finder to find all the remaining essential

elements of the offense, the court applied the test for determining the constitutionality of such presumptions and concluded that "we cannot say with substan-

tial assurance that the presumed facts. . .[are] more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact . .. *"63
In assessing the constitutionality of the North Carolina statute's presumption of intent, it is important also to look to the line of authority that rejects the
rationale and result in Scott. In State v. Robinson" the New York court upheld

a presumption that was, for purposes of this analysis, substantially similar to the
Ohio statutory provision in Scott.6 5 Like the statutes in North Carolina and
Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 5, 455 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (1983); see also supra note 37 (discussing the
difficulties in obtaining sufficient evidence against the homeowner defendant).
A careful reading of § 14-118.5(e), which does not refer to the distribution of devices, reveals
that the presumption applies only to the type of conduct prohibited in § 14-118.5(a). In other words,
the presumption applies only to the actual theft of cable service and not to the selling of converter/
decoder devices, which is proscribed by § 14-118.5(b). The limited application of the presumption
makes sense because the activity of selling mechanical devices is much easier to detect and prove
than the use of such devices inside the home to steal cable services. See supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
56. See State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 372 A.2d 612 (App. Div. 1977); State v. Robinson,
97 Misc. 2d 47, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Crim. Ct. 1978); State v. Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 455 N.E.2d
1363 (1983).
57. See State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 239-40, 372 A.2d 612, 614-15 (App. Div. 1977);
State v. Robinson, 97 Misc. 2d 47, 57, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (Crim. Ct. 1978).
58. 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 5, 455 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (1983).
59. See Act of July 13, 1977, H.B. No. 271, 1977 Ohio Laws 2278 (repealed 1984).
60. See id. (repealed 1984).
61. Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d at 4-5, 455 N.E.2d at 1368. A permissive presumption permits the
factfinder to infer the "elemental fact" after the "basic fact" is established. With a mandatory presumption, the factfinder is requiredto "find" the "elemental fact" upon proof of the "basic fact." Id.
62. Id. at 4, 455 N.E.2d at 1368 (presumption is mandatory on its face). The statute construed
in Scott stated:
The existence, on property in the actual possession of the accused, of any connection, wire,
conductor, or any device whatsoever, which effects the use of cable television service without the same being reported for payment as to service,. . . shall be prima-facie evidence of
intent to violate and of the violation of this section by the accused.
Act of July, 13, 1977, H.B. No. 271, 1977 Ohio Laws 2278 (repealed 1984).
63. Scott, 8 Ohio App. at 5, 455 N.E.2d at 1367-69; see also MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547,
549-50 (Fla. 1978) (declaring unconstitutional provision in theft of service statute providing for presumption of intent to violate).
64. 97 Misc. 2d 47, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Crim. Ct. 1978).
65. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 165.15(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). The relevant portion of the
New York statute states:
[P]roof. . .that telecommunications equipment, including, without limitation, any cable

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

Ohio, the New York statute provided that proof of an illegal connection to a

utility service "shall be presumptive evidence" that the recipient of the service
was responsible for the unlawful connection. 6 6 The Robinson court, however,
interpreted the statutory language as creating a permissive, rather than a
mandatory, presumption. 67 Furthermore, the Robinson court held that the pre-

sumption satisfied constitutional requirements because the defendant's receipt of
the utility services as a result of the illegal tampering provided a sufficient "rational connection between the presumed fact and the proven fact."' 68 In effect,
the New York court in Robinson employed an analysis and reached a decision
diametrically opposed to the analysis and decision in Scott.
As the Scott and Robinson cases illustrate, there are plausible and compel-

ling arguments both for and against the constitutionality of the section 14118.5(e) presumption. Should the new presumption be found unconstitutional,
it would be possible to sever section 14-118.5(e) without invalidating the entire
statute. 69 Although the remainder of the statute logically could stand without

the presumption, the practical effect of severing the presumption provision
would be to assure victory for many defendants. 70 Without the benefit of the

presumption, plaintiffs or prosecutors would prevail only if they could present
affirmative evidence that defendants "knowingly and willfully" tapped on to the
cable system "for the purpose of intercepting or receiving. . . programming or
72
service." '71 In most cases this would be a difficult burden to satisfy.
The federal antitrust laws present a second potential challenge to the North

Carolina theft of cable service statute; in prohibiting all parties except cable
companies from selling and distributing converter and decoder devices, the stattelevision converter, descrambler, receiver, or related equipment, has been connected to the
equipment of the supplier of the service without the consent of the supplier of the service,
shall be presumptive evidence that the resident to whom the service which is at the time
being furnished by or through such equipment has, with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service, created or caused to be
created with reference to such equipment, the condition so existing.
Id.
66. See id.
67. 97 Misc. 2d at 61, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (rejecting defendant's argument that the statutory
presumption effected a shift in the ultimate burden of proof).
68. 97 Misc. 2d at 59, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01. Reaching the same result on a New Jersey
statutory presumption in a substantially similar context, the court in State v. Curtis said:
[i]t is more likely than not that the customer [defendant] participated in the tampering
resulting in the failure of the meter to record fully the current supplied to that customer
...
. Such an inference is rational when tested by human conduct and experience, for the
only person who would usually be motivated to tamper with a meter is the one who would
profit financially ....
148 N.J. Super. 235, 239-40, 372 A.2d 612, 615 (App. Div. 1977).
69. For a case in which the court declared a similar presumption unconstitutional, severed the
stricken part, and allowed the remainder of the statute to stand, see MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d
547, 550 (Fla. 1978).
70. Of course, invalidation of the presumption would not substantially affect actions in which
the defendant is accused of dealing in converter/decoder devices under § 14-118.5(b). See supra note
55 and accompanying text.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a) (Supp. 1984).
72. See State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 240-41, 372 A.2d 612, 615 (App. Div. 1977); see
also supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a presumption provision).
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ute might violate the antitrust laws by giving a monopoly in the marketing of
such mechanisms to cable companies. 73 Such a challenge, however, probably
would fail. Plaintiff in Ciminelliv. Cablevision74 was prevented from selling converter and decoder devices by a New York statutory provision7 5 similar to
North Carolina's section 14-118.5(b). 76 He sued to enjoin enforcement of the
state statute, arguing that it was preempted by the Sherman and Clayton federal
antitrust statutes. 77 Using reasoning that would be applicable to an antitrust
challenge to section 14-118.5(b), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York rejected the claim. The court noted that the state action
immunity doctrine provides an exemption from the antitrust laws when "the
activities constitute the action of the state in its sovereign capacity.' '7 8 Finding
that the New York Legislature enacted the statute in its sovereign capacity and

that the statute served a legitimate state interest, the court ended its inquiry and
upheld the validity of the state law.79 This same reasoning probably would pro-

tect North Carolina's statute from a similar antitrust challenge.
An apparent flaw in the North Carolina statute is its failure to cover the
primary noncable forms of pay television.80 Theft of pay television service statutes in some states prohibit the unauthorized interception of both over-the-air
pay television signals and cable services.8 1 The phenomenal growth and promising future of noncable pay television systems 82 raises the question whether the

North Carolina General Assembly was shortsighted in not extending protection
in section 14-118.5 to over-the-air pay television transmissions. If the general

assembly was shortsighted, its omission could be remedied easily by either
amending the statute to cover all pay television signals or by enacting a new
statute specifically to protect over-the-air signals. The omission, however, was
See Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 152-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
583 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984).
Ciminelli, 583 F. Supp. at 152.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 157. The court said:
The evidence shows that faced with a growing problem of theft of cable television
services, the State of New York, as sovereign, enacted legislation to combat the problem. . . . [W]e find no merit to the argument that [the statute] serves no legitimate state
interest and instead authorizes defendants to violate the antitrust laws by declaring their
action lawful. Thus, we conclude that the state action exemption applies to this cause of
action.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
80. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
81. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1985); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.12,
31.13 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
82. See, eg., Comment, Subscription Television, supranote 13, at 839; Comment, Pay Television
Piracy, supra note 3, at 531.
Over-the-air systems are often commercially feasible when cable systems are not. "Unlike cable
television, over-the-air pay TV does not require burdensome initial outlays of time and capital. [citations omitted] Laying underground or aboveground cable is a time-consuming and expensive process. [citations omitted]" Id. at 531 n.3. Generally, there must be at least 30 homes per mile to
make an area potentially profitable for cable companies. See Comment, supra note 2, at 99 n.23;
Note, The Piracy ofSubscription Television: An Alternative to the CommunicationsLaw, 56 S. CAL.
L. REv.935, 935 n.3 (1983).
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justifiable when the current version of the North Carolina theft of cable service
statute was passed. Even though at that time theft of over-the-air signals was a

substantial problem for STV and MDS operators, the willingness of the federal
courts to grant relief for such piracy under the Communications Act of 193483
made it less urgent for state legislative bodies to provide a remedy. By contrast,

the availability of comparable federal relief for cable companies was quite
84
uncertain.

Soon after the new North Carolina theft of cable service statute was passed,
however, Congress responded to those who argued that the main body of law

regulating communications, the Communications Act of 1934,85 was severely
outdated and not capable of being adapted to modem communications technolo-

gies. 86 In October 1984 Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 198487 which significantly amended the Communications Act of 1934.88 The
1984 amendments address the problem of piracy of both over-the-air and cable
pay television signals. Although the 1984 statute does not resolve all the issues,
it goes far toward clarifying the uncertainties and ambiguities of the 1934 Act as
applied to modem pay television technologies. 89 Like the North Carolina theft

of cable service statute, section 633 of the 1984 Act provides for criminal 90 and

83. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1982) (amended 1984). An implied private cause of action under
§ 605 has been recognized for many years. See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d
Cir. 1947) (holding that § 605 created an implied civil action under which plaintiff could sue defendant for secretly recording plaintiff's voice on the telephone and then "publishing" the communication by playing the tape in court). The courts have granted relief in private § 605 actions for the
unauthorized interception of both STV and MDS signals. See, ag., Movie Sys., Inc. v. Heller, 710
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983) (MDS signals); National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820
(9th Cir. 1981) (STV signals).
84. Until 1984 there was much controversy over whether the 1934 Communications Act applied to the unauthorized theft of cable television service. See, eg., 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T.
CASEY, supra note 3, 26.02[l][b]; Comment, Decoding Section 605, supranote 3, at 364-66 & n.20.
Although the Communications Act of 1934 had been interpreted by courts as creating a private
cause of action and STV and MDS operators had been allowed to recover against thieves of their
over-the-air signals, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, the Act was not applied to cable until
the year immediately preceding passage of the 1984 amendment to the North Carolina cable theft
statute. In 1984 two federal district courts granted relief to cable companies in private civil actions
under § 605. See Cablevision v. Annasonic Elec. Supply, No. 83-5159 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984)
(included as appendix in Ciminelli v. Cablevision (Ciminelli II), 583 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 (E.D.N.Y.
1984)); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
85. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1982) (amended 1984).
86. See, eg., Comment, Subscription Television: Should the Government Prohibit Unauthorized
Reception?, 18 CAL. W.L. REV.291, 291 (1982); Comment, supra note 2, at 97.
87. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757).
88. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1982) (Communications Act as it appeared before the 1984
amendments).
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. A person who intentionally intercepts cable services or assists another in doing so in violation of § 633 will face a fine of up to $1,000 or a prison term of six months or less or both. Pub. L.
No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(1)). When the violation of§ 633 is intentional and "for the purposes of commercial benefit
or private financial gain," the defendant "shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than 1 year, or both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or
imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both, for any subsequent offense." Id. (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 553(b)(2)). "Private financial gain" is defined so as to require more than the mere avoidance of fee payments by a private individual who pirates cable services for viewing in the "individ-
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private civil actions against thieves of cable television service 91 and explicitly
includes within its purview the manufacturers and distributors of unauthorized
cable interception devices. 92
The civil action created by section 633(c)(1) is very broad in scope and may
be pursued in any state court or federal district court. 93 The class of potential
plaintiffs in a section 633 civil action is defined expansively to include "[a]ny
person aggrieved by any violation of [the substantive portion of section 633]." 94

Civil remedies include injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief.95 Compensatory relief may include attorney's fees in addition to damages, which may be
either the "actual damages" suffered by the plaintiff plus any additional profits
earned by the violator as a result of the violation or a statutory default

amount.9 6 Section 633 accords a great deal of discretion to the trial court. If
the court finds that the defendant violated section 633 "willfully and for pur-

poses of commercial advantage or private financial gain," then the court may
add to the civil compensatory damages a punitive award of up to

$50,000.97

Conversely, if the court "finds that the violator was not aware and had no reason
to believe that his acts constituted a violation of.

.

. section [633], the court in

its discretion may reduce the award of damages to a sum of not less than
$100."98
ual's dwelling unit." Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(c)(5)).
91. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796-97 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553). The substantive prohibition is found in § 633(a)(1):
No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable
operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.
Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)).
Section 633 applies only "to theft of a service from the point at which it is actually being
distributed over a cable system." See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4655, 4720.
92. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553). Section 633(a)(2) states:
For the purpose of this section, the term 'assist in intercepting or receiving' shall include
the manufacture or distribution of equipment intended by the manufacturer or distributor
. . . for unauthorized reception of any communications service offered over a cable system
in violation of subparagraph (1).
Id. (to be codified at § 553(a)(2)). The manufacturer or distributor is liable (or guilty) under § 633
only if he created or sold the devices with the intention that they would be used to intercept signals
in violation of § 633(a)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4655, 4720-21; 1 C. FERRis, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 8.03
(Special Supp. 1985).
93. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796-97 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
94. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(1)).
95. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
96. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)). The default amount is between $250 and
$10,000, determined on a case by case basis. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C), (c)(3)).
In proving profits earned by the defendant as a direct result of the cable service theft, the plaintiff
only has to show the defendant's gross revenues, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to
establish "his deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
violation." Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i)).
97. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B)).
98. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(C)). Compare this broad discretion given to the
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Of tremendous importance to states like North Carolina that have adopted

statutes proscribing the unauthorized reception of cable television signals and
the marketing of devices designed to facilitate such service thefts is section
633(c)(3)(D) of the 1984 federal statute. Section 633(c)(3)(D) specifically states
that the federal statute does not preempt state laws that prohibit the theft of
cable television service. 99 Also, the legislative history of the 1984 Act indicates

that section 633 was not intended to circumscribe or preempt the application of
what was previously known as section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
or other existing laws that provide remedies for the theft of cable service.100
Thus, neither the availability of a state claim nor the federal case law predicated
on the Communications Act of 1934 was affected by the 1984 changes.101
Since the new federal statute has not preempted North Carolina's theft of
service statute, it is useful to compare the statutes' provisions in determining
judge under the federal statute to increase or decrease the damage award with the rigid method for
calculating damages under the North Carolina theft of cable service statute. See supra notes 45-51
and accompanying text.
99. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796-97 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(D)). The official legislative history explains the rationale behind
§ 633 (c)(3)(D):
The Committee recognizes that a number of states have enacted statutes which provide criminal penalties and civil remedies for the theft of cable service, and the Committee
applauds those efforts. [Such state laws] are not affected by this section, even if such laws
impose higher penalties or sanctions than those set forth in this section. The Committee
believes that this problem is of such severity that the Federal penalties and remedies contained herein must be available in all jurisdictions (and enforceable in state or Federal
court) as part of the arsenal necessary to combat this threat.
H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4721.
It is apparent, therefore, that North Carolina's theft of cable service statute is not preempted by
the new federal law.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4720 ("Nothing in this section is intended to affect the applicability of existing Section 605
[§ 705(a) after the 1984 Act] to theft of cable service, or any other remedies available under existing
law for theft of service.").
101. See supra note 84. In addition to the Communications Act of 1934, the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 occasionally has been mentioned as a potential source of relief
for cable companies plagued by cable television signal thieves. See Comment, supra note 2, at 11718; Comment, DecodingSection 605, supra note 3, at 363 n.3, 365-66 & n.20. The 1968 Act's provisions prohibit both the unauthorized interception of wire and oral communications and the manufacture and distribution of devices designed to facilitate unauthorized interception of such communications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2512 (1982).
Even though some commentators practically take for granted that the Crime Control Act's
protection of wire communications affords cable companies a cause of action against service thieves
and those who assist them, see Comment, supra note 2, at 117-18; Comment, Decoding Section 605,
supra note 3,at 363 n.3, 365-66 & n.20, there is no case support for such a position. See 2 C. FERRIS,
F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, %26.02[2]. In fact, two federal district courts have explicitly
rejected the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as a means for providing remedies
to cable television operators harmed by thefts of service. See Cablevision v. Annasonic Elec. Supply,
No. 83-5159 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984) (included as appendix in Ciminelli v. Cablevision (Ciminelli
II), 583 F. Supp. 158, 163-164 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F.
Supp. 376, 382-83 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The original motivation for passing the Crime Control Act
apparently was to prohibit "wire-tapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly
authorized law enforcement officials." Id. at 382; see S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112-13; 2 C.FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra
note 3, f 26.02[2]. Other than the actual language of the statute, which has been strictly interpreted
with the Act's purpose in mind, there is little reason to believe that the Act can be used by cable
companies to protect their economic interests against service thieves. See id.
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which claim is best for different plaintiffs. There are two major differences between the North Carolina statute and section 633 of the 1984 federal statute.
First, the federal act, unlike the North Carolina statute,10 2 does not contain a
provision creating a prima facie presumption of unlawful activity upon proof
that the defendant actually received the benefit of the illegally obtained services.
This apparent advantage to a plaintiff in an action under North Carolina statute's section 14-118.5 over a plaintiff in a federal action becomes somewhat illusory, however, when one compares the definitions of the substantive offenses
under the two statutes. The North Carolina statute describes the offense as an
intentional act of connecting to a cable system or tampering with a cable system
for the purpose of receiving cable service;10 3 the new federal statute, however,
defines a violation as the mere unauthorized interception or receipt of cable services. 104 On its face, the North Carolina statute requires a higher degree of proof
of active wrongdoing by the defendant. The absence of a statutory presumption
in section 633, therefore, may not make the North Carolina statute a more attractive basis for an action than section 633. Second, the North Carolina statute, in section 14-118.5(b), makes it unlawful for a party to distribute or sell
devices "designed to decode or descramble any encoded or scrambled signal
transmitted by [a] cable television system." 10 5 The language of the North Carolina statute does not clearly require proof that the defendant distributor or seller
of interception devices specifically anticipated and intended that the devices
would be used to intercept cable signals illegally. Section 633(a)(2) of the new
federal statute, by contrast, requires proof that a manufacturer or distributor of
devices capable of illegally intercepting cable signals actually intended for the
10 6
devices to be used in such an illegal manner.
Although both the North Carolina statute and the new federal statute create causes of action for theft of cable services, North Carolina's statute apparently does not extend to theft of over-the-air pay television services. 10 7 The
federal statutes, on the other hand, have been applied to STV and MDS systems10 8 and should continue to apply in the future. Applicability of the federal
statutes to interception of aerial signals by satellite dishes, however, is more
complex. Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, before the 1984
amendments, generally had proved inadequate to deal with the issue whether the
102. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
103. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a) (Supp. 1984); see alsosupra note 27 and accompanying
text (giving language of § 14-118.5(a)).
104. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)); see also supra note 91 (giving language of § 633(a)(1)).
105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984); see also supranote 28 and accompanying
text (giving language of § 14-118.5(b)).
106. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)); see alsosupra note 92 (giving language of § 633(a)(2)). Of course,
this analysis and distinction between the new federal statute and North Carolina's theft of cable
service statute would be irrelevant if the devices defendant was accused of manufacturing or selling
had no legitimate uses.
107. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text; notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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use of satellite dish antennas to intercept satellite transmissions was legal. 10 9
While "[a] federal district court in Florida [had] held that satellite transmissions

of live NFL football games transmitted to a specific audience were protected
under Section 605 from unauthorized reception by earth stations owned and

operated by a restaurant for commercial benefit," 110 there apparently was no
recovery under section 605 against a private individual using a home satellite

dish for noncommercial purposes.'1 1
The 1984 federal cable act redesignated section 605 in the Communications
Act of 1934 as section 705(a) and added provisions to this section.1 12 Section
705(b) provides an exemption from liability under section 705(a) for the inter1 13
ception for private use of certain "satellite cable programming" signals.

"Satellite cable programming" is narrowly defined by the statute as signals
transmitted by satellite "primarily

. .

.for the direct receipt by cable operators

for their retransmission to cable subscribers." '

14

Under the section 705(b) ex-

109. See, ag., 2 C. FERUS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 26.02[l]; Comment, supra
note 2, at 103. In enacting its theft of cable service statute, the North Carolina General Assembly
resolved the issue by simply specifying that the use of satellite antennas would not be a violation of
the statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-188.5(f) (Supp. 1984); see also supra note 25 and accompanying text (giving language of § 14-118.5(f)).
110. 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 26.02[l] (referring to National Football League v. The Alley, Inc., No. 83-0701 (S.D. Fla. 1983)).
111.

See id.

112. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 5-6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2802-04 (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605). The use of the phrase "section 705" in this discussion refers to § 705
of the Communications Act of 1934 as it appears after the 1984 amendment. Section 705 of the
Communications Act of 1934 corresponds to 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1985).
Section 705(d) creates criminal and civil actions and remedies identical to those found under
§ 633(b) and (c). See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. Prior to the 1984 Act, private civil
actions under § 605 [§ 705(a) after 1984 Act amendments] were merely implied. See 1 C. FERRIS, F.
LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 8.02[2] (Special Supp. 1985); supra note 83.
113. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)).
Although § 705 does not clearly state that the interception of aerial pay television signals by
satellite dish antennas is generally unlawful, such a conclusion is compelled by the narrow exemption created by § 705(b). The logical implication of the integrated statutory scheme is that the interception of aerial signals by satellite dish antennas is illegal unless the interception satisfies the
exemption requirements of § 705(b).
114. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1)). The official legislative history explains that:
The interception of the "satellite cable programming" must in fact be directly from
the satellite feed in order to come within the terms of the exemption to liability set forth in
subsection (b). Unauthorized interception of such programming in its retransmitted form,
where the form of retransmission is otherwise protected under subsection (a) or other relevant law, is clearly prohibited. Thus, if the programming interception is transmitted, for
instance, by means of. . .MDS. . .or STV, liability for such interception shall apply
regardless of whether [the conditions for the § 705(b) exemption have been met].
H.L REP. No. 934, 98th ong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 474849. Limiting the § 705(b) private interception exemption for satellite transmissions to those satellite
transmissions intended primarily for receipt by cable companies comports with Congress' desire not
to affect prior case law under § 605 [§ 705(a) after 1984 Act amendments]. It seems somewhat
arbitrary, however, to give the benefit of the § 705(b) exemption to private individual satellite antenna owners whose antennas happen to intercept signals categorized by the statute as "satellite
cable programming" while at the same time denying the exemption to satellite owners whose satellite
antennas intercept other signals. The inequity of this situation would be much less severe if satellite
antenna owners were able to ascertain whether the signals being intercepted by their antennas were
eligible for the § 705(b) exemption; then, the satellite antenna owners could determine whether their
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emption, no violation occurs when "satellite cable programming" signals are
intercepted for private viewing if the signals are not scrambled and if a market-

ing system has not been created to allow individual satellite antenna owners to
pay for the right to intercept the signals. 115 North Carolina's cable television

theft statute specifically excludes satellite dish antennas from its prohibitions.'

16

Because the "purpose of section 705(b) is to facilitate a marketplace solution to
the specific situation in which an individual using a backyard [satellite dish antenna] intercepts . .. unencrypted satellite cable programming," 117 section
705(b) would likely preempt any state statutes governing this type of

interception. 118

The North Carolina General Assembly reacted intelligently to the growing

contemporary problem of theft of cable television service by enacting a compre-

hensive amendment to the state's theft of cable service statute.' 19 The statute's
current provisions indicate that the general assembly made a realistic appraisal
of the scope of the theft problem and the plight of cable companies victimized by

service thieves. Cable companies that take advantage of the new civil action

20

will have the benefit of a logical presumption that the recipient of the illegally
activities were in violation of § 705(a) and could make conscious choices about how to structure
their behavior.
115. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)); H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4745-46.
116. See supra note 109; note 25 and accompanying text.
117. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4747.
118. The expansive nonpreemption language of § 633 (c)(3)(D), supranote 99 and accompanying
text, is limited by its terms to provisions of title VI. The nonpreemption language of title VII found
in § 705(d)(6) is not broad enough to encompass state laws governing signal interception by satellite
antennas. Section 705(d)(6) explicitly states that the new federal statute does not preempt state or
local laws prohibiting "the importation, sale, manufacture, or distribution of equipment by any person with the intent of its use to assist in the interception or receipt of radio communications prohibited by [§ 705(a)]." Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws (98 Stat.) 2803
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6)). Furthermore, § 633(c)(3)(D), which provides that nothing
in title VI of the federal statute bars states from enacting and enforcing laws "regarding the unauthorized interception or reception of any cable service or other communication service," id. at 2797
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(D)), clearly does not prevent title VII's provisions concerning satellite signal reception from preempting state statutes attempting to regulate the unauthorized
receipt of satellite transmissions. It is logical, therefore, to presume that state statutes prohibiting
interception of satellite signals could not define as illegal an activity permitted under § 705(b). See
supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. If the federal statute did not preempt state statutes
dealing with aerial signal interception by satellite dish antennas, at least to the extent of the exemption provided in § 705(b), then each state could effectively thwart the purpose underlying § 705(b).
See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. In this regard, it is important to remember the very
narrow scope of the § 705(b) exemption for satellite antenna interceptions. See supra notes 114-15
and accompanying text.
Any potential conflict between North Carolina's theft of cable service statute and the § 705(b)
exemption in the federal act is avoided because of the explicit provision in the North Carolina statute
that excludes satellite dish antennas from its prohibitions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(f)
(Supp. 1984); supra note 109; notes 25 & 116 and accompanying text. The possibility of such a
conflict, however, certainly would become relevant should the North Carolina General Assembly
adopt a statute to regulate or prohibit the interception of aerial signals by satellite dish antennas.
119. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5 (Supp. 1984).
120. See id. § 14-118.5(c); supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
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obtained service was responsible for the theft, 12 1 and a plaintiff who successfully
establishes the elements of a civil claim is entitled to recover substantial statutory damages even if actual damages cannot be proved or are less than the statutory amount. 122 Also, by including as permissible defendants distributors and
sellers of devices designed to enable unauthorized access to cable television services, 123 the North Carolina General Assembly has attempted to maximize the
efficiency and enforceability of the statute's provisions.

The significance of the North Carolina theft of cable service statute is somewhat overshadowed by the adoption of the new federal statute1 24 aimed at the

same activity. Because the federal statute expressly provides, however, for the
coexistence of state causes of action governing theft of cable service, 12 5 it is clear
that the North Carolina statute has not been preempted. Even though there are

a few obvious differences between the federal and the North Carolina theft of
cable service statutes, 1 26 the ramifications of these distinctions and the relative
benefits of proceeding under each statute will be realized only as the statutes are
interpreted by courts. The existence of the new federal statute, however, should

not cause North Carolina judges to give a restrictive construction to North Carolina's theft of cable service statute, nor should the terms of the federal law be

127
looked upon as a limitation when applying the North Carolina statute.
Section 14-118.5 may be criticized on grounds that it should not be limited
to protection of cable television signals but should also encompass over-the-air
pay television signal transmissions. Such criticism is at least partially persuasive. Denying protection under state law to MDS and STV signals, which are

fully covered by section 705(a) of the federal Communications Act,'128 while

granting protection to cable television signals, may no longer be justifiable because the disparity that once existed in the protection given cable television sig-

nals and over-the-air pay television signals by federal law has now been
eliminated. 129 If the intent of the general assembly was to protect MDS and
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(e) (Supp. 1984); supra notes 54-55 and accompanying
text.
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984); supra notes 45-51 and accompanying
text.
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984); supra note 28 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 91.
125. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
126. For a brief discussion of some of the basic differences between the two statutes, see supra
notes 98 & 102-06 and accompanying text. Another distinction is that the federal statute provides
for the recovery of attorney's fees and costs by a prevailing plaintiff whereas the North Carolina
statute does not. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.)
2796 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984).
127. See supra note 99.
128. See supra notes 83 & 114 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
The over-the-air pay TV delivery systems, especially MDS, are expected to continue to grow
and expand, see supra notes 13-14, and the injury suffered by MDS and STV operators who are
victimized by service thefts is analogous to the injury inflicted upon cable television operators whose
services are stolen. Also, the federal case law developed under old § 605 [current § 705(a)] provides
complete protection to MDS and STV signals, see supra notes 83 & 114, in much the same way that
§ 633 provides unadulterated protection to cable television signals. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. There are no categorical exceptions to or exemptions from the MDS and STV
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STV companies as well as cable providers, the definition of "cable system" in the
existing statute1 30 could be amended to include them. An even better solution,
whatever the general assembly's original intent, would be to enact a separate

statute, providing remedies similar to those in the new theft of cable service
statute, for thefts of over-the-air pay television signals involving devices other
13
than satellite dish antennas. 1
Given, however, the nature of the unique statutory scheme in the new fed132
eral statute dealing with the interception of aerial signals by satellite antennas

and considering the potential constitutional implications of such regulation,133 it

signal protection under § 705(a) as there are for satellite to cable company signals under § 705(b),
see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text
(discussing prudence of not enacting state statute to regulate interception of signals by satellite antennas at least until § 705(b)'s exception provisions are litigated).
130. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
131. The proposed statute would apply primarily to the interception of over-the-air signals by
decoder and converter devices. Therefore, an interception system composed of a satellite antenna
combined with a decoder or converter would be covered by the statute because of the use of the
descrambling device.
STV and MDS signals generally require a decoder or descrambler device for intelligible interception. See supra notes 13-14.
Even if the North Carolina General Assembly rejects the idea of enacting a statute making
illegal the unauthorized interception of aerial signals by devices other than satellite dish antennas, it
should at least consider proscribing the manufacture, distribution, sale, and possession for sale of
such aerial signal interception devices. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1985).
Adopting a separate statute to cover the interception of aerial pay television signals is preferable
to merely expanding the scope of the cable service statute because of the differences in the technologies and modes of delivery of the over-the-air systems on the one hand and of cable television systems on the other. The issues and problems that arise in each context, although definitely similar,
are not identical and could possibly merit very different treatment.
132. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802-03 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)); see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
133. Although the amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit some types of
satellite signal transmission interception by satellite dish antennas may have been necessary in order
to protect those who have a proprietary interest in such signals, some commentators have warned
that such a change in the law inevitably will create new privacy concerns. See, eg., Piscitelli, Home
Satellite Viewing: A Free Ticket to the Movies?, 35 FED. CoM. L.J. 1, 36 (1983). Their argument is
predicated on the fact that, unlike unauthorized decoder and converter devices, satellite dish antennas have many legitimate uses. Id.; see also 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3,
26.02[1][b] (noting that interception of "community-sponsored and advertiser-sponsored programming" is a totally legitimate function of satellite dish antennas). Therefore, the existence on a person's property of a satellite dish is not an absolute assurance that it is used to receive protected
transmissions. See Piscitelli, supra, at 35. From this basis, the critics assert that the means required
to confirm the use of home satellite dish antennas for illegal purposes pose major constitutional
questions regarding the privacy rights of the antenna owners. Id.
Conceding the logical appeal of such arguments, upon closer scrutiny it is difficult to distinguish
between the invasion of privacy implications of the methods employed to detect the use of a decoder
or converter device inside the home, see supra note 37, and the methods employed to detect the use
of a satellite antenna to gain access to protected signals. The fact that satellite antennas have some
legitimate uses and that decoder and converter devices do not is largely irrelevant to the present
analysis since converter and decoder devices are generally out of public view inside the home, and
often electronic surveillance is required to detect unauthorized interception of pay TV signals by
converter and decoder devices. Such use of electronic surveillance by a cable company to discover a
decoder device being employed to gain illegal access to MDS signals has been upheld against a
constitutional privacy challenge by at least one court. See Movie Sys., Inc. v. Heuer, 710 F.2d 492,
496 (8th Cir. 1983); supra notes 37 & 40 and accompanying text. The point of this discussion is not
to suggest that there are no valid constitutional objections to the use of electronic surveillance or
other techniques to discover the illegal interception of pay television signals by decoder devices or by
satellite antennas, but rather to recognize that the privacy issues presented by each method of signal
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would be prudent for the state to refrain from regulating the use of satellite dish
antennas to intercept over-the-air signals at least until the new federal law has
had an opportunity to develop. While the unauthorized interception of MDS
and STV signals under the federal statute 134 is unconditionally illegal 135 and
thus no major conflicts between the federal and state laws prohibiting the unauthorized interception of such signals would exist, section 705(b) creates a relatively complex exception when satellite antennas are used to intercept
unscrambled aerial signals. The enactment at the present time of a state statute
regulating the interception of signals by satellite antennas would only contribute
to the inevitable confusion that will occur as the federal statute is applied 136 and
would raise questions of substantive conflict between the federal and state

statutes.

137

Finally, it appears that the North Carolina General Assembly erred in not
including within the prohibitions of section 14-118.5(b) the actual manufacture
of devices designed to decode scrambled cable television signals. Section 14-

118.5(b) prohibits the distribution, sale, attempt to sell, and possession for sale
of the enumerated devices; 138 the failure to proscribe the manufacture of such

devices seems an illogical omission and could create an unnecessary loophole.
North Carolina's new theft of cable television service statute offers a

number of significant weapons to cable television companies in their fight against
cable service pirates. The statute is progressive and well- designed; by creating a

civil action with the potential for a recovery of treble damages, prospects for
achieving the ultimate goal of deterring cable theft activity appear to be
excellent.
WALTER

D.

FISHER, JR.

interception are substantially similar. Thus, the privacy concerns are no more compelling in one
situation than in the other and therefore should not be a catalyst for singling out satellite dish antennas for preferential treatment.
134. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)).
135. See supra notes 83 & 112-115 and accompanying text.
136. For example, there will almost certainly be a great deal of controversy over what constitutes
a "marketing system" under § 705(b)(2) in determining whether the § 705(b) exemption is available.
137. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984).

Cannon v. Miller: The Brief Death of Alienation of Affections
and Criminal Conversation in North Carolina
Two facts were certain: that on October 15, 1979, Haywood Cannon and
1
his wife Rachel were separated, and that on May 20, 1981, they were divorced.
The circumstances of Rachel's relationship with Jeffrey Miller were less clear.
Few would have approved had it begun before Rachel's separation from Haywood, but perhaps the relationship began innocently after the Cannons' marriage had finally failed. This moral distinction, however, does not make a
difference under the tort law of North Carolina. In either event, the law offers
"heart balm ' 2 to Haywood. If Rachel and Jeffrey had engaged in sexual relations before the divorce, Haywood could recover damages in an action for criminal conversation-despite the couple's separation. 3 If the relationship began
before the separation, Haywood was likely to prevail in an action for alienation
of affections. 4 These causes of action are ancient and are entrenched in the law
of North Carolina. 5 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, however, abolished
6
these causes of action in the recent case of Cannon v. Miller, temporarily de-

stroying Haywood's hope of recovery. Haywood's chances for recovery, however, were restored three months later when the North Carolina Supreme Court

vacated the court of appeals' decision on procedural grounds and remanded the
case for trial. 7 The supreme court made its reversal without reaching the merits

of the case and without reviewing the viability of causes of action for alienation
of affections and criminal conversation. This Note analyzes the court of appeals'
decision in Cannon and concludes that, despite the court of appeals' mispercep-

tion of its ability to abolish the causes of action, 8 the merits of the case were
correctly resolved.
1. Cannon v. Miller, 71 N.C. App. 460,460-61, 322 S.E.2d 780, 783 (1984), vacated, 313 N.C.
324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985).
2. "The poetic name 'Heart Balm' refers to a financial soothing of the pocketbook of a victim
in compensation for an unfortunate affaire de coeur." K. REDDEN, MODERN LEGAL GLOSSARY 241
(1980). A heart balm action is a legal term of art referring to civil actions for loss of romantic love.
Id. See infra notes 16-50 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 36-50 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
5. Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 595, 96 S.E.2d 870, 873 (1957). The court in Bishop
stated:
The existence of a cause of action for damages in favor of a husband against one who
wrongfully and maliciously alienates the affections of his wife depriving him of his conjugal
rights to her consortium has long been recognized in England and this country. This is a
fundamental common law right.
Id.
6. 71 N.C. App. 460, 322 S.E.2d 780 (1984), vacated, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985).
7. Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 327 S.E.2d 888 (1985). The supreme court allowed plaintiff's petition for discretionary review for "the sole purpose of vacating the decision of the Court of
Appeals purporting to abolish the causes of action for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation." Id. The supreme court stated that the court of appeals had "acted under a misapprehension
of its authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and its responsibility
to follow those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court." Id.
8. See supra note 7.
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In Cannon the North Carolina Court of Appeals abolished the causes of
action for alienation of affections and for criminal conversation. Plaintiff husband, acting pro se, brought both actions against Jeffrey Miller, a Pitt County
attorney, seeking a total of $250,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 9
In support of his action for alienation, he alleged that his wife had taken a job as
deputy clerk at the Pitt County Courthouse in May 1979, that she had become
acquainted with defendant that summer, and that by late September or early
October defendant had persuaded his wife to have sexual relations. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's activity" 'affected the will' of [his] wife and caused her 'to
transfer her love, loyalty, and devotion from this plaintiff to the defendant' " and
that "the influence was so strong that plaintiff's wife showed an 'obvious loss' of
the genuine love and affection that had existed during the marriage until that
time."' 1 To support his action for criminal conversation, plaintiff alleged that
defendant had engaged in sexual relations with plaintiff's spouse at various times
before the divorce.1 1
Defendant responded by filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
causes of action were unconstitutional, or, alternatively, were contrary to the
public policy of North Carolina. This motion was denied.1 2 The court did,
however, grant defendant's motion for summary judgment based on affidavits
and exhibits (the Cannons' divorce records) which indicated that the marriage
had been unhappy and that defendant's relationship with the spouse had begun
after the separation. 13 Plaintiff appealed, and defendant cross-appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. After holding that summary judgment had been
improperly granted, 14 the court of appeals agreed with defendant that the actions should have been dismissed. The court based its holding on its conclusion
that alienation of affections and criminal conversation are archaic concepts that
15
serve no purpose in modern society.
Criminal conversation and alienation of affections are tort actions that seek
to protect the marital relationship against intentional interference by third parties. Along with seduction and breach of promise to marry, they are commonly-and derisively-termed "heart balm" actions since they purport to
award money damages for emotional harm.1 6 The specific interest protected is
one spouse's right to the other's consortium. 1 7 Though these actions often are
brought against the same defendant and arise from the same set of events, they
are historically separate and involve different elements of proof.
Actions for alienation of affections evolved from a husband's common-law
right to recover from anyone who intentionally "enticed" his wife to leave the
9. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 460, 322 S.E.2d at 783.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 461, 322 S.E.2d at 783.
Id.
Id. at 461-62, 322 S.E.2d at 783.
Id. at 462, 322 S.E.2d at 783-84.
Id. at 463-70, 322 S.E.2d at 784-88.
Id. at 497, 322 S.E.2d at 803-04.

16. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 929 (5th ed. 1984).
17. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
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home, with the result that he lost his wife's society and services.18 The action of

enticement was based on general common-law rules governing the master-servant relationship and the view that the wife was the husband's servant. 19 This
principle was first articulated in the 1745 English case of Winsmore v. Green22
21
bank, 20 and was commonly followed in this country, except in Louisiana.

North Carolina recognized the action of enticement in the 1849 case of Barbee v.
23

Armstead.
Early actions in enticement had little to do with the emotional state of marriage; rather, they sought to protect a husband's right to his wife's consortium.

Consortium, in its traditional sense, has been defined as "a bundle of legal rights
to the alliterative trio of the services, society, and sexual intercourse of the
wife." 2 4 The wife's duty to the husband derived from her legally inferior posi-

tion, which essentially made her the husband's servant. One commentator
describing the wife's status observed:

It appears.

. .

that the foundation of the husband's right of action for

the loss of consortium is based on the idea that the wife is her husband's servant, since an interference with the service of a servant is an
actionable trespass. The wife is sub virga viri sui, is classified with the
servants, and both wife and servants are considered chattels. The very
nature of the relationship and the duties which it imposed on the wife
together with her inferiority and subservience easily gave to the husband proprietary interest in25her, and in turn led to proprietary actions

for the loss of her services.

Actions for enticement, however, have little utility in an age in which the

wife is viewed as a partner in marriage rather than as her husband's servant.
Thus, enticement gave way to its modem counterpart, the action for alienation
of affections. The tort of alienation was first recognized in New York in 186626
18. 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 207, at 553-54 (4th ed. 1980); W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 917-18; Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "HeartBalm," 33
MICH. L. REv. 979, 992-94 (1935).
19. Comment, Alienation ofAffections and CriminalConversation: Unholy Marriage in Need of
Annulment, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 323, 327-28 (1981).
Originally, a master could recover for physical injury to a servant if loss of services resulted. Since a wife was viewed as a servant, a husband could also sue for the loss of the
wife's services when she was injured by the defendant. Later, to meet the labor crisis in
fourteenth century England resulting from the Black Death, a remedy was provided
against anyone who enticed servants away from their masters. Thus, the sources of the
original [action for alienation] had in common either physical injury to the servant or
physical removal (enticement) of the servant from the premises of the master.

Id.
20. 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (1745) (recognized husband's right against one who intentionally "persuaded, procured, or enticed" wife to leave home).
21. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 470-71, 322 S.E.2d at 788.
22. See Moulin v. Monteleone, 165 La. 169, 115 So. 447 (1927) (refusing to recognize an action
for alienation of affections since damages would be essentially punitive, and such damages are not
allowed in civil cases under Louisiana law).
23. 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 530 (1849).
24. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 916.
25. Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. Rnv. 651, 653 (1930).
26. Heermance v. James, 47 Barb. 120 (N.Y. App. Div. 1866).
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and eventually was adopted by all states except Louisiana. 2 7 The basis of this
tort is the deprivation of the wife's affection for the husband, that is, a "loss of

love, society, companionship and comfort."' 28 Expanding the concept of consortium to include emotional interests was a natural result of the conflict between

the older, strictly proprietary basis of enticement and newer, egalitarian ideas
about the legal status of women, morality, and the function of the family.29 A

1919 Colorado decision aptly described the new emphasis on affection rather
than on services: "There are two primary rights in the case; one is the right of
30
the plaintiff to the body of his wife and the other to her mind, unpolluted.
The plaintiff is required to establish three elements to sustain a cause of
action in alienation of affections: 3 1 (1) a valid marriage, (2) the loss of affection
or consortium, 32 and (3) the wrongful and malicious conduct 33 of the defendant
that caused 34 the loss of affection. Adultery is not a necessary element to a

cause of action in alienation since the interest protected is a spouse's right to
marital affection, not an exclusive right of sexual intercourse. Indeed, one commentator has noted that in-laws are more likely to be defendants than are
35
"wicked lover[s]."
Criminal conversation 36 is simply a civil action for adultery. Like the early
action for enticement, criminal conversation was not concerned with emotional
damage to a marriage; rather, the interest protected was the "defilement of the
27. See supra note 22.
28. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 918.
29. See id. at 916; Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. Rav. 1
(1923); Lippman, supra note 25. But cf. 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 207, at 554 ("the basis of the
action is not merely a loss of affections but rather a loss of consortium"); Brown, The Action for
Alienation ofAffections, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 472, 472 (1934) ("the gist of [the action] is not the loss of
affections but rather the loss of consortium").
30. Sullivan v. Valiquette, 66 Colo. 170, 172, 180 P. 91, 91 (1919).
31. Litchfield v. Cox, 266 N.C. 622, 146 S.E.2d 641 (1966); Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592,
96 S.E.2d 870 (1957); Ridenhour v. Miller, 225 N.C. 543, 35 S.E.2d 611 (1945); Hankins v. Hankins,
202 N.C. 358, 162 S.E. 766 (1932).
32. A partial loss of affections is sufficient. 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 207, at 554.
33. To prove malice it is not necessary to show a "spiteful, malignant, or revengeful disposition"; rather, one need only prove unjustifiable conduct injurious to another. Cottle v. Johnson, 179
N.C. 426, 429, 102 S.E. 769, 770 (1920).
Special rules apply when in-laws are defendants. See 2 R. LEE, supranote 18, § 207, at 558-59.
The relation of parent and child justifies the parent in giving counsel and advice in regard
to the child's marital affairs so long as the parent acts in good faith. The law recognizes
and respects not only the marital relation, but likewise the natural affection between a
parent and child. The rights of parents end at the border of good faith. When parents
advise and interfere with the marital relations of their children, the presumption is that
they have acted in good faith and for the child's welfare. A parent has a privilege which is
overcome only by proof of its abuse. The privilege has been extended to other near relatives who are justified in giving advice in personal matters.
Id. at 559.
34. The standard for causation is lenient. A spouse need only demonstrate that the defendant's
conduct was the controlling or effective cause even though other causes may have contributed to the
alienation. Bishop v. Glazener, 245 N.C. 592, 96 S.E.2d 870 (1957).
35. 2 R. LEE, supra note 18, § 207, at 559. See generally, Brown, supra note 29, at 480-87
(discussion of in-laws as defendants in alienation actions).
36. The term "conversation" probably derives from the action's former status as an ecclesiastical crime. The term "conversation" was used euphemistically for intercourse. See W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 124, at 875 n.75 (4th ed. 1971).
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marriage bed, the blow to family honor, and the suspicion cast upon the legitimacy of the offspring."' 3 7 Thus, the essence of the criminal conversation action
is the husband's exclusive right to sexual relations with the wife, based both on a
need to maintain pure bloodlines for inheritance purposes and on principles of
morality.38 To establish a valid claim in criminal conversation, the husband has
to prove (1) a valid marriage and (2) sexual intercourse between the defendant
and the plaintiffs wife. 39 In modem practice, actions for criminal conversation
are functionally indistinguishable from actions for alienation.4° Each serves as
heart balm, and the two are frequently brought together. 4 1
Because of the husband's legal superiority to the wife and the proprietary

nature of his right to consortium, alienation of affections and criminal conversation were virtually strict liability torts. Consent and connivance of the husband
were the only recognized defenses to either tort.42 A wife's consent was consid-

ered irrelevant; because of the fictional legal unity of the spouses, the wife was
not legally capable of giving consent to a compromise of her husband's marital
rights. 43 The plaintiff's own adultery was not a defense,4 4 nor was his subse-

quent condonation of his wife's behavior.4 5 Even a valid separation agreement
would not necessarily bar an action for alienation. 46 Similarly, mere separation
was no defense to criminal conversation. 47 In modem practice the same rules

limiting available defenses apply.
Originally, only the husband could bring an action for alienation or for

criminal conversation. His exclusive right was based on the common law's recognition of his-and only his-right to consortium. As a virtual servant, the

wife's role in the marriage did not entitle her to a reciprocal interest in the hus-

band's consortium. 48 Even if she had such an interest, she was unable to enforce

it; women were not permitted to bring actions independently until passage of the
37. 2 PL LEE, supra note 18, § 208, at 567; see also Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393, 403, 79
S.E. 872, 876 (1913) ("the wrong relates to. . . the dishonor of [the] marriage bed,. . . the suspicion cast upon [the] legitimacy of the offspring . . . [and] the invasion and deprivation of...
exclusive marital rights and privileges").
38. Lippman, supra note 25, at 654-55; Comment, Piracy on the MatrimonialSeas-TheLaw
and The MaritalInterloper,25 Sw. L.J. 594 (1971).
39. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938); Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C.
426, 428-29, 102 S.E. 769, 770 (1920); Powell v. Strickland, 163 N.C. 393, 402, 79 S.E. 872, 876
(1913).
40. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 919.
41. Id.
42. 2 R. LEE, supranote 18, § 208, at 571; W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at
921; cf. Barker v. Dowdy, 223 N.C. 151, 25 S.E.2d 404 (1943) (condonation of wife's adultery does
not constitute a defense of connivance).
43. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938); Chestnut v. Sutton, 207
N.C. 256, 257, 176 S.E. 743, 743 (1934); Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N.C. 426, 428-29, 102 S.E. 769, 770
(1920); Scott v. Kiker, 59 N.C. App. 458, 464, 297 S.E.2d 142, 147 (1982).
44. See Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 194, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938).
45. Barker v. Dowdy, 223 N.C. 151, 152, 25 S.E.2d 404, 404 (1943).
46. See Sebastian v. Kluttz, 6 N.C. App. 201, 213-14, 170 S.E.2d 104, 111-12 (1969).
47. Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 195, 198 S.E. 619, 621 (1938).
48. NV.PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 915-16; Lippman, supra note 25, at
654-56.
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Married Women's Property Acts. 49 Most states, including North Carolina, now

permit women to bring actions for alienation of affections or criminal
50
conversation.
Most commentators view alienation of affections and criminal conversation
actions as devices to maintain family harmony and deter wrongful outside inter-

ference with the marriage.5 1 Few would contend that these are unworthy goals.

Yet the actions' effectiveness in achieving the desired ends is at best questiona-

ble, and the potential abuses and shortcomings of the actions are real and dangerous. A policy decision to retain these actions must be based on a conclusion

that they are sufficiently effective to outweigh their inherent disadvantages. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals sided with the majority of jurisdictions and
commentators52 in concluding that the balance of factors demanded abolition:
Unarguably, the integrity of the marriage relation and the preservation
of marital harmony are interests deserving of judicial protection. Yet,
we find general agreement among the authorities who have examined
the issue that, on balance, the social harm engendered by the existence
of these torts . . . outweigh[s] the meritorious goals purportedly
53
served by the actions.

Thus, even though the court was willing to concede the existence of cases in
which a spouse had suffered genuine wrong, it concluded that "equity to the
plaintiff is not the only consideration." 5 4 The court's decision to abolish these
49. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 916; Lippman, supra note 25, at 656.
The wife's incapacity to sue was described bluntly in Hipp v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182
N.C. 9, 12, 108 S.E. 318, 319 (1921):
At common law the husband could maintain an action for the injuries sustained by his wife
for the same reason that he could maintain an action for injuries to his horse, his slave or
any other property; that is to say by reason of the fact that the wife was his chattel. This
was usually presented in the euphemism that "by reason of the unity of marriage" such
actions could be maintained by the husband. But singularly enough this was not correlative and the wife could not maintain an action for injuries sustained by her husband.
Blackstone gave this explanation:
We may observe, that in these relative injuries notice is only taken of the wrong done to the
superiorof the parties related [husband] by the breach and dissolution of either the relation
itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom; while the loss of the inferior [wife] by
such injuries is totally unregarded. One reason for this may be this: that the inferior hath
no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the superior is
held to have in those of the inferior,and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *143 (emphasis added).
During the latter half of the 19th century all states enacted statutes, generally known as Married Women's Property Acts, which removed much of the wife's legal disability. H. CLARK, THE
LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 7.2 (1968). Consequently, married women were allowed to acquire, own, and transfer property, to make contracts, to be employed, and
keep their earnings, and to sue and be sued. Id.
50. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 16, § 124, at 916; see, e.g., Townsend v. Holderby,
197 N.C. 550, 149 S.E. 855 (1929); Brown v. Brown, 124 N.C. 19, 32 S.E. 320 (1899).
51. See, eg., Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 988-89; Holbrook, supra note 29, at 4-6; Comment,
supra note 19, at 327; Note, The Suit of Alienation of Affections: Can Its Existence Be Justified
Today?, 56 N.D.L. REV. 239, 250-52 (1980); Comment, supra note 38, at 613; Comment, Alienation
ofAffections: FlourishingAnachronism, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 585 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Alienation of Affections: FlourishingAnachronism].
52. See infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
53. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 491, 322 S.E.2d at 800 (emphasis added).
54. Id.
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actions was based on its recognition of four significant drawbacks in allowing
actions for alienation and criminal conversation: the potential for abuse, the

lack of deterrent effect, the difficulty of determining causation, and the inappro55
priateness of recovery for emotional harm predicated on a property theory.

First, the court stressed the great potential for abuse inherent in the alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions. Because these torts often
connote sexual misbehavior, the chance of blackmail always exists, as does the
possibility of unfounded claims that will damage reputation. 56 The threat of

bringing either action also may induce defendants to accept unfavorable extraju-

dicial settlements. 57 In the event that such claims go to trial, the tinge of immorality may distort the process of determining damages; connotations of

misbehavior may cause" 'emotion and moral indignation to prevail over considerations of private or public injury in the assessment of damages.'

s58

Second, the court in Cannon found no significant deterrent force in alienation of affections or criminal conversation actions. The possibility of an adverse

judgment and award does not enter into the minds of transgressors. Nor does
the policy of punishing only the outside party correspond to the reality of marital disintegration. The court noted that deterrence rests on the unrealistic assumption of a harmonious husband-wife relationship that is destroyed by a

malicious intruder. 59 It is more likely that" '[the] defendant becomes enmeshed

with [the] plaintiff's spouse without preconceived design, [and when] there is

such design, juries can scarcely be expected to.

.

. distinguish the pursuer from

the pursued.' "60 Under such circumstances the threat of a civil action can have
little deterrent effect. 6 1 Furthermore, the publicity and stress of litigation associated with the action would destroy any chance of reconciliation. 62 Indeed, the

court felt that the practical effect of money damages was to allow a plaintiff a
55. Id. at 491-92, 322 S.E.2d at 800-01.
56. Id. See H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 267; Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 996. Another
commentator made this assessment: "[T]he threat of exposure, publicity, and notariety [sic] is more
than sufficient to breed corruption, fraud, and misdealings on the part of unscrupulous persons in
bringing unjustified and maliicious [sic] suits." Comment, Criminal Conversation: Civil Action for
Adultery, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 495, 500 (1973).
57. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 491, 322 S.E.2d at 800.
58. Id. at 481, 322 S.E.2d at 794 (quoting Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 1009).
59. Id. at 480, 322 S.E.2d at 793; see also H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 267. Clark states:
[Tihe action for alienation is based on psychological assumptions that are contrary to fact
...
.[V]iable, contented marriages are not broken up by the vile seducer of the Nineteenth Century melodrama, though this is what the suit for alienation assumes. In fact the
break-up is the product of many influences. It is therefore misleading and futile to suppose
that the threat of a damage suit can protect the marital relationship.
Id.
60. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 479, 322 S.E.2d at 793 (quoting Feinsinger, supranote 18, at 995).
61. Id. at 478-79, 322 S.E.2d at 793; see also Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Iowa
1978) (McCormick, J., dissenting). Judge McCormick stated in Bearbower
Many authoritative studies have been made of the nature of marriage and the cause, prevention, and cure of marital failure. I have searched among them in vain for any support
for the. . . assumption that the existence of the alienation tort is a deterrent to marital
breakdown or a device for protecting the family unit.
Id. (McCormick, J., dissenting).
62. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 492, 322 S.E.2d at 800-01.
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"'forum for vindictiveness and posturing self-justification.' "63
A third flaw of heart balm actions is that the tort concept of causation is too
simplistic to reflect the dynamics of the usual marital breakup. 64 In actions for

alienation, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was the controlling
cause of the loss of affections. 65 To do so effectively it is necessary to conduct a
full inquiry into the marital history, the quality of the couple's relationship, and
the couple's deepest motives. 66 Such investigations are difficult to conduct and

the results usually are inconclusive. The ability of psychologists to determine
the cause of a particular marital breakdown is questionable; 67 moreover, the
presence of the third party in a romantic triangle may not be causally related to
the decision to engage in extramarital activities. 68 Indeed, the inability to6 9determine causation may tempt juries to resolve the issue on moral grounds.

Last, alienation of affections and criminal conversation actions reflect a
property basis for recovery that has no relevance to modem understandings of

psychology or social values. The court stated that these actions have never
shaken free from their proprietary origins. 70 When the right to bring heart balm
actions was extended to women, the actions were not restructured to reflect
greater equality between spouses, changes in sexual mores, and newer views of
the family's function. 71 The retention of the rule against spousal consent as a

defense illustrates this point.72 The rule is based on the fictional unity of man
and wife, 73 and logically cannot be justified since the fiction has been discarded.
Nevertheless, the rule against consent as a defense has been extended to both
63. Id. at 487, 322 S.E.2d at 798 (quoting Bearbower v. Merry, 266 N.W.2d 128, 138 (Iowa
1978) (McCormick, J., dissenting)). Clark has characterized these actions, in part, as a "forced sale
. . . of affections." H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 267.
64. See Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 478-80, 322 S.E.2d at 793-94; Comment, supra note 38, at
613-14.
65. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
66. H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2, at 265-66; see also Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 995 ("An
expert social scientist would scarcely undertake to designate any one cause of disorganization as
'controlling' in a given case, yet the law confidently relies on the jury to make such a selection.").
67. W. GOODE, THE FAMILY 161-62 (2d ed. 1982).
From the beginning of divorce research, analysts have tried to pin down the 'causes' of
divorce, but with little success. Inquiries have reported what legal grounds the divorcing
couple uses, what complaints they make about each other outside that legal action, and
many of the factors associated with higher or lower rates of marital dissolution. It seems
unlikely that we shall locate any simple set of causes.
A few marriages doubtless end because of some single large cause, such as the
husband's violence or the wife's neurosis, but very likely most modem divorces are the
result of many diverse difficulties. These create a continuing cumulative process of conflict
during which both spouses gradually come to reject both the relationship and each other.

Id.
68. A. FROMME, THE PSYCHOLOGIST LooKs AT SEX AND MARRIAGE 207-25 (1950).
69. Comment, supra note 38, at 614.
70. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 492, 322 S.E.2d at 801; see also Brown, supra note 29, at 472
("Consortium is a property right, and it would seem to follow that the action for alienation of
affections is to be treated as one for a tort to property; even though . . . the damages are based
primarily upon personal injuries to the plaintiff.").
71. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
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husband and wife. Many commentators have noted that after the legal inferiority of women-the very basis for alienation and criminial conversation-had
been eliminated by the Married Women's Property Acts, the courts could easily
have abolished the actions as unwarranted. 74 Instead, the courts chose to extend
the actions to women on a theory of the wife's equal interest in the marriage. 75
The effect was to grant a proprietary interest in consortium to the wife as well as
76
the husband.
The court of appeals in Cannon was offended by the notion of a proprietary
interest in love or affection: "common sense dictates that by definition these are
'rights' which can only be voluntarily given to one spouse by the other."'77 Since
"spousal love and all its incidents do not constitute property that is subject to
'theft' or 'alienation,' "78 the court concluded that actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation have become "removed from the realm of social
79
reality."
It is difficult to quarrel with the court of appeals' conclusion in Cannon that
actions for alienation of affections and for criminal conversation should be abolished. The ubiquitous possibilities for abuse, the absence of deterrent force, the
difficulty in assigning blame, and the patent backwardness of permitting a proprietary interest in a spouse's affections clearly outweigh any utility these actions
may have in protecting the interests of the rare, totally innocent party who has
suffered a bona fide wrong. Nor would any measure short of eliminating both
actions have been meaningful. Retaining alienation of affections or criminal
conversation actions while allowing for a defense of consent would have been
tantamount to abolition given the consensual nature of the torts.80 A decision to
retain alienation of affections while eliminating criminal conversation would
have amounted to preserving a civil action for adultery, with the added element
of lost affections; 81 problems with abuse, causation, and deterrence would have
remained. Conversely, retention of only the emotionally neutral action of criminal conversation would have required a proprietary approach to spousal relations that few would accept. Such an approach would have had the advantage of
ending questionable actions against meddlesome in-laws, 8 2 but would not have
resolved questions of abuse, deterrence, causation, and the property basis for
recovery. Finally, limiting recovery to actual damage only could have protected
a defendant from an irrational jury and could not have afforded protection
74. Feinsinger, supra note 18, at 990; Lippman, supra note 25, at 662; Comment, supra note 19,
at 328-30.
75. See, eg., Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C. 682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947).
76. Cannon, 71 N.C. App. at 476-77, 322 S.E.2d at 791.

77. Id. at 477, 322 S.E.2d at 792.
78. Id. at 492, 322 S.E.2d at 801.
79. Id. at 477, 322 S.E.2d at 792.
80. See Comment, supra note 19, at 339-40.
81. See Note, Hunt v. Hunt: The Status of the "Heartbalm" Torts in South Dakota, 27 S.D.L.
REv. 160, 169 (1982) (criticizing South Dakota Supreme Court's decision to abolish criminal conversation but to retain alienation of affections).
82. See Comment, Alienation of Affections FlourishingAnachronism, supra note 51, at 599-
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against the other shortcomings of the action described above.83
The court of appeals' decision is in accord with the current national trend

away from heart balm actions. To date, twenty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have either abolished alienation actions by statute or have prohibited

monetary recovery in such suits, 8 4 while two states have reduced the statute of
86
limitations to one year 85 and another state has eliminated punitive damages.
Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have legislatively abolished ac-

tions for criminal conversation or have prohibited monetary recovery in such
suits; 87 four states have shortened their statutes of limitations, 8 and at least

three others have limited the amount of damages recoverable.8 9 In eight states it
is a crime even to file a complaint alleging one or both causes of action. 90 Other
states have judicially abolished criminal conversation and alienation. 91 The
83. See id. at 600.
84. ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-341 (Supp. 1984-85); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-572b (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923
(1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West 1984) (monetary damages not permitted); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 51-1-17 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1 (Burns 1973 & Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 167 (1964); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 3-103 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2901 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 553.02 (West Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 271-601 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460.2 (1983) (monetary
damages not permitted); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West 1952) (monetary damages not permitted); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAW § 80-a (McKinney 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Page
1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (with insignificant exceptions); OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.840 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 170 (Purdon 1965) (with insignificant exceptions); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (Supp. 1984) (monetary damages not permitted); VA. CODE
§ 8.01-220 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 56-3-2a (Supp. 1984); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (West 1981);
Wyo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977) (monetary damages not permitted).
85. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14 (Supp. 1984).
86. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 1 1901-07 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (limited to actual damages).
87. ALA. CODE § 6-5-331 (1975); CAL. Cr1. CODE § 43.5 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-20-202 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572f (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 3924 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 771.01 (West 1984) (monetary damages not permitted); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-17 (1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-4-1
(Burns 1973 & Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2901 (West 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 553.02 (West Supp. 1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.380 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23-1 (West
1952) (monetary damages not permitted); N.Y. Clv. RIGiTS LAw § 80-a (McKinney 1976); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.29 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 8.1 (West Supp. 1983-1984)
(with insignificant exceptions); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.850 (1983); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05
(Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1001 (Supp. 1984) (monetary damages not permitted); VA.
CODE § 8.01-220 (1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (West 1981); WYo. STAT. § 1-23-101 (1977)
(monetary damages not permitted).
88. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-201 (Supp. 1981) (one year); KY. REV. STAT. § 413.140(1)(c) (1972
& Supp. 1984) (one year); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.140 (Vernon 1952 & Supp. 1984) (two years);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980) (one year).
89. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 11 1951-57 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (limited to actual damages); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-37-50 (Law. Co-op 1976) (limitation on recoverable costs); WAsH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.84.040 (1962) (limitation on recoverable costs).
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 771.01 to -.05 (West 1964); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-4-1 to -3 (Bums
1973 & Supp. 1984); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-301 (1980) (alienation only); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-601 to -604 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:23-1 to -3 (West 1952); N.Y. Civ.
RIG=rs LAW §§ 80-a to 81 (McKinney 1976); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.01 to -.03 (West Supp.
1981); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-23-101 to -103 (1977).
91. Four state supreme courts have abolished criminal conversation: Bearbower v. Merry, 266
N.W.2d 128 (Iowa 1978); Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980); Fadgen v. Leyker, 469
Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976); Hunt v. Hunt, 309 N.W.2d 818 (S.D. 1981).
Two courts have eliminated actions in alienation of affections: Funderman v. Mickelson, 304
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supreme courts of four states, although disapproving of these actions, have left
the question of abolition to the legislatures. 92 The trend away from heart balm
actions is also reflected among the commentators. Indeed, it is difficult to find
recent commentary that advocates the retention of alienation or criminal
93
conversation.
The importance of the Cannon decision, however, goes beyond the narrow

issues of alienation of affections and criminal conversation. It reflects a trend in
North Carolina's domestic relations law toward removing fault as an element in

the dissolution of marriage. With insignificant exceptions, divorce is available to
either spouse regardless of fault. 94 Equitable distribution of marital property
proceeds on the presumption that an equal division is fair unless certain factors
relating to the needs or contribution of one spouse are present; 95 fault is not

among the factors. 96 Similarly, although a showing of fault is a prerequisite to

alimony, 97 the award is limited to dependent spouses9 8 and the amount is governed by need. 99 Adultery, however, is still a bar to alimony, 1° ° and a trial
judge may reduce an award in light of a dependent spouse's fault.101 Even so,
these recognitions of fault constitute only a limitation on the supporting spouse's

obligations and not a remedy for marital misconduct.
Because of the decreased role of fault in the dissolution of marriage and its

attendant economic consequences, the maintenance of actions for alienation of
affections and for criminal conversation seems incongruous. If the aggrieved

spouse has few rights against the offending spouse arising from marital fault,
clearly the aggrieved spouse should have fewer rights against a third party. The
court of appeals' decision in Cannon, therefore, could have harmonized North
N.W.2d 790 (Iowa 1981); Wyman v. Wallace, 94 Wash. 2d 99, 615 P.2d 452 (1980). But see Nelson
v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (affirming cause of action but requiring plaintiff to show that
the causal effect of defendant's conduct outweighed all other causes, including conduct of plaintiff
and spouse).
92. Gorder v. Sims, 306 Minn. 275, 237 N.W.2d 67 (1975) (alienation retained); Kremer v.
Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W. 582 (1978) (criminal conversation retained); Dube v. Rochette, 11
N.H. 129, 262 A.2d 288 (1970) (alienation retained); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.
1973) (criminal conversation retained).
93. See, eg., H. CLARK, supra note 49, § 10.2; Comment, supra note 19; Note, supra note 51;
Note, supra note 81; Comment, supra note 38; Comment, Alienation ofAffection: FlourishingAnachronism, supra note 51. But see Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional
Interference with the MaritalRelationship, 48 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 426 (1972) (author advocates
elimination of criminal conversation but retention of alienation of affections with adultery as an
element).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (1984) (providing for divorce after one year's separation); see also
id. § 50-5.1 (special provision for divorce based on a spouse's insanity).
95. Id. § 50-20(c).
96. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals recently has ruled that marital fault is not a
proper consideration under section 50-20(c)(12). See Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 321
S.E.2d 161 (1984). For a discussion of Hinton, see Note, Hinton v. Hinton-EquitableDistribution
Without Considerationof MaritalFault, 63 N.C.L. REv. 1204 (1985).
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1984).
98. Id.
99. Id. § 50-16.5 (1985); see also Lemons v. Lemons, 22 N.C. App. 303, 206 S.E.2d 327 (1974)
(alimony awarded not as punishment for broken marriage, but for demonstrated need).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.6(a) (1984).
101. Id. § 50-16.5(b).
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Carolina's tort law with the state's policy of deemphasizing fault in divorce if it
had been allowed to stand. Because of the supreme court's summary reversal of
Cannon, however, actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation
are still part of the law in North Carolina. Thus, a spouse is given an acknowledgment of fault in tort that the divorce statutes deny.
Similarly, the decision could have eliminated an unfair disparity in the law
of interference with family relationships. Unlike a spouse, a child has no cause
of action against a third party who causes the alienation of a parent's affections.
In the 1949 case of Henson v. Thomas,102 the North Carolina Supreme Court
ruled that since a parent is under no legal obligation to love his or her children, a
child could not hold a third party liable for the parent's withdrawal of affections.
The court distinguished between the parent-child relationship and a marriage,
noting that a spouse's right to maintain actions for alienation and criminal conversation was recognized only because of the "common law conception of the
husband's property right in the person of his wife." 10 3 Unquestionably, the parent-child relationship is as important to society as the marital relationship. It is
illogical to allow a cause of action in one situation and to withhold it in another.
Cannon was not a subtle decision, nor was it a difficult one. The court of
appeals may have misperceived its authority to change the law, but it did not fail
to recognize the need to do so. Alienation of affections and criminal conversation originate from the need to discourage or vindicate violations of proprietary
interests that no longer exist; these actions are ill-suited to protecting the emotional interests that characterize the ideal modem marital relationship. Marriages must stand or fall according to their own strengths and weaknesses.
There is no reason for the state to provide a forum in which the estranged spouse
can bitterly assign fault for a failed marriage. Cannon, nevertheless, has been
remanded to Pitt County Superior Court for trial. There the parties will litigate
the complex questions of marital breakdown in a tort action rooted in the medieval concept that a wife is her husband's chattel. Eventually the North Carolina
Supreme Court will be able to decide Cannon or a similar case on the merits of
abolishing actions for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. When
that opportunity arises, the court of appeals' decision in Cannon should be persuasive in closing North Carolina's courts to disputes such as the one between
Haywood Cannon and Jeffrey Miller.
JAMES LEONARD

102. 231 N.C. 173, 56 S.E.2d 432 (1949).
103. Id. at 174, 56 S.E.2d at 433.

Azzolino v. Dingfelder: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Recognizes Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims
The recent development of medical processes to detect genetic defects in
unborn fetuses, I in combination with the recognition of a woman's legal right to
obtain an abortion, 2 has caused a reformulation of the physician's duty of due
care in the area of prenatal malpractice torts. Recognition of this duty has led to
for relief, most notably those termed "wrongful
the development of new claims
'4
birth ' 3 and "wrongful life."
This Note examines the development of these new tort claims and analyzes
5
the North Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Azzolino v. Dingfelder. It
concludes that the court's novel formulation of damages is potentially detrimental to those it is designed to benefit and is an unwarranted abandonment of established case law.
In October 1979 Michael Azzolino was born with a permanent genetic disorder known as Down's syndrome or mongolism. 6 Michael's mother had received prenatal care at the Haywood-Moncure Community Health Center (the
Clinic), a family health care facility operated by Orange-Chatham Comprehensive Health Services, Inc. (OCCHS). 7 During her visits to the Clinic, Mrs. Azzolino was under the care of Jean Dowdy, a registered nurse employed by the
Clinic as a family nurse practitioner, and Dr. James R. Dingfelder, a boardcertified obstetrician-gynecologist on the staff at North Carolina Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill.8 Dr. Dingfelder's duties at the Clinic included providing
prenatal care for patients and supervising the work of the family nurse
practitioners. 9

During the first trimester of her pregnancy Mrs. Azzolino asked Nurse
Dowdy about the advisability of having amniocentesis performed. 10 Nurse
1. These procedures include amniocentesis, ultrasonography, roentgenography, and fetoscopy.

See Elias & Verp, PrenatalDiagnosis of Genetic Disorders, 12 OBSTET. GYNECOL. ANN. 79 (1983).

For a discussion of amniocentesis and ultrasonography, see infra note 10.
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. For a discussion of the wrongful birth claim, see infra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the wrongful life claim, see infra notes 60-81 and accompanying text.
5. 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), disc. rev. granted, 313 N.C. 327, 327 S.E.2d 887
(1985).
6. Normal human genes have 46 chromosomes, arranged in 23 pairs. Down's syndrome is a
chromosomal abnormality caused by the presence of a third chromosome in the twenty-first pair.
Individuals afflicted with Down's syndrome suffer moderate to severe mental retardation as well as
physical abnormalities such as a small, somewhat flattened skull, a short, flat-bridged nose, and
squared hands with shortened fingers. Reduced "sensory acuity levels," especially in the ability to
smell and taste, are common, as are coordination and reflex difficulties. See DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1290 (26th ed. 1981); D. GIBSON, DowN's SYNDROME 6, 8-10
(1978).
7. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 292, 322 S.E.2d at 571.
8. Through a contractual arrangement between the University of North Carolina School of
Medicine and the Clinic, Dr. Dingfelder spent one-half day per week at the Clinic. Id.
9. Id.

10. Amniocentesis is a diagnostic procedure in which amniotic fluid (the fluid surrounding the
fetus in the womb) and fetal cells present in the fluid are aspirated with a syringe and tested for
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During a later

appointment, Mrs. Azzolino questioned Dr. Dingfelder about amniocentesis,
stating that she had heard there was a need for such testing in pregnant women
over the age of thirty-five. 12 She was thirty-six at that time and was concerned
about the risk of having a deformed child. Dr. Dingfelder informed her that

amniocentesis was not necessary for women below age thirty-seven.' 3 He did
not perform amniocentesis on Mrs. Azzolino, nor did he advise her of the existence of a genetic counseling facility in Chapel Hill. If amniocentesis had been
performed, the genetic abnormality of the fetus would have been discovered
in
4
time for Mrs. Azzolino to exercise her legal right to obtain an abortion.1
On October 13, 1981, the Azzolinos filed a medical malpractice action nam-

ing Dr. Dingfelder, Nurse Dowdy, and OCCHS as defendants.' 5 Three distinct

claims for relief, as well as a claim for punitive damages, were stated in the
complaint. In the first cause of action plaintiff parents set forth a "wrongful
birth" claim. They alleged that the individual defendants negligently had failed
to provide Mrs. Azzolino with complete and correct information with respect to

amniocentesis and the availability of genetic counseling. They further alleged
that if Mrs. Azzolino had been advised properly, she would have undergone

amniocentesis and would have discovered that her child, if born, would suffer
from Down's Syndrome. They alleged that given this knowledge Mrs. Azzolino
would have had the fetus aborted.1 6 In the second cause of action the child,
Michael Azzolino, set forth a "wrongful life" claim. He alleged that the negligence of the physician caused him to be born afflicted with Down's Syndrome
instead of being aborted while still a fetus, "thereby damaging him by virtue of
his very existence."' 17 In the final cause of action Michael's half siblings claimed

damages due to the fact that the financial and emotional hardships resulting
from having a Down's Syndrome child in the family deprived them of the full

8
measure of parental comfort, care, and society.'
Defendants filed motions to dismiss all three claims for relief stated in the
biochemical and chromosomal defects. Amniocentesis usually is performed in conjunction with an
ultrasonic examination, a procedure that allows the physician to determine the position of the fetus
within the womb, thus reducing the risk that a vital organ of the fetus will be injured when the
needle is inserted into the amniotic sac. See Elias & Verp, supra note 1, at 79-80. Amniocentesis is
the standard test performed to detect Down's syndrome and has an accuracy rate of over 99%. See
Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 424,404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979); Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 317, 322 S.E.2d
at 586.
11. Nurse Dowdy's advice apparently was based solely on her belief that the problem of genetic
defects should be left "in God's hands." Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 311, 322 S.E.2d at 582. Nurse
Dowdy's only other discussion of amniocentesis with Mrs. Azzolino was to state the potential harmful consequences of what she termed "a very dangerous procedure." Id. In fact, the increased risk
of either fetal or maternal injury produced by amniocentesis is less than one percent. See Elias and
Verp, supra note 1, at 83.
12. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 313, 322 S.E.2d at 583.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 314, 322 S.E.2d at 584.
15. Id. at 317, 322 S.E.2d at 586.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 292, 322 S.E.2d at 571.
18. Id.
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complaint. These motions were granted for the second and third claims. 19 Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages
also was allowed, 20 leaving the parents' wrongful birth claim the sole cause of

action remaining for trial. At the close of plaintiffs' presentation of evidence,
defendants successfully moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50 of the

21
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wrongful birth and its related causes of action were not recognized at com-

mon law.22 Consequently, when these claims first were asserted in the 1960s,
there was some confusion as to the terminology involved. 23 At present, the

claims for relief in prenatal malpractice cases in which the defect itself was not
caused by the defendant's negligence are divided into six categories. 24 By far the
19. Id. at 293, 322 S.E.2d at 572.
20. Id.
21. A motion for directed verdict is properly granted only if the plantiff fails to present evidence sufficient to support a favorable finding on all the essential elements of his claim for relief. In a
tort action these essential elements are duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and actual damages.
Id. at 310-11, 322 S.E.2d at 582.
That the directed verdicts were granted in favor of each defendant individually is important
because it separated the claims for appeal. An adverse finding against one defendant therefore would
not necessarily affect the others. See infra note 96.
22. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 259, 190 N.E.2d 849, 858, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1963); Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 294, 322 S.E.2d at 573.
23. The term "wrongful life" first was used in Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 259, 190
N.E.2d 849, 858, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1963). This claim would now be termed one for dissatisfied life. See infra note 24. Later courts have added to this confusion. See Robak v. United States,
658 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1981) (wrongful pregnancy referred to as wrongful birth); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 772, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375 (1975) (confusing wrongful life or
wrongful birth with wrongful pregnancy); see also W. PROssER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS
§ 55, at 370 & n.34 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) (Zepeda referred to as a wrongful life claim). For a
discussion of the distinction between wrongful birth, wrongful life, wrongful pregnancy, and dissatisfied life claims, see infra note 24.
24. The six claims are wrongful birth, wrongful life, wrongful pregnancy, unplanned life, dissatisfied life, and claims by the deformed infant's siblings. See infra text accompanying notes 25-59
(discussion of wrongful birth); infra text accompanying notes 60-81 (discussion of wrongful life).
Wrongful pregnancy is the parents' cause of action against the defendant physician for some negligent act that results in the birth of a healthy, but unplanned, child. See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976) (unsuccessful abortion); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240,
187 N.W.2d 511 (1971) (tranquilizers negligently substituted for oral contraceptives); Clegg v.
Chase, 89 Misc. 2d 510, 391 N.Y.S.2d 966 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (failed tubal ligation). Wrongful pregnancy is sometimes called wrongful conception. See Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy,33 S.C.L. REv. 759
(1982). Unplanned life is the filial counterpart to the parents' wrongful pregnancy claim. These two
claims generally are joined. See Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpracticein
Genetic Counseling and PrenatalTesting, 33 S.C.L. REv. 713, 718-20 (1982). Dissatisfied life is the
claim brought by an illegitimate child against his father, claiming injury by virtue of his status as an
illegitimate child. See Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1963); Williams v. State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 223 N.E.2d 343, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
The courts of at least five jurisdictions have faced claims brought by the siblings of an unplanned child, alleging damages to the extent that the new child diminished their share of parental
society, care, and financial support. This claim could be termed an "unplanned sibling" claim. See
White v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 146 (D. Kan. 1981); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del.
1975); Aronoff v. Snider, 292 So. 2d 418 (Fla. App. 1974); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.
App. 1982); Sala v. Tomlinson, 73 A.D.2d 724, 422 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1979); Cox v. Stretton, 77 Misc.
2d 155, 352 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1974). In Azzolino the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected a
similar claim by the siblings of a deformed child. See Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 306, 322 S.E.2d at
578-79. No court has recognized a cause of action for either the dissatisfied life or unplanned sibling
claims. See Rogers, supra, at 729 & n. 119 (dissatisfied life claims successful); Azzolino, 71 N.C. App.
at 303-04, 322 S.E.2d at 578 (unplanned sibling claims unsuccessful).
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most important of these claims are those for wrongful birth and wrongful life.
Wrongful birth is a claim for relief brought by the parents of a child born
with genetic defects25 or other abnormalities 26 discoverable during the first trimester of pregnancy. 2 7 A negligent act of the mother's doctor 28 is alleged to
have caused this defect to go undiscovered until after the birth of the child. The

plaintiff parents claim that but for the negligence of the doctor, they would have
obtained a legal abortion and avoided the burdens of caring for a deformed

child. Although not a traditional cause of action, wrongful birth fits into the
traditional tort framework29 as a medical malpractice claim.
The first case to address a wrongful birth claim squarely was Gleitman v.
Cosgrove,30 a 1967 New Jersey Supreme Court decision. In Gleitman defendant

doctor negligently made the erroneous statement that the mother's contraction
of German measles during pregnancy would not harm the fetus. Full information on the risk of German measles was within the professional knowledge of

defendant's speciality. 31 The mother alleged that she might have secured an
abortion had she been aware of the risk of birth defects resulting from her condition.32 Plaintiff parents sought damages for the mental anguish and severe fi25. Examples of parental suits for undiscovered genetic defects include Phillips v. United
States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1980) (Down's syndrome); Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ.
Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (ray-Sachs disease); Call v. Kazirian, 135 Cal. App. 2d
189, 185 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1982) (Down's syndrome); Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834
(1981) (cystic fibrosis); Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421,404 A.2d 8 (1979) (Down's syndrome); Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (Down's syndrome); Park v.
Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977) (polycystic kidney disease), aff'd sub nom. Becker
v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71
N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984) (Down's syndrome); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290
S.E.2d 825 (1982) (Tay-Sachs disease).
26. Most nonhereditary fetal defects are caused by a disease contracted or a drug taken by the
woman during pregnancy. The most common defect-producing disease is rubella, or German measles. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich.
App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). Although often filed as products liability
claims, suits based on defects produced by the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) can be viewed as wrongful life claims. As in all wrongful life claims, if the defendant had not performed the negligent act
complained of-distributing a dangerous drug designed to prevent miscarriage-the plaintiff child
probably would not have been born. A leading case in this area is Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 558, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1981). See
Abrahams & Musgrove, The DES Labyrinth, 33 S.C.L. REv. 663 (1982).
27. The timing of the defect's discoverability is important because it determines the availability
of an abortion to terminate the pregnancy. Since a woman has an absolute right to obtain an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy, the birth of an infant suffering from a defect discoverable
during the first trimester is due to the choice of the child's mother, or to the negligence of the
mother's physician. See infra note 77.
28. To support a claim for relief, the negligent act or omission could have been the fault of the
doctor, a nurse, a lab technician, or some other provider of prenatal health care. This negligence
could have taken several forms. See infra text accompanying notes 43-48.
29. The elements of a tort claim are the presence of a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, a breach of that duty, a close causal relationship between the breach of duty and the injury
to the plaintiff, and actual injury or damages suffered by the plaintiff. Lowery v. Newton, 52 N.C.
App. 234, 237, 278 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1981); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 30, at 16465.
30. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
31. Id. at 25-26, 227 A.2d at 690-91.
32. Id. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691. This allegation by the mother might have given defendant a
strong defense. By claiming that but for defendant's assurances she "might" have had an abortion,
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nancial burdens associated with raising a deformed child.
The court denied recovery on three grounds. First, it stated that the parents' claim did not demonstrate the essential element of proximate cause; 34 because the child's defect resulted from the disease contracted by his mother and
not from any act of defendant, the court concluded that causation could not be
shown. The court noted that the result would have been different if plaintiff
parents had shown an "act or omission which result[ed] in impairment to what
otherwise would [have been] a normal, healthy child."'35 Second, the court
stated that even if the parents had been informed of the possible risks to the
fetus, their only alternative to having the child was abortion, a procedure subject
to criminal sanction in New Jersey. 36 Since the doctor could not have been
negligent in refusing to perform a criminal abortion, he could not have been
negligent in failing to advise the parents to consider such an abortion.
Third, the court reasoned that had the parents been able to obtain an abortion lawfully, their claim would fail for lack of ascertainable damages. 37 Damages in a tort action are compensatory and are "measured by comparing the
condition plaintiff would have been in had the defendants not been negligent,
with plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the negligence." 38s In a wrongful birth claim the parents allege that but for the negligence of the mother's
doctor, their deformed child would not have been born. This claim would require the court to assign a value to the "intangible, unmeasurable, and complex"' 39 benefits of parenthood that plaintiff parents would not have experienced
had they obtained an abortion, and to compare this value with the alleged burdens incurred in raising a child with birth defects. For the parents to state a
recognizable injury, the burden of parenthood must outweigh the benefits. The
40
court believed that such a determination was impossible.

A major portion of the court's reasoning in Gleitman was invalidated by the
landmark abortion decision Roe v. Wade.41 In ruling that a state has no legitimate interest in prohibiting abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy, 4 2
the Supreme Court not only effectively nullified the "inherent sanctity of life"
argument, but also eliminated the causation problem. Because a woman's right
to have an abortion is a fundamental right, the decision implied that liability can
plaintiff mother made proof of causation difficult. The implication of her statement is that she might
not have elected to obtain an abortion. Later plaintiffs have avoided this problem by alleging that
but for the negligence of the defendant, an abortion "would" have been obtained. See, eg., Azzolino,
71 N.C. App. at 292, 322 S.E2d at 571.
33. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 26, 227 A.2d at 691.
34. Id. at 28, 227 A.2d at 692.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 31, 227 A.2d at 693-94. The court's claim in Geitman is premised on the idea of the
inherent sanctity of human life, an idea also noted in In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
37. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 29-30, 227 A.2d at 693.
38. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 692.
39. Id. at 29, 227 A.2d at 693.
40. Id.
41.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

42. Id. at 164.
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attach to all acts or omissions that abridge that right. The failure to inform a
woman of special conditions that might produce a deformed infant would operate to discourage her from making an informed decision as to whether to exercise her right to obtain an abortion. Therefore, a woman's doctor has a duty to
inform her of such high risk conditions. This duty would be breached if the
doctor (1) failed to inform the woman that a diagnostic procedure existed, 43 (2)
failed to inform the woman of a high-risk condition for which no diagnostic
testing was available, 44 (3) informed the woman of the diagnostic test but negligently failed to perform the test,4 5 (4) informed the woman of the diagnostic test
but negligently advised her not to undergo the test,46 (5) performed the diagnostic test in a negligent manner, obtaining an incorrect result, 47 or (6) performed
the diagnostic test but failed to inform the woman of the test results. 48 Any of
these failures would deprive the woman of information essential to an informed
decision as to whether to obtain an abortion, thus proximately causing the birth
of the deformed infant.
The problem of unprovable damages noted in Gleitman still exists even in
the wake of Roe, but it apparently has caused few problems for the courts. This
development may be reflective of the trend toward allowing recovery of damages
for purely psychic injuries begun with Dillon v. Legg4 9 in 1968. The increased
certainty with which psychiatrists have been able to measure mental anguish is
considered to be a major factor in allowing recovery for damages once thought
50
too speculative to be proved.
Most of the wrongful birth cases decided since Roe have tended to accept
wrongful birth as a variety of the traditional negligence action.51 As in all medical malpractice claims, the physician's duty of due care is created by virtue of his
professional relationship with the patient.5 2 The defendant's conduct in comparison to the accepted standard of professional behavior determines whether
that duty has been breached. Other jurisdictions also employ an objective standards test, frequently couched in terms of the customary community standards
43. See Karsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977).
44. See Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981).
45. There appears to be no reported case illustrating this type of negligent behavior. Imposing
liability in this instance would be consistent with the general pattern of imposing liability for failure
to present a pregnant woman with information relevant to her consideration of obtaining an abortion. See infra notes 75-77 & 86-87 and accompanying text.
46. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984).
47. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
48. Although there is no reported authority illustrating this type of negligent behavior, imposing liability would be logically consistent with cases imposing liability for failure to present a pregnant woman with information relevant to her decision to either obtain an abortion or give birth. See
infra notes 75-77 & 86-87 and accompanying text.
49. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
50. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 54, at 361-62.
51. See, eg., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478
A.2d 755 (1984); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983).
52. See Byrd, The North Carolina Medical Malpractice Statute, 62 N.C.L. REV. 711, 713
(1984).
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for behavior. 53 As noted above,54 interference with the woman's right to obtain
an abortion is sufficient to establish proximate cause. The only substantial area
of disagreement among jurisdictions that have considered wrongful birth claims
has been the question of the proper measure of damages.
Damage awards in wrongful birth cases can be divided into four categories.
First, the court can award parents all the costs they will have to bear as a result
of the defendant's negligent act. These costs would include the normal expenses
of raising an ordinary child, the extraordinary expenses to be incurred for the
care and treatment of an impaired child, and the mental anguish suffered by the
parents as a consequence of caring for their deformed child. 55 Second, the court
can approach the issue of causation in a slightly broader fashion. Instead of

focusing solely on the fact that but for the defendant's negligent act this particular deformed child would not have been born, courts can consider the expectations of the plaintiffs. Some courts have reasoned that since the plaintiffs in a
wrongful birth suit intended to become parents, they also must have intended to
bear the ordinary expenses of their child. The normal expenses of raising a
child, therefore, are deducted from any award for damages. Thus, only the parents' mental anguish and the extraordinary expenses involved in raising an im56
paired child will be awarded.
Third, some courts allow the plaintiff parents to recover only for the ex53. See State v. Ulin, 113 Ariz. 141, 143, 548 P.2d 19, 21 (1976) ("recognized standards of good
medical practice in the community"); Hickman v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 311 So. 2d 778, 779
(Fla. 1975) (to be liable doctor must act "clearly against the course recognized as correct by his
profession"); Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 925, 237 N.W. 444, 449 (1931) ("usual and customary practice among physicians and surgeons in the same or similar localities"); Goheen v. Graher, 181 Kan. 107, 111-12, 309 P.2d 636, 637 (1957) ("reasonable degree of learning and skill
ordinarily possessed by members of his profession. . . in the community where he practices or
similar communities"); Cervantes v. Forbis, 73 N.M. 445, 448, 389 P.2d 210, 213 (1964) ("recognized standards of medical practice in the community"); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 78 Wash.
2d 460, 467, 656 P.2d 483, 489 (1983) ("degree of skill expected of the average. . . practitioner, in
the class to which defendant belongs").
54. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
55. Only one court has adopted this formulation of damages in a wrongful birth action. See
Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying Alabama law). An offset for the
normal costs of child care is a sounder rule for the reasons stated in the text accompanying note 56.
The Robak rule is better suited to wrongful pregnancy claims since in those cases no child was
expected or desired by the plaintiff parents. About half of the courts faced with wrongful pregnancy
claims have allowed damages consistent with Robak. The others have disallowed recovery for normal expenses of child raising because of the "offsetting benefit" rule. The different approaches to this
problem and the courts that have adopted each position are noted in Hartke v. McKelway, 526 F.
Supp. 97, 104 (D.D.C. 1981). For a discussion of the "offsetting benefit" rule, see infra note 56.
56. See Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d 483 (1983). The parents' mental anguish is a compensable
injury because there is a general public policy "to compensate parents not only for pecuniary loss but
also for emotional injury." Id. at 475, 656 P.2d at 493.
The Eisbrennercourt used RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) to justify deducting from damages the normal expenses of raising a child. Section 920 states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property
and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was
harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to the
extent that this is equitable.
The court concluded that the various benefits of parenthood would offset at least part of any award
for the parents' mental anguish. Eisbrenner,106 Mich. App. at 367-68, 308 N.W.2d at 214.
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traordinary expenses involved in raising the deformed childA 7 Although they
accept the idea of offsetting the award by the normal costs of raising a child,

they will not recognize an award for the parents' mental anguish. These jurisdictions believe that mental anguish damages are not sufficiently ascertainable.
Last, some courts have awarded damages only for the mental anguish of the

parents, with no compensation given for the costs of raising a child. At least
three different rationales have been offered in support of such an award.5 8 The
extraordinary medical and educational expenses of the impaired child are so

clearly a proper subject of recovery, however, that no jurisdiction which recognizes the wrongful life cause of action denies that additional recovery. 5 9

The other major cause of action in the area of prenatal malpractice torts is
the wrongful life claim. Unlike wrongful birth, in which the parents sue directly
as plaintiffs, a wrongful life action is brought in the name of the impaired child.
This difference has made most courts, including those that recognize an action
for wrongful birth, unwilling to accept wrongful life claims.6° Analysis of the
four elements of a traditional tort claim as applied to wrongful life cases highlights several different criticisms of the claim.
First, the very nature of the claim has caused some courts to decide that it
is not a traditional tort. In a wrongful life claim, the plaintiff child alleges that
the defendant physician negligently permitted the child to be born, thereby causing the child to suffer life with a permanent disability. The child's very existence
is alleged to constitute its injury. Given the high value society places on human
57. See Moore v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1981); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401,
386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer
v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975). The reluctance of these states to
award damages for mental anguish is not limited to wrongful birth cases. In the area of bystander
tort, in which a witness to a tort committed against a third person recovers for mental anguish, the
leading case allowing recovery, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72
(1968), had not been followed by any of the four states in question at the time the above noted cases
were decided. The Dillon rule since has been adopted in Texas. See Landrith v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
58. See Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 57 A.D.2d 73,
394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1977); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), disc.
rev. granted, 313 N.C. 327, 327 S.E.2d 887 (1985). In Berman the court considered the complete
educational expenses of the child without isolating the additional costs of educating an impaired
child. It held that "such an award would be wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved, and
. . . would. . . constitute a windfall to the parents." Berman, 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
Although the Karlsons court stated that an award for mental anguish would be proper, it does not
seem to have considered an award for the child's expenses. Karlsons, 57 A.D.2d at 78-79, 394
N.Y.S.2d at 936-37. In Azzolino the court concluded that "the unusual nature of the wrongful life
and wrongful birth actions" required that only the child be allowed to recover for these extraordinary expenses. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
59. The New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the parents to recover extraordinary child support
expenses in Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 432 A.2d 834 (1981). The New York Court of Appeals
allowed similar recovery in Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895
(1978). The court of appeals inAzzolino also permitted the child to sue for these expenses. Azzolino,
71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
60. See, ag., Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Gildiner v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357,
308 N.W.2d 209 (1981); Park v. Chessin, 60 A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977), aff'd sub nonm.
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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62
life61 and the lack of any common-law precedent for wrongful life claims,
some courts have concluded that no legally recognized wrong has been
committed.
Second, Roe v. Wade,63 the decision that provided the rationale for the
parents' wrongful birth claim, also has created an impediment to the recognition
of wrongful life actions. In Roe the Court held that a fetus was not protected by
the fourteenth amendment because a fetus is not a person. 64 It therefore can be
argued that the physician owes no duty to the fetus, since a duty is defined as
"that [obligation] which a person owes to another." 65 Without the essential element of duty, the plaintiff can not maintain a negligence action. Prior to Roe,
probably because the fetus was treated
the "no duty" argument was not raised,
66
statutes.
abortion
state
in
as a person
67
Third, some courts have held the plaintiff child unable to prove causation.
The child's defect was not actually produced by the defendant's negligent act,
but by some external factor such as disease or a genetic trait present in the
child's mother. These courts, therefore, are unwilling to impose liability on a
physician for a condition he did not "cause." The physician "caused" the
child's deformity only in the sense that he prevented the child's destruction as a
fetus. 68 The idea that such destruction is a reasonable alternative to life-however tortured-is rejected by these courts.
Last, by far the most troublesome aspect of a wrongful life claim is assigning a value to the alleged damages. The traditional tort damage awardplacing the injured party in the position he would have occupied "but for" the
acts of the defendant-is inapplicable. If the defendant had not acted in a negligent manner, the plaintiff would not have been born. To determine damages the
court must compare the current position of the plaintiff-living with a permanent impairment-with the position the plaintiff would have been in had the
defendant not been negligent-aborted while still a fetus. This determination
necessarily requires the court to place a value on "the utter void of nonexistence" 69 and has caused some 70courts to rule that wrongful birth claims fail for
lack of ascertainable damages.
Not all courts have found these difficulties insurmountable. The highest

61. See supra note 36.
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. Id. at 158.
65. BLACK'S LAW DIcIONARY 453 (5th ed. 1979).

66. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 n.55. The Court noted certain inconsistencies with this argument.
Id. at 157-58 n.54.
67. See Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Berman v.
Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Trex. 1975).
68. But cf notes 42-48 and accompanying text (a woman has a fundamental right to obtain an
abortion).
69. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 28, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (1967).
70. See Smith v. United States, 392 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49
N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d
895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (rex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 59 Wis.
2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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courts of three states have recognized wrongful life as an example of the tradi-

tional medical malpractice claim. 7 1 Various theories have been used to overcome each of the objections previously raised against wrongful life claims.
Two theories have been proposed in support of the existence of a duty owed

by the woman's doctor to her unborn fetus. A major argument against the findig of such a duty can be negated if the fetus is assumed to be a person. Despite
72
the Roe holding, a fetus is recognized as a legal person for several purposes,

including the well-established proposition that an infant can recover damages
for other prenatal torts. 73 There is no reason this rule should not apply in
wrongful life cases. Second, even if the fetus is not recognized as a person, the
duty owed to its mother would extend to it as well. This idea is taken from
section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.74 The physician's duty is not
to prevent the birth of an impaired child but rather to inform the parents so that
they can make an intelligent decision as to "whether life is best for the child." 7 5
Determining whether there has been a breach of duty is a question of fact to
be addressed at trial.7 6 The threshold determination in wrongful life cases is
whether the child's defect was such that a reasonable physician would have
known of its presence by the end of the first trimester. 7 7 Failure to perform
diagnostic tests that would have discovered the impairment is a breach of the
duty of due care.
71. See Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982); Procanik v.
Cilo,97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P.2d
483 (1983).
72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62 (1973). These rights, however, are contingent upon
the live birth of the child. See infra note 73.
73. The right of a child to sue for prenatal injuries first was recognized in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65
F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). All jurisdictions now permit a child to recover for prenatal injuries
produced by a direct act of the defendant, but only if the child is born alive. See W. PRossER & W.
KEETON, supra note 23, § 55, at 368. If a plaintiff chooses to bring a wrongful life claim under this
theory, the threshold requirement of live birth will, by definition, always be satisfied.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965) provides:
Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of Physical Harm
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical
harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information,
where such harm results
(a) to the other
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
Comment b to this section is particularly illustrative of the wrongful life action. It provides that
it is as much a part of the professional duty of a physician to give correct information as to
the character of the disease from which his patient is suffering, where such knowledge is
necessary to the safety of the patient or others, as it is to make a correct diagnosis or to
prescribe the appropriate medicine.
Id. comment b.
75. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 298, 322 S.E.2d at 574.
76. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 23, § 37, at 237.
77. Since Roe v. Wade a pregnant woman has had an absolute right to obtain an abortion in the
first trimester of pregnancy. If the defect in the fetus is not discoverable until after the first trimester,
the physician cannot be held liable for negligence, since nothing he could have done would have
provided the woman with more complete information as to the desirability of an abortion. Liability
will attach in cases of a defect that the physician negligently fails to discover during the first trimester because at that time the woman could have pursued abortion as an alternative to allowing the
birth of the child.
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The element of causation, once considered unprovable in wrongful life

cases, 78 no longer is considered a major obstacle. The defendant's argument
that the mother's condition is the actual cause of the child's injury, although
literally true, does not reach the essence of the complaint. The plaintiffs do not
claim that the physician produced the genetic condition in the child's mother.
Nor do they argue that the defect in the fetus was produced by some negligent
act of the defendant. Instead, they allege that the defendant's acts precluded any
parental decision to abort the fetus 79 and that this negligence caused the birth of
a deformed infant whose very life constitutes injury.
Determining the proper measure of damages has been difficult for the

courts that have recognized the wrongful life claim. By claiming that his injury
results from the very fact of life itself, the child is claiming, in effect, that not

having been born would have been preferable to living with a deformity. This
claim for the general damages resulting from life with a deformity has never
been recognized. 80 Some courts, however, have allowed the child's claim for the
extraordinary expenses for education, medical treatment, and special care neces-

sitated by his impairment.8" Such special damages are both compensatory in
nature and sufficiently ascertainable to be awarded without undue speculation.
Azzolino v. Dingfelder82 presented the first opportunity for a North Carolina court to evaluate the wrongful life, wrongful birth, and unplanned sibling
claims. 83 Following a review of the purposes and functions of the motion to
dismiss, 8 4 the court considered Michael Azzolino's wrongful life claim in light
of the essential elements of a traditional negligence action. First, the court determined that the defendants owed Michael a duty. This duty arose not only
from an extension of defendants' duty to Michael's mother, but also from

Miechael's independent right to damages for other prenatal torts. Thus, both
rationales used by other jurisdictions to establish a duty to the child were
78. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
79. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 306, 322 S.E.2d at 580.
80. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON , supra note 23, § 55, at 371.
81. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348
(1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 351, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
98 Wash. 2d 460, 479, 656 P.2d 483, 495 (1983). For examples of other attempts to develop a
formula for measuring damages in prenatal torts cases, see Note, Park v. Chessin: The Continuing
Judicial Development of the Theory of "Wrongful Life," 4 AM. J. LAW & MED. 211 (1979); Note, A
Cause of Action for "Wrongful Life" [A Suggested Analysis], 55 MINN.L. REv.58 (1970).
82. 71 N.C. App. 289, 322 S.E.2d 567 (1984), disc rev. granted, 313 N.C. 327, 327 S.E.2d 887
(1985).
83. Prior to discussing the merits of the allegations, the court had to decide whether a timely
appeal had been filed by Michael. Defendants claimed that Michael's right to appeal was forfeited
because it was not exercised within 10 days of the granting of the motion to dismiss. The court ruled
that while an appeal could have been made at that time, it was only necessary after the granting of
the directed verdict against the parents' claims. The directed verdict marked the date of final judgment because the claims of Michael and his parents were not separate and distinct. Id. at 294, 322
S.E.2d at 572.
84. The court noted that the sole function of the motion to dismiss is to test the complaint for
legal sufficiency, compelling the trial court to treat the allegations of the challenged pleading as true.
The motion should not be granted unless "the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim that would entitle him to relief." Id. at 295, 322 S.E.2d at 573.
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85
adopted by the court.

Second, the court considered the question whether this duty had been
breached. Because defendants' duty to the mother required disclosure of "mate-

rial information about genetic risk," failure to disclose such information evidenced a breach of the duty of due care.8 6 The lack of this information

effectively precluded the rational exercise of the mother's right to obtain an
abortion. Interference with this right established the third essential element of
the claim, proximate cause. 87 The evidence of causation was particulary strong
88
in this case.
Last, the court considered the joint questions of actual injury and appropriate damages.8 9 Like all other jurisdictions that have considered the matter, the
court concluded that the claim for general damages was speculative. 90 The
court, however, also determined that Michael's claim for special damages was
cognizable at law. These special expenses include "the extraordinary costs of
special treatment, teaching, care, medical services, aid and assistance [required]
for the child because of his impairment." 9 1 Unlike the other jurisdictions that
allow both the wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, the court in Azzolino
92
ruled that these special damages could be recovered only by the child.
The court next considered what might be called the "unplanned sibling"
claim. The court noted that five other jurisdictions had considered and disallowed similar claims. 93 Fatal flaws were noted in each of the three theories
plaintiffs used to justify their claim. 94 The court concluded that "there is no
'95
basis in law or logic for such an action."
Finally, the court considered the parental claim of wrongful birth.
Favorable resolution of the wrongful life claim virtually predetermined the outcome of the wrongful birth claim. 96 The elements of duty, breach, and proxi85. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
86. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 297, 322 S.E.2d at 574.
87. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
88. Mrs. Azzolino testified that "if she had been told there was a 50% chance of injury to the
fetus occurring and a one in 2,000 chance of having a child with Down's Syndrome, she still would
have had amniocentesis." Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 317, 322 S.E.2d at 586. Evidence also was
presented to demonstrate that Mrs. Azzolino had obtained abortions on two earlier occasions. The
evidence supported her contention that she would have had an abortion in this instance if the risks
had been explained to her. Id.
89. Id. at 299, 322 S.E.2d at 576.
90. Id. at 300, 322 S.E.2d at 576. See supra text accompanying note 80.
91. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 301, 322 S.E.2d at 576.
92. The other jurisdictions to allow this claim permit either the child or the parents to recover
the special damages. See supra note 71.
93. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 303, 322 S.E.2d at 578; see supra note 24.
94. First, the court rejected the negligence theory because the doctor owed no duty to the
deformed child's siblings. Second, a claim based on nuisance theories was ruled to be applicable only
in instances of unreasonable interference with a real property right. Last, the court ruled that a
claim based on the loss of parental consortium is not recognized in North Carolina. Azzolino, 71
N.C. App. at 304-06, 322 S.E.2d at 578-79.
95. Id. at 304, 322 S.E.2d at 578.
96. The court's ruling in plaintiffs' favor on the wrongful birth and wrongful life claims was
based solely on the evidence of Doctor Dingfelder's negligence. Because he treated Mrs. Azzolino
within the scope of his employment at the Clinic, the doctrine of respondeat superior could have
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mate cause found to exist in the child's cause of action are all derived from the
initial duty owed by the physician to the mother. A few distinctions, however,
merit attention. First, North Carolina has adopted a statute pertaining to the
standard of care applicable to medical malpractice actions. 97 A key provision of

this statute is that liability will not exist unless the physician's act was "not in
accordance with the standards of practice among members of the same health

care profession.

.

situated in the same or similar communities ...

."98

The

enactment of the "same or similar community" rule "presumably reflects the

belief, based in large part on the well-worn distinction between the country doctor and the big city doctor, that the quality of medical practice differs with the
character of communities and that the standard of care, to be fair, must reflect
this difference." 9 9 In Azzolino defendant physician sought to use this rule to
limit his duty of care to the performance of the services the Clinic could have
been expected to provide. 1° ° The court was not persuaded by this argument,
and held defendant to the standard of care exercised at North Carolina Memo-

rial Hospital. 10 1
Second, the court justified its recognition of the wrongful birth claim with

reference to its earlier recognition of the wrongful pregnancy claim.10 2
Although the court did not articulate its reasoning on this point, one possible
argument is obvious. If damages are to be awarded in wrongful pregnancy cases
for the birth of a healthy but unwanted child, it seems inequitable not to afford

similar relief to the parents of a child born with a serious deformity. Third, the
court recognized the public policy of holding negligent individuals liable for the

consequences of their actions.103
Last, the court once again was faced with the question of the appropriate

measure of damages. After reviewing the approaches taken by other jurisdicsupported a finding against OCCHS. The court of appeals therefore ruled that the directed verdicts
in favor of the clinic and OCCHS were erroneously granted. Id. at 318-19, 322 S.E.2d at 586-87.
The directed verdict in favor of Jean Dowdy was upheld because plaintiffs were unable to establish
the essential element of proximate cause. Id. at 312, 322 S.E.2d at 583.
97. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-21.11 to -21.14 (1981).
98. Id. § 90-21.12; see Byrd, supra note 52, at 723.
99. Byrd, supra note 52, at 713. The Azzolino court quoted and relied on this passage. See
Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 315, 322 S.E.2d at 585.
100. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 315, 322 S.E.2d at 585.
101. Id. The use of North Carolina Memorial Hospital (NCMH) as the relevant community
was important for finding a breach of duty. Testimony of other physicians practicing at NCMH
indicated that while genetic testing would be recommended for women age 37 and over, such testing
would be performed on younger women if they showed "high concern" about genetic defects of the
fetus. "High concern" was defined as "sufficient concern to have talked to their obstetrician or
someone. . . ." Id. at 315, 322 S.E.2d at 584-85. Doctor Dingfelder apparently believed that the
other physicians at the Clinic would have performed amniocentesis only on women over age 37. Not
performing amniocentesis on Mrs. Azzolino therefore would have been in accordance with the accepted practice at the Clinic, though it may have been negligent for someone practicing in the
NCMH community. Id. at 315-16, 322 S.E.2d at 585.
102. See Jackson v. Bumgardner, 71 N.C. App. 107, 321 S.E.2d 541 (1984), disc. rev. granted,
312 N.C. 797, 325 S.E.2d 486 (1985) (arguments heard April 8, 1985); Pierce v. Piver, 45 N.C. App.
111, 262 S.E.2d 320, appealdismissed, 300 N.C. 375 (1980) (The decision dismissing the appeal was
not included in the Southeastern Reporter.).
103. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 307-08, 322 S.E.2d at 580.
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tions, 1° 4 the court decided that an award for the complete cost of raising the
child would be "wholly disproportionate to the culpability involved and would
place an unreasonable financial burden on health care providers." 10 5 The court
also noted that an award for punitive damages would be inappropriate. 10 6 Having earlier decided to allow only the child to maintain an action for extraordinary support expenses, the court ruled that the parents could recover damages
"only for the mental anguish which they have endured and will continue to
endure as a result of the birth of the impaired child."10 7 This division of damages marks a change from the established law of this state and may be detrimental to the interests of those persons it is designed to protect.
It is a settled rule in North Carolina and other states that the tortious action of a third party which produces injury to a minor child creates two distinct
claims for relief. These claims are:
(1) the right of the child to recover for his mental and physical pain
and suffering, and the impairment of earning capacity after attaining
majority; and (2) the right of the parent to recover for loss of services
of the child during minority, and other pecuniary expenses incurred or
likely to be incurred by the parent as a consequence of the injury, including expenses of medical treatment.108
If wrongful birth and wrongful life claims are recognized as essentially similar to accepted traditional torts, the traditional damages rules should not be
summarily discarded. As noted above, the child's claim for general damages has
been rejected uniformly as not susceptible to nonspeculative proof.10 9 This conclusion leaves only the parents' claim for the extraordinary expenses of raising
an impaired child.11 0 These damages traditionally have been recoverable by the
parents as an incident of their duty to provide for the support of their child. The
court noted in Azzolino that "it is the child who suffers if the money is not there
to pay for the care that he needs.""' Apparently believing that this situation
was unusual, the court held these special damages recoverable only by the child.
Although it is true that a child born with a deformity would suffer if the proper
care were not provided, the same could be said about a child who was born
healthy but became impaired shortly after birth as the result of a defendant's
conduct. Even if unusual circumstances qualify the child's action for special
damages, there is no reason to deny the parents' traditional claim. Allowing
either the parents or the child to bring an action for extraordinary support expenses would bring North Carolina into agreement with the other jurisdictions
12
that have recognized both the wrongful life and wrongful birth claims.'
104. Id. at 308, 322 S.E.2d at 581; see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
105. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 309, 322 S.E.2d at 581.
106. Id. at 320, 322 S.E.2d at 587-88.
107. Id. at 309, 322 S.E.2d at 581.
108. 3 R. LEE, N.C. FAMmY LAW § 241, at 218 (4th ed. 1981).
109. See supra text accompanying note 80.
110. Although not a traditional element of damages, the modem trend is to allow recovery for
the parents' mental anguish. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
111. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
112. See supra note 71 (list of cases from these jurisdictions).
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Several policy considerations support the majority rule recognizing the parental claim for extraordinary support expenses of a child born with a deformity.

First, the recognition of this parental claim is evidence of the high value society
places on the family unit. Taking the right to sue for the child's injuries away
from the parents only lessens the esteem accorded the family relationship. The
court's refusal to allow the parents to recover extraordinary support expenses is
tantamount to claiming that the special relationships within the family are no
113
longer worthy of protection.
Second, the parents' duty to provide care and support for their children
long has been recognized in this State. 114 This duty has been cited as a major
reason for allowing the parents' claim for damages." 5 Nothing in the Azzolino
opinion suggests that this traditional duty has changed. There is, therefore, no
reason to abandon such a fundamental rule of damage recovery.

As an alternative to the traditional rule of parental recovery, the court in

116
Azzolino proposed creation of a guardianship for the benefit of the child.

Guardianships often are formed when a child obtains a large sum of money or
other valuable property. 17 Although this form of fiduciary relationship has the
advantage of ensuring the existence of the funds necessary for the care of the
child, several potential drawbacks should be noted. First, the formalities of a

fiduciary relationship can transform even simple transactions, such as the payment of the child's expenses and the sale of investment securities, into cumber-

some procedures."

8

Second, such proceedings can be expensive. Annual

accountings must be filed with the court. The costs of preparing such records, as
well as the fiduciary's commission, are payable from the ward's property. 119
These requirements diminish the amount of money available for the child's sup-

port. Last, although the opinion is unclear, there is some doubt whether the
parents could qualify as the child's guardians. If the court were not troubled by
the parents' inability to handle the damage award in a prudent manner, the
113. Among the damages traditionally recoverable following injury to an unemancipated minor
child is the value of the services and earnings of the child lost due to the injury. Such recovery
follows from an interference with a unique parental right. See 3 R. LEE, supra note 108, § 241, at
220. Recovery by a third-party guardian, see infra text accompanying note 116, is inconsistent with
this traditional obligation.
114. See Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 167 N.C. 55, 59-60, 83 S.E. 12, 14 (1914).
115. See 3 R. LEE, supra note 108, § 241, at 221.
116. Azzolino, 71 N.C. App. at 302, 322 S.E.2d at 577.
117. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 17, at 37 (5th ed. 1973).
118. A guardian, like a trustee, is a fiduciary with certain powers and duties prescribed by
statute.
The powers of a guardian are ordinarily narrower than those of a trustee. . . . In many
states a guardian can make no investment without the authority of the court which appointed him, nor can he without such authority sell land of his ward. The authority of a
guardian does not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the court which appointed him ....
I A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUsTS § 7, at 73 (3d ed. 1967).
In North Carolina, payment of support costs from the ward's property is subject to the formalities specified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-6 (1984). The special proceedings involved in the sale of
property are outlined in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-31, -33 (1984). The guardian's power of investment
is defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 36A-1, -2 (1984).
119. The annual accounting procedure is set forth in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-39 (1984). The
guardian's commission is provided for in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 33-43 (1984).
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guardianship itself would not be necessary. These doubts also could disqualify
the parents as guardians. There is judicial precedent for disallowing parents as
guardians on the grounds that the interests of the two relationships are naturally
inconsistent. 120 These criticisms are not intended to suggest that the use of a
guardianship is necessarily improper, or that it would be improper in this instance. Indeed, special circumstances may merit the creation of a fiduciary relationship.1 21 This criticism of the court's decision in Azzolino, however, is
directed to the general rule that a guardianship is requiredin wrongful life cases.
A more logical rule would allow the trial judge, the authority most familiar with
the special circumstances of each case, to use his discretion in ordering the creation of a guardianship. 122
In a case of first impression, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has chosen to recognize claims for relief based on wrongful birth and wrongful life. This
enlightened holding brings the state in line with the progressive jurisdictions that
have considered these claims. Despite its assertion that wrongful birth and
wrongful life are forms of the traditional medical malpractice claim the court
adopted a nontraditional and insupportable formulation of damages. Action
should be taken on appeal to allow the parents to recover in their own names the
extraordinary support costs attributable to their impaired child.
DOUGLAS EDWARD PECK

120. See White v. Osborne, 251 N.C. 56, 110 S.E.2d 449 (1959).
121. One such circumstance would be the parents' inability to manage large sums of money.
Another factor would be uncertainty as to the collection of the entire judgment. This latter factor
was the rationale used to require the appointment of a nonparental guardian in White v. Osborne,
251 N.C. 56, 59-60, 110 S.E.2d 449, 451-52 (1959).
122. The trial judge could use his discretionary power to supervise the creation of a private
support trust managed by a professional trustee, such as a bank. A private trust, properly administered, vould provide the same security as a guardianship, but reduced judicial overview would result
in substantial savings in administrative costs. See Fratcher, Powers andDuties ofGuardiansof Property, 45 IowA L. REv. 264, 334 (1960).

